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The aim of this dissertation 
The term 'insider trading' is understood, in a legal sense and as an 
economic phenomenon, to .mean situations where a person buys or sells 
securities when he possesses important information which affects or is 
likely to affect the value of those securities.'The~~ transactions are set apart 
from normal dealings because the other parties involved do not possess this 
same information. 
Insider trading need not be limited to exchange markets, but can occur in 
almost any form of bargaining where there is an unequal distribution of 
information between the parties involved. The dealing in securities can take 
place at arm's length, even in shares that are usually quoted on the 'stock 
market. There' could also be dealings in commodities or land1, all 
transactions in which one of the parties is in possession of non-public 
information2, and therefore has an advantage over the other party 
concerned. Although these transactions. may have certain phenomena in 
common with insider trading on stock exchanges, this dissertation will 
examine only the latter because of its economic background. 
One of the differences between the different kinds of transactions is that, 
whereas in face-to-face dealings an investor is exposed to certain risk 
factors related to these transactions, in stock markets he is able to diversify 
1 See one of the most celebrated US - insider cases, SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Company, 258 F _Supp 262 (SDNY 1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 401 F2d 
833 (2d Cir 1968), cert. denied, 394 US 976 (1969), in which a company intended 
to buy land which promised to give access to a major ore deposit (coppper and zinc) 
at a comparatively modest price after a successful strike. That intention was partly 
undermined because of a sudden increase of the share price. This was due to insider 
trading, which gave away much of the information about the deal - also causing a 
rise in land prices. 
For an interesting analysis (based on a new theoretical approach to insider dealing) 
of how to measure the damages the company suffered see Macey, 'From fairness to 
contract: The new direction of the rules against insider trading', (1986) Securities 
Law Review 177 at 211; also published in (1984) 13 Hofstra Law Review 9. 
2 Barrie and Carpenter, 'Ethics and insider trading in local government - a case of the 
law and the profits?', (1994) 9 SA Public Law 74. 
2 
the unsystematic risk specific to a given company or industry away m a 
portfolio. 
Also, unlike other kinds of dealings; the price achieved on stock exchange 
markets is the result of heterogenous expectations.3 From this perspective 
the investor is 'protected' by the price established through market 
processes, not by his personal bargaining power or position,4 which is the 
case in face-to-face dealings. The pricing mechanisms ensure that the share 
price reflects the available information. The investor does not rely on 
individual, but on mandatory disclosure, and the price serves as a signal5 to 
- indicate the existence of certain information.6 
Moreover, most legislation7 provides that a contract 1s neither void nor 
voidable for reasons of insider dealing. This gives further - this time legal -
evidence that there is a notable difference between face-to-face dealing 
situations and anonymous trading on stock markets.8 This distinction is 
valuable for the purposes of this dissertation. 
At first sight, one would think that such information-based dealings in 
securities on public markets is unfair because it puts the co-contractants on 
3 Schneider, 'Wider Insiderhandelsverbot und die lnformationseffizienz des 
Kapitalmarktes', DB 1993, 1429 at 1433. 
4 Scott, 'Insider trading: Rule lOb-5, disclosure and corporate privacy', (1980) 9 
Journal of Legal Studies 801 at 808. The role of the price in the uniformed trading 
mechanism resembles the role of consensus forecast in expert opinion polls. Such 
forecasts tend to demonstrate greater predictive accuracy whenever individual experts 
have roughly equal access to diverse information or technical skills. Hence the more 
equal the informational level the more accurate the price mechanism. 
5 So-called 'price decoding', see above all Verrecchia, 'Consensus beliefs, 
information acquisition, and market information efficiency', (1980) 70 American 
Econonic Review 874 at 881 fn 12. 
6 So-called 'price transparence', see Carney, 'Signalling and causation in insider 
trading', (1987) 36 Cath University Law Review 863 at 881. 
7 See, for instance, s 63(2) CJA 1993 Part V in the English law on insider trading 
which provides that no contract shall be void or unenforceable by reason only of a 
)s 
contravention of s 52 ( ie the section on 'insider dealing'). 
See for this view the article by Millner 'Fraudulent non-disclosure' (1957) 
74 SALJ 177 at 183, who correctly distinguishes between face-to-face dealings and 
dealings which occur on exchange markets. 
,/ 
3 
unequal terms and thus renders the transaction in some way or other 
fraudulent or, as far as the insider is concerned, unethical.9 Therefore, the 
uninvolved observer would probably wish to void such a contract and grant 
those investors who dealt with insiders the right to sue them. These issues 
lead us directly into a discussion of the economic problems surrounding 
insider trading. It will be argued in this dissertation that the so-called 
)fairness' argument is not actually convincing after all. 
We will see, for instance, that a considerable number of economistslO think 
that losses caused by insider trading prohibitions outweigh the losses caused 
by insiders, and the ref ore argue that insiders should be allowed to trade 
✓freely. It will be shown that this opinion can be based on more than one 
economic approach or school of thought. , 
Moreover, there are many views which maintain that non-insiders suffer no 
losses at all.1 1 This argument has, strong legal implications because without 
J1osses there is not really a juristic basis for prohibition. On the contrary, 
insider trading is said by some theories to influence positively the 
performance of capital markets, by helping the share price to reflect more 
/
information than is available through mandatory disclosure. This argument, 
however, would seem appropriate only where the dealing is effected on an 
anonymous market. This confirms that insider transactions on stock 
exchanges should not be placed under the regime of the law of contract 
j(such as face-to-face dealings).12 For this reason we will not investigate the 
9 
10 
This 'fairness argument' and its moral implications will be dealt with in Chapter 1 of 
Part I of this dissertation. 
The modem controversy was stimulated by Manne, 'Insider Trading and the Stock 
Market', New York, 1966 (cited as 'Manne'), whose arguments in favour of insider 
trading are so significant that they still have to be taken into account in today/s legal 
debate. 
11 Outsiders want to pay only 97% of the price which they would normally be prepared 
to pay for the same stock. They 'discount' expected losses to insiders, see Schomer, 
'Gesetzliches Insiderhandels-verbot: Eine ordnungspolitische Analyse', Wiesbaden, 
1991 at 149. 
12 See for contractual remedies the analysis by Hurter 'Die regsposisie van die koper 
van ongenoteerde aandele in geval van verborge gebreke en wanvoorstelling', 
(1988) 10 Modern Business Law at 134. The approach suggested by Hurter, ie die 
'beskikbaarheid van die aedilisiese aksies by die koop van onliggaamlike sake', idem 
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problem of face-to-face (insider) dealings. 
Part I will also provide a detailed overview of the different economic 
schools of thought, and their applications to insider dealing. At this stage 
the economics of insider trading will be discussed. The first aim of this 
investigation is to paint an economic background to any statutory provisions 
on insider trading, including those to be examined in Part Two. 
The debate on whether it is useful to regulate insider dealing still continues 
after many years of research. The main argument of the proponents of 
insider dealing nowadays is that insider gains can be regarded as part of the 
compensation packages of managers who would in return accept a cut in 
salary. This idea is mainly based upon the economics of 'principal-agent' 
relationships (the manager with insider knowledge being the agent). This 
!
notion will be discussed ,in detail.13 It will be argued here that there is no 
, necessity to ban insider trading from our markets. 
Nevertheless, for reasons such as 'investor protection' and the 
'competitiveness' of the home capital market, most countries, including 
those examined in Part Two, have adopted statutes the intention of which is 
to ban insider trading by making it an illegal act. We will examine whether 
or not such simplified catch-words as 'market protection' or 'investor 
protection' are valuable concepts which would justifiably enable State 
authorities to imprison insiders. It will be argued that our present 
understanding of 'market or investor protection' needs to be modified 
because of this simplified understanding of the situation. 
The theory which is developed in this dissertation will take into account that 
\/there is no convincing economic model for suitably addressing the insider 
dealing issue. In such a situation, where we cannot prove that either 
prohibition or free trading on inside information is socially beneficial, what 
needs to be considered is whether market participants should define their 
interests and the protection of their markets themselves - according to their 
own priorities. 
We live in an open, democratic society in which people hold many rational 
and irrational beliefs. Because of this it will be argued that market 
13 
at 140, should, however, be extended to quoted shares if they are traded in face-to-
face dealings~ see also Eskinazi, 'The protection afforded in South African law to a 
purchaser of listed securities on the JSE', (1989) 1 SA Mere Ll 145. 
See Chapter 2 of Part I. 
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Jprocesses should be allowed to determine which legal solutions equal out the 
interests of the parties involved. The market participants should, therefore, 
be allowed to put forward their opinions. That would make it necessary to _ 
incorporate more ideas in a legal model than just that of 'prohibition'. We 
will see a proposal that a better-fitting model under the given social data is 
to allow and disapprove of insider trading simultaneously. This reflects 
true democratic values; as with all others, the stock market should also be a 
truly democratic institution for the good of all involved. 
Part Two will discuss the legal problems of insider regulation. It is argued 
that most insider legislation does not have a firm basis in economic 
/ findings, but rather on vague notions of 'market protection' and/or 
'fairness'. The insider trading laws of England, Germany and South Africa 
will also be examined in detail. This also suggest which legal solutions can 
be offered instead of the existing regulations . 
..fo-s shall be seen, there are notable differences with regard to the definition 
of 'the insider', as well as with regard to the concept of what precisely 
constitutes 'inside information'. Certain sanctions (eg criminal ones) are 
imposed on insider dealers, and it is debated whether or not also to impose 
civil sanctions. The three laws differ considerably in this respect, which 
makes it necessary to examine whether such civil sanctions are at all 
appropriate. 
Finally, the legal issues, above all, the key elements of insider trading 
provisions, are brought in line with the economic findings discussed in 
Part I. Any evaluation of the systems in the three countries must take into 
consideration their different economic and historic backgrounds, as well as 
their current and future problems. I hope that inspite the fact that I have 
been somewhat influenced by my own legal education, this will be corrected 
with the consideration of the different national solutions being seen from an 
international context.14 It goes without saying that imitation, even between 
countries which have similar legal and financial institutions, should be 
avoided. Yet it is still possible to reach an advanced understanding of both 
J one's own country's laws and those of foreign laws by placing them side by 
side for analysis.15 That is certainly one of the aims of this, and any, 
comparative analysis. 
14 See Zweigert-Kotz 'Introduction to comparative law, vol 1 - The framework, 
6 
To gain acceptance of a law concerned with insider dealing by most, if not 
all, members of a society, we would expect legal reasoning to take into 
consideration the economic aspects of insider trading. However, we will see 
in the course of this examination that there is no substantial economic 
argument either for or against insider trading. Absence of an economic 
basis for this issue makes it all the more difficult to favour one or the other 
legal concept, let alone to mould more appropriate legal norms. 
This apparent absence of an economic basis suggests an alternative legal 
solution, which is open to both banning and non-banning of insider trading 
simultaneously. The aim of this approach is to ensure that at all times the 
market participants, above all shareholders and firms, can define and 
protect their interests by themselves without outside interference. This, it is 
argued, deserves to be called 'market protection' in a truly democratic 
sense. It will be shown that most present insider trading legislation is based 
on the interests of financial market people, and not on the interests of firms 
and shareholders. As these last-mentioned play the main role in the 
allocative process, it is of vital importance to reinforce their interests. 
To make this more apparent to the reader, I shall in the final chapter put 
forward some suggestions for a Model Code which addresses the regulatory 
problem of insider dealing without favouring one or the other of the 
examined laws. It will be argued that this Model Code needs to· be based on 
both the legal and economic findings of the examination, and leaves it open 
ts,market participants to define their interests with regard to insider 
trading. Thus 'market protection' is achieved by means of a balance of all 
interests which may play a part in the insider trading issue. 
Oxford. 1987 at 16. 
15 See for the aims of comparative analysis Zweigert-Kotz op cit at 13 et seq. 
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Part 1: Economic data for a legal topic 
The first part of this dissertation will focus its attention on the economic 
background of insider dealing regulations. The second will examine more 
closely the relevant legislation of England, Germany and South Africa. To 
evaluate existing statutes it is necessary to develop a theoretical background 
against which the pros and cons of the examined rules can be discussed. 
The investigation will start with a closer examination of a very common 
argument used in the insider dealing discussion, namely the 'morality' or 
'fairness' argument. Once we have discarded this apparently weaker 
argument, it will become obvious that we shall have to examine in depth the 
economic approaches to insider dealing. This examination of the economic 
data will encompass, in its first chapter, a presentation of different 
economic schools of thought such as Ordoliberalismus , transaction cost 
models, the Chicago School of Law, and market process oriented view. 
In a second step, their theories will respectively be applied to insider 
dealing problems. The presentation of these theories will lead our interest 
to focus on market processes and their implications for insider regulation 
approaches ( Chapter 2 of Part I). 
Chapter 1: Legislative approaches to and three common 
arguments against insider dealing 
Before we can examine the economics of insider dealing, we will have to 
consider some common arguments used in insider dealing regulation models 
- either to back up prohibitian or to allow free trading. These are namely 
the 'laissez-faire' approach and the 'fairness' or 'morality' argument. This 
chapter will also provide, a general overview of different possible legal 
approaches. 
A. How can the law address insider trading? 
In the context of how insider trading can be addressed by the legislator, 
some further remarks are necessary with regard to the aims of this 
dissertation. It is pointless to present all the different solutions to insider 
trading of industrialised nations, because this would necessarily remain a 
shallow surface study. As soon as one goes into detail and analyses the 
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different laws, one would lose sight of the mam underlying principles 
involved. 
The w~y of presenting legal issues favoured here, is to compare three 
existing laws on insider trading, taking into account the economic findings 
of Part I. This is done in Part II, the laws chosen being those of England, 
Germany, and South Africa. The examination encompasses an ~valuation of 
/'.heir respective pros and cons. Since these three countries have different 
cultural and economic backgrounds we can be assume that their solutions 
shed sufficient light on possible legal solutions in general. It is, however, 
not intended to provide a detailed overview on all legislative attempts to 
control insider activities throughout the rest of the world. 
We want to know how to regulate this issue in future with fresh insights. 
Over the past few years insider prohibitions have been changed over and 
over again, which is proof enough that these laws did not offer convincing 
solutions for addressing the insider dealing issue. It would be of little 
interest to present them all here. Besides, that has already been done 
elsewhere.16 What such legislation has to offer is a realisation that the 
question remains unsolved. That is the task: an examination which puts 
forward a new solution. The reader may then draw his or her own 
conclusions with regard to their own legislation. Only where the historic 
development is essential to understand current legislation, will it be 
explained in that context. 
There are four different models of regulation which are modified from one 
/country to another. The first one comprises statute law banning insider 
/ trading and making it unlawful. Here, for instance, a possible modification 
could be whether or not to impose criminal sanctions and/or civil sanctions 
on the insider. The second basic model . would refrain from all types of 
regulation, thus allowing insiders to trade freely. The third (regulatory) 
model would consist of (private) rules within organisations and units, which 
determine both prohibiton or not and the extent of this prohibition. Insiders 
would be bound contractually by the organisations and/or individual firms 
who join such organisations - for instance all private or semi-private bodies 
in the corporate banking business. 
A fourth model could be based on the economic uncertainty of insider 
16 Eg Assmann/Wegen (eds), 'Insider trading in Western Europe', 1994. 
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dealing and will be developed later in this dissertation. At the end of this 
thesis the 'democratic' approach to market protection will be suggested in 
terms of statutes which take into consideration both economic and legal 
findings of the examination. 
The first three models occur today in various forms and with their own 
modifications all over the world in countries with stock markets. The 
statute model is very common, for example in the United States, although 
there are also rules by the Stock Exchange Commission (SEC) or other 
semi-public bodies. Nevertheless, statutes predominate in their insider 
systems. The non-regulation model was in existence in most European 
countries before the adoption of the insider dealing Directive in 1989, and 
its transformation into the national laws of the Member States. The third 
basic model, including private rules as opposed to public statutes, used to be 
the German model until the end of 1994, when the transformation of the 
aforementioned European Directive was finally carried out. 
I. Non-regulation and 'laissez-faire' - approach 
/ Non-regulation of insider trading offers at first sight considerable 
advantages. It would seem to be one potential field of the 'less State' model. 
This can be based on the assumption that the economy of a country can only 
profit when there are less public rules, for such rules would seem to deter 
the investment of foreign capital. Also, it would seem very likely that 
capital would go abroad and seek places with less prohibitions. The modern 
non-regulation models in Europe were not (at least not expressly) based on 
a laissez-faire approach. 
A famous example to be cited, however, is England in the 19th Century. 
Foreigners with money were allowed to trade freely and to invest without 
being subject to complex regulation. Thus, one could be tempted to think in 
a somew/hat over-simplified way that, without prohibitions of any kind 
there will be an increase of prosperity for the country as a whole. Such an 
/argument is not convincing. 
/
'First of all, one must bear in mind that we seek an internationally-
acceptable solution and not a legislative attempt to control insider trading 
by only one country. The example of the European Communities teaches us 
that benefit for the people of more than one country is most where a 
reasonable amount of harmony is brought about by legislation in all 
Member States through the legislative attempts undertaken by Brussels. This 
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harmonising helps to enlarge and intensify the Common Market where one 
can invest everywhere under the same legal conditions. 
Even if all countries opted for non-regulation - based on the hypothesis that 
the laissez-faire approach is the most suitable - we would create a situation 
where all insiders could trade freely, but we would still not know whether 
or not such trading is beneficial or detrimental. In such a situation it could 
as well be that the efficient allocation of resources is limited everywhere. 
We are looking for a legal solution which serves the interests of market 
participants in a larger context.17 
Secondly, the view that less rules for insiders would create a better 
atmosphere for investment appears to be shortsighted because of the 
modern phenomenon of 'separation of ownership and control'. Today it 
would seem that the vast majority of insiders are managers who deal with 
other people"s money, but do not invest themselves - at least not significant 
amounts in the companies they work for. If the firm-risk were more 
balanced between insiders and shareholders, companies may perform better. 
The problem of separation of ownership and control would only be solved 
in an economic situation where the insider is at the same time the 
entrepreneur. Creating the best surroundings for insider-managers, 
however, would not coincide with the creation of a better investment 
climate. On the contrary, the investor in a modern capitalist society would 
then rather look for a market where his own interest is protected against the 
insiders. Therefore, the laissez-faire approach has to be rejected. 
II. Regulation and the 'moral' or 'fairness' argument 
Prohibiting insider trading, on the other hand, can be based on various 
assumptions. Firstly, it could be assumed that insider dealing is 
economically detrimental for allocative efficiency. This argument relates to 
what is called 'market protection' (se~ Chapter 2). 
Other arguments have more directly and obviously played a role m the 
17 The European Directive on insider dealing. OJEC 18.11.89 No L 334/30. for 
instance. is explicitly based on the assumption that ' ... such co-ordinated rules also 
have the advantage of making it possible. through cooperation by the competent 
authorities. to combat transfontier insider dealing more effectively.' That is a telling 
formulation. . 
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legal development of insider regulation, namely the moral and fairness 
arguments and assumptions. It has been said that insider trading is immoral 
and/or harmful to outsiders. Most people seem to assume losses incurred by 
non-insiders when dealing with insiders. We can classify this group of 
arguments as the 'protection of the individual' - approach. Legally, this ,
1 
approach becomes relevant when civil remedies are sought in order to 
protect market participants (we are not concerned here with punitive 
damc1.ges, because their function is not reparation or compensation so much 
as penalty). 
The question whether non-insiders incur Uuristically relevant) losses needs 
to be regarded in the economic context, more specifically when we examine 
market processes later on. There we will see that market participants have 
enough investment techniques to ensure that they do not suffer losses to 
insiders which would require legal response. 
Consequently, at this early stage of the examination, we have to inquire into 
the question of whether insider trading is immoral. Curiously enough, this 
examination will also provide us with good arguments against the 
assumption that outsiders incur any legally relevant losses due to insider 
trading. We seem to be in need of an answer to the philosophical question: 
'what is morality'? However, this is certainly not the place to develop a 
concept of morality18, so, we must ask ourselves what can be immoral 
about insider trading. Most anti-insider provisions seem to have a rather 
strong moral support.19 What are the underlying concepts? The main 
conceptual ideas are the 'misappropriation' analysis and the 'fiduciary' 
approach which will both be discussed. According to the fairness approach 
it is unfair to trade on the strenght of a disparity20 of information. Some 
even say that fairness is achieved ( only) when insiders and outsiders are in 
equal positions (hence 'equal access' - theory)21 . 
18 Nevertheless. none of the writers cited give an actual qefinition of what 'morality' is 
supposed to be. This is certainly a shortcoming because he who judges insider 
trading as unethical should also be able to define in positive terms what moral 
behaviour on capital markets look like. At least some writers try to explain what 
immorality consists of. Those amongst the moral-concept writers who are simply of 
the opinion that insider trading is immoral - without at least naming the criteria upon 
which they base their hypothesis - will not be dealt with because of their omission. 
19 For the alleged moral implications of insider dealing see Rossouw, 'The morality of 
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Unequal information is, however, unavoidable in our world since, for 
instance, the manager will always know more than the shareholder. But 
unless there is something unethical about the division of labour, this is 
certainly not unfair.22 It would, then, not be only insider trading that is 
unfair (and unethical), but all transactions in which there is a disparity of 
information. This claim is overly broad.23 
As the writer has elaborated elsewhere24, the insider who owes a disclosure 
duty to the market cannot escape from that duty through refraining from 
insider trading. The duty to inform (disclose) is laid down in the disclosure 
rules which also determine the extent of the 'equality' of information 
insider trading', (1991) 12(3) SA Journal of Philosophy at 66; Patterson, 'Insider 
trading and business ethics', New Zealand Law Journal 1984 at 369; for the 
'fairness' approach see also Rider, 'Should insider trading be regulated? Some initial 
considerations', 95 SALJ 1978 at 79; see also Loss, 'The fiduciary concept as 
applied to trading by corporate 'insiders' in the United States', (1970) 33 Modem 
Law Review 34. 
Very sceptical, McCarty, 'Business, ethics and law', (1988) 7 Journal of Bus 
Ethics at 881; Moore, 'What is really unethical about insider trading?', (1990) 
9 Journal of Bus Ethics at 171, who takes the view that the breach of fiduciary 
duties is the constituent element of the insider's immoral act, idem at 177. This is 
doubtful, because in most modem insider legislation the breach of a fiduciary duty is 
not considered relevant for the dealing offence. 
20 Moore at 172; King Task Group, Draft Report on Insider Trading, 26 March 1997 
at 5 - critical of the Report Stassen "Insider Trading Minority Report", 25 June 1997. 
21 The main modem proponent being Levmore, 'Securities and secrets: Insider trading 
and the law of contract', 68 Virginia Law Review 1982 at 117 et seq., who defines 
the insider as someone owing fiduciary duties to the corporation and its current and 
potential shareholders, see ibid at 117 fn 2; a recent support of the equal access 
theory has been given by James Boyle, 'Shamans, software, and spleens\ Harvard 
University Press, 1996 at 83, who argues that insider trading laws promote 
democratic values by ensuring relatively equal access to commercially valuable 
information affecting stock prices. Yet, Boyle does not explain why equal access is 




Easterbrook, 'Insider trading, secret agents, evidentiary · privileges, and the 
production of information', 1981 Supreme Court Review 350. 
Moore at 172. 
Tippach 'lnsider-Handelsverbot und die besonderen Rechtspflichten der Banken', 
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amongst traders on a Stock Exchange. Regardless of whether we consider 
these rules fair or unfair - an insider who respects these rules is not unfair 
because he respects the law. 
It is generally understood in the law that there is no duty to disclose every 
single item of information before carrying out a business transaction eg buy 
or sell shares. Proponents of the morality approach accept25 this hypothesis. 
Although the extent to which there is a duty to inform remains to be 
considered, it cannot be said to be unfair to act or trade on unequal 
information - unless there is something unethical about it in general... , 
which we shall now examine. 
1. Morality approaches· to insider dealing 
Morality approaches offer three main arguments why insider trading could 
be immoral: misappropriation, harm, and fiduciary principles. The 'harm' 
argument26 has to be placed in the context of economic loss ie the 
assumption that insiders cause such losses to individual shareholders. That 
will be considered later. 
We could interpret the act of a corporate insider who deals on private 
information as 'theft'. Such an insider deprives the company of the sole use 
of the information, which is in itself an asset.27 He misappropriates ('steals' 
to put it more bluntly)28 valuable non-public information entrusted to him 
with the, utmost confidence.29 The 'misappropriation' theory was developed 
" 
from this.3° Theft is immoral, not only according to our penal codes, but 
also according to our moral beliefs. If the insider were a thief, we could 
assume that insider trading is immoral. 
Secondly, one could argue that the real reason for prohibiting insider 
Koln, 1995, at 30 et seq. 
25 Moore op cit at 172. 
26 Moore op cit at 176, however, sees harm possibly caused by insiders as a moral 
implication. Conceptually, this seems perceivable. Yet for the purposes of this 
dissertation harm is a foremost juristic and economic issue which shall be dealt with 





Moore op cit at 175. 
Moore, ibid. · 
US v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, citing Chief Justice Burger in US v. Chiarella. 
For a more detailed analysis see Tippach op cit at 35-37. 
14 
dealing is that it erodes the fiduciary relationship that lies at the heart of 
our business organisations. Indeed, Moore31 thinks that harm stems 
primarily from the cracks in the fiduciary relationship caused by permitting 
insider trading, rather than from actual trades with insiders. The fiduciary 
relationship is supposed to contribute to efficiency, since it encourages those 
who are willing to take risks to place their resources in the hands of those 
who have the expertise to maximise their usefulness.32 The claim of 
fiduciary relationship is seen as not purely a 'private' matter. Its erosion 
would generate social costs as well as costs for corporations and 
shareholders.33 
2. Yet it is not immoral - first aspects of a 'democratic' 
approach to insider dealing 
It is important to keep in mind two ideas which render so-called moral 
argument highly debatable. Firstly, we have generally to be very careful 
when fairness or moral arguments are raised in legal discussion. In the law 
such arguments too often serve as discussion-stoppers, permitting advocates 
to assert conclusions without reasons while branding those who think 
otherwise as moral dwarf s.34 
Secondly, even if we knew the contents of moral behaviour, we would still 
not know why we would have to do what ethics require, which in itself is 
also a philosophical question that remains unsolved.35 This would at least 
have to be based on another hypothesis, namely that morality is a 
compelling as opposed to a freely-chosen behaviour. Yet we will not be able 
to solve these eternal human problems, and must limit our inquiry to the 
two abovementioned aspects: misappropriation and fiduciarity. 
31 Moore op cit at 180. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Easterbrook, 'Insider trading as an agency problem', in: Pratt/Zeckhauser (eds), 
'Principals and agents: The structure of the business', Boston, 1985, 81 at 83. 
35 McCarty op cit ( ethics and law) at 889. 
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The theory of misappropriation may sound persuasive36, but has, in fact, 
little value. In Germany, for instance, before the European anti-insider 
provisions were enacted, firms could under the old system of voluntary 
rules have charged their insiders for trading on corporate information.37 
Yet, they never did; a fact which may indicate that insider trading is not 
truly harmful to corporations. 
Another reason for the above-mentioned failure of corporations to outlaw 
insider trading may be that they did not wish to waste scarce resources on 
continous and extensive monitoring.38 But this is not very convincing: even 
if some say that there is no place for ethics in the (firm-) internal 
perspective,39 and that since profit is all that business takes seriously, then 
business ethics are at least a device to make higher profits. For then, the top 
50 big enterprises in a country like Germany would at least have adopted 
such internal 'ethical' rules to increase their profits. Or do we really think 
that institutions like the German Bank, Daimler Benz, Shering, or Bayer 
would be financially unable to develop ethical conduct rules if there were a 
chance of losing out if they did not? 
It is important to note that these companies still adopted internal codes of 
conduct before the insider prohibition became law (and at the moment they 
are busy extending these rules). The writer suggests that a change of mind 
of a majority of shareholders, politicians, board managers, bankers, and 
corporations was required in order to implement a new thinking which 
argued that insider dealing can be detrimental for the market. And this, of 
course, is based on the 'democratic' assumption that, at the end of the day, 
people decide by themselves what they think is good for them and what not. 
They may be wrong, but they are free to decide. From this we can conclude 
that, before insider dealing was prohibited, the majority of people did not 
think it was actually harmful. This will play an important role in the 
development of a new legal approach to insider dealing. 
The next shortcoming of the misappropriation theory is that it does not 





Cf Merwin. Jr .• who favours this theoretical approach. 'Misappropriation theory 
awaits a clear signal', The Business Lawyer 1995/6 at 803. 
On the basis of§ 404 AktG. 
Moore at 179. 
For a discussion of this approach see McCarty op cit at 882 et seq. 
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public at large as opposed to corporate information, which is designed to 
serve the (private) interests of the company. 
Another serious shortcoming of the misappropriation theory is that it is 
based on an incorrect hypothesis. The theory states that the information is 
'stolen'.The notion of theft implies that the thief benefits from the value40 
of the stolen object. Corporate information, howev~r, is not meant to be 
used on capital markets in order to carry out profitable stock transactions. 
Such information is generated, for instance, to launch a new product range. 
The profitable insider transaction does not, strictly speaking, represent the 
value of the information. The insider ('thief) exploits a mere side effect of 
that information without rendering the company unable to increase their 
profits on the basis of their new product. On the other hand, if the insider 
were to disclose the information before the share transaction, the company 
would almost certainly lose ground to competitors who could use the new 
information for free. Even if the alleged thief deals, the companies so not 
become less profitable. 
On the other hand, one would certainly agree with Moore 41 that fiduciary 
duties owed by managers (and employees) to the firm and its shareholders 
has a long and venerable history in our society. Also, it seems right to 
assume that nearly all of our important activities require some sort of co-
operation, trust, or reliance on others. 
Yet at the basis of her reasoning there is a serious flaw. She argues that the 
increase in the circulation of 'false information' would cause a general 
decline in the reliability of information and a corresponding decrease in 
investor trust.42 However, announcing false information or 'rumours' that 
the company has a new product43 is not insider trading, but stock 
manipulation. Such manipulation constitutes a wrongful act, but does not 
constitute insider trading. 
In a nutshell, the fiduciary concept refers to trust and uprightness in the 





Someone who steals a savings booklet in fact only steals the money on the account if 
he succeeds to draw the money. The booklet itself has little (if at all) value. 
Op cit at 180. 
Ibid at 180. 
For this example see Moore at 179. 
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exclude from the insider-definition all persons who have no44 fiduciary 
obligation to the company. The market insider or the 'tipee' (ie a person 
who receives information) could never be found guilty of insider trading on 
the basis of that concept. 
Due to anonymous trading on stock markets, the outsider45 never knows the 
identity of his trading partners. His reaction would be either naive (ie 
trustful) or distrustful towards all market participants on the other side of 
the market, eg as a potential buyer of shares towards all potential sellers. 
This investor would protect his interests (by discounting expected losses 
from the stock price)46 against everybody who trade_s on non-public 
information, whether or not the other person is bound by fiduciary duties. 
Market performance is more likely to suffer from such a uniform hostile 
behaviour by outsiders than from insider dealing itself. The validity of the 
fiduciary concept is hence doubtful, because it does not reflect the realities 
on exchange markets. 
Moreover, it is perfectly conceivable that some firms allow their managers 
to trade on inside information, because theoretically every firm can define 
the extent of the fiduciary duty which is required by a manager. The 
contents of fiduciary obligations could vary from firm to firm. Which kind 
of fiduciary obligation should then be enforced? This would never be know. 
This counter-argument leads us to more a general discussion about this 
moral and fiduciary concepts. It has_ been assumed by the aforementioned 
authors that insider trading constitutes a violation of the fiduciary· concept. 
But is there enough reason to believe this? The answer is no, and this is so, 
because such an assumption unfortunately contains a petitio principii. 
Nobody has proved so far that insider trading is harmful to anybody. It is 
reasonable to assume that the manager should carry out all lawful activities 
in order to foster the performance of his company. He should then refrain 
from insider dealing only when it is established that such dealing is 
detrimental to the firm. If insider trading is beneficial for the firm ( or for 
44 And that is sometimes very tricky to define. For instance, the printer in the Chiarella-
case could have been from an external printing-works company in which case he 
would owe fiduciary duties only to his own employer! For this argument see 
45 
46 
Tippach op cit at 34. 
Yet, of course, market insiders are often able to detect the identity of insider traders. 
See Schomer op cit at 149. 
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the market and thus indirectly for the firm), he could trade on his advance 
information. Without knowing what beneficial effects insider trading might 
have, we cannot assume that such trading is contrary to the fulfilment of 
fiduciary duties. 
B. Summ-ary 
Non-regulation of insider dealing - in so far as it is maybe a possible model 
solution to insider trading - cannot be based on a laissez-faire approach. 
Often, the harm allegedly caused by insiders is implicitly taken for granted. 
However, the first important finding was that, although insider restrictions 
seem to have a good deal of moral support, opponents of insider dealing 
could not prove that such dealing is in fact harmful in any respect. This 
leaves it open to further investigation whether insider dealing causes 
measurable harm. As far as the moral analysis goes, insider trading as such 
is not immoral. Trading on unequal information is neither contrary to the 
law nor to morality. Nor do the informational imbalances involved make it 
unfair, because typically all kinds of contracts in our modern world where 
division of labour prevails, are based on the fact that one co-contractant 
knows more than the other. 
The concepts of misappropriation and fiduciary duty were analysed with 
regard to their moral implications. The conclusion reached was that the 
insider who trades does not misappropriate the information in the sense that 
he would steal the value of this object from the corporation. The 
misappropration theory is a misconception because it assumes that the 
company may allow the insider to trade, which would obviously be 
contrary to the worldwide existing insider trading prohibitions. These 
prohibitions are made by the State and can, at this stage of the development 
of insider trading rules, not be modified by private companies. 
We have also seen that the insider does not violate the fiduciary principle. 
Fiduciary duties are always violated when insiders cause harm to the 
corporation or to the shareholders. Yet, as long as we have not proved that 
their trading is in fact detrimental or beneficial, the claim made by 
proponents of moral arguments against insider dealing implies a petitio 
principii. And therefore, on this merely hypothetical basis, insider trading 
cannot be said to be immoral. 
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In Chapter I we have analysed the arguments for and against moral support 
of insider trading provisions. It was argued that the strong moral support of 
anti-insider provisions is not justified. Perhaps even more important, the 
findings draw the lawyer~ s attention to the major importance of theoretical 
economic considerations in evaluating the internationally differing legal 
approaches. Having discarded moral arguments against insider dealing,. it is 
now convenient to start the economic analysis of exchange market 
transactions based on non-public information. 
A. The purpose of this Chapter 
In this Chapter we will examine the different economic views on insider 
dealing and their respective arguments. Through this, our own theoretical 
basis is also further developed, for we shall see that there is no convincing 
economic model. In this context we shall discuss the alleged harm to 
investors caused by insider transactions. It will be argued that there are no 
such individual losses, a fact which undermines all legislative attempts to 
base insider prohibitions on the 'protection of the individual' approach. 
En passant, one will also see that the whole concept of 'disclose or abstain' 
which was designed by US legislation to protect such individual interests, 
was in fact a misconception. Investors have certain techniques to protect 
themselves against the eventuality of insider-induced losses. 
B. Interaction of law and economics in gene_r_al 
'Efficiency is my primary concern' -
This statement by Harold Demsetz47 has become quite famous, and not only 
in economic literature. Its programmatic sense stands for a view which is 
also relevant to modern legal issues. Some think that any legal provision 
must be moulded in such a way as to ensure maximum efficiency when 
applied. The Chicago Law School scholars are among the most eminent 
writers of this economic analysis of the law. One could certainly argue that 
47 Demsetz, 'Perfect competition, regulation and the stock market', in: Manne (ed), 
'Economic policy and regulation of corporate securities', Washington, 1969 at 16. 
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what they have done is to transform economic efficiency into a value.48 It is 
beyond any doubt that their perspective has added considerably to the 
evaluation of legal rules. Criteria such as reduction of transaction or 
monitoring costs need to be considered when we examine the economic 
implications of insider dealing. 
For the elaboration of insider dealing provisions it is important to note that 
much attention is given to economic aspects. However strongly the 
proponents of insider trading prohibition stress the insider's unfairness or 
his unethical behaviour towards other investors, it would be unwise from a 
modern perspective of juristic thought to condemn insider dealing if it were 
economically beneficial to the market - if both the individual investor and 
the insider would benefit from its positive effects, such as, for example, by 
more accurate pricing of the shares which might enhance allocative 
efficiency. The German stock market, for instance, seems to have been 
dominated by insiders and yet its performance during this period was good. 
The efficiency argument raises some doubts as to whether criminal 
sanctions should be imposed on the insider - if his buying or selling of 
securities does not damage the market. On the contrary, if insider trading 
were beneficial, it would even seem highly unfair and immoral to put into 
jail those who enhance the market performance through their informed 
trading. Their transactions would align egotistic behaviour and public 
welfare. And do not the vast democratic majority in the market system 
favour this idea of the overall welfare through individual welfare? At least 
some of the goals would be achieved which proponents of insider trading 
predicted when the ban on insider dealing is lifted, namely the fuller 
reflection of information in stock prices (which fosters allocative 
efficiency), and further incentives to produce favourable information on the 
side of entrepreneurs49, who would find themselves adequately rewarded 
48 
49 
See Kripke, 'Manne~s insider thesis and other failures of conservative economics', 4 
Cato Journal (Winter) 1985, 945 at 948: 'Some loss of efficiency qiust be endured 
for the sake of a larger goal.' 
Manne, 'In defence of insider trading', Harvard Bus Review 1966 (Nov/Dec) at 
118. This argument, namely, the fact that in a modem corporation the person who 
creates relevant items of information would no longer be the one who owns the 
company, has certainly raised quite some criticism. It was also criticised that 
managers who trade on insider information would be at the top of a hierarchy in 
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for their socially important work. What needs to be examined is whether or 
not insider transactions are in fact harmful. In that case regulation would 
seem to be inevitable. 
C. Is insider trading economically harmful? 
ls insider dealing economically harmful? This is indeed the most important 
and disputed point in the whole discussion.50 As we have seen, many writers 
simply assume that insider dealing must somehow be harmful to other 
investors. We shall see, however, that this contention is not well-founded. 
I. Situations where harm is allegedly caused to outsiders 
In this subsection we will discuss the notion of 'harm' in the insider trading 
context. Some of these examples are cited because at first sight they seemed 
to prove that insider dealing is harmful. But things are not as clear as they 
may at first seem, especially when one looks at the various hypotheses upon 
which the harm-assumption is based. 
1. Harm and hypothesis 
The basic idea behind the following examples is that the non-public 
information will bring about a change in stock price& when it becomes 
public. Simplified, the assumption is: good information will increase the 
share price, and vice versa, negative information brings it down (again, 
50 
whose lower ranks the actual information is generated. As a result of the latter, the 
person creating the information would no longer have an incentive to generate such 
information. Cf for instance Schotland, 'Unsafe at any price: A reply to Manne, 
insider trading and the stock market', 53 Virg Law Review 1967 at 1425~ cf also 
Kripke op cit at 945-957. 
See the excellent article by Wang, 'Trading on material non-public information on 
impersonal markets: Who is harmed, and who can sue whom under SEC Rule 1 Ob-
5?', (1981) 54 Southern California Law Review 1217, who finally suggests that 
'each act of insider trading does in fact harm other individuals', idem at 1234 et seq., 
but that the individuals cannot be identified~ see also Herzel/Kratz, 'Insider trading: 
Who loses?', (1987) 165 Lloyds Bank Review 15 who suggest that insider dealing 
does not lack victims, but rather credible Qlainti{fs. The present author thinks, ....,, ........... ~ 
however, that it is exactly this fact which indicates that no-one is harmed at all. 
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here, subsequent to disclosure). The insider is then assumed to profit 
because he knows the 'true value' of the share and can either sell or buy 
before the price reacts. 
In terms of capital market efficiency hypothesis ('EMCH') this hypothesis is 
not uncontested. Some economic authors think that all information, 
including the non-public(!), is at all times reflected in the share price. That 
is the so-called strong version of the EMCH51. We cannot discuss this issue 
here, but it gives an idea of the extent to which the 'harm' argument is 
based upon hypotheses which are seldom truly stated in the juristic 
literature. Also the assumption that information is reflected in share prices 
is not without difficulties. We must bear in mind that the price is a function 
of heterogenous expectations about an uncertain future. These expectatidns 
are certainly influenced by many things. For instance there are days on the 
stock exchange when the general mood is bad, and even otherwise very 
favourable news does not result in an increase of share prices. We will have 
to take that into consideration before we assume harm because it fits into 
our world picture, But moving beyond these general considerations we will 
examine those situations in which allegedly insider trading causes harm to 
individual investors. These examples reflect the beliefs of most, if not all, 
proponents of insider trading prohibitions. Let us now have a look at them. 
2. Buying before release of good news 
The first of these classical examples is the very basic situation where an 
investor sells his shares without a putting a limit tQ his order. He would, for 
instance, sell his 500 shares in the xy-company at any price achieved on the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange on a given day. The insider buying 100 or 500 
or 1000 shares in the same company knows that good earning ratios for the 
first half year performance are to be announced in a couple of days. 
Allegedly, the insider causes harm to the other investor from whom he buys 
the shares. 
The second example is taken from Moore52 and this is certainly a more 
refined one. The alleged harm caused by the insider in this example is more 
51 
52 
See Fama, 'Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work', 
(1970) 25 Journal of Finance 383 at 383. 
Op cit at 176. 
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difficult to prove wrong, ie to refute. It is assumed that someone has placed 
an order to sell his shares in Megalith Co., currently trading at $50 at 
share, at $60 or above. An insider knows that Behemoth Inc. is going to 
announce a tender offer for Megalith shares in two days, and has begun to 
buy large amounts of stock in anticipation of the gains. Because of his 
market activity, Megalith stock rises to $65 a share and the order is 
triggered. If the insider had refrained from trading, the price would have 
risen steeply two days later, and the aforementioned investor would have 
been able to sell his shares for $80. Writers like Moore think that, because 
the insider traded, this investor failed to realise the gains that he otherwise 
would have made. 
3. Selling before bad news becomes public 
The other type of example does not offer anything new. It simply reverses 
the premise. The simple version of this is the fallowing: the shareholder -
or rather the potential shareholder - places an unlimited order with his bank 
or broker to buy a certain amount of shares in the z-company. The insider 
who sells shares in the z-company knows that the company will have to 
recall a series of cars from the market, because they are faulty. This will 
generate extra costs for the corporation and thus decrease the profit for the 
term. The fact is due to be announced to the public tomorrow. 
The more refined version of that same example is a situation where an 
outsider investor places the order to sell with a limit of $34. Normally, the 
limit would have been reached and the shares would have been sold. But 
many insiders are selling these days, and it is assumed that their activities 
result in a sharp drop of the share price to $33 so that the order is not being 
carried out. On release of the relevant information the share price drops to 
$28 and the investor is very unhappy. He, and with him a good number of 
writers, think that this happens due to the insider's fault, for without the 
insider he could have sold the worthless paper. Are they right or not? It 
will be argued that they are not. 
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II. Why these exampJe_s_iail to prove economic harm 
All these examples, although they may sound convincing, fail to prove that 
insiders cause economic harm to the investor. 
1. Outsider profits from insider transactions 
The following example53 will show that there are also situations where 
ordinary investors can profit from insider trading. Suppose an outsider tells 
his broker to sell some of his shares, currently trading at $45, if the price 
drops to $40 or lower (a so-called 'stop loss'-order). An insider knows of 
an enormous class action suit.54 to be brought against the corporation in two 
days. He sells his shares, lowering through his transaction the price to $38 
and triggering the other investor's sale. When the suit is made public two 
days later, the share price plunges to $25. If the insider had abstained from 
trading, the investor would have lost far more than he did. It seems that this 
investor was protected by the insider. 
This example is structurally in line with the abovementioned ones. As we 
shall see, the inherent structure is disputable if not completely erroneous. 
Yet, assuming for a moment that the structure is correct, one can see that 
outsiders will in some cases accumulate gains through insiders who trade. 
Those ordinary investors have at least windfall profits. Actually, all 
outsiders who act on the same side of the market as the insider profit. When 
the insider sells and thus brings the share price down a little before it drops 
sharply, all other sellers acting simultaneously with the insiders profit from 
their transactions, provided their sell-limits are reached. 
Moreover, all investors who buy (while insiders are selling) pay less than 
they would have without the insiders bringing the price down. What they 
get, however, may be worth less than it seems to be because they do not 
have the complete information about the stock in question.55 Yet as far as 
information is concerned it is important to note that all outsiders acting on 




Taken from Moore op cit at 176. 
It is disputable whether or not such information falls within the ambit of the legal 
term 'inside information', because it was not generated by the corporation. Yet this 
needs to be discussed in the context of the definition of the legal terms later on. 
Cf Moore op cit at 177. 
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insider made the information public. Then, of course, they would lose. 
These outsiders lose anyway, if insider trading results in a price change 
because they can only sell their shares at a lower price. However, the same 
would be true for potential buyers, if the insider were to disclose positive 
company news. These buyers would have to pay far more for the same 
shares. 
There are also practical problems involved. Assume that the insider sells 
2.000 shares on a day when 47.522 shares are traded in 10.000 transactions 
at 125 different prices by 8.500 different people, some of them insiders, 
others not. It is doubtful whether one could find out when which insider 
sold to which potential buyer at which price. Particularly on a market like 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange where many shares are traded on the basis of 
the 'uniform price'56 (dt.: 'Einheitspreis', being the price at which most 
share transactions can be carried out; the official market-makers are legally 
bound to trade at that price; all other prices would result in less 
offer/demand and thus less transactions) it would be difficult to establish if 
an outsiders suffered a loss to an insider (the outsider's shares might as well 
have gone to another outsider!), and if so, what amount of money he may 
have lost (maybe only 10 of his 50 share~ went to an insider). It is 
practically impossible to determine who suffers losses from insider trading 
while others might profit. 
On a larger scale, however, alleged 'losses' and gains for ordinary investors 
seem to equal out as a whole with insider trading. The insiders create 
situations where the overall result of their trading is zero. Harm is perhaps 
caused to some ordinary investors, whilst others might profit from it 
without even being aware of it. Economically, insider trading generates a 
certain redistribution of wealth amongst outsiders, but none of them is 
systematically outperformed, .because they would all trade sometimes with 
the insiders and sometimes on the other side of the market. 
It is not even certain whether insiders do systematically outperform the 
market at all. An early empirical study on the topic carried out by Wu57 
came up with the following result: there is no sufficient evidence to prove 
56 For the mathematical procedure to calculate this price see Schomer op cit at 49. 
57 Wu, 'Corporate insider trading profits and the ability to forecast stock prices', in 
Wu/Zakon (eds), 'Elements of investment', University of Pennsylvania, 1965, 442 
at 448. 
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that insiders in 50 companies as a group had outperformed the market. This 
is a telling argument. Some more recent studies did, however, come to the 
conclusion that insiders outperform the market by 5-10%.58 There is not 
even a convincing economic model which would prove that insiders can 
sufficiently exploit their information.59 
Yet the most important point here is that the individual harm which may be 
caused to some outsiders is equalled out by gains made by other outsiders. 
This zero sum game, however, does not say anything about pros and cons of 
insider trading. Insider trading could still be beneficial for the market on 
the whole. Even if the alleged loss to all outsiders equals the amount of 
insider profits, the question of whether insider trading should be abandoned 
would by no means be answered. 60 We shall see that some economic 
approaches, such as institutional microeconomics or (partial) pareto models, 
go beyond the perspective of the individual harm. 
2. Structural faults in the above examples 
There are several structural flaws in the above examples. As far as the basic 
examples are concerned, there is a mixing up of alleged insider-induced 
losses and informational duties of the insiders. The insider is not always in a 
position where he is allowed to disclose his information. For instance a 
bank official who knows about a tender offer to be launched in two qays is 
certainly unable to disclose this information prior to that day.61 Hence the 
bank official would have to abstain. Then the ordinary investor would 
simply buy the shares from someome else because it is common to all stock 
markets that the orders will be carried out as long as they are unlimited 
(which was assumed in the first category of examples). Such an investor 
would be 'harmed' anyway. What really 'harms' the outsider is, in fact, the 
58 See Gilson and Kraakman, 'The mechanisms of market efficiency', (1984) 70 
Virginia Law Review 549 at 556 fn 27~ see Schomer op cit at 181. 
59 Most interestingly, however, already Manne furnished possible reasons for this 
phenomenon, see subsection hereinafter 'The position of Manne, his critics, and 
60 
61 
( ... )'. 
Manne (Insider trading) at 103 et seq. 
It is assumed here that the disclosure of the information through the company is in 
accordance with the statutory disclosure requirements. 
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timing of the disclosure. Harm is due to the legal rules about disclosure. 62 
In most cases the company insider would also not be allowed to disclose 
prior to the plans of his corporation. It is not correct to assume that the 
insider causes the harm. Profits and losses can only be made in the bigger 
framework of the informational system as it is established by the law. From 
a psychological point of view, one may add that the outsiders, without yet 
being legally entitled to the new information, would have traded anyway, 
irrespective of whether there is insider dealing or not.63 
The second of the underlying assumptions of those examples is that the 
insider knows about the 'true value' of the shares.64 This true value includes 
the information still hidden to the public. But is it really correct to assume 
that the ordinary investor could buy or sell at this alleged 'true value' of the 
stock at all? Only if he could sell or buy at this price, would he be harmed 
through insider dealing which supposedly changes the price. One should 
again argue in terms of the informational system: as long as the disclosure 
rules do not require the company to disclose, the price is correct (ie in the 
juristic sense of the word even though perhaps not in the economic sense) 
because it reflects all legally available information. The investor who sells 
or buys on this informational basis will always get the 'correct' price.65 
This price would then be incorrect only if the insider changed it through his 
transactions. And that is indeed the third assumption implied in the above 
examples. The second and refined type of these examples assumes that price 
limits are reached through insider trading itself. This assumption, however, 
is incorrect.66 First of all, none of the insiders has any interest in making 
everybody aware of their transactions. They trade a good deal in advance of 
the date of disclosure. Whenever one observes carefully the developement 
of share prices, one will see that there is only price fluctuation shortly 






See Tippach op cit at 61 et seq. 
King/Roell, 'Insider Trading', (1988) Economic Policy 163 at 168. This is in some 
ways also the basic assumption of Manne at 100-104, 109, who concluded that there 
is no link of causality between insider trading and alleged individual losses. His 
position will be discussed in a more detailed manner further on in the text. 
See Schomer op cit at 46. 
See Tippach op cit at 61et seq. 
Schomer op cit at 49 et seq. 
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fact that secondary insiders like financial analysts trade high volumes once 
they get the information - and that happens only close to the announcement 
itself. Economic research suggests that insiders refrain from trading big 
volumes because that would make other investors aware of it. 
Moreover, insiders do not have the market power to influence prices 
significantly.67 Consequently, their trading volume is not big enough. And 
even if it really changes the price slightly, there are always professional 
investors who decode this as trading signals for new information. Such 
trading or volume signals play an important role when market processes are 
discussed further on. One function of these signals is that they hint at 
potentially interesting new information - thus creating incentives for 
professional investors to adjust the price in the 'correct' direction, ie the 
direction which the price will take once the announcement of the respective 
news is made. Other investors will also profit from this price adjustment, 
because the 'true value' of the share is reflected better by the price when 
insiders trade. 
Another important point in the 'harm' discussion has not yet properly been 
made, and that is 'self responsibility'. H there is an event like the quarterly 
earning announcement, or the half-year performance, every investor can 
wait until the announcement is made before he trades. There is always a bit 
of luck involved if one buys or sells shares because the future is uncertain. 
One would never be able to precisely predict the result of such an 
investment. The ordinary investor (and also the insider) bears this risk of 
selling or buying too early. If the ordinary investor procedes to trade 
knowing that an announcement is due to be made, it is certainly his own 
'fault'. In many cases he will also profit from such a risk because the 
information may as well be positive. 
This informational risk can only be excluded if the investor waits until the 
announcement is finally made. Then, however, the possible profit is also 
gone, because prices adjust immediately. The insider tries to avoid this 
informational risk for himself, yet by doing so he does not cause harm. 
Moreover, outsiders have developed great skills to avoid possible harm 
through insider trading. (see further on in the context of market processes). 
67 Carlton/Fischel 'The regulation of insider trading', (1983) 35 Stanford Law Review 
857 at 866, who have observed less dramatic price changes where insider trading 
occurs. 
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=3~. --~F~i-n~dings so far 
Apparently, we live in a strange world when it comes to the insider trading 
issue. Because we are accustomed to a way of linear thinking which makes 
us believe that where there is a gain there must be a loss, we get stuck in the 
'harm' debate. In this subsection it was argued that this is not necessarily so. 
On capital markets it is in fact different. There are losses due to 
informational imbalances, and insiders may or may not gain from their 
advanced knowledge. Yet their trading does not cause losses. The outsider 
would not be better off, if he traded with another outsider. If there are 
losses through insider trading, then at the same time there are as many gains 
to other outsiders, because many transactions are carried out 
simultaneously, and they all contribute to the current price situation. 
This unique feature of capital markets is opposed to face-to-face dealings in 
which the gain to one co-contractant is a reflection of the loss of the other. 
We have also seen that the 'disclose or abstain'-theory upon which most of 
the American insider dealing approach is based is not valid. Whenever the 
insider refrains from trading, investors do not profit. The 'harm' argument 
blurs the fact that investing on stock exchanges is a market process. Even 
with insider trading there may be gains and losses, but at the end of the day 
the situation balances itself out. The insider does not bring about any major 
price changes. If one looks upon insider dealing as an issue of protecting the 
individual, however, one gets stuck in a zero sum game situation without 
ever realising its possible benefits. It simply does not matter whether 
occasionally one or other investor suffers a loss. Even in the very unlikely 
case that an order limit is reached due to insider trading the main factor 
which causes individual losses is the informational situation for which the 
insider is not responsible. 
Harm other than this relates to the organisation of disclosure requirements 
or self-responsibility, not, however, to insiders. If one were to keep up such 
one-sided arguments, it would indeed be pointless to regulate insider 
trading. In order to avoid this, we shall now enter into the economic 
analysis of insider trading. 
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_D~---~P_r-e_s_e_ntation of the main economic schools of thought 
and their application to insider dealing 
At this stage it is necessary to have a more detailed look at the economics of 
insider dealing. It is of interest both for interpretation and of developement 
of the laws on insider dealing to discuss the economic arguments and 
theories around this topic, especially those fairly recent ones which focus on 
agency problems. It is also necessary to discuss the economics of insider 
dealing with respect to the enforcement problem, namely the sanctions to be 
imposed on insiders. It is doubtful whether we should put an insider into 
jail if we is not sure about the effect of his transactions. 
Another interrelation between the adequacy of sanctions and insider 
contraventions is evident68: normally, if the legislation increases fines, one 
would expect a greater deterrent to have been created. There are, however, 
some reasonable doubts. What we can say about most insider sanctions 
(worldwide) is that they have proved· to be far less efficient than they were 
intended to be. 69 And, as a matter of fact, the transactions of an insider on 
stock exchange markets are economic ones, whose legal implications cannot 
and should not be discussed without a thorough basis of economic 
knowledge. For this purpose we shall now consider in some detail the main 
economic theories and their respective application to insider trading. 
Before one can embark on an evaluation of the statutes, one will certainly 
have to define one's own position with regard to the economic findings. 
This will be undertaken in the next subsection. The lawyer will find that not 
only is much debated in his own field, but also in the area of economic 
research. Due to the variety of opinions among economic writers, one needs 
68 
69 
See Botha, 'The economics of the crime and punishment of insider trading in South 
Africa', (1992) 4 SA Mere U at 145~ see in particular Becker's seminal article 
'Crime and punishment: An economic approach', (1968) 76 Journal of Political 
Economy at 169. 
For the minor deterrent effect produced by increased sanctions in the US (they have 
more sanctions than anywhere else in the world) see Seyhun. 'The effectiveness of 
the insider-trading sanctions', (1992) 35 Journal of Law and Economics at 149~ see 
Naylor, 'The use of criminal sanctions by UK and US authorities for insider trading: 
How can the two systems learn from each other (II)', 11 Comp Lawy 1990, (I) 53, 
(II) 83, who asks 'why are the results so poor?', ibid at 88. 
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to make sure that the economic basis of our evaluation is clearcut. 
At the same time it must be understood that the discussion of economic 
theory herein is limited in two ways: firstly, due to the restraints of space, 
it is possible to present only the most important economic theories. 
Secondly, as mentioned above, the findings of economic research are 
disputed, and it must be clarified that the arguments are not generally 
accepted amongst economists. The present writer shares the view that 
criteria for the desirability of statutes and their further development are to 
be found in sources external to the law.70 Economic findings contribute, 
however, to the exactness of the legal reasoning no matter to which extent 
they can be proved right or wrong. 
We need to distinguish three major groups of economic theories, ie the 
liberal approach, the model of allocative efficiency, and, finally, a group of 
theories at the center of which there are market- and competition-processes 
as such. The first to be analysed here is the concept of freedom. 
I. The concept of freedom as a framework to the e.:onomic 
_ analysis of legal rules 
Everybody would certainly agree on principle that it is beneficial to grant 
the maximum freedom to both market participant insiders and non-insiders. 
How can that be achieved? Many economists discuss the concept of 
institutions. Institutions are looked upon as a set of rules which serve to 
facilitate future actions through rendering them more secure and making 
the results more predictable.71 They can be subdivided into micro-
institutional and macro-institutional views. It is one of the main concerns of 
economic research to determine an ideal framework of order, and which set 
of rules is needed to guarantee the maximum amount of liberty to the 
individual. 
This classical liberal approach is mainly based on the seminal works of F. 
70 See Hayek, 'Recht, Gesetzgebung und Freiheit', vol 1, Regeln und Ordnung, 
Mtinchen, 1980 at 98. 
71 See Meyer, 'Entwicklung und Bedeutung des Property Rights-Ansatzes in der 
Nationalokonomie', in Schtiller ( ed), 'Property Rights und okonomische Theorie', 
Mtinchen, 1983 at 1. 
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A. von Hayek and Walter Eucken.72 Its adaptation to modem theory, the so-
called neoclassical concept of competitive (economic) freedom (the German 
term here describes it more correctly as Wettbewerbsfreiheit'), starts with 
the premise that competition allows each individual to employ his means 
and abilities for his own self-determined goals.73 . This concept comprises 
three basic assumptions: individual freedom will secure economic 
efficiency74 ('non-dilemma' thesis); economic policy's only function is to 
ensure that the law should formulate some per-se restrictions ('rule of law' 
thesis)75; finally, that the market system is inseparable ('non-separabilis' 
thesis) in the sense that no single market must be regarded in isolation for 
analytical purposes76. 
1. R I f! • ~:..1. I . e evance Lor •n~J.Uer regu atJOns . 
I 
Each of those assumptions appears to be relatively problematic in regard to 
insider dealing regulations. Starting with the third assumption, regarding 
markets as a holistic systems does not seem very accurate. Apart from the 
general economic criticism against this thesis, it would seem impossible to 
define the relevant market for insider dealing. Is it the whole capital market 
as an organised and structured system? Or does it also comprise the private 
sale of shares (eg over the counter sales, or sales at arms' length in 
general)? Even if we consider only the capital market which is open to the 
public, this is a reasonably large market which allows a discussion of the 
freedom aspect. Thus the stock exchange is a non-separabilis market and 
the above concept is applicable. 
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thesis'.77 Yet it must be kept in mind that restrictions placed upon insider 
dealing can comprise both types of regulations (ie prohibition not to do or 
command to do). Certainly, there are prohibitions with regard to dealing on 
inside information but we will also encounter a number of commands. First 
of all there are the various disclosure requirements which contribute to the 
current insider dealing system.78 It would seem to some that the main 
purpose of insider dealing prohibition is to encourage timely disclosure.79 
Yet, it is also possible to define the injunction to disclose as a rule 
prohibiting insider dealing: 'it it forbidden to deal without previous 
disclosure'. This thesis has rightly been criticised.80 The lawyer would also 
think that each prohibition, of course, contains the command to behave in a 
certain prescribed way. 
The basic assumption is that granting freedom will enhance economic 
efficiency. The 'non-dilemma thesis' explicitly discards an efficiency 
approach.81 It is assumed that efficiency will come, even if only as a 'side 
effect', once freedom is established. One can, however, argue against this 
assumption that efficiency, at the end of the day, could grant more freedom 
because it enhances public welfare on the whole. And indeed, as we shall see 
later, the welfare economics approach has turned the argument upside 
down: for the proponents of that approach freedom comes as a side effect 
when market efficiency is guaranteed. 
, Generally speaking, it seems to be difficult either to discard or approve of 
insider dealing prohibitions in terms of the freedom concept. Analysing the 
'non-dilemma thesis' in a more detailed manner it must be emphasised that 
without a preliminary definition of what freedom and efficiency are, one 
will not be very successful, simply because one would have no paradigms 
against which the effect of insider dealing prohibitions could be evaluated. 
This question, however, remains unsolved. 
Certain criteria are needed to define which restrictions are undue and which 
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Remember the American approach 'disclose before you deal'. 
Schomer op cit at 77. 
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and for whom82 - it could also be the insider who needs more freedom in 
order to achieve better results for the economy. At this stage economists 
have to admit that not a single practically applicable criterion has been 
developed. Therefore, the (neo-) classical approach cannot be applied a'.s 
such to our problem. We have learnt, however, that freedom is also a value 
in economic theory. Since the freedom concept is not applicable, a new 
approach had to be developed in economic theory. 
2. The new approach to competitive freedom 
Consequently, it has been attempted to determine factors which indicate 
restrictions placed on competitive freedom. One indicator was said to be the 
number of buying alternatives for the potential buyer.83 The application of 
this criterion to insider dealing is problematic because it has been developed 
for goods markets, not for share markets. Schorner84 thinks that once 
applied to stock markets this criterion would rather constitute an argument 
against insider dealing prohibitions because the insiders (buying and selling) 
would be deterred and hence the number of buying alternatives would be 
reduced. This, however, does not seem to be so evident. It is equally 
conceivable that market liquidity is lowered through insiders, simply 
because other market participants are deterred by their mere presence in 
the market. The most that we can say is that in terms of competitive 
freedom it remains uncertain whether insider dealing prohibition is 
desirable or not. This is an important finding: in terms of economic theory 
it is not necessary to prohibit insider activities. 
Another modification of the neoclassical concept has been suggested by 
Schmidtchen85, who asserts that competitive market freedom must be 
interpreted as the freedom to do everything that is not regulated either 
through prohibitions or commands. Freedom develops in the context of this 
protected perimeter as the possibility to carry out all actions which are 
allowed. Competitive freedom can be defined only in terms of an 
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faces legal alternatives: if truly competitive freedom is defined within the 
boundaries of legal rules, the argument is circular because one would have 
to conceive a legal rule offering the greatest possible freedom which is, 
however, itself defined as part of the legal rules which define the limits of 
freedom. 
Schmidtchen presents two alternative solutions in order to avoid this circle. 
One of them being an efficiency test, the other being an analysis according 
to 'the rules of just behaviour' ('Regeln gerechten Verhaltens').87 The latter 
alternative tells us nothing useful because if we knew what justice is, we 
would not really be troubled - not even with regard to insider dealing. As 
to the introduction of the efficiency parameter, it is convenient to deal with 
this in more detail further below when the Chicago Law School is 
presented. To sum up, the freedom- approach does not really offer an 
answer to the question whether or not to allow insider dealing. One can 
sense already that there is always another way of looking upon it, in both 
legal and economic reasoning. 
87 Schmidtchen at 120. 
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II. Efficiency-oriented policies_ 
The second very interesting group of theories focuses our attention on 
efficiency patterns. The underlying general principle is that everybody will 
benefit from efficient (stock) markets. These writers argue that one will 
have more freedom the more efficiently the market functions. 
1. The basic postulates of welfare economics and the 
pareto principle 
It is the most important aim of any welfare economics approach to 
determine the welfare increase or decrease of a suggested or given political 
or legal measure through an economic analysis of such a measure. The two 
basic postulates of this concept are individualism and the sovereignty of the 
citizen. The first postulate is called 'methodological individualism' because 
it assumes that common welfare is based on the welfare of the individuals in 
a society. The second is meant to ensure that each individual can judge for 
himself whether a political or legal measure is beneficial to him or not.88 
Economists have tried to determine a social welfare function (so-called 
'collective choice' function), in other words: what general behaviour is 
needed to increase public welfare?. Yet, analysing an insider dealing 
prohibition on the basis of such a collective function is sure to fail.89 The 
conceptual reason for this failure is that there is no possibility of 
establishing a non-contradictory social welfare function. We owe this 
insight to the findings of Arrow90 who established the so-called 
'impossibility theorem' in 1951 already. All later studies did not succeed in 
proving this finding wrong. It was said that one general conclusion is the 
durability and robustness of Arrow's impossibility result. 91 This 
impossiblity theorem shall not be put into question. In other words there is 
no generally applicable parameter with which one could measure the 
88 Killp 'Wohlfahrsokonomik I. Die Wohlfahrtskriterien', 2nd ed, Diisseldorf, 1982 at 
469 et seq. 
89 
90 
Schomer op cit at 89. 
Arrow, 'Social choice and individual values', 2nd ed, New York, 1%3 at 24-31, 
48-60, and 96-100. 
91 Sen, 'The impossibility of a paretian liberal', (1970) 78 Journal of Political 
Economy at 152-157. 
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desirability of a certain socially relevant behaviour; and this can then, 
subsequently, be enforced by the law. 
Since a consistent social welfare function does not exist, welfare economist 
refer to pareto principles as parameters to distinguish the good measure 
from the socially detrimental one. The basic pareto principle runs: a policy 
measure is only beneficial if no individual believes that his or her situation 
is deteriorated, and at the same time at least one individual thinks that his 
situation is improved through the measure.92 Pareto optimum is achieved if 
no individual pareto improvement is possible without deteriorationg the 
situation of another individual.93 
2. Evaluating insider prohibitions on the basis of welfare 
economics, pareto optimal, and partial pareto models 
In terms of the welfare economics approaches we would have to ask 
ourselves whether or not restrictions on insider dealers would lead to a 
pareto optimum situation or at least to a pareto improvement. This is the 
classical restrictive pareto principle.94 In order to determine the welfare 
increase we need parameters which reflect the welfare economic approach. 
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precise policy conclusions in case one single individual's situation deteriorates. 
Writers like Kaldor and Hicks put forward the idea of compensation: a policy 
measure is beneficial (although detrimental to some individuals), if the increase of 
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For further details see Schomer op cit at 90. 
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for the evaluation of insider restrictions 
In order to measure a possible pareto improvement or pareto optimal, it is 
agreed that an equilibrium model of competion under the assumption of 
uncertainty is helpful.95 The theorem derived from this asserts that a 
competitve economy achieves a pareto optimum, where all producers and 
consumers act as if they were being offered prices on complete96 markets 
with full competition.97 
The second main theorem says that various pareto optima can be achieved 
each on the basis of various initial distributions of (property) rights. Hence 
every competitive equilibrium can lead to an optimum situation in terms of 
pareto analysis which also implies that at least (initial) redistribution does 
not impair pareto optimality.98 Only in this latter case there can be a 
distinction between distributional justice and allocative efficiency. However, 
where the market differs significantly from the competitve model, or if the 
assumptions of the two optimality theorems are not fulfilled, the above-
mentioned distinction can no longer be made.99 As long as the conditions 
required for this distinction to be made are not fulfilled, one will have to 
bear in mind that any change of the law, for example the restriction on 
insiders, can bring about (undesired) redistribution of (property) rights and 
thus be detrimental to the proper allocation of capital resources.100 
We can learn from this that it is not so easy to justify economically 
restrictions placed on insider trading. This confirms the difficulties 
encountered in the context of the freedom approach. The important 
implications for insider dealing legislation is that, if one is not sure about 
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prohibition with utmost care. 
b) Problems arising from an evaluation based on equilibrium models 
and external efffects 
Evaluating the pros and cons of insider dealing restrictions on the basis of 
such an equilibrium model poses several problems. The first being that the 
two theorems imply the mutual independence of buyers and sellers.101 
Individual actions or preferences (for example personal interdependencies), 
can result in effects external to the market which are detrimental. The 
market is unable to incorporate these external effects into its own 
mechanism, because they are unpredictable. The existence of such external 
effects is, therefore, equated with market failures - which eventually lead to 
the demand for public measures (eg taxes or other restrictions).102 
Consequently, in an equilibrium system it would seem necessary to impose 
restrictions on insiders because their stock operations are contrary to the 
general equilibrium. They have an informational advantage which might 
upset the pre-existing equilibrium. 
But things are never quite the way they seem. If the informational 
imbalance (in favour of the insider) is assumed to be a deviation from the 
pareto optimum, it becomes obvious that the market failure approach 
implies a market which is free of any informational imbalances103, namely a 
market without information problems at all.104 This, however, calls for an 
opposing view. If the parameter for public reaction to alleged market 
failures were a world without any informational problems at all, then one 
would be able to justify all kinds of public intervention. 
Yet there is no such economic system that meets the requirement that every 
piece of information is available to everybody and that everybody, 
therefore, has the same expectations about future events. This would mean 






Schomer at 92. 
Dahlmann, 'The problem of externality', 22 (1979) The Journal of Law and 
Economics 141 at 153 et seq., and 161 et seq. 
Greenwald/Stiglitz, 'Externalities in economies with imperfect information and 
incomplete markets', 101 (1986) The Quarterly Journal of Economics at 229 et seq. 
Schomer op cit at 93 draws this conclusion with which I agree. 
'Information and efficiency: Another viewpoint', 12 (1969) The Journal of Law and 
40 
rightly calls this a 'nirvana approach'. 106 Our world is simply less perfect, 
if at all. Without a shadow of doubt, it would be useless to argue that an 
equal standard of information is achievable. Moreover, even if it were, it 
remains uncertain whether such equilibrium conditions are desirable.1°7 
Moreover, we do not know whether insider dealing prohibitions actually 
enhance the desired equilibrium at all. It could just as well be true that 
insider trading can help incorporate full information into share prices108 
and thus result in an informational equilibrium. 
It is very difficult to operate with homogenous expectations as a given 
normative element for policy suggestions. Even if the norm were fulfilled, 
namely an informational balance were achieved, and insider dealing did not 
occur, it would still remain questionable on which level those expectations 
should be equal: on the level of the insider (ie full disclusure is required); 
or on that of the outsider (which would mean complete deterrence of 
insiders) or somewhere in between. Besides, it is extremely difficult to 
determine how such a homogenous level could be achieved.109 
At the end of the day one will find that it is not really possible to determine 
how useful insider restrictions are as long as we use models which reflect a 
world in which insider dealing is absent. A further step becomes necessary: 
one has to choose a model analysis where the model is reduced to a more 
modest format (a partial pareto models). Such a model encompasses fewer 
people, but can still take into account the existence of asymmetric110 
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to insider trading. Before we can examine it, some preliminary remarks 
about partial models in general are necessary. 
c) Partial models, the 'second best problematic', and the theory_of 
the third-best 
Today it is generally accepted in economic literature that, as long as the 
pareto optimum cannot be achieved in all parts of a national economy, one 
has to face the so-called 'problematic of the second best'.111 It is important 
to note that in such a situation the realisation of the other pareto conditions 
will not in every case result in an increase of welfare.112 As far as policy 
issues are concerned, most theories assume that, at least partially, the 
optimum conditions are not fulfilled. 
The problem is that, whenever one tries to adapt one part of the economy to 
the optimum conditions, ie the 'first best' solution, the result is that social 
welfare as a whole will decrease.113 Then at least one of the, optimum 
conditions is not fulfilled and the resulting restriction cannot be removed. 
This problem is summed up as the general theorem of the second best.114 In 
terms of insider trading this means that even if the law prohibits such 
trading, other parts of the economiy can be affected in a negative way. 
Three possible solutions have been conceived to cope with this difficult yet 
inevitable situation: the first being simply to refrain from statements about 
welfare economics. This has to be discarded, because it does not contribute 
to an evaluation of the insider dealing problem. 
The second solution would be to consider the restrictions due to the second 
best situation, yet try and mould a model with the aim of optimsing and 
deriving policy recommendations from it. 115 It is important to realise the 
difference between this constructivist second best analysis, and other models 
which try to examine the conditions of first and second best solutions. One 
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organisational skills and powers of co-contractant parties. This will be 
discussed in the context of the agency relations. 
The big, yet unsolved, problem of the second solution is that its policy 
recommendations are far from being precise.1 16 This inaccuracy must be 
inherent in any attempt to create partial models because we would have to 
regard every detail for every single person and good. Such a model could 
not even cope with informational problems. If, for instance, one wishes to 
impose import taxes in a (normal) situation where at least some taxes are 
politically unenforceable (ie a restriction to the model), all other ( eg 
export) taxes have to be adapted because they are part of the whole tax 
system; and they would also have to be adapted in a second best way, and so 
on - an impossible task, if one considers that this calculation would have to 
be carried out for every individual consumer.111 
As a consequence of this obvious impracticability inherent in the 
constructivist view, economists developed another approach which simply 
ignores the effects of the restrictions (or changes) in other areas. It was thus 
named the third best theory. 118 This. approach is adequate because the 
informational and administrative costs of the second best approach119 are 
taken into account; and because partial problems can be dealt with in 
conjunction with pareto patterns where sufficient separation of the different 
parts of the economy is granted120, even though the non-separabilis 
requirement is not fulfilled. The stock market would seem to be a 
sufficiently 'separated' section. 
Such a policy is less interested in intervention, and tries to cope with the 
individual weaknesses of the economic order on a step-by-step basis. This is 
far more practical. A further advantage of this model is that it has direct 
implications for insider regulation: regulation will affect the market 
process; as long as one has no complete model which is able to measure the 
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develop an interim (step-by-step) model; policy recommendations in either 
direction (put forward, for instance, by financial analysts) must be rejected, 
because they separate the market section. 
The problem of this approach121 is to determine how the (partial) pareto 
principle can be interpreted in terms of insider dealing. This problem must 
be di sussed together with informational processes on markets as institutions 
in the subsection on 'institutional economics'. 
dj Summary __and interim conclusion 
So far we have seen two types of model-exogenous concepts: the freedom 
approach and the welfare approach. From neither could we derive specific 
answers to our overall problem, namely whether insider dealing should be 
regulated or not. Nevertheless, this contributes a great deal to our question 
because it tells us that a certain suspicion is imperative wherever lawyers or 
economists suggests that regulation of insider dealing is the only possible 
answer. Since neither pure freedom nor pure welfare thinking are able to 
solve the problem, it is logically impossible for any other analysis which 
refers to freedom or welfare and requires regulation to be consistent. We 
must therefore be careful when people such as financial analysts claim that 
the gate to freedom on stock markets is banning insider trading. 
From the various pareto economic approaches we have also learnt that it is 
extremely difficult to find parameters which enable us to measure the 
effects of both insider trading and regulation. We have seen that (non-) 
regulation has effects upon the markets. The overall implication for the 
insider debate is, however, that one cannot be sure whether or not 
prohibition is beneficial. This was confirmed both by the individual 
freedom approach and the welfare approach (ie collective protection). 
121 For a sustainable, argumentative and philosophical foundation see Popper, 'The 
open society and its enemies' vol 1, 5th ed, London, 1966 at 157-168~ Schomer op 
cit at 100 calls this 'Sttickwerkstechnologie'. This expression should not be 
misinterpreted as 'bungled' work, but simply be understood as a step-by-step 
approach. 
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III. Institutional micro-economics 
The problem which remains unresolved by equilibrium models of any kind, 
was that these would result in an institutional vacuum. The legal framework 
plus all problems related to organizational questions were considered only 
implicitly as constant data.122 This criticism of the various model 
approaches led to an analysis in the cent re of which economists placed 
... 
'realisable' institutions (eg the stock exchange). From this angle it became 
possible to take into account individual business restrictions (eg trading 
prohibitions) and heterogeneous expectations of the parties involved. 
There are three specific approaches which need to be presented as they have 
contributed numerous sustainable arguments to· the insider discussion: the 
property rights approach, the principal-agent analysis and the economic 
analysis of law in the sense of the Chicago School of Law. It is worth 
mentioning that another approach which is based on the key term 
'transaction costs' is methodologically a variant of the property rights 
approach.123 Transaction costs will be considered as an important argument 
within the presentation of the 'property rights' approach. 
1. 'Property Rights' approach and Coase theorem 
The property rights approach, like that of welfare economics, takes as its 
starting point an individualistc idea of man.124 It assumes that human beings 
endeavour to apply both their abilities and the economic resources to satisfy 
their needs. Problems arise where this individualistic behaviour affects 
others. In such conflict situations it becomes necessary to specify the 
individual's rights. This may be done by means of socially accepted norms, 
conventions, traditions, or positive law; or it will be achieved through 
122 Albert, 'Modell-Denken und historische Wirklichkeit', in Albert (ed) 'Okonomisches 
Denken und soziale Ordnung', Ttibingen, 1978, 39-61 at 58; see Schomer op cit at 
101 note 146 for the interesting relation between this criticism and the entrepreneur-
123 
approach by Schumpeter. 
Schtiller, 'Property Rights, Theorie der Firma und wettbewerbliches Marktsystem', 
in Schtiller (ed) 'Property Rights und okonomische Theorie', Mtinchen, 1983, 145 
at 161 et seq. 
124 Schtiller, 'Einftihrung', in Schtiller (ed) (Okonomische Theorie), VII-XXI at VII. 
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contracts which provide for institutional business restrictions.125 However 
accomplished, other individuals will be excluded from using one 
individual's property rights.126 It is at once obvious that 'institutional' rules 
which confer property ri_ghts are not - as they are, for example, in the 
equilibrium and (partial) pareto models - mere given data.127 This has 
important implications for the regulation of insider dealing: for example, a 
manager's use of special information in stock market transactions (ie a 
property right to use the information) affects the market differently from 
an insider dealing prohibition placed on the same manager by the law.128 
The Coase-theorem129 provides a criterion to determine the efficiency of 
alternative legal options. It states that, irrespective of what the initial 
distribution, neither allocative efficiency nor pareto optimum are affected 
in a negative way, if the following conditions are met: (i) there is complete 
competition on the examined market; (ii) the initial distribution consists of 
fungible property rights; and (iii) there are no transaction costs. 130 
This suggests that privately negotiated solutions will also lead to real (and 
not merely fictitious)131 compensation and pareto efficiency. This approach, 
unlike the approach of welfare economics, allows us to recognise the 
private component of external effects (eg of rules regulating property 
rights). Where negotiation costs are absent, one may therefore speak of the 
internalisation of external effects. This makes it obvious that public or 
political change is only one possible solution. It also makes obvious that it 
is by no means self-evident that a public solution is any better than a private 
one achieved by means of contracts. This finding is of great significance for 
the legal recommendations suggested at the conclusion of this thesis. 
The property rights approach also has a normative aspect, namely, the 
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costs. 132 Therefore, all insider (non-) 133 regulations must be examined in 
terms of decreased or increased transaction costs.134 Of course, the success 
of such an examination depends to a large extent upon how 'transaction 
costs' are defined. Unfortunately, 'transaction costs' is one of the undefined 
terms of economic literature.135 For example, are the costs of information 
supply and information analysis, specification and distribution of property 
rights, monitoring and negotiation costs, to be included in the definition of 
transaction costs?136 It would seem that costs related to information must be 
included; and indeed the inclusion of such costs marks an important step 
forward from the theory of welfare economics. 
Yet it remains very difficult or even impossible to determine precisely the 
cpsts of information. The reason for this difficulty is that we must know all 
informational sources, their prices, and -their quality.137 If these data are not 
available, we will not be able to optimise our informational activities (ie 
discover information sources, determe their quality, and so on). Logically, 
this could lead us into an infinite cycle138: optaining information and 
evaluating it both generates costs - yet, at the same time we would have to 
determine the cost of the informational status-quo. This is logically 
impossible. So, what needs to be done? 
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regulations exclusively in terms of transaction costs 
A model which is entirely based on transaction costs will fail. In the present 
social situation (ie with the 'invariable' that our societies are non-
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informational costs. For in order to do that we would have to determine the 
price of an insurance which covers informational risks. 'Informational risk' 
is a lack of knowledge about the effects of human incorporated in a plan 
model.139 Whenever there are informational risks, these insurance costs 
cannot be spec~fied. Insider regulations (or, alternatively, non-regulations) 
attempt to minimise informational costs, for instance, research costs 
incurred by outsider shareholders in order to find out whether or not there 
are insider transactions in certain shares. 
Market prices for insurances (which cover informational risks) need to be 
determined within the legal framework. Insider regulations are part of this 
legal framework. Therefore, the contribution of insider regulations to the 
reduction of transaction costs cannot be measured by a transaction cost 
model that is unable to quantify the informational risk. Again we have an 
infinite cycle140: no unregulated market can provide us with any 
information about transaction costs in a regulated market. 
Even though in most cases there is no determination of the exact transaction 
costs, 141 the literature on transaction costs has made some additional 
suggestions. One of them is that the law-making process should result in 
well-defined statutes. Where that is not the case, there will be danger of 
contravention of the law (and subsequent penalties) both of which would 
lead to increased informational costs.142 This, however, is a task not for an 
economist, but for a lawyer. Hence there is no further economic argument. 
What we can learn from these transaction cost arguments is that, for the 
sake of all participants in capital markets, any regulation should provide 
clearcut definitions which clarify who may or may not deal, and on which 
information.143 Moreover, as we have seen, the argument that (non-) rights 
approach. regulation will lead to a cost-reduction, must be viewed with care 
and some suspicion. 
139 Where it can be incorporated, however, it must be 'insecurity which can be handled 
with', see Schneider, 'Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre', 3rd ed, Mtinchen, 1987 
at 2. Such insecurities are one basic condition for the existence of complete markets, 
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A Coasian Mode] versus the o1d-fashioned argument that insider 
trading is detrimental to other market participants 
Most lawyers144 who favour insider dealing prohibitions assume that, in one 
way or another, the outsider party to the insider transaction suffers a loss 
(economically). They conclude therefore that insider trading should be 
prohibited (legally). 
However, the term 'loss' in the sense used by lawyers needs to be re-
considered in terms of the property rights approach. Here, the second 
theorem of welfare economics must be remembered. Only if one can 
distinguish between the original distribution of property rights and the 
efficiency of resource allocation, is it possible to ignore the allocational 
effects of property rights distribution ( eg through insider regulation). As 
we have seen above, however, this is not possible, because any initial 
distribution of property rights is equally efficient (Coase theore~). 
Therefore, the distribution of property rights (and obligations) should be 
carried out in such a way that the total economical efficiency gain is as 
large as possible.145 
In terms of such an approach - which considers the total economic effect -
any restriction means a 'loss' to at least one acting party. If the restriction is 
placed on insiders, then insiders suffers a loss146 (ie that they cannot exploit 
the value of their information). Yet it has never been proved that non-
insiders (plus their expectations) must be 'protected' in order to foster the 
overall economic development. 
'Loss' bears a reciprocal character147 in a situation where a distribution of 
rights and obligations is carried out. In order to justify restrictions for 
insiders it would be necessary to prove that this is better for the economy. 
In our world, where we certainly have an initial distribution of (property) 
rights, we could speak of loss or damage only when well-founded 
expectations are not fulfilled, for instance when the parties to a contract 
undertake not to deal on inside information, but one of them nevertheless 
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rights should be changed through insider dealing regulation. Hence there is 
originally no such expectation. The ref ore, we cannot speak of a damage or 
a loss. The (re-) distribution of property rights must, on the contrary, be 
founded on an examination of the following question: who, (insiders or 
non-insiders) is to suffer a 'loss' (and to what extent)148 so as to improve 
the economic situation as a whole.149 
Yet no such examination has sufficiently proved that damage to either side 
is benefjcial for the economy as a whole. Supporters of the school of 
thought based on the 'property rights' distribution, remain rather vague 
when it comes to general statements concerning the initial distribution of 
property rights. 150 Only one important new approach has been developed, 
namely is the economic analysis of law151 (Chicago Law School). This 
approach will be dealt with in the following subsection. 
2. Economic analysis of law - the Chicago School of Law 
The Chicago School of Law utilises the property rights approach yet 
pursues the goal of moulding legal norms in such a way that the economy as 
a whole benefits.152 
a) ___ ..... A~n...____..e ..... ffi~c~i~e-n~cy,;~a"'l"p'-rp~ro=a-c~h 
Their approach includes the decrease of transaction costs and, what seems to 
be very important, it bases itself on the assumption that voluntary market 
transactions lead to an improved efficiency. In their view the distribution of 
rights should equal the· distribution which the participants in the markets 
would have chosen.153 An optimal distribution exists where exactly those 
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acquired for himself without distribution.154 This concept is based on the 
idea that voluntary market transactions lead to more efficiency. 
It seems appropriate to adopt this approach in order to determine who may 
use inside information.155 One would have to ask who would (for instance 
in an auction) bid the most in order to acquire the right to exploit such 
information. However, a general prohibiton of insider trading could not be 
based on this approach. Regulating insider trading or not boils down to the 
question of whether we want inside knowledge to be exploited. Therefore, 
for such a fictitious auction to be representative, there would have to be a 
bidder with the interest to pay for the non-use of information. However, 
this bidder" s money would be completely wasted. In economic theory we 
find models of such auctions for the right to pollute the air (for instance for 
the chemical industry). It is assumed that only a limited amount of toxins 
can be used, and firms must acquire the property right to use them. In that 
case, it makes sense for some bidders (for instance interested environmental 
groups) to bid and then not use the acquired right to pollute. The non-use of 
information, however, has no such positive side-effects as is for example 
the non-pollution of the air. Hence, nobody would bid. 
Albeit theoretically promising, the approach based on such a model market 
evaluation is not capable of solving important methodological and 
informational problems. Firstly, the market transaction is only in an 
abstract model. No real compensation is paid to the other individuals in the 
market. This in itself is a contravention against the pareto criteria. We have 
discussed the prpblem of the 'missing compensation' in the subsection on 
welfare economics: without the duty to compensate there is redistribution of 
wealth (property rights) which is exactly the opposite of what we want.156 
For this reason alone the approach has to be discarded. 
Secondly, it would be too difficult for the legislator to obtain information 
about any efficiency-increase because, in market transactions which are 
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remains uncertain.157 This again is an 'infinite cycle' problem of the kind 
we encountered earlier in the section on property rights (ie obtaining 
information about a situation which could only come into existence with 
that information, for instance transaction costs in non-regulated markets 
where the market is still regulated). Therefore, the economic analysis of 
(any) proposed insider dealing law is not very promising. 
b) Conclusions for insider dealing regulations 
Examining the insider dealing problem in terms of the economic analysis of 
law reveals once more that any juristic argument favouring prohibition on 
the ground that insider dealing allegedly damages other participants, is not 
well-founded.158 Paying a higher sum for the non-use of information is 
unacceptable because then the possible benefits of the information would be 
lost. The question is, rather, who should exploit the value of the 
information. Any other conclusion implies that information as such is not 
beneficial. The hypothesis that information is useful and beneficial shall, 
however, not be put in question. 
Therefore, the economic analysis adds to the view that prohibition is not 
necessarily beneficial. Yet the Chicago School of Law does not really have 
an argument for a proper solution of our problem. Neither transaction cost 
minimisation nor model-market transactions can prove that the prohibition 
of insider trading is either necessary or superfluous. The general problem 
is that the economic theories examined so far have tried to cope with 
external costs through external mechanisms (regulation, granting more or 
less freedom, and so on). We shall now turn to another model approach 
which offers an internalisation of external costs. 
157 Coleman ibid at 84 and 97 et seq. 
158 Schomer at 109. 
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3. Principal-Agent-Models 
Principal-Agent-theory (also called 'agency theory') exammes agency 
relations between at least one principal and one agent.159 The theory 
assumes two features to be common in these relationships. Firstly, that both 
parties pursue their own goals through their relationship, and secondly, that 
there is a situation of asymmetrical information distribution between the 
two. 160 The principal dep~nds on the action of the agent.161 The agent 
makes decisions which bind the principal - hence his informational 
advantage over the latter. A typical example of this is the relationship 
between managers (as agents) and shareholders (as principals). It is due to 
this informational imbalance that insider dealing by the agent becomes 
possible. 
a) Positive theory of agency and agency costs 
According to Jensen 162 we have to distinguish between two different 
methodological approaches, ie the 'positive theory of agency', which is 
mathematically and non-empirically oriented, and the principal-agent 
approach163 The tool in terms of which institutional regulations are 
analysed is referred to as 'agency costs'. The sum of the agency costs is the 
overall utility decrease due to inform~tional imbalance between principal 
and agent. To evaluate the utility, these theories use as a parameter, or 
rather as a point of reference, an 'ideal world' in which there is an 
informational equilibrium, ie homogenous expectations of all market 
participants. 
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when the management acts exclusively in the shareholders 'interest, and 
when managers maximise their own benefits) can be subdivided into three 
different types of costs.164 Firstly, and most obviously, there are 
monitoring expenditures, for the principal certainly needs to control what 
transactions are carried out in his name. Secondly, there are so-called 
bonding expenditures. These are costs incurred by the the agent. 'Self-
bo n tding' costs, for instance, are incurred when the agent signs a contract 
by virtue of which he is not allowed to be an agent for someone else (eg 
refrain from competitive business); or he shares the economic risk of the 
principal (eg loss of bonus if the share price of the company is below a 
certain price). Thirdly, every agency relation implies certain residual losses 
inspite of monitoring and incentives, 165 eg information costs to keep the 
principal informed. 
In recent research this approach has been most important for the question 
of the institutional regulations in enterprises.166 The hypothesis here is that 
in a competitive world only those institutions will survive which generate 
the least agency costs (so-called 'survival approach'167)_168 Hence the 
question: what measures will bring about a reduction of agency costs? In a 
firm, this requires the introduction of incentives and controls. 
It is also necessary to analyse the effects of regulations upon the individual 
benefits of the co-contractants. These effects are called 'retro-action on 
control markets', control markets for managers (ie the labour market for 
managers), and the market for corporate control. These control markets 
will be considered once we have discussed some more general aspects. 
b) The principal-agent-approach 
Before we turn to agency models for insider dealing, it is necessary to 
broaden the basis of our inquiry. The principal-agent-approach is also 
164 Jensen/Meckling op cit at 308; for the general definition see for instance Menichetti. 
'Aktien-Optionsprogramme ftir das Top-Management'. DB 1996. 1688 at 1689. 
165 See Schomer at 111. 
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mathematical and formalised. It examines incentives and risk distribution in 
contracts. We want to know which informational advantage of the agent 
(and maybe also the use of this insider knowledge) will result in an optimal 
risk distribution between principal and agent.169 This is very important in 
order to determine the extent to which the manager must disclose 
information to his principal. Disclosure would immediately hinder his 
dealing on the strength of the information, because its exploitable valµe 
would be gone. This approach allows for a new kinds of parameters, 
namely the salary and incentives (eg the production of inside information) 
which can be included in managerial contracts. Thus contracts help to create 
a situation where external costs (eg monitoring insiders) are internalised. 
This could render administrative monitoring ( of insiders) and, 
consequently, legal insider prohibition superfluous. 
c) Problems posed by the agency model analysis, particularly moral 
hazard and adverse selection 
Before we can endeavour to outline a convincing approach to insider 
dealing we must examine more closely the general and specific problems of 
agency models. 
Every agency approach faces certain inherent general problems:. the first of 
these problems being that agency costs (ie monitoring, bonding, and 
residual expenditures) used as criteria for economic decisions are also 
'opportunity costs'170, ie costs which are meant to measure the amount of 
lost benefits, for instance, residual information costs. It is very difficult to 
determine these costs in situations without a general competitive 
equilibrium,171 which is what we want to achieve t~rough regulation. Such 
an equilibrium, qowever, is needed to calculate the abovementioned costs 
(similar to the information costs in the transaction cost model!) in terms of 
insurance primes. We do not have such an equilibrium in our markets - that 
is why we ask which form of (non-) regulation of insider dealing will help 
to find this equilibrium~ Yet, here again we have an infinite cycle problem: 
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prohibiting insider trading) in terms of costs - no matter whether they are 
transaction or agency costs.172 
Having presented the general objection which can be made towards agency 
models, we shall now analyse two more specific problems of agency 
relations: 'moral hazard1173 and 'adverse selection'. Moral hazard is the 
possibility of the agent increasing his own utility to the detriment of the 
principal's. The basic problem in this regard is that whenever the firm 
performs poorly, it is very difficult to determine whether this is due to 
managerial misbehaviour or to an exogenous incident. Either specific 
control systems or special salary agreements are needed in order to prevent 
the manager from profiting unduly.174 
This gives rise to the question whether, if insider dealing is allowed, the 
manager will be enabled to benefit himself at the expense of the shareholder 
(like other so called 'fringe benefits' such as less working hours, a car, or 
business lunches175). In terms of the moral hazard problem, one has to 
examine the following aspects of a managerial contract: incentives, risk-
sharing with the shareholders, and possible cuts in salary which are 
compensated through allowing insider dealing. 
The second problem is what economists call 'adverse selection'. Due to 
asymmetric information distribution amongst prospective parties to 
contracts, there is a negative selection process from the point of view of the 
quality of the products (or rights) which are sold.176 Why negative? The 
potential buyers of second-hand cars, for example, know the average 
quality of all such cars offered in the market, and are therefore willing to 
pay only the average price. Potential sellers with better cars than average 
172 Schneider, 'Agency costs and transaction costs', in Bambetg/Spremann (eds), 
'Agency theory, information, and incentives', Heidelberg, 1987 at 481-494. 
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will refrain from selling because they can only contract at the average 
price. Hence the average quality will be reduced as a consequence of their 
reaction; and potential buyers reduce their offered average price. And so 
on, until the cars offered are of worst available quality.177 
Mechanisms which can stop the negative selection process are 'signalling' 
and 'screening'.178 'Screening' means that the market participant with less 
information can apply certain tests to verify the quality of products offered. 
'Signalling' is the other side of the coin. The better-informed seller of 
better (than average) products sends out certain signals to potential buyers 
which can be traced by them without being copied by sellers of average 
products .179 
The adverse selection analysis can also be applied in order to compare 
different (legal) insider dealing approaches and their effects on the 
efficiency of capital markets. Because the negative selection is due to 
asymmetric information, any legal solution must allow new information to 
be distributed as quickly as possible amongst all market participants. 
Certainly, this goal is not achieved by a 'disclose or abstain' policy, because 
the insider who follows this rule is more l~kely to abstain. Hence the rule 
will definitely not result in a quick supply of new information. Insider 
trading, on the other hand, can incorporate new data in share prices. 
Therefore, it should be seen, not so much as an 'evil', but as an economic 
feature which may bring about beneficial effects for the market-process. 
We shall now examine these processes. 
177 Akerlof, 'The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism', 84 
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IV. Markets and process-oriented Models 
Thus far we have considered the conceptual change from equilibrium 
approaches to efficiency-oriented approaches. Both approaches did not look 
upon competition as a process in itself. Economists referring to Hayekl80 
considered that competition as such is a process which helps to discover new 
information for economic plans.181 
With regard to insider dealing it is interesting to note that the equilibrium 
approaches never really examined the process through which homogenous 
information (ie an informational equilibrium) is achieved.182 In the new 
process-oriented approach, however, unequal distribution of information is 
itself the basis for a discovery process183 in markets. 
Markets facilitate this discovery process. It is of crucial importance to 
understand that markets are the institutions where - through the possibility 
of gaining from arbitrage trading - the process of information-discovery 
takes place. Organised capital markets help reduce informational risks, and 
thus achieve better allocation of limited resources; and hence render the 
future less insecure (in terms of expectations of the market participants).184 
• 
In the course of our examination of market process analysis we shall 
explain institutional rules with reference to the enterpreneur and his 
function in competitive markets.185 Schumpeter's view was that the 
entrepreneur always destroys the pre-existing equilibrium. This, however, 
is regarded as positive for the developement of the economy because a new 
equilibrium is going to be achieved at a higher level of information (eg 
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1. Complete competition as a normative parameter 
The theory known as 'Ordoliberalismus '186 states that a liberal approach 
towards the economy within an 'Ordnungsrahmen ' ('framework of order') 
set by the State) must result in both freedom and economic developement. 
'Complete competition' according to this theory encompasses only the free 
access to markets for all interested parties. Prices are not determined by the 
market process (ie through competition), but they are regarded as given 
data because the access to the market is what counts. Today this seems 
unacceptable, because, if such perfect competition were achieved, the 
function of competition (ie the dynamic process of discovery) would 
automatically come to an end_l87 
Yet Ordoliberalismus is os importance for insider dealing. It says that it is 
the task of the state to secure competition. Although not explicitly expressed 
in the context of insider trading, ordoliberal recommendations for a 
competitive 'framework of order' are relevant to the insider prohibition 
discussion. Namely, the following measures are recommended: 
1. Laws created by organisations and institutional units must be viewed 
with a critical eye. Parliamentary legislation should reduce the law-making 
power of such organisations, because they do not normally lead to any just 
balance of interests, but tend to create a one-sided distribution of rights.188 
2. No distortion of prices should be allowed.189 
3. Open markets with strong anti-monopoly policies ought to be created, 
and patent protection should be reduced.190 
4. The freedom of contract should be limited only where it is misused in 
186 Schomer op cit at 117 calls it the German variant of neoliberalism . 
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order to negatively affect competition.191 
Above all, it is an anti-monopoly policy which contributes to our insider 
problem, because inside information creates, although only for a limited 
time, an informational monopoly situation,192 One might be tempted to 
think that the use of insider knowledge (being a kind of patentable 
knowledge, for instance about a new range of products) is tp be limited in 
terms of both anti-monopoly and the reduction of patents. But is such an 
application of the basic ideas of this economic approach to insider dealing 
appropriate? We must keep in mind that the main purpose of this theory is 
to enhance perfect competition in the sense of accessability of markets - an 
aim which is not suitable for modern process-oriented capital markets, 
because it would stop the 'discovery-process' that leads to new information. 
This alone makes an application undesirable. 
The central role of contractual solutions is important for insider dealing, 
and in particular for the solution which will be submitted. Each individual 
( or insider) has the right either to transact in securities or to bind himself 
not to do so via (managerial) contract. Self-binding is necessary only if 
insider dealing is in any way detrimental - and thus such a restriction of 
contractual freedom is justified.193 Again, to prove this, one would need a 
convincing argument either in favour of or against the beneficial effect of 
insider dealing. Alternatively, one can envisage a contractual solution which 
does not completely exclude (State) regulation. The latter is appropriate as 
long as we do not have a convincing economic explanation. As long as 
uncertainty prevails about the effects of insider trading one should off er the 
greatest possible variety of options to the market participants. 
2. The competitive process detects new information 
Once equilibrium-thinking was discarded, the New Austrian School194 of 
thought put forward an opposing theory. Hayek195 pointed out that, because 
191 Ibid, at 275-279 
192 Schomer op cit at 121. 
193 Schoner op cit at 122. 
194 See Kirzner, 'The Austrian School of Economics', in Eatwell et al (eds), The New 
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human knowledge is limited, there can be no equilibrium. Because 
knowledge is necessarily limited, some expectations will always be 
disappointed. This leads to further adjustments of both behaviour and new 
expectations. Therefore, the term 'equilibrium' can be applied only to 
individual persons. Whenever the 'homo oeconomicus' meets with 
deviations from his plans and expectations he will readjust those.196 When 
more and more people start to adjust their expectations, there will be a 
tendency for these expectations to coincide, thus leading towards 
equilibrium.197 
It is very important for our inquiry that the medium through which people 
achieve more knowledge is the price structure. Because prices reflect the 
share value and heterogenous expectations about the future (eg future 
earnings). The price mechanism works as long as insider facts can influence 
the actions of other investors, at least indirectly: the other investors detect 
the existence of such facts through the transactions of the better informed 
(eg insiders).198 The result of such a processes is what Hayek calls 
'Spontane Ordnung ' (engl.: spontaneous order) 199 because such an order is 
the result of many transactions based on different expectations. 
3. 'Spontaneous order' versus positive rules 
Together with this spontaneous order there are also abstract rules of 
conduct. Apart from genetically innate and traditional rul~s passed down to 
us, we consciously accept and modify social rules.200 Within this system of 
rules human beings can form expectations because they know fragments of 
t);ie whole; expectations which will turn out to have been partially correct, 
others need ~o be adjusted201 on the new informational level. 
This theory was applied to the. insider dealing problem.202 This gave rise to 
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information. The parameter used is the enhancement of the discovery 
process. Kirzner explicitly refers to Manne, whose theory against the 
prohibition of insider dealing will be dealt with later. Kirzner argues that, 
firstly, it is pointless to criticise any action on moral grounds without a 
deep reflection on the possible benefits from these actions.203 Secondly, he 
argues that one could look upon insider dealing profits as an example of 
managerial creativity and as real entrepreneurial profits. Here we have for 
the first time, at least implicitly, a positive assessment of insider dealing in 
an economic school of thought: entrepreneurial gains are the basis for 
competitive processes through which information is transmitted; and hence 
bring about a tendency towards the desired equilibrium.204 
In a further st~p, the authors of the New Austrian School ought to provide 
criteria for the conscious formation of rules. Such criteria are needed in 
order to ensure that the selective process does not degenerate into a naive 
survival approach205 according to which only those groups survive which 
coincidentally chance upon the 'right' rules (which seem to be right 
because they survive). In truth, it is impossible to define criteria for such an 
Ordnungsrahmen . 
It is also clear that there has never been a natural development of rules 
either favouring or prejudicing individual interest groups. On the contrary, 
most rules have not come into existence through a selection process. Rather, 
they owe their existence to the intention to protect the interests of some 
group. Disclosure rules are a good example of this 'non-evolution' 
approach.2°6 Companies and insiders would certainly prefer to conceal 
some information for as long as possible. Yet all potential shareholders 
want information, and it is vital for the market that this need is fulfilled. 
Hence disclosure rules have had to be formulated to balance out the interests 
involved. 
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approach in economics, there is no valuable criterion for a positive system 
of rules. It is necessary to adopt a more modest approach towards analysing 
rules. One must start by simply taking into consideration their effects on 
market processes. It suffices for a policy ( or rule), if its results in this 
process are more efficient than those of other rules. The justification of a 
legal rule is, in this perspective, its beneficial effect.207 But how to evaluate 
such effects? 
4. How to evaluate the benefits of (insider-) rules? 
According to process-concepts, rules can be evaluated only by measuring 
their effects on the markets. A rule is considered positive if it results in an 
increase of efficiency in the market. The real problem then is: how far can 
we increase efficiency.208 In economic literature this problem has been 
named 'rules utilitarism'.209 However, comparing efficiency levels of 
institutions such as the Stock Exchange (instead of measuring the beneficial 
effect of a rule on the whole economy as suggested by welfare approaches), 
lacks a reliable parameter. In other words it is extremely difficult to 
determine that a rule ( or an institution) is more efficient? Besides, one has 
to define what efficiency shall mean. 
In this regard the process-approach is similar to the theory that tried to 
define pareto improvements for individuals.210 Due to informational 
problems it is impossible to measure the change of utility for all 
participants.211 Thus, one has to evaluate the utility effect of alternative 
rules in such way that the effect on market process itself serves as the 
relevant criterion. Competition enhances the (information) discovery 
process only in situations where prices fully reflect the amount of 
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widespread knowledge available to all.212 Spontaneous order exists because 
prices can adjust expectations, ie they reflect new informational levels. 
As far as capital markets are concerned, it is necessary to examine the 
effects that alternative rules have on this function of market prices. With 
regard to insider dealing this means that the best regulation ( or non-
regulation) is the one which enhances the transmission of information 
through prices.213 
It must be emphasised that in this model the pareto principle is modified. It 
is no longer used as a parameter for the increase of every individual's 
benefit increase, but only as a conceptual tool which takes into consideration 
the preferential systems which prevail in institutions214 (eg the preference 
of German investors to buy shares of companies which pay a high 
dividend). This modification has the advantage that we no longer need to 
solve the problem of actual compensation payments ( eg to those German 
shareholders who have invested in a company that pays a high dividend one 
year, but in the following year produces a loss). 
Yet such (pareto) benefit increase can only be achieved in a situation where 
the members of our society agree on the aim of improving market 
mechanisms.215 Whether there is such an agreement is, however, difficult to 
determine.216 It is all the more difficult because group interests can easily 
come disguised as a reflection of the common interest. The problem here 
can also be described as 'institutional choice' problem: members of a society 
try to find out which institutions best serve their common interest. To solve 
this one might try to find an impartial person.217 Not in the sense that one 
individual is elected to decide about rules, but in the sense that any person 
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chosen) would agree that his possibilities to pursue personal goals are (at 
least equally} good.218 
Thus the chance to realise individual aims becomes the parameter of 
efficiency219 - a remarkable step away from the classical pareto approach 
according to which there is no overall improvement if only one person is 
worse off. 'lnstitutioanl choice' allows that some suffer losses - as long as 
they think that their chances to gain are as good as for other participants. 
This implies an abstraction from the concrete interests of individuals who 
agree with an institutional choice because they are convinced that, on the 
whole, they will profit even though some might incur losses.220 Eg 
individuals may think they suffer concrete losses to insiders - yet they are 
convinced that the market performs better when insiders are present; and 
that this results in an overall economic improvement because markets 
become informationally efficient. 
It is therefore necessary to examine whether an insider regulation enhances 
informational efficiency. Here we are close to the 'discovery process' 
suggested by Hayek: there is improvement (eg through rules) if the chances 
of the unknown person (ie the investor who is not yet present in the market) 
are improved.221 The 'unknown person' can also be the entrepren~ur whose 
function it is to reduce uncertainty for the market participants.222 
Thus, for an institutional choice between regulation and non-regulation of 
insider dealing we must examine whether they result in a reduction of 
uncertainty. Two aspects need to be considered: the impact of rules on the 
market process, and the impact on the principal-agent situation (ie 
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Summary and first conclusions for a democratic 
approach to insider trading 
The economic theories we have examined, when applied to insider dealing, 
do not really bring us concrete results. Equilibrium models which imply 
that market participants have homogenous expectations, are to be discarded. 
They ignore the fact that in our world there are informational imbalances -
as the principal-agent analysis has clearly proved. Thus we can accept only 
those theories which are based on the hypothesis of heterogenous 
expectations. That gives rise to the question whether regulation is needed at 
all. Economic theories address this question in different ways. 
As we have seen, the freedom approach suggests that insider regulation is 
unnecessary. At the core of liberalism is the belief that measures should be 
relied upon as little as possible. This leads us to the efficiency theorem as a 
parameter to evaluate (non-) regulation. Unfortunately, the efficiency-
oriented approaches do not result in concrete suggestions either. Their most 
important contribution to our discussion is to avoid 'nirvana' (ie non-
realisable) approaches. When we compare the efficiency effects of rules, we 
have to compare institutions. For an evaluation of rules, the possibility of 
non-regulation must also be considered because that can result in more 
efficient allocation. This analysis can incorporate the positive -aspects of 
both property rights and process approaches. 
It is, however, impossible to evaluate norms on the basis of transaction costs 
as a parameter. Nevertheless, it is an argument in favour of one alternative 
if this cuts out costs. That again favours non-regulation because monitoring 
and detection are expensive and result in a higher tax burden. However, if 
the transaction cost approach is discarded, what alternatives are there? This 
question was relevant also for the micro-institutional approaches. 
The methodological contribution of the efficiency models is the (partial) 
pareto principle, ie the increase of individual benefits. The problem here is 
that it is practically impossible to detect increases or decreases in individual 
benefits; this informational problem remains unresolved. On the premise 
that insiders suffer losses (when insider trading is not allowed) it became 
apparent that there must be a real compensation paid to them, for instance, 
a higher salary. The principal-agent approach suggests that they could as 
well trade and accept a cut in salary. 
As long as compensation is not provided for in insider dealing regulations 
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(and to date there is no such statute), we can use as a conceptual tool only 
the pareto principle which takes into consideration the 'unknown' person 
(anybody randomly chosen) to evaluate the benefits of a norm. This 
concept, based on Hayek, is process-oriented and holds that institutions ( eg 
capital markets) work most efficiently when people think that their interests 
are best-protected - even though some might suffer losses. 
The market approach examination has already contributed some interesting 
findings to our insider dealing problem: it revealed that, economically, it is 
not necessary to ban insider dealing. On the contrary, we learnt that 
process-analysis allows for some individual losses (if it is proved that 
insider dealing causes these losses), as long as the efficiency or the social 
benefit are enhanced. In that case everyone profits even though some 
individuals might suffer losses. In a nutshell, increase of the overall utility 
could mean losses for some. 
It is also important to note that the process approach is, not without reason, 
sceptical about general rules designed by organisations or other social units. 
That explains why, at the end of the day, the old German insider dealing 
(non-legal) approach had to be rejected. It was implemented and monitored 
by organisations. As a result, no insider was ever found guilty of insider 
dealing. Those rules were in fact paper tigers. 
Some parts of the current English insider dealing system have to be viewed 
with scepticism because it includes regulations designed by organisations 
such as the Self-Regulating Organisations (SROs, for example the Securities 
and Futures Authority (SFA); the Securities and Investment Board (SIB); 
and also to some extent the Panel of Take-over and their code. 
We have also seen that, once one accepts that there is no overall economic 
solution to the insider problem, one must turn to market processes, and 
more specifically, to price functions. In order to evaluate insider 
regulations we have to measure their effects on prices, because these are 
indicators for informational efficiency. Entrepreneurs (and managers), who 
are the main producers of information, must also take into consideration the 
effect that insider regulation has on their firms. In this regard liberalism 
favours contractual solutions. That is in line with both the freedom 
approach ('less State') and transaction cost thinking (less monitoring costs). 
Before we can start the legal examination, it is important to summarise the 
position of Manne. His views have an important influence on the legal 
discussion around insider dealing prohibitions. 
V. 
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Manne, his critics - and some conclusions for our 
democratic approach 
Manne224 presented his conceptual approach to insider trading in 1966_225 
Until then the conventional fairness/moral approach had prevailed in the 
USA without being put in question. His starting point was simple and 
reflected academic curiosity: 'What is so bad about insider trading?'.226 
He considered fµnd management strategy in general. He pointed out that one 
way of exploiting new information causes no harm because it involves no 
transactions; many people don't buy or don't sell because they have inside 
information. Fund managers, for instance, do not sell when they have access 
to positive company data, although they originally planned to sell the stock. 
They will simply refrain from selling the shares that they would otherwise 
have sold. Economically, this has the same effect on the price as a decision 
to buy the same number of shares on the basis of inside information.227 No 
one would try to enforce that these insiders sell their stock. 
1. Protected interests in a prosperous society 
Manne found that no-one with an important interest is harmed when 
insiders are allowed to trade.228 On the contrary, many people are helped, 
because insiders cause the share price (prior to release of positive news) to 
begin rising earlier than it would have if they had not bought. Outsiders 
who sell while prices rise will get a higher return than they would have had 
there been no insider transactions. The share price reflects more accurately 
the value of the stock which is beneficial for allocative processes in general. 
Thus, unfettered insider trading will improve stock market 'continuity', ie 
the closeness between the prices at which consecutive transactions are 
224 See Manne, 'Should fund managers use inside information personally? Yes', (May 
1967) The Institutional investor at 19 et seq.~ Manne, 'Insider trading and the law 
professors', 23 (1970) Vanderbilt Law Review at 547 et seq. 
225 1966 is the year not only of the publication of 'Insider trading and the stock market', 
but also of 'In defense of insider trading', Nov./Dec. 1966 Harvard Business 
Review at 113. 
226 This is the title of an article by Manne, in Jan./Feb. 1967 Challenge at 14. 
227 Manne op cit (Cato Journal) at 938. 
228 Manne at 110. 
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executed. The price movement becomes relatively smooth. Critics have 
argued that such smoothness is not necessarily better than a sudden jump.229 
Yet, people should decide this quesJion for themselves: whether they prefer 
sudden price movements or smoothness will to a large extent depend on 
their personal risk-aversion. They ought to be given a democratic choice. 
More conservative investors may be hostile towards such sharp movements; 
and less conservative investors may be happy about such movements 
because they wish to take more risk and to benefit, from the possibility of 
generating high profits. 
A system which offers both possibilities seems ideal. In fact, economic 
research since Manne wrote has shown that, in this regard, he was not 
completely right. As we shall see, price adjustment is not due to insiders but 
to so-called 'signalling effects'. The insider himself is not even 'guilty' of 
price movements, and therefore his transaction cannot cause harm. 
Nevertheless, Manne's main proposition - that no one is harmed - is valid. 
He was right, too, when he argued that short term buyers and sellers (eg 
chartists who act upon price movements) gain from insider trading.230 This 
also creates incentives to deal and thus increases market liquidity. 
Manne's analysis has been subjected to criticism. To some it seems 
paradoxical that we should be urged to reverse both the theories and law 
which we have enabled us to achieve today's prosperity and, now that we 
have unprecedented resources for effectuating our views of fairness, that 
we should be urged to allow practices long deemed unfair and unlawf ul.231 
This is a direct reply to Manne"s proposition that unregulated insider 
trading may be fundamental to the survival of our corporate system, and 
that it may be nothing less than the wellspring of American prosperity.232 
We are not going to discuss here the wellsprings of our modern societies. 
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Yet the counterargument is also not well-founded. Do we really know 
whether insiders refrained from trading prior to modern securities 
legislation, and that they did not trade afterwards? What we do know is that 
legislation was deemed to have become necessary - which seems to indicate 
that insider practices did prevail. And yet society prospered. Perhaps this 
prosperity is due to a shared feeling that all is well in capital markets. 
This consideration is important for our pluralistic democratic approach t0 
insider trading: whenever the majority believe that something needs to be 
regulated, then the law will eventually be changed - whether such change is 
theoretically sound or not. We should, however, make sure that such change 
is not brought about merely to promote the interests of a limted group; for 
then they tend to increase their own welfare and not the common welfare.· 
It is certainly wise policy to seek an explanation for a particular regulatory 
position in order to find out who will benefit most.233 It is interesting to 
note that Manne detected those who profit most from insider restrictions: 
the financial service people, because they are next in line to gain access to 
information before the public at large does_234 They trade before 
dissemination, and enjoy an advantage even over the disclosing insider.235 
In order to ensure that all interests are treated equally, we must also take 
into consideration that market professionals, such as analysts, bankers, or 
fund managers, have an important function for the liquidity and the depth 
of the market. Neither regulation nor non-regulation models ought to deter 
their transactions. 
2. Limited exploitability of information 
Another point raised by Manne is that, because of practical limitations on 
the exploitability of inside information,236 the insider will seldom be able to 
233 See Stigler 'The theory of economic regulation', 2 (1971) Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science at 3 et seq. 
234 Manne op cit (Cato J) at 942. A recent study on the first noticable effects of the 
German WpHG confirms this, see Gerke/Bank/Lucht, 'Die Wirkungen des WpHG 
auf die Informationspolitik', 10/96 Die Bank 612 at 616. 
235 Cf Levmore op cit at 126. 
236 Manne at 78 et seq. 
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make a big profit. The most important limiting factors are: other 
information (eg political) which has influence on the stock price 
development; the time period to capture the fresh information which may 
be as little as a few minutes; the insiders's insufficient capital; his own 
uncertainty about the extent to w·hich other insiders have al~dy executed 
transactions; and the fact that occurence of significant opportunities to 
exploit information is on average once every ten years for each listed 
company237. This is another argument against the harm allegedly caused by 
insiders. 
Of course, the insider can borrow money; and options (eg on indices) which 
demand less capital are available. Moreover, Manne238 saw the possibility of 
a market for information. At the most informal level, this market would 
consist of, for example, two executives who are members of the same golf 
club. Another device for such a 'marketing' of inside knowledge would be a 
clearing-house for information where a person today might deposit 
information and tomorrow draw out non-public information deposited by 
other insiders. Investment bankers and underwriters would be able to 
function as 'clearing houses'.239 
3. Entrepreneurial reward 
In addition to the positive effects on market functions, Manne suggested that 
insider trading is necessary because it is the most appropriate form of 
compensation for entrepreneurial activity, eg innovation; for instance, an 
imaginative merger or sales campaign, a new product, or an improved 
method of financing.240 Manne first distinguished the entrepreneur's task 
from that of the capitalist (who bears the financial risk), and from that of 
the manager (whose task is to do the 'predictable'). 
In our modern world technical progress is not so much the work of· 
individuals but of teams and organisations. Thus the distinction between 
managers and entrepreneurs has become less important, but Manne' s 
argument is still valid today. The original idea behind it does not seem to 
237 Ibid at 110. 
238 Ibid at 63 et seq. 
239 Ibid at 67. 
240 Ibid at 131. 
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have lost appeal: without the entrepreneurs (or managing teams) being 
rewarded properly they will disappear, and with them finally the corporate 
organisation. Even the most bureaucratically-minded person may begin to 
have original ideas if the possibility of large rewards exists.241 For this to 
be achieved a fixed salary is unsatisfactory because it is only appropriate 
for the purchase of a known or given service in the labour market. 
Some critics have raised objections to this point. They argue that the proper 
reward could also be given as a bonus in a profit-sharing plan or as share 
options.242 To this Manne replied that bonuses must be determined on an 
annual basis, while the effects of any given innovation may be very 
prolonged. It may not be apt to pay out a bonus when a company has 
actually lost money. Also, entrepreneurs tend to value their contribution to 
the company higher than others will.243 That, however, is not too difficult: 
managers and firms must agree to enter into a contract (ie an interest 
equilibrium) - whether or not this includes an entrepreneurial reward. 
Another objection is that some people may profit from the information who 
were not involved in the production of the new product.244 To this Manne 
replied that it is possible for the company to isolate bookkeepers from the 
valuable information for as long as is necessary, and that this can be 
justified on the ground that they do not contribute to the new product. 
However, the contribution of an individual may be subtle, and one must 
therefore exercise caution concluding that no reward is deserved.245 This 
has an important implication for the legal discussion: if we decide to ban 
241 Manne at 123. 
242 Schotland op cit at 1436 at fn 39. A clear disadvantage of stock (and or option) 
programmes is that lower dividends will lead to higher prices of the shares - an 
incentive for the management to lower the dividend, both to the detriment of the 
shareholders. See Menichetti op cit (Optionsprogramme) at 1689. 
243 Manne at 135. Another disadvantage of bonus-systems is that bonuses are balance-
oriented, and balance sheets are also made for banks and do not always reflect the 
true state of affairs of the company, see Menichetti (Optionsprogramme) at 1689. 
244 This is a variation of the 'free rider' problem: if persons can benefit from a good 
without paying for it, they will do so. If one cannot exclude those who do not pay 
for the good, no-one has an incentive to pay for it - hence no incentive to produce, 
and the good will not be supplied. 
245 Manne at 157. 
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insider trading, we have to extend the definition of an 'insider' to 
encompass non-entrepreneurs and even non-corporate people. And indeed, 
later Manne extended his insider-definition to 'outsiders' in possession of 
non-public information.246 
Another objection is that insider trading could undermine public confidence 
in the stock markets and the efforts to -'own your share of America'247. Yet 
if there is no plausible argument to prove that insider trading causes harm, 
then surely the sensible course of action is not to outlaw insider trading but 
to educate investors (so that they understand they are not harmed).248 Then 
public confidence will not be undermined. Furthermore, why not also allow 
insiders to buy their share in companies? This would help solving the 
problem of separation of ownership and control. 
It has been argued that it might be very difficult to isolate the value of the 
entrepreneurial act.249 This view is not convincing, because the market 
itself will provide the insider with the exact amount of the reward. The 
information is worth exactly the difference between the price before and 
after announcement of the produced news item. The insider can freely 
choose when he trades. The risk that other factors dilute the effect of the 
information on the price is either with the company or with the insider. 
Provisions must be made for this in the contractual agreement between 
company and manager.250 Managers and companies are professional enough 
to bargain for their expectations. Doing that they already take into 
consideration factors like the situation of the particular branch of industry, 
performance of the company, or experience of the manager. Why should 
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In this context it has also been argued251 that the reward is unpredictable. 
But that is to miss the point. If the entrepreneur or the manager is so 
conservative that he accepts only a (completely) fixed salary252, then he will 
simply refrain from insider trading because of the risks involved. If he 
takes the risk, it creates an incentive to generate information in order to 
increase his income. The possibility that managers have different risk 
aversions and preferences suggests that they ought to be given the choice 
between these two alternatives. This is an imp<;>rtant finding for the 
suggestions in view of a Model Code in Part III of this thesis. 
4. Timely disclosure, moral hazard, and risks 
Three further objections have been raised against Manne: the first is that 
insiders would delay disclosure because they first want to carry out their 
own transactions. The second is called 'moral hazard' and means the 
possible incentive for insiders to generate bad news on the strength of 
which they could also trade,253 and which is obviously to the detriment of 
their companies. The third objection is that insiders who are allowed to 
trade might select riskier projects than the shareholders want because, if the 
risk pays off, they can capture a portion of the gains by insider trading, and 
if the project flops, the shareholders would bear the loss.254 
The last of these objections can also be expressed in terms of market 
processes. The insider gains from volatility.255 Insider trading normally 
decreases the day-to-day variance in the share price beca-use price 
fldjustment becomes less abrupt. This phenomenon may give insiders an 
incentive to increase the variance in their firm's share price in order to 
create more trading opportunities.256 For that purpose they might select 









Schotland op cit at 1457. 
This is suggested by Easterbrook op cit (Secret agents) at 332. 
See Moore op cit at 178. 
Easterbrook op cit at 332. 
Easterbrook op cit (Agency) at 84. 
Leftwich/Verrecchia, 'Insider trading and managers' choice among risky projects', 
Chicago Grad. School of Business, Working Paper No 63, 1981. 
Easterbrook op cit (Secret agents) at 332. 
Op cit (Cato Journal) at 936. 
74 
that, for many reasons managers are, in truth, far too risk-averse. 
Risk-aversion cannot really be the decisive factor in the debate. If it is 
known that a company allows insiders to trade, then outsiders can decide 
whether they are too risk-averse to become shareholders in such a 
company. All that is necessary is that investors be given clear notice of the 
fact that a particular company allows insiders to trade. 
It must also be borne in mind that the risk-aversion argument can be viewed 
from a different perspective: the shareholder can diversify259 his portfolio, 
and thus balance unsystematic risks. While he can at the same time invest in 
high risk companies and low risk firms, the manager risks his main source 
of income. The shareholder, on the other hand, can invest in different 
companies and thus diversify his risk. The manager may therefore even 
tend to act in a far more risk-averse fashion than the shareholder would 
wish.260 Taking this into account, permitting insider trading might create 
incentives for the management to incur some more risks which would also 
be beneficial for the shareholders. 
The penultimate objection concerns the disclosure issue. It is said fact that 
insiders delay disclosure because they still want to increase their profits 
before dissemination. But this argument is unconvincing. On the contrary, 
disclosure can be expected to be even more speedy where insiders trade.261 
As we have seen, the insider.,s gains depend on the absorption of the 
information in the price of the shares. Yet this happens mainly at the time 
of disclosure. Thus the insider needs disclosure in order to realise profits. 
And if we accept that the insider., s financial means are limited, it will be in 
his interest to invest his money in the stock only as long as necessary. Thus 
it is in his interest to buy ( or sell) and then disclose immediately, so that the 
price will adjust rapidly and yield its returns to him. 
A serious problem would, however, seem to be the possible production of 
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insider as positive information.262 It is generally agreed that a reward for 
failures is as detrimental for a company as the consequent lack of single-
minded dedication of a manager to his job which goes along with it.263 In 
that case there would be a severe conflict of interest between shareholders 
and managers. 
Man~e rejects these objections. He points out that entrepreneurs (and also 
managers) are attracted to those positions offering the greatest opportunity 
for them to make large, indefinite gains, and these they can in the long run 
only achieve through good news. On the whole, good news is more likely 
than negative news,264 firstly because the long-term trend of the stock 
prices is upward, so that, all other things being equal, occasions of good 
news should exceed those of bad. Secondly, bad news may tend to unfold in 
a more gradual fashion, or perhaps be anticipated, as is the case with a low 
earnings report or a dividend cut. Bad news may also more frequently be 
information affecting an entire industry and thus not be susceptible to 
individual managers.265 
Manne~s reply to this objection may seem too simple. But his conclusion (eg 
that insider trading will not result in moral hazard problems) is 
nevertheless right, although not on the basis of his own arguments, but on 
the hypothesis of the modern economic theory of control market for 
managers ie that the labour market for managers will punish bad company 
performance (these markets will be dealt with later). In a situation where 
the insider acts to the detriment of his company, he will be liable for 
damages not on the ground of wrongful insider trading266, · but for breach 
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Chapter 3: A democratic approach to insider trading 
We have considered the conclusions to be drawn from the main economic 
theories in regard to insider trading. We shall now suggest a new approach 
which incorporates these economic findings. This model may be called 
'democratic' because it reflects the pluralistic opinions in our societies and 
is based upon self-responsibility. Its aim is to give capitalist investors, 
shareholders, and managers the greatest number of alternatives from which 
they may choose a solution that they deem the most appropriate. Based on 
this theoretical policy basis, the examination in Part Two of the present 
thesis we shall analyse different insider legislation; and we will then suggest 
a new juristic solution to the issue of insider dealing. 
A. Important aspects of market processes and the 
protection of the market 
We have seen in the previous chapter that the idea of banning insider 
trading on the assumption that individual market participants need 
protection is not convincing. Manne has focused our attention on the effects 
which insider dealing may have on the market process. With regard to this 
it is certainly not a coincidence that the European Directive on insider 
dealing267 is explicitly based on the idea that ' ... for that market to be able 
to play its role effectively, every measure should be taken to ensure that 
market operates smoothly'. The assumption was, however, that insider 
trading is detrimental to this smooth operation. In the light of modern 
economic findings this assumption needs to be reconsidered. The aspects of 
market processes that we will examine will also provide further insight into 
economic data on insider trading. 
I. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) 
We have seen that insider trading may have an impact on the price 
movement of shares and options, and that this can be invoked as an 
argument in favour of such trading. It is necessary to understand how these 
prices are 'made'. Market's efficiency is a function of the speed with which 
information is incorporated in prices. 
267 Op cit note 17. 
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1. Market mechanisms and absorption of new information 
In the first place we have to examine the way in which information is 
incorporated in the prices of securities. This is also fundamental for the 
evaluation of legal concepts applied to insider trading. Of all recent 
developments in financial economics, the 'Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis' (EMCH) has achieved the widest acceptance by the legal 
culture.268 We lack, however, a single, comprehensive explanation for the 
existence of market efficiency.269 The most widely accepted definition of 
'market efficiency' is that prices at any one time fully reflect all available 
information. 270 
As a deyice Jor classifying empirical tests of price behaviour, the ECMH is 
divided into 'weak', 'semi-strong', and 'strong' forms.271 The weak form of 
the ECMH asserts that only past events which are available to all investors 
are re~ected in share prices (ie the price does not reflect insider trading). 
According to the strong form, all information is at all times reflected. For 
the lawyer this is difficult to understand, because insider trading prohibition 
is based on the assumption that 'inside' information is not reflected in the 
share price.272 According to the semi-strong version, the only type of 
information which is not reflected in the share price is inside information. 
All three forms of the ECMH were tested in both model and empirica,l 
studies; and none of them has been proved to be wrong. 
The strong-form tests examine the extension of the hypothesis to 
information available only to particular groups of investors (ie insider 
268 Gilson and Kraakrnan, 'The mechanisms of market efficiency', (1984) 70 Virginia 
Law Review 549 at 549. 
269 Gilson and Kraakman, idem at 553~ also, very interestingly, Gordon/Kornhauser, 
'Efficient markets, costly information, and securities research', NYULR, vol 60, 
1985, 761 at 841 who mention tests that reject the EMCH altogether, suggesting that 
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information).273 These tests suggested (although their results have been 
mixed)274 that corporate insiders - such as officers, directors and affiliated 
bankers - can systematically outperform the market,275 a fact which 
confirmed the semi-strong tests. 
And indeed most empirical support has been in given to the semi-strong 
form. Unlike the weak form, which presumes that only information which 
is available to all traders is reflected in the share price276 (ie 'old' 
information, such as price histories, as well as information about current 
events)277, the semi-strong form shifts from 'publicly distributed' 
information to 'publicly available' information that is not known to all 
market participants.278 According to this semi-strong from both economists 
and lawyers assume that markets are fully informed about the data which 
have been disclosed. 
It is important to note that any prohibition of insider trading must assume 
the correctness of this semi-strong form of the ECMH because if the weak 
version were correct insider trading would not influence the price; yet we 
have seen that at least derivatively informed trading influences the price. 
Also, only under the semi-strong form there is the possibility of an 
informational imbalance between insiders and outsiders. The consequence 
of the assumption is that investors can confidently rely on the absence of 
any relevant informational imbalance when they trade in efficient markets. 
There is no need for outsiders to further analyse the market situation, 
because stocks are fairly priced, in the sense that there is no systematic 
273 Fama, idem at 409-412. 
274 Gilson and Kraakman op cit at 556 fn 27. 
275 Gilson and Kraakman, idem at 556 fn 27. If this were not the case, any prohibition 
imposed on insiders would make no sense, for it would prove that inside 
information is already reflected in share prices (there is, however, empirical research 
supporting the strong form). That would make any regulation superfluous, see 
Haddock/Macey, 'A coasian model of insider trading', (1987) 80 Northwestern 
University Law Rev 1449 at 1455 fn 13. 
276 Fam.a op cit at 387 et seq.; Wang, 'Some arguments that the stock market is not 
efficient', (1986) 19 Univ of Cal Davis Law Review at 341; for more references see 
Carney op cit at 878 fn 71. 
277 
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bias.279 At the same time, insiders who are aware of information being 
disclosed can freely trade on it, confident that the courts will not find any 
unlawful informational advantage over other market participants. 
Since insider regulation is based on the semi-strong form of the ECMH,-the 
element of 'non-public' which recurs in all insider legislation must be 
defined in terms of disclosure. As we shall see later on, information can be 
'public' even before disclosure. 
Moving from information that is publicly available to firm-specific 
information which is not yet formally announced or released, price 
adjustments become more complex, and less well-documented.280 Insider 
trading contributes to the price adjustment process because it reveals 
further information ( eg when insiders buy the outsiders are made aware of 
the existence of positive news). That is exactly the 'information-discovery' 
process that was suggested by Hayek . 
With regard to new information in general, it has to be noted that investors 
partly act as if markets were not efficient, and as if information can 
produce gains.281 This has been described as the 'paradox of efficient 
markets'.282 If there were no gains from investments in information, 
traders would not invest in research activities, and prices could not remain 
efficiently set.283 Yet, why would anyone incur the cost of acquiring new 
information, if hair-triggered decoders (such as the price of a security) will 
reflect it anyway? The answer is that prices are not fully-informative and, 
indeed, that the acquisition effort is made precisely because they are not.284 
A market where price decoding is both costless and accurate could not 
continue to support an efficient equilibrium in which prices fully-reflect 
trading information,285 because such a market would offer no incentives to 








Carney, idem at 883. 
For studies on price adjustments see Wang op cit at 364 fn 60 et seq. 
Carney op cit at 883. 
Grossman/Stiglitz, 'On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets', 
(1980) 70 American Economic Review 393 at 404. 
Carney op cit at 883 fn 93. 
Gilson and Kraakman op cit at 577. 
Grossman/Stiglitz op cit at 395. 
80 
inefficiency' (ie lose its informational efficiency).286 In other words, in 
order for the market to continue to be efficient, it must remain inefficient 
enough to create incentives for some market participants to search for new 
information. Efficient_markets _are nevei:._perf~ctly_effici~!}t mark~.-
From this follows that prices do not fully reflect information, and that it is 
the task of market participants (eg financial analysts) to decode more 
information from price movements. This finding also supports Manne's 
theory that insider dealing is beneficial for the market efficiency: insider 
trading as such is a potential further information that can be decoded by 
others - which eventually helps to make prices more efficient. Hence 
'market protection' is a strong argument in favour of free insider trading 
rather than of prohibitions. 
2. Insider trading and market efficiency 
This subsection describes the mechanism through which insider trading 
makes prices more accurate than in a world without insider trading. 
a) Price adjustment: movement from uncertainty to certainty 
The distinction between 'hard' (ie certain) information and uncertain 
forecast, portrays a constant movement toward certainty as new data either 
confirms or alters the old information and thereby renders it 'new'.287 
Where knowledge is incomplete, uncertainty about future prospects will 
remain - until actual events resolve that uncertainty. Before that, trading 
activities (including insider transactions) will fine-tune the price, which 
finally reflects the 'consensus' of traders' assessments.288 The consensus can 
be defined as the point where heterogenous expectations meet. 
b) Capital asset pricing model: all shares are equally priced 
In instances of monopolistic access to information ( eg corporate insiders 
and exc~ange specialists), information first enters the market through a 
very small number of traders whose own resources are not large enough to 
286 Gilson and Kraakman op cit at 577. 
287 Gilson and Kraakman at 563. 
288 Gilson and Kraakman at 581-585. 
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induce speedy price equilibration289 (note that this is also in line with the 
proposition made by Manne). But reflection of this information in prices 
does not exclusively depend on the trading efforts of these insiders. 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAP) theory teaches us that a security 
represents only a particular combination of expected return and systematic 
risk. For every share/option there are many potential substitutes available. 
The price of a security changes as a result of new information that alters 
investors' expectations about the security's risk and return. These investors 
assume that insiders trade because private ('hidden') information has altered 
_their (ie the insiders's) expectations.290 On the premise of the CAP, ie that 
all stocks are priced equally in efficient markets, and a perfect correlation 
between expected returns and market risk exists, investors can in fact be 
indifferent about holding any two securities with the same beta factor.291 A 
beta factor is the portion of risk represented by the relationship between the 
riskiness of the market and the riskiness of a particular security292. Put 
differently, all stocks with the same beta factor are perfect substitutes -
absent inside information293 - which implies that the demand curve for any 
given stock is perfectly elastic over a very wide range.294 
The consequence of this is that even a large increase in the supply of a 
particular security in the market has no observable effect on price.295 Hence 
insider trading in itself cannot cause any damages to investors on the other 
side of the market. Insider profits do not even vary with the size of the 
trade, because the elasticity of the demand curve is not influen~ed by the 
size of the trade.296 This is important when we discuss civil remedies 
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individual insider transaction. This is a strong confirmation of our findings 
when we considered harm allegedly caused by insider trading: there ts 
indeed no material loss to the outsiders through an insider transaction. 
c) How prices really react upon insider dea1ing 
Price increases (ahead of positive information) or declines (ahead of 
negative information) are attributable to the information effect of 
secondary offerings, eg that insiders were selling out.297 Their trades, 
however, (no matter how big the size of their transaction) do not result in a 
price change. The major implication of this is that an increase in the volume 
of transaction in any particular security has no impact on its price, unless 
traders believe that valuable new information about the issuer exists.298 
Investors can decode trade signals in order to aquire new data. 
'Signal' in terms of market processes is information about trade volumes or 
identity of traders (ie insiders). Through such signals outsiders can decode 
the existence of inside information without knowing the information itself. 
The outsiders' transactions will finally adjust the price. Thus, the reflection 
of non-public information in prices (ie before the information has been 
disclosed!) is a two-stage process: it is first triggered by initially-informed 
'insider' trading; but then, at a critical threshold, it rapidly accelerates as a 
result of reactive trades (the so-called derivatively-informed trading). This 
ensures that prices reflect each 'bit' of decoded information with 
efficiency.299 Stated differently, the process helps reflect particular key 
trading facts (price, volume and insider trading, if it is detected). 
Such pieces of information have strong implications for price. Thus, as 
Estrada300 points out, insider trading prohibition reduces the flow of inside 
information channelled into securities prices - and so magnifies the reaction 
of these prices produced by the public announcement of non-public 
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risky! Indeed, this is a very interesting finding, particularly with regard to 
the so-called conservative (small) investor who, according to legislation and 
the capital market people is said to need so much protection. 
We learn from this that insiders do not cause price movements themselves, 
but send out certain signals which can be decoded by other traders who then 
cause price adjustments. This view has received considerable empirical 
support. Using previously unexplored data of the SEC, Meulbroek301 finds 
that the stockmarket detects302 the possibility of 'informed' trading and 
includes this information into the stock price. Both the amount traded by 
the insider and additional trade-specific characteristics lead to the market's 
recognition of the informed trading. To the extent that insider trading 
reveals the presence of valuable information, it generally moves stock 
prices in the correct direction.303 
Typically, however, the insider trader will find it desirable to ensure that 
the market price does not reveal his information (price signal). He will seek 
a situation where there is a 'pooling' equilibrium, rather than a situation 
with a 'separating' equilibrium where information can be decoded from 
prices.304 This simply means that insider activity can be decoded more 
easily when surprising price movements (like sudden increases of bid-offer-
spreads) occur; and that the insider prefers to hide in the 'pool' of all the 
stock orders. In a 'pooled' market products of different qualities are traded 
301 Meulbroek, 'An empirical analysis of illegal insider trading', (1992) 47 Journal of 
Finance at 1661-1699. 
302 'Undetected' trading does practically not signal at all, cf Camey op cit at 887; there 
is empirical evidence that insiders make a major part of their stock market gains from 
information revealed through trades, cf Givoly/Palmon op cit at 79 et seq.; the 
contrary, ie that insiders hide their most important transaction-information by trading 
through friends or relatives (eg to avoid sanctions) is observed by Seyhun, 
'Insiders' profits and market efficiency'. ( 1986) 16 Journal of Financial Economy 
189 at 207. 
303 Manne at 78 et seq. was once more the author who first raised this issue. Yet, the 
phenomenon is not caused by increased demand through insider orders, but through 
derivatively-informed trading, for more details see Carlton/ Fishel op cit at 879 et 
seq. and text hereinbefore. 
304 Laffon and Maskin, 'The efficient market hypothesis and insider trading on the stock 
market', (1990) 98 Journal of Political Economy at 70-93. 
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at the same price. In the case of insider trading, all shares of one company 
are still the same, but some of the shares are traded while the trader has 
superior knowledge of the true value of the share - a similar situation to a 
market where different products are traded at the same price. Thus 
undetected insider trading creates such a 'pool' in which the insider can hide 
provided there is sufficient trading volume by other market participants. 
The EMCH may well fail if there is imperfect competition on the market305, 
because then there will be insufficient competitive activity amongst other 
traders. And sufficient competition is necessary to ensure that inside 
information is decoded and the price adjusted as quickly as possible. 
Gilson and Kraakman 306 have pointed out that the (initial) distribution of 
information amongst traders will determine the relative efficiency of the 
market's response. If competitors in the market do not possess sufficient 
skills to discover new information (and thus move the price in the correct 
direction), efficiency cannot be achieved. Hence the importance of financial 
intermediaries (ie a broad range of institutional investors, from banks and 
insurance companies to mutual funds307) whose task is to spread new data, 
and to encourage competition trading. It would therefore be unwise to deter 
professional traders who have access to information as soon as it is 
announced. This has important implications for the definition of 'non-
public' ie that it is not in line with economic theory to give extra time to 
absorb the news after it has been publicly announced. It also follows from 
this economic finding that some market professionals have to be exempted 
from the insider trading prohibition. Efficiency depends on how quickly 
information is incorporated into prices, and these professionals help 
incorporating it. 
d) How to strengthen the signal decoding and pnce adjustment 
process - special disclosure requirements for insiders? 
Because derivatively-informed trading seems to function slowly and 
sometimes only sporadically, such trading does not seem to have much 
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policy question is not whether or not to permit insider trading, but whether 
the derivatively-informed trading mechanism can be made to operate more 
efficiently.309 Only this would make the market more efficient - the aim of 
the proponents of insider trading prohibitions. 
This again suggests that what is important is not so much insider trading 
prohibitions - so long as other measures are provided which ensure fast 
absorption of new information. One suggestion in this regard has been that 
insiders must disclose the fact of their trading and the size of their trades 
(not, however, the information itself). Yet, as such disclosure is required 
only some ten to forty days after the trade,310 this would seem to do little 
assist to the efficient operation of the derivatively-informed trading.3 11 
Gilson and Kraakman 312 suggest that, at some period before trading, the 
insider be required to disclose his identity and the size of the intended trade 
('pre-trade' disclosure). This policy recommendation is not without 
objection. Above all, there is the problem of monitoring insider trading, 
detecting it, and, also, the (transaction) costs incurred by supervisory bodies 
(ie taxes would have to be imposed in order to pay these costs). What is 
more, it is not really desirable to oblige insiders to announce their trades in 
advance. Prices would then rise irrespective of whether he deals on inside 
information or not. Like everybody else the insider has personal price 
limits. If these limits are reached as a consequence of his announced 
intention to sell, will he nevertheless have to sell the shares because he had 
reported his intention? This cannot be the right approach. Moreover, the 
separation of ownership and control is intensified where insider are 
deterred from trading. Therefore, such disclosure requirements do not 
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Clever outsiders; techniques of market makers to avoid 
losses to insiders; and allocative efficiency 
We shall now consider certain techniques developed by investors which help 
to avoid 'losses' to insiders if there are such 'losses'. We shall see that 
investors can protect themselves, and also enhance market efficiency, 
without the need for legal prohibitions. 
1. 'Clever' and 'naive' outsiders 
Even if there are occasionally losses, investors generally have developed 
skills to protect themselves from losses to insiders. Today, only naive 
outsiders trade without taking into consideration that insider trading does 
occur. They are likely to lose if they do not take steps to prevent possible 
losses. Ex ante, as we have seen, in the case of insider prohibitions all 
outsiders can sometimes expect to gain and sometimes to lose.3 13 Naive 
outsiders, however, will always 'lose', if there are losses. 
'Sophisticated' outsiders discount any expected loss from the share price. 
They will pay a lower price for the stock when they purchase because they 
assume that sonie of the shares are offered by insiders ( or deinand a higher 
price when they sell, assuming that some shares are sold to insiders). 
In case the shareholder is an outsider who paid a higher price for the shares 
(ie he has not discounted expected losses to insiders), he will ask for a 
higher dividend yield per share according to his earning expectations. In a 
subtle way, he claims back from the company the expected loss to insiders. 
For the shareholder both ways are effective to make up for expected losses 
to insiders.314 In other words the market provides means by which investors 
313 Haddock and Macey op cit at 1454 explain why this is so: If insiders do not sell 
ahead of bad news, the price of the stock will be driven down less quickly. Thus 
selling outsiders who sell between the event and its announcement will be better off 
than in situations where insiders trade because they sell at a higher price. If insiders 
do not buy ahead of good news, selling outsiders are worse off because insider 
trading would have driven the price of the stock up and the outsiders would have 
obtained more for their shares. 
314 Demsetz, 'Corporate control, insider trading, and rates of return', (1986) American 
Economic Review 313 at 316~ see also Ott/Schafer, 'Economic effects of EEC 
insider trading regulation applied to Germany', International Review of Law and 
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can effectively protect themselves. There is no need to ban insider trading, 
so long as it is beneficial, ie so long as its results in more accurate pricing, 
thus enhancing allocative efficiency. 
2. Market makers 
Some writers, above all in English economic literature,315 argue that the 
main 'victim' (ie the most likely to suffer losses) of insider trading is the 
market maker.316 This concern arises from the fact that trading on most 
anglo-american317 stock exchanges is carried out by professional market 
makers, ie people who hold themselves out at all normal times in 
compliance with the rules of a regulated market as willing to acquire or 
dispose of securities318. Market makers are on this broad premise obliged to 
set prices. They must deal, and so he will inevitably lose to insiders. 
This argument is, however, unconvincing. Clearly, the professional market 
maker is not a naive outsider. The market maker is fully-aware of the risk 
that insiders might cause losses to him. What is more, the market maker can 
Economics (1992) 357 at 363. The weakness of this argument is that as soon as the 
traded securities are commodity futures or other derivatives, the trader cannot 
demand a higher dividend. It is evident that the same applies to sellers of shares. On 
the other hand, we can certainly assume that a company which does not pay the 
highest possible dividend will not survive in a competitive market - allocational 
processes will direct capital to more profitable investment possibilities. 
315 See in particular Fenn/McGuire/Prentice, 'Information Imbalances and the Securities 
Markets', in: Hopt/Wymeersch (eds), 'European insider dealing - Law and practice', 
London, Boston, 1991 at 5; but see, for a view which advocates decriminalisation of 
insider trading, Arshadi/ Eyssell, 'The law and finance of corporate insider trading: 
Theory and evidence', Dordrecht, 1993 at chapter 7. 
316 Goodhart, 'The economics of Big Bang', (1987) Summer Midland Bank Review 6 
at 9 et seq.; Alcock, 'Insider dealing - how did we get here?', 15 Comp Lawy 1994, 
67 at 67; King/Roell, 'Insider Trading', (1988) Economic Policy 163 at 169. 
317 Not so, however, in Germany, where they have an auction system which is based 
on the so-called 'Einheitskurs' being the price at which the highest number of 
transactions can be carried out. None of the brokers or dealers has the obligation to 
'make' a price and deal. 
318 Cf Sched 1, para 1(2)(a) to s 53(4) of the CJA 1993 Part V. 
.. 
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also benefit from such 'losses' to insiders319. The reason for this is that 
when the market maker knows that insiders are acting on one side of the 
market he can re-arrange his price quotes accordingly. The imminent risk 
of his position is that most of the time he will not know whether he deals 
with an outsider or an insider. Therefore, in order to recoup such losses, 
market makers must widen their bid/ask-spreads320), on the basis of which 
they deal with other investors,321 irrespective of whether or not these other 
parties happen to be insiders. 
The ultimate victims are, then, the ordinary investors who pay higher 
transaction chatges for the gains of the insiders. Thus there seem to be real 
benefits that can be obtained through preventing insider dealing.322 On this 
basis, in the eyes of most English legal writers, insider dealing should be 
prohibited.323 But this is not really convincing.324 The argument assumes 
that outsiders who are not market makers are naive. But, as we have seen in 
the previous subsection, outsiders have the necessary means to protect 
themselves against losses; and what is more, the risk of a loss is indeed very 
small (see chapter on 'loss'). Given the large number of financial services 
. people, investment and trust bankers, financial intermediaries, fund 
managers, analysts, and other advisors who deal professionally in the 
. markets (and assist the naive outsiders when they bargain for the 'good' 
prices), it is surely wrong to base legislation on the assumption of the naive 
outsider; and, as this naive outsider is always the ultimate• victim, the 
argument that market makers suffer losses is also .not convincing. 
Professional traders will ensure that the price structure is efficient and 
319 See King/Roell op cit at 169 who quotes a bookie as saying 'he (ie the insider) is my 
most valuable client. I always shorten the odds when he bets, it saves me a fortune.' 
320 Schmidt, 'Insider regulation and economic theory', in: Hopt/ Wymeersch (eds) op 
cit 21 at 26. 
321 Goodhart op cit at 10; and indeed, the study by Copeland/Galai, 'Information effects 
on the bid-ask spread', (1983) 38 Journal of Finance at 1457 gives evidence of a 
positive relation between insider trading and market makers' spreads. 
322 Goodhart, idem at 10. 
323 McVea, 'Financial Conglomerates and Chinese Walls', Oxford, 1993 at 61; 
Rider/Ffrench, 'The regulation of insider trading', London, 1979 at 3. 
324 See the German economist Schmidt, 'Borsenorganisation zum Schutze der Anleger', 
Ttibingen, 1970 at 37-79. 
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'correct'. This is one of their important functions. It is more likely that all 
dealers are efficiently protected when market makers protect their interests. 
3. Self-protection and allocative efficiency 
On the premise that practically every insider either protects himself or is 
protected by the pool of trading, it seems certain that all outsiders will 
discount the expected losses to insiders from the share price. That has an 
important implication: it will lower the general price levels, in other words 
shares become cheaper. If prices on secondary markets are lowered, this is 
not without effect on the primary market (ie the issues of new securities): 
their prices will also be lower (remember that new shares must always be 
less expensive than those which are already traded - otherwise investors 
would not invest in them), with the result that less capital will be allocated 
to companies, and, consequently, less money will be invested. This 
argument is called the 'higher capital cost' approach.325 
Moreover, the increased bid/ask-spread brings about a taxation-effect for 
the investors, which may result in a preference to invest in things other than 
325 Ott/Schaf er op cit at 364 et seq.~ the approach is based on the fact that rational 
investors can choose from a variety of financial instruments, not all traded on 
securities markets, see Easterbrook, 'Managers' discretion and investors' welfare: 
Theories and evidence', (1984) 9 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 540~ see also 
in favour of this view King/Roell op cit at 170~ but see against this view Schomer 
op cit at 110 et seq.~ the weakness of this argument is that, if insider trading truly 
damages stock value, we would expect to see firms interested in redqcing the cost of 
capital by adopting their own rules against insider trading. There is, however, no 
evidence that firms do adopt such rules, Camey op cit at 896. See, however, the 
examination on the (positive) interrelation between such rules and the share price of 
financial institutes by Torabzadeh/Davidson/Assar, 'The effect of the recent insider-
trading scandal on stock prices of securities firms', (1989) 8 Journal of Business 
Ethics at 299 et seq., whose overall findings furnish evidence that investors 
appreciate the fact that a firm has internal compliance codes. See for an examination 
of such codes Tippach op cit at 212 et seq. See also Manove, 'The harm from insider 
trading and informed speculation', (1989) 104 Quarterly Joum of Econ at 823-845, 
who says that insiders are able to appropriate returns to corporate investment at the 
expense of shareholders. Insider trading therefore tends to discourage corporate 
investment and reduce the efficiency of corporate beha,viour. 
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shares (or options), so that capitalisation will not be optimal.326 This would 
be an indirect harm caused by insiders, even though it is not caused by their 
trades but by their mere presence in the market. Such a lowered allocative 
efficiency could finally cause more severe harm to market and society than 
insider trading itself was ever thought to cause. 
Is this approach convincing, and must insider trading the ref ore be banned? 
The answer is again: no. Firstly, the above argument can be countered by 
pointing to the fact that insider trading helps incorporate new data into 
share prices. Hence both prohibition ( on the basis of the higher capital cost-
approach), and deregulation (ie free insider trading) aim at the same 
beneficial result for the market. It is impossible to determine which is the 
more suitable approach. They merely suggest two different options. 
Secondly, whenever investors trade, there is uncertainty about information 
which has not yet been released. Insiders abstain from trading because they 
are not allowed to disclose the information to the public at large.327 Hence 
all other investors are still uninformed, and uncertainty prevails. In this 
case, the inaccuracy of the price is even worse than in a situation where 
insiders trade,328 because insider trading will incorporate information into 
prices.329 Once the new information is released, the price reaction could be 
less drastic in situations where insider dealing has occurred previously.330 
Whether insider dealing is prohibited or not, the only way to avoid losses 
resulting from a lack of information is to trade great volumes of several 
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is the case both in markets where insider dealing is prohibited, and in 
markets where it is allowed.331 The small investor will have to incur some 
losses anyway, whether or not insider dealing is prohibited because he, by 
definition, does not have large fqnds to increase his trade volume in order 
. to minimise his losses. To do this, one would need sufficient capital. 
4. Conclusion 
There is an important lesson to be learnt from this subsection. The persons 
who really profit from the insider trading prohibition (based, of course, on 
the premise that it is obeyed) are market participants who have enough 
capital to invest. These traders are mainly institutional investors, such as 
funds, banks or brokers,332 There are no actual benefits for the (allegedly 
protected) small investor through insider dealing prohibition. The fact is 
that certain groups have special interests that are promoted by imposing 
prohibitions on insider trading. The capital market is an important factor in 
our modern societies; and surely the legislators listen to these groups 
because of their economic power. Sometimes they may listen too carefully. 
Our analysis has shown that one is not compelled to conclude that insider 
trading causes harm to investors. Nevertheless, even if there is no need for 
prohibition, we must still ask ourselves what alternative we can offer. An 
alternative must be moulded in such a way that a sufficient number of 
investors will feel protected, and more so than under a regime of insider 
prohibition. It has also become clear that prohibition (ie regulation) is 
probably not the best approach; at least, it is not the only possible way to 
address the problem of insider dealing. It seems that such protection would, 
at least to the same extent, be provided by an agency model (ie a non-
regulation model based on contractual freedom) which will be discussed in 
the following subsection. 
331 
332 
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B. The agency approach in the context of market processes 
In Chapter II we saw that one of the main problems posed by the agency 
analysis is that of 'moral hazard' ( other problems like adverse selection 
have been dealt with). 'Moral hazard' was used as a term to describe the 
possibility of the agent increasing his own utility to the detriment of the 
principal, s. We saw that, to overcome this problem, the firm will need 
either specific control systems or special salary agreements. If the company 
does not wish to rely on state help, the managerial contract must include 
agreements on incentives, risk-sharing, participation in the stock capital, or 
- as we will see -possible cuts in salary in return for allowing the manager 
to deal as an insider333. 
I. Interest groups versos shareholder interests 
It has been suggested that potential purchasers of a company's shares, 
whether outsider-shareholders or complete outsiders (potentially buying 
shares of the company for the first time), might want insiders to trade. 
Why? If a price sensitive event comes to the attention of the firm's manager 
before anyone else learns of it, the manager will profit if he can trade on 
the basis of this knowledge. The manager will not profit if such insider 
trading is effectively prohibited by law. The key question then becomes: 
who gains that benefit when insiders cannot.334 We have to remember that 
both insiders and market profess'ionals can be identified as interest 
groups335 in regard to these extra gains. 
We must bear in mind that whoever it is who gains, it will definitely not be 
the outsider shareholder, ie whether insiders are banned or not, the outsider 
shareholders will lose the trading profit anyway. The reason for this is that 
if insiders do not trade, then the persons who will gain will be those who 
are able to hear the news first after the announcement: market 
professionals, such as brokers, exchange specialists, arbitrageurs, brokers, 
portfolio managers, securities researchers, and financial analysts.336 If 
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trade, the next (second-best) information processors will. The 'normal' 
c;apitalist shareholders will not benefit if insiders are barred from such 
trades, because other outsiders can beat them to the information. The only 
difference lies in the identity of the parties to whom the trading profits go, 
insiders or market professionals.337 
II. Conflict of interest: shareholders and managers 
Shareholders could be, however, at least partial beneficiaries when insiders 
trade on inside information. It is important to recognise that there are 
mutual incentives for allocating the property rights in information to its 
highest-valuing user, and that this does not depend on negotiations between 
insiders and investors.338 In the agency context, the relevant parties are 
insiders and shareholders who are involved in a private contract. Since 
Demsetz and Jensen the corporation as such is considered as a 'nexus of 
contracts.339 The pre-existing contractual relationship manifests itself in the 
company's articles of incorporation.340 That contract ties the shareholder 
( owner) as principal and the manager (insider) as agent. The basic problem 
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advantage through incentives that influence the agent's behaviour, yet 
reward the agent enough so that he will not quit.341 
One of the principles of an agency relationship is that any changes in the 
rules of the game will either benefit or hurt all the players. Clearly, by 
allowing their managers to trade on inside information, companies grant 
them, and not the shareholders, the benefits from the information. So we 
must ask why firms might want to allocate the property right in valuable 
information to their managers rather than to their shareholders. After all, 
the company is based on the shareholders' capital. Hence the question is: 
why should shareholders want to allocate property rights in valuable 
information to managers rather than to themselves? The answer is that the 
shareholders will benefit from insider trading because they will allow the 
insiders to trade only in exchange for a reduction in their wages.342 
It is important to understand that principal-agent-relations are contracts. In 
terms of these contracts managers can profit from altered expectations 
about the firm (as a compensation package) and shareholders will be 
compensated by the manager' cut in salary. This will help to realign the 
interests of principal and agent: agents would be allowed to increase their 
profits on the strength of inside information, shareholders will increase 
their returns because expenses are reduced. 
III. Moral hazard and control markets 
The idea that insider trading can be regulated by contract so as to benefit 
both the shareholders and the managers is conceptually brilliant. Yet, as we 
have seen, it has raised criticism.343 As a matter of fact, insiders can also 
341 Pratt/Zeckhauser, 'Principals and agents: An overview', in Pratt/Zeckhauser op cit 1 
at 17. It is assumed that firms are not dominated by managers, and that shareholders 
are not systematically robbed of their invested wealth, see Haddock/Macey op cit at 
1450 fn 1; the terminology may cause some problems for lawyers: although lawyers 
use the agency concept in a variety of senses, the legal concept implies a relationship 
in which the principal retains the power to control. In firms this can be different, see 
Clark, 'Agency costs versus fiduciary duties', in Zeck/Pratthauser op cit at 56. 
342 Carlton/Fischel at 861; Haddock/Macey at 1451; Demsetz, 'The structure of 
ownership', (1983) 26 J of Law and Econ 375 at 379; Easterbrook op cit at 83. 
343 Easterbrook op cit at 81; also Easterbrook op cit (Secret agents) at 309. 
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profit from trading ahead of bad inf ormation.344 In the extreme case this 
could make managers indifferent as between working to make the firm 
prosperous, and working to make it bankrupt.345 One objection to Manne"s 
position was that managerial staff will be distracted from diligent work . 
when they trade. 
Managers might also be tempted to use such negative information. That, 
however, would create incentives to produce such negative data.346 From 
this perspective the insider would not only gain from negative performance, 
but he would consciously perform poorly in order to profit from the bad 
news about his firm. As we have seen, Manne"s answer to this problem was 
certainly not entirely satisfactory. Without the existence of some specific 
control markets managers would in fact be able to exploit the agency 
relation to the detriment of the shareholders. 
1. Control markets for managers 
There are three control markets which make it extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for the manager to act to the detriment of the shareholders: the 
capital market; the labour market for managers; and the market for take-
overs.347 
The first and perhaps most obvious of these control markets is the capital 
market. As soon as managers act contrary to shareholders., interests, share 
344 Easterbrook op cit note 15 at 84. 
345 Carlton/Fischel op cit at 873~ see Schneider op cit at 1430. 
346 Gilson and Kraakman op cit at 633 fn 221, therefore, made the point that, if insider 
bans are lifted, managers should at least be forbidden to exploit negative 
information. It is respectfully submitted that this does not contribute to an 
appropriate solution of our problem. Above all, the monitoring institutions (and 
hence the problem of costs) would have to continue operating in order to detect 
trading on negative data. This would not help to increase social welfare. Secondly, it 
is a fact that some firms perform poorly. Assuming that insider trading helps to 
reflect this in the share price, then this is still better for all investors. Therefore, it is 
wiser than rely on prohibition and thereby postponing the reflection of such bad 
news in prices. 
347 See Jensen, 'Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers', 76 
(1986) The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 323 at 324 et seq. 
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prices will drop.348 Such a drop disciplines managers for various reasons. 
Firstly, it will be more difficult to raise capital funds for projects which 
makes it likely that some managerial staff is dismissed. Secondly, in many 
managerial contracts there are clauses which grant the manager a bonus 
(shares or options), or a participation in the dividend if the share price 
remains above a certain level - as soon as the price drops below this level, 
the manager will loose the bonus. His interest is then also that the company 
performs well. 
The second of these markets is the managerial labour market. The basic 
idea here is that both good and bad managerial performance is reflected in 
the market value (ie the totality of the share prices) of the company; and 
bad results lead to cuts in salaries, or even to dismissals. Thus managers 
have a strong incentive to refrain from both consumption on the job (ie 
pursuing their own interests more than the company,s)349 and from 
shirking (ie lowering their work efforts). 
It is however not so easy to measure the quality of managerial performance. 
Because of asymmetric information (which is inherent in agency relations), 
the shareholder does not always know whether the company,s bad 
performance was due to a manager's faults or to reasons exogenous to the 
company (which cannot be attributed to managers). Yet many enterprises 
today are highly diversified, so that exogenous influences, as difficulties at a 
particular branch, are not of great importance. Thus, it is much easier for 
the stockholder to tell whether the management of a conglomerate is doing 
a good or a bad job than it is for him to tell the same about the management 
of an individual branch or small company. Tullock350 said that, simply 
following the rule of firing the management whep.ever the profits fall may 
well be an optimal technique for operating the company. 
Clearly, this is an uncompromising view. Yet together with the share 
market, this seems to be an efficient control, because (as we have seen) the 
insider/manager who trades brings the share price in line with the 'true 




See Manne, 'Mergers and the market for corporate control', 73 (1965) Journal of 
Political Economy 110 at 112 et seq. 
Manne op cit (Mergers) at 112~ Jensen/Meckling op cit at 316-8. 
Tullock, 'The new theory of corporations', in Streissler ( ed) 'Roads to freedom', 
London, 1969 at 307. 
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duties poorly start selling their shares, the share price will drop. That drop 
is observable to the stockholder, and can thus be. used as a parameter to 
distinguish between managerial faults and exogenous influences. The latter 
can hit the whole branch of the industry so that share prices decline in the 
whole branch. In the absence of such exogenous influences ( eg political 
news) the shareholders know that the drop in the share price is due to poor 
management performance. 
The third control market for managers is the market for enterprise control 
(eg buy-outs or take-overs). Enterprise control is the property right to 
determine the management of corporate resources, ie the right to hire, fire 
and set the compensation of, top-level managers.351 This control function is 
itself a value for the (controlling) shareholder.352 The idea of control is 
this353: if the share price of a company is lower than the average share price 
of firms in the same field of economic activity, or lower than the market on 
the whole, this is an indicator of bad managerial performance. ·Such 
companies offer possibilities for capitalist shareholders, the so-called 
'raiders' to gain profits from firing the management and hiring new labour 
who will better serve the interests of the shareholders. That will thus result 
in an increase of the share price, hence a profitable resell for the investor. 
The most common way to 'raid' is by carrying out management buy-outs or 
a take-over by another company. It has been said that a manager who fears 
losing his job (through such replacement or a take-over, in other words, 
through an external or internal control market for managers), has an 
incentive to trade on inside information hoping that the take-over will fall 
through.354 But this is a weak argument, because (as we assumed) the 
information is negative. Hence, selling ahead of that news will help lower 
the share price even further and thus facilitate the take-over. Therefore, the 
management will rather try and perform well in order to maintain their 
career positions. Again here the reflection of their good performance is the 
rise of the share price which will make it undesirable for investors to take-
over company. The market for corporate control is best viewed as an arena 
351 Jensen/fuback, 'The market for corporate control', 11 (1983) Journal of Financial 
Economics 5 at 5. 
352 Manne op cit (Mergers) at 112. 
353 Manne, idem at 112-4. 
354 Easterbrook op cit at 333 et seq.; see also Davidson/Solomon at 92. 
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in which managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate 
resources.355 Both the control market for managerial labour and the market 
for enterprise control are complementary to one another. 
2,c__ __ _,,.C.,_,o=d..,e ..... s.____,,.o,...f.__3,C=o ..... n...,d...,o....,c"'-"'t 
Bearing in mind the original concept of the 'theory of the firm, it is clear 
that there is no ambiguity about the objective function of the firm in 
modern financial theory: managers should maximise the current market 
value of the firm.356 Thus, it is sensible (instead of chasing insiders) to 
develop certain ethical codes of conduct within firms which, again 
contractually, bind the managerial staff. Managerial skills should include 
the formation of a specific business ethic. When this is done, staff in leading 
positions are likely to gain satisfaction from their company's well-being. 
Moreover, empirical studies357 have shown that share prices increase when 
firms implement business strategies based on ethical codes of conduct.358 
Therefore, it appears to be wiser to carry out one's business in a moral way 
than to waste much thought on insider trading. However, we are not sure of 
all this. In order to prevent the small likelihood of excessive misuse ( or 
production) of negative information, it seems to be a good approach to 






Jensen/Ruback op cit at 5 et seq. 
Kaen et al op cit at 815 (quoting Jensen/Smith). 
Torabzadeh/Davidson/Assar, 'The effect of the recent insider-trading scandal', 8 
(1989) Journal of Business Ethics 299 at 302 et seq. 
See Tippach op cit at 222 et seq. 
Carlton/Fischel op cit at 893; see Schneider op cit at 1434 et seq., who suggests that 
dealing on 'put options' by insiders should be prohibited, idem at 1435. This is 
questionable. Contrary to short sells which do not, normally, exceed a period of a 
few days (which means that the information must already be about to be released in 
order for the insider to gain a profit), 'put options' can cover periods of several 
months. Why, however, should this be prohibited then? If the market is efficient, 
dealing in options will also help reflect complete information. Such dealings also 
convey information; and this is beneficial because it contributes to efficient pricing. 
IV. 
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More than a zero sum game: advantages of agency 
relations which allow insiders to trade 
There are several reasons why such contractual agreements are more 
economically efficient than attempts to prohibit and monitor insider trading 
through administrative bodies. 
The first of these reasons relates to the informational effects that such 
managerial contracts allowing insider trading can have on the markets. We 
have seen that it is generally assumed that insider trading brings the share 
price in line with the informational 'truth' (true value). The more 
accurately prices reflect all information (ie including inside information), 
the better the prices will guide capital investment in the economy (allocative 
efficiency).360 
Secondly, disclosure costs are lowered through insider trading within a 
contractual frame. It will be recalled that the (initial) distribution of 
information will enhance price efficiency. Hence it is in the interests of 
firms to disclose information about themselves. Disclosure, however, is 
expensive.361 And complete (mandatory) disclosure can never be an 
optimal solution, because, for instance, in the case of a confidential study 
revealing valuable mineral ore deposits,362 such full disclosure would 
destroy incentives to create valuable new information. That destructive 
impact on incentives is inevitable with full disclosure because all 
information will then be treated· as a public good, ie something free of 
cost.363 For this reason shareholders may also value insider trading because 
360 Carlton/Fischel at 866. 
361 Inside information particularly is extremely costly to everyone except the insiders, cf 
Gilson and Kraakman op cit at 628. 
362 Carlton/Fischel, idem at 867 et seq.; Easterbrook/Fischel, 'Mandatory disclosure and 
the protection of investors', (1984) 70 Virginia Law Review 669 at 674. 
363 It would be interesting to reconsider the nature of information, ie whether it is 
'public' or 'private', in the light of this incentive argument. If firms are allowed to 
opt out of the regulation which imposes restrictions on insider dealing, information 
may become at the same time private and public: the insider exploiting it in a private 
context which is based on his contract with the shareholders; and, at the same time, 
public in that it enhances efficient pricing and allocative functions. Arrow, 'Limited 
knowledge and economic analysis', (1974) 64 American Economic Review 1, 
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it gives the firm an additional method of communicating and controlling 
inf ormation,364 thus enhancing an optimal pricing of their stock. 
Thirdly, the company's internal communication systems should benefit 
from insider trading. Since higher-positioned managers want to make sure 
that they can trade as soon as information is produced, they will ensure 
closer contact with the other staff members who work, for instance, on a 
new product. A better internal communication will certainly help to 
improve the performance of the company.365 Moreover, markets for 
managerial services and corporate control appear to function more 
effectively when insiders trade, because the true value of the stock is 
reflected in the price_366 
Only superior managers will accept the compensation scheme, beca_use they 
produce valuable information which they can exploit. This will help 
minimise the costs of screening (potential) managers.367 That again brings 
about an advantage for the shareholders as the costs for their company are 
reduced. Hence the shareholders' interest to refrain from exploiting inside 
information themselves, and to transfer this property right to the 
management. 






argues, however, that information is a always a public good 
This was a point made by Kitch, 'The law and economics of rights in valuable 
information', (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies at 683~ Carlton/Fischel, idem at 
868~ another very interesting point in terms of market efficiency was made by 
Fischel/Ross: insider's purchases, once disclosed or decoded, may be the reason that 
market participants become more optimistic, see Fischel/Ross, 'Should the law 
prohibit 'manipulation' in financial markets?', (1991) 105 Harvard Law Review 503 
at 524. One would have to ask whether decoded selling would lead to a more 
pessimistic market. Even such pessimism reflects the situation in the market better. 
Cf Easterbrook op cit (Agency) at 85. 
Carlton/Fischel at 867. 
Carlton/Fischel at 871 et seq. 
Estrada op cit at 215 et seq. argues that insiders should be allowed to trade against 
the payment of a lump-sum tax. With this tax he suggests to compensate investors 
who are harmed by insider trading, idem at 215. This view is unacceptable, because, 
as we have seen, it is impossible to determine who is eventually harmed, if at all 
anyone is harmed. Taxation must therefore be the wrong device. The redistribution 
scheme which taxes create is also.off track, because the first to profit from the tax-
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because there will be no further need to monitor insider activities. And 
even if some monitoring of managers is still necessary on the part of firms, 
these costs will by far be lower than the enforcement costs of administrative 
supervisory bodies (whose success in barring insider trading is traditionally 
rather poor). 
Earlier in this text the risk-problem was discussed. The objection here is 
that insiders might be tempted to invest in riskier projects. This argument is 
not convincing because, should the riskier projects fail, the manager will 
suffer a loss in the value of his human capital, because he is blamed for the 
failure.369 Managers sometimes behave like administrative people and do 
not f <>Ster a constructive development. This type of manager should be 
encouraged to engage in riskier projects rather than deterred from insider 
trading. 
As to the argument that information may be delayed because the insider 
wants to profit from it first, it has to be noted that there is no empirical 
evidence to support this fear.370 On the contrary, it is more likely that 
disclosure will be made more quickly. Disclosure provisions fall within the 
ambit of responsibilities of the legislature, which must be designed so as to 
maintain sufficient incentives for the production of information. One such 
incentive is non-regulation. 
369 
370 
Carlton/Fischel op cit at 872. 
Dooley. 'Enforcements of insider trading restrictions'. (1980) 66 Virginia Law 
Review 1 at 34 who finds. after examining a sufficient number of cases. that insider 
trading did not delay the public disclosure of information. 
102 
c. Conclusion: a democratic approach to insider deali~ 
We have considered the economic theories; and their application to insider 
trading; the market process oriented approaches; and the alternative of 
agency, ie allowing insider dealing and using it as a form of compensation. 
It is now time to develop an onceptual approach which is a suitable basis for 
a proper legal solution to insider trading. This theoretical framework is 
also necessary in order to compare and evaluate the different laws. 
I. Market protection 
We have seen that there is neither empirical nor theoretical evidence to 
show that the individual investor needs protection. Thus, clearly the market 
is at the core of our concern. The aim of both prohibition and permission 
of insider trading by special agency contracts is the protection of the capital 
market. However, one is not sure about the best way to provide for this 
protection. 
Efficiency concerns, transaction costs, and incentives are three of the major 
issues of market protection. We have seen that it is very dangerous to rely 
exclusively on the financial service people who argue that legal prohibition 
of insider trading is necessary in order to enhance market efficiency. The 
interest analysis has clearly shown that regulation serves their interests best; 
and that is why they try to convince the legislator to provide for 
prohibition. Nevertheless, there is also not enough evidence to prove that 
using e:t compensation package - in the sense that the insider may deal on the 
strength of ( exclusively) positive information - is sufficient. It may as well 
be that for certain firms or insiders, depending on whether or not they are 
risk averse (and hence unwilling to give up a higher fixed salary) it is better 
to place a contractual or statutory ban on insider trading.371 
There is no one single 'first best' solution. Given the overall economic 
impossibility of a first best solution in general, this is not surprising. This 
makes it necessary to find an approach which will help to ensure the 
efficient functioning of our markets until a convincing economic, and thus 
juristic, answer to the insider problem is found. In the meantime, our 
solution will have to be based on trial and error, and must be compatible 
with our democratic_ system. 
371 Haddock/Macey op cit at 1467 et seq. 
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II. The democratic approach 
Two very important groups concerned with market protection have never 
properly been asked to offer their opinions: shareholders and companies. In 
our modern democracy it would seem vital to foster self-responsibility. So 
why not allow these interest groups to decide for themselves? One could 
certainly rely on their ability to pursue their interests. If they felt that a 
statutory system would be the best solution for them, they could opt in and 
have their shares monitored for insider activities. On the other hand, if they 
felt that they could save (transaction) costs and thus improve their 
performance, they could opt out and allow insiders to trade. To put it in a 
nutshell: less State where less State is wanted. And the State has to learn that 
citizens need no costly protection where markets function properly. 
Although it is constantly asserted that markets must be protected, people 
ignore the fact that the market (within its own process) develops certain 
'cleansing' mechanisms. We have seen that catch-words like 'market 
protection' (as used, for instance, by the European Directive on insider 
trading) are not yet well-founded, even though they are mentioned so often. 
It will be argued that, in most cases, legislators do not even state the 
hypotheses which legal enactments are based upon. 
As long as we do not know with any certainty what is t~e best for the 
market, we should off er the greatest number of options, and let the market 
itself find out the optimal procedures. The market is composed of 
companies and shareholders. Financial analysts are of importance, but their 
importance is a secondary one. No doubt, in the course of time the best 
solution will be found. In the meantime we shall have to wait and see. The 
present legislation, however, provides only for prohibition. The costs for 
enforcement of this legislation are not fully revealed. Most investors take it 
for granted that taxes are used to pay the monitoring system. The allegedly 
beneficial effects of prohibition do not come free. Shareholders and 
companies ought to become aware of this. That should make them much 
more interested in non-regulation than they presently are. 
There is also not enough evidence that statutory prohibition of insider 
trading is completely superfluous - as proponents of free market patterns 
believe. For instance, it could be detrimental to the markets to allow 
insiders to trade on the strength of negative information. Yet this issue can 
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also be addressed via the contractual agency approach. Carlton and 
Fischef372 argue that companies should be given the freedom to opt out of 
the regulatory system, which system ought, however, in the meantime to be 
maintained. Then we will be able to really compare the results, ie how 
investors react to the agency approach, and how companies perform 
without their insiders being prohibited from trading. 
Some transaction costs have to be incurred, for managers will presumably 
accept cuts in salary only if these cuts are made up for by their expected 
profits from insider trading. In fact, the profits from insider dealing must 
be a little bit higher. 
On the other hand, if insider trading is allowed, it is likely that managers 
will own more of their company's shares, which will serve two purposes. 
Firstly, it will diminish the separation of ownership and control. This is a 
very important issue: Georg Koffler, chairman of Pro 7 (a German TV 
Channel exercising a lot of media influence), for instance, said that he sold 
his 3% stake in shares of Pro 7, not because he thinks this is a bad 
investment, but because he would always be concerned about insider 
dealing.373 This is certainly not a good development. Secondly, it will 
reduce the moral hazard risk (ie the incentive to generate negative 
information),374 for managers would suffer losses from a devaluation of 
their own shares. 
We can define the democratic approach to market protection as the 
conviction of the majority that something (ie either regulation or non-
regulation) protects their interests best. This is democracy. We live with 
uncertainty; and we can never know anything with absolute certainty. By 
applying economic models to the reality of stock markets we will be able to 
lower uncertainty (which is reflected by heterogenous expectations) to a 
certain degree. 
But what is theoretically best for individuals and markets is of less 
importance. As long as people think that they are protected by one or other 
model, then for them that model is a good ~odel, and they will eventually 
372 Op cit at 895~ Haddock/Macey op cit at 1468~ this opinion is shared in the German 
economic literature by Schmidt op cit at 38. 
373 Interview on TV (Channel SAT 1, 'Teleborse'), 17.1.1996. 
374 Schomer at 210. 
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choose it. The difficulty of all regulatory attempts is that they do not clearly 
reveal the hypotheses on which they are based. The suggested 'democratic 
approach' is honest and modest: its hypothesis is that we do not know 
whether regulation or non-regulation of insider trading is better. 
Therefore, it seems to be appropriate to leave both alternatives open to 
market participants. 
III. Minimum standards of this approach 
In this subsection both parts of the democratic approach will be explained. 
It is convenient to start with the prohibition, since this is the more common 
part of this model. 
1. Opting in: insider trading prohibited 
Firstly, companies can opt in and have their shares/options monitored. This 
alternative is chosen by companies which want to prevent their insiders 
from trading. Reasons for this choice could be: low variability of the share 
price, and risk aversion of either shareholders or managers. These 
companies must register with a supervisory body which monitors the 
tradings on the stock exchange. According to the amount of shares traded, 
the company will have to pay a fixed price for the monitoring service. 
a) Who monitors? Who pays? 
It is generally agreed that companies do not themselves have effective 
means to monitor insider activities on stock markets. Therefore, this task 
has to be carried out by a supervisory (State) body. Until now, the 
companies received the alleged benefits of this service without having to 
pay for it. That is not so in the democratic approach, which relies more on 
self-responsibility. If companies wish their shares to be monitored for 
insider dealing transactions they ought to pay for that service. The taxpayer 
should not be asked to pay in order to improve the performance of specific 
companies, if he is not interested in shares at all. Therefore, shareholders 
ought to pay via their firms.375 The amount to be paid decreases the profits 
375 In this regard it has been a very meaningful step in the right direction that under the 
new German § 11 (1) Nr. 3 WpHG (for the WpHG ~ee details hereinafter Part II) 
companies with registered securities must pay 10% of the costs for the 
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of the firm. That 1s the price to be paid for the alleged benefits of 
regulation. 
The exact amount to be paid by firms ought to depend on the following 
variables: the volatility of the share price (because the higher the 
variability, the more likely insider trading will be); the average amount of 
shares traded per day; and, last but not least, the expected costs of the 
supervisory body (staff, equipment, and building). The fact that 
shareholders have to pay for what they have defined as their 'protection' 
will also make them aware of some advantages of the opting-out possibility. 
This approach makes it clear that monitoring insider trading is a special 
(and costly) service. If insider dealing were proved to be detrimental to the 
performance of the capital market, it would be advisable to use the general 
tax yield to have shares monitored, because then it would be in the common 
interest to enforce the ban on insiders. It is of course assumed here that, in 
a democratic society, capital markets serve the interest of all people, not 
only those of shareholders. 
b) Clear-cut definitions ensure personal freedom 
The economic theory which put forward the 'freedom approach' taught us 
that definitions of the 'insider' and of what constitutes inside information 
mu.st be clear, to make it obvious to the insider to what extent his market 
activities fall within the ambit of prohibition. Otherwise deterrence would 
lower the liquidity376 of the market, because the insider would choose not to 
trade even if he were allowed to do so. Clearly, any prohibition which is 
placed on insiders by the 'democratic approach' must respect this aspect of 
personal freedom of market participants. Also, the 'democratic approach' 
must take into consideration the economic doubts as to whether or not 
insider trading is harmful. One must be very careful not to fine insiders ( or 
even imprison them) when it cannot be proved that they cause harm. 
Although it is clear that company insiders (and information about 
corporations) must be encompassed by the legal definition of the 'insider', 
Bundesaufsichtsamt ftir den Wertpapierhandel (ie the supervisory body newly 
created for capital market matters. 
376 This is an important issue for the JStE, since it is a developing market, see Roy 
Andersen (President of the JSE) in FAZ 8.11.1995. 
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this is less clear for market insiders (and market information377). Are they 
to be included in an agency model? At first sight, it would seem that the 
agency approach cannot cover market information, because this data is 
exogenous to companies and therefore uncapable of being included in firm 
contracts. Yet such market information can be included by the agency 
approach. Companies can decide whether or not they want their shares to be 
monitored. That decision, however, can cover market information as well, 
because this type of information is also incorporated into the price of 
securities. Companies may have a legitimate interest in achieving an even 
more accurate pricing of their shares through incorporation of market data. 
If so, they will allow their managers to trade. Companies may, however, be 
interested to ensure that only their managers can trade on market 
information, and not third parties (eg financial analysts). 
Another issue must be addressed. So far we have discussed only 'real' 
insiders. Normally, regulation encompasses tipees (it is suggested that their 
transactions be called 'derivative' insider trading rather than using the 
expression 'tipees'). They are of importance also for agency contracts, 
although they are not the managers of the firm. Their derivative insider 
trading enhances market efficiency because it helps incorporate new 
information into the share price. They are not supposed to enter into 
contractual relationships between insider-managers and firms or 
shareholders, but managers might wish to sell their information to them. 
If so, we need a contractual clause in the managerial contract permitting the 
manager to sell the information to third parties. This would be beneficial 
for the market because the manager ( or entrepreneur) does not always have 
enough capital to buy shares. However, if one wishes to ban insider trading 
( contractually), it will be necessary to prohibit the manager from profitting 
by selling information because derivative insider trading is likely to affect 
outsiders as much as insider trading itself. 
377 For an interpretation of the term see Aeischer/Mundheim/Murphy, 'An initial inquiry 
into the responsibility to disclose market information', (1973) 121 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 798 at 799 et seq.~ also Barry, 'The economics of 
outside information and rule lOb-5', (1981) 129 Univ of Pennsylvania L Rev 1307. 
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Insider trading allowed; pareto-improvements; 
incentives for managers; and first or second best 
contracts between firm and managers 
The democratic approach does not only offer a prohibition-solution to 
insider trading, but also provides for firms to decide whether or not 
insiders can trade. Where firms allow (managarial) insiders to trade, profits 
from such insider trading would constitµte a part of their compensation 
package. 
a) Insider trading allowed 
The second alternative in the 'democratic' model is that companies are free 
to opt out of the monitoring system offered by supervisory bodies. These 
companies do not wish their shares to be monitored for insider activities, 
because they feel that their performance is better when they reduce costs 
(for salary) and gain through the extra incentives given to managers to 
produce good information. Therefore, they allow their management to deal 
on the strength of inside information. Once firms opt out they will want to 
ensure, however, that most of the beneficial effects of insider trading (other 
than for the market functions) are passed on to the shareholders. They need 
to enter into a contract with the managers in which it is agreed upon that 
the insider accepts a cut in salary in return for the possibility to profit from 
insider trading. 
b) Pareto improvementthrough firm contracts 
The contract solution brings about a pareto improvement for all parties. 
For the shareholder there is more accurate pricing and more incentives 
offered to the manager to generate good news. The managers can increase 
their compensation package by producing good news, which will in return 
increase profits for the shareholder. This aligns interests of shareholders 
and management. 
Transaction costs for the firms are at the same time lowered, because 
information will be incorporated in share prices through insider trading, 
and does not need to be communicated (information costs) to every single 
shareholder.378 The manager will have to bear more risk (ie risk share 
378 See Schomer at 216. 
109 
incentive to overcome the separation of ownership and control), even if he 
does not engage in riskier projects, because his salary depends on the 
performance of the company. This will also help overcome the separation 
of ownership and control. 
A first-best solution (in terms of pareto-improvement) would be possible 
only if incentive problems were absent.379 A difficulty that goes together 
with incentives is how to control the managerial work. The reality is that 
the principal/shareholder has no effective way of observing the work of the 
agent/manger.380 Hence the need to include incentives in the contract at the 
risk of incomplete risk distribution. Risk distribution would be perfect only 
if the bargain was solely concerned with the question of risk distribution. A 
contract, however, which only includes risk distribution would potentially 
be to the detriment of the shareholder because of the unsolved moral hazard 
problem.381 Therefore, it seems inevitable that the manager must be given 
some extra compensation382 (in order to secure the risk of moral hazard). 
This will immediately result in a second-best solution. 
Nevertheless, the pareto improvement of this model is still more preferable 
to a model where insider trading is completely banned, because in the latter 
case monitoring and enforcement costs are excessively higher. Other forms 
of compensation (such as shares or options on shares) do not have the same 
effect: when the company performs badly, the manager's shares lose value 
and cannot be sold, for that would imply a contravention of the insider 
trading prohibition. 
c) The problem of dominant and controlling shareholders 
A special situation can be observed in firms with a dominant shareholder. 
As a consequence of his dominant position he will inevitably gain access to 
inside information. The problem of his extra profits from insider 
transactions is that they could well be to the detriment of the average 
379 Schomer at 219 et seq. 225. rejects the first best solution in this context as a nirvana 
approach. 
380 See Holmstrom. 'Moral hazard and observability'. 10 (1979) Bell Journal of 
Economics. 74 at 77-9. 
381 See Holmstrom at 77-9. 
382 See Rees. 'The theory of principal and agent. Part 1'. 37 (1985) Bulletin of 
Economic Research 3 at 6. 24. 
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shareholder.383 Do we again have a fairness problem here? The answer is 
that there is no unfairness here. Dominant shareholders who concentrate 
their capital in one firm do not have the opportunity (like the average 
shareholder) to diversify away the firm-specific risk. Therefore, they have 
incentives to control the managers,384 particularly because they will have 
great difficulties in selling their shares if the company performs poorly.385 
Their profits from insider trading are redistributed to the other 
shareholders in the form of the higher COJ!trol effort undertaken by the 
dominant shareholder.386 Again, here, interests equal out when the 
dominant shareholder makes some profits from insider trading. 
d) The contract between company and manager 
Such a contractual system has several advantages. The first is its flexibility. 
The 'democratic approach' takes into consideration that there are different 
character-types of managers; some are risk adverse, others like to take 
383 
384 
See Demsetz (Corporate Control) at 313 et seq. 
If there is more risk one could be tempted to ask why people engage in such 
investments at all. It seems that dominant shareholders occur only in firms with high 
specific risks - where inside information is extremely valuable given the high 
volatility of the share price. More opportunity for profits, however, equal out the 
higher risk, see Demsetz, idem at 313 et seq. 
385 Demsetz, idem at 314. 
386 See Demsetz op cit at 313-315; for the opposite view see for instance 
Davidson/Solomon op cit (The agency origins of insider trading) at 88. 
The present writer does on principle agree with Demsetz's position. Yet two more 
arguments should be considered. Since substantial shareholders profit from their 
'one-sided' investment insofar as they gain considerably more influence and control, 
they could also be asked to pay a little in return. Also, their decision was not 
forced - they could have diversified their portfolios like any other investor who 
accepts his position as minority shareholder. Thus it seems necessary to impose 
further duties on the substantial shareholder because he is in such a powerful 
position, see for this position Lutter op cit (Zur Treuepflicht des GroBaktionars). Yet 
in our capitalist societies it is good to have people who take up responsibilities in 
their companies; hey should be encouraged by the possibility of gaining as insiders 
rather than be deterred by prohibitions. 
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more risks. It is suggested that their salary consist of two components;387 
one should be a fixed income, and the other a flexible part based on the 
following factors: the risk-aversion of the manager; other available forms 
of payment (like bonus or options on stock); the ri~k aversion of the 
shareholders; the branch of industry; and the volatility of the shares in that 
particular branch ( or company). 
Some basic payment terms have already been discussed.388 In addition, it is 
submitted that the cut in salary should be slightly lower than the expected 
gains from insider trades so that the insider can rely on a limited 'safety 
zone'. Thus he will not be pressured into exploiting each new piece of 
information fully. Such a safety zone would generate some transaction costs 
(residual costs), since the expected net gains destributed to insiders are 
perhaps not completely redistributed to the shareholders. However, it is 
more preferable (and less expensive) than relying on monitoring all the 
time: we must bear in mind that economic theory teaches us that some 
residual losses are inevitable, so that these residual costs seem acceptable 
This solution would also create further incentives for the insider to raise his 
salary by the production of valuable information (one could call this a 
'creativity bonus'), which will in turn increase the profits for the 
shareholder. Therefore, we can conclude that a balance will be reached 
between the interests. The conflict between shareholders and agents thus 
diminishes. 
387 See Laux, '(Pareto-) Optimale Anreizsysteme bei sicheren Erwartungen', 40 (1988) 
ZfbF 959 at 963-978. 
388 See in the subsection on Manne's theory, above at p 67 et seq. 
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D. Summary of Part I 
Part One of this thesis examined the economics of insider trading. By 
applying the main economic theories to the insider trading issue it became 
clear that there is no need for regulation prohibiting insider activity. 
Insider trading was found to be neither immoral nor unfair. Therefore, 
regulation cannot be based on morality nor on fairness arguments. From an 
economic point of view it is uncertain whether or not insiders outperform 
the market - and if they do, whether that is to the detriment of the 
shareholders. The most important finding in this regard was that insiders do 
not necessarily cause harm to individual investors or groups of investors. 
We should abandon the linear idea that insider gains necessarily reflect 
harm caused to outsiders. 
Even if the insider does outperform the average investors, the insider's 
profits do not reflect losses incurred by outsiders. Due to the complicated 
system of pricing in stock markets, it is impossible to determine whether an 
outsider was harmed by an insider transaction. On the contrary, insider 
transactions are likely to enhance price accuracy, and thus the allocative 
efficiency of the market. It is more likely that insider trading and 
subsequent uninformed trading based on trade_ signals will protect market 
performance better than any type of prohibition. We have also seen that 
insider trading has no negative impact on disclosure: insiders will not 
postpone disclosure, because their gains depend on the announcement of 
new information. 
As regulation and enforcement are costly, it was necessary to ask whether 
there are options other than prohibition to cope with the insider 
phenomenon. One economic approach was found to be particularly 
appealing: the agency relationship between manager and shareholders/firms. 
Based on the assumptions that the greatest amount of freedom should be 
granted to all market participants, and that managers (in their function as 
today's entrepreneurs) should be rewarded properly for their work, it was 
suggested that they be permitted to trade freely on inside information as 
part of their compensation package. Objections to this approach such as the 
'moral hazard' problem, 'adverse selection', and failure to protect markets 
were rejected. 
The most important finding in that context was that at this stage of legal and 
economic research, it is impossible to determine whether or not insider 
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trading is beneficial or detrimental. Interest analysis did prove, however, 
that the second-best informed persons, such as financial analysts, bankers, 
and brokers, have a specific interest in prohibition because their position 
enables them legally to exploit their informational advantage over the other 
market participants. Therefore, it is wise to be careful when such people 
propose regulation. 
Given this uncertainty, it seems best to leave it to the parties involved to 
decide whether or not they feel that they need State protection. The 
'democratic approach' combines both regulation and non-regulation, and 
achieves pareto improvements for the system as a whole. Firms are enabled 
to opt in or out of the statute system. If they opt in, they will have to pay 
the monitoring costs. If they opt out, they will enter into contracts with 
their managers specifying their compensation packages. This suits our 
pluralistic society, because there are different kinds of characters amongst 
managers and shareholders: risk-bearing or conservative, with high or low 
risk aversion. Some prefer risky projects which give opportunities for high 
returns on · investment. The democratic approach is an answer to the 
plurality of characters, their various needs and aims in life. It is based on 
the ability of markets to find the best solution. 
In the microcosm of the firm, as well as in the macrocosm of the markets, 
interests will equal out in a contractual system. As long as we do not know 
which solution is the best, we should grant opportunities. This will 
guarantee that people are satisfied with the market system and pursue their 
interests freely. 
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Part 2: Legal elements of insider dealing 
Outline of Part Two of the study 
Having examined the economics of insider trading, we shall now enter into 
the legal discussion of the topic. First we shall give a brief overview of the 
present legislation in South Africa, the European Union, England, and 
Germany. Then the study will elaborate on the problem of how to define 
'inside information', because it is the main element of the insider trading 
definition. The comparison of the different legislative approaches makes it 
clear which legal and economic are currently favoured. It will be argued 
that some of these concepts are applied in an inconsistent way, mainly 
because they have been influenced by interest groups such as the financial 
services industry. 
The European Directive on insider trading, for instance, chose the market-
protection approach in terms of which insider trading is detrimental for the 
public trust in the market process. Yet, as we shall see later, this intention is 
not truly reflected by the Directive, because 'market protection' is still 
defined as 'investor confidence', which relates to the older concept of 
investor protection. 
The overall purpose of the comparison is to determine the best legal options 
available. This is of importance for our suggetions in view of a Model Code 
in Part Three of this study. While examining the laws, we need to .keep in 
mind that there is no economically reliable basis for insider trading 
prohibitions. 
Chapter 1: The legislative situation in the three countries 
In all legislation on insider trading we find certain elements that constitute 
the crime: the information; the definition of who is an insider; and the 
offences (including a list of securities in which insider trades can occur).389 
We shall examine the legislation of South Africa, England, and Germany in 
regard to these elements. 
389 See, however, Hopt, 'Europaisches und Deutsches Insiderrecht', ZGR 1991 at 17, 
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Before we go into detail, it is necessary to give an overview of the 
respective laws of these countries. The examii:iation starts with South 
Africa, followed by the European law, European law being the source for 
both the English and the German insider trading prohibitions. 
A. Insider trading prohibition in Sooth Africa 
As in many other countries, provisions aimed at regulating insider dealing 
have been extended in South Africa in 1990. Since the former provisions 
contained in ss 224 and 229-233 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 were 
enacted, not a single person in South Africa was convicted390 of 
contravening s 233,391 which made insider dealing a criminal offence.392 
The issue of insider trading was first seriously raised in 1970 when the 
'Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act' (the Van 
Wyk de Vries Report) was published.393 Since Percival v Wright394, it 
seems to have been generally assumed that directors have 'carte blanche' to 
utilise their inside knowledge in private speculation.395 The South African 
company law at that time were therefore extremely outdated396 in this 
regard. 
who subdivides insider dealing aspects into four parts: insider, inside information, 
securities and sanctions. 
390 King Task Oroup, Draft Report on Insider Trading, 26 March 1997 at p 1. The same 
is true with regard to prosecution under the present law to the present date. 
391 See, for instance, the excellent article by Jooste, 'Insider Dealing in South Africa', 
(107) 1990 SAU 588 at fn 3. 
392 Under the former provisions the penalty would have been a fine not exceeding 
R2.000 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, or both the fine and 
imprisonment. Sees 441{l){b) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
393 RP 45/1979; Benade's brief summary in (1972) 16 Joum of Bus Law 167. The 
Commission also commented on other issues of company law and did by no means 
limit their enquiry to the issue of insider trading, cf Benade, 'A survey of the Main 
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act', (1970) CILSA 277. 
394 [1902] 2 Ch 421. It was held that directors owe no fiduciary duties to the members. 
395 Levin, 'Insider Trading in modern company law', ( 1967) 30 Tydskrif vi'r 
Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 137 ( conclusion at 245) at 138. 
396 Rider, 'The regulation of insider trading in the Republic of South Africa', (94) 1977 
SAU 437 at 437. 
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The earlier established Millin Commission397 had merely proposed full and 
regular disclosure of all share dealings of directors or nominees in their 
company as the best remedy.398 As a result, the companies were required to 
maintain a special register of shares and debentures held by the directors, 
whether personally or through nominees. This was meant to reveal what 
share dealings had taken place and when.399 The information to be given by 
directors had to state, within 21 days of a securities transaction, the 
number, description and amount of shares and debentures held in the 
company, its holding company, and its subsidiaries or the subsidiaries of its 
holding company.400 This proved to be both inappropriate and inefficient. 
The Van Wyk de Vries Report recommended that insider trading in 
securities listed on a Stock Exchange should be made a criminal offence, 
carrying heavy penalties.401 The anti-insider-trading provision introduced 
on the Committee recommendations provided that: 
'every director, past director, officer or person402 who has knowledge 
of any information concerning a transaction ... of a company ... which 
if it becomes publicly known, may be expected materially to affect the 
price of the shares ... , and who deals in any way to his advantage ... , 
shall be guilty of an offence.403 
397 Final Report of the Company Law Amendment Inquiry Commission (1947-48) (UG 
69/1948). 
398 Just like the Cohen Committee at that time in England, cf para 'isl, which led to s195 
of their Companies Act corresponding closely to s70nov of the South African 
Companies Act 46 of 1926; see Levin op cit at 138. 
399 Levin op cit at 138; cf sections 70nov et seq of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 and 
Companies Amendment Act 46 of 1952. 
400 Sec. 70nov (11), (12) of the old Act as amended by Act No. 46 of 1952, see 
Emmett/Barlow, 'Principles of South African Company Law', Cape Town, 
Wynberg, Johannesburg, 6th edition 1969 at p 149; cf also Palmer/Light, 
'Company Secretarial Practice in South Africa', 3rd edition 1958 at 247 et seq.; cf 
also Leveson 'Company Directors', Durban 1970 at 21 et seq. 
401 § 44.57 and Recommendation 106. 
402 For the scope of insiders see the comments in Joubert, 'The Law of South Africa', 
Vol 4 paras 249, 251 at fn 2~5. 
403 Former s 233 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
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This form of insider regulation had serious shortcomings,404 in particular 
concerning take-over situations405 where it seemed that officers and 
directors of the target company were not within the ambit of the insider-
definition when buying shares of their own company406, because the take-
over would not have been a transaction of their company. 
It was therefore obvious that the provision needed to be reviewed - and 
moulded in a more appropriate way. In the 1989 Companies Amendment 
Act407 and the 1990 Companies Second Amendment Act408 the legislator 
enacted provisions that were designed to cope more efficiently with the 
misuse of 'inside information'. 
The 1989 Companies Amendment Act409, which was repealed by the 1990 
Companies Second Amendment Act, never came into force. The old s 440F 
of the 1989 Act had contained provisions which reflected410 a very 
generous borrowing411 , and in places verbatim copying, from rule lOb-
5,412 adopted by the Stock Exchange Commission (SEC) in the USA under 









Rider op cit at 448. 
Du Plessis, 'Binnekennistr;msaksies by oomames en samesmeltings', (1989) 1 SA 
Mere Ll 46 at 47. 
Du Plessis, 'Enkele probleme met betrekking tot binnekennistransaksies by 
oornames en samesmeltings van maatskappye in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
maatskappyereg', Master Thesis at the Universiteit van Suid-Afrika, 1988 at 50 et 
seq.; with re~ard to the aforementioned shortcoming and others see Van Zyl, 'Die 
bekamping van binnekennistransaksies in Suid-Afrika', (1989) 77 TSAR 77 at 79. 
Act 78 of 1989. 
Act 69 of 1990. 
Act 78 of 1989. 
Luiz, 'Prohibition against trading on inside information - the saga continues', (1990) 
2 SA Mere Ll 328 at 328 says that it was a mirror image of rule lOb-5; the present 
author does indeed agree with this contention. 
In particulars 440F(l): 'Any person who, ... in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security (a) employs any device, scheme or artifice to defraud any person; (b) 
makes any untrue statement of a material fact .... For an anylysis of the provisions 
of the 1989 Act see Luiz, 'Insider trading: A transplant to cure a chronic illness?', 
(1990) 2 SA Mere Ll 59 at 61; see (also for the 1989 Act), analysing the difficult 
issue of what sanctions should be imposed, Jooste, 'Insider dealing in South 
118 
The new s 440F which has been in effect smce 1 February 1991414 
contains no such 'plagiarism'. The reason given by the Memorandum on the 
Objects of the 1990 Companies Second Amendment Bill415 for the 
substitution of the new s 440F was 'the perception, and indeed the fear, of 
some South African financial institutions that the net has been cast too 
widely and that important, innocent investment activities are included in the 
programm. '416 
The present legislation is to be found largely in the new chapter XV A of the 
Companies Act 1973, containing the new sections 440A to 440N. These 
have come into force at various dates between 1 October 1989 and 
1 February 1991.417 The following statutory framework is provided:418 
-The establishment419 of the Securities Regulation Panel420 with, inter 
alia, the function of supervising dealings in securities. The Panel is granted 
powers of subpoena and interrogation for the purposes of performing its 
functions.421 It has the power to impose an obligation on certain persons to 









Africa - the civil aspects'. (Winter 1990) 4 De Ratione 29-33 and Jooste, 'Insider 
dealing in South Africa - the criminal aspects', (Winter 1990) 4 De Ratione 21-28. 
Issued in 1942, making it unlawful '(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to 
defraud\ '(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact .. .'~ cf, for instance, 
Levin op cit at 251. 
Jooste op cit note 142 at 591. 
Government Notice RIO of 1991~ see Schoeman. 'Guide to the companies act and 
regulations'. Revising editor Walter D Geach, Cape Town, Wetton, Johannesburg, 
1992, service No 21. 1994, at 10-204F. 
B 119B-90 (GA) at 17. 
Ibid.~ for a comment on the second fear, which is that South African common law 
concepts on fraud differ from those in the USA, see Jooste op cit at 591 fn 17. 
Jooste, 'Insider trading, A new clamp-down', (1991) 20 Businessman's Law 248 
at 248 fn 3~ see J T Pretorius (ed) Companies Act 61 of 1973 and Close 
Corporations Act 69 of 1984, 1991 at 340. 
See Jooste op cit at 588 et seq. 
Sec. 440B of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The sections referred to hereinafter are 
those of the aforementioned Act as long as further specification is not given. 
420 Hereinafter referred to as 'the Panel'. 
421 Sec. 440D. 
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securities.422 
-Insider dealing is still a criminal offence;423 now, however, in terms 
of a wider definition, and subject to stiffer penalties.424 Moreover, a 
statutory civil remedy for the benefit of a victim of insider dealing was 
created.425 
The role of the Panel is undoubtedly viewed as crucial to curtailing insider 
dealing. It is hoped that the Panel will have at its disposal the type of 
professionalism, independence and experience which is requir~ to assist the 
commercial branch of the police force and the Attorney-General's office in 
giving effect to the s1,1bstantive statutory provisions aimed at preventing 
insider dealing.426 In the absence of the Panel, Jooste427 believes that it is 
unlikely that the new provisions on insider trading would be more effective 
than the old ones. 
The economic literature in South Africa has not contributed any importanf"' 
insights to the worldwide debate. With the exception of Botha428, Kantor429 
and Swersky430, the dominant opinion in the literature is, surprisingly, but 












Sec. 440 F. 
Sec. 441(1)(a). 
Sec. 440F( 4). 
Jooste op cit at 589. 
Idem, at 589. 
'Aspects of capital market efficiency and statutory regulation of insider trading in 
South Africa', Joum Stud Econometrics 1991, 15(2), 57 at 67. 
'In support of insider trading - More than a zero-sum game', (1991) 
20 Businessman's Law 167. 
'Should the net be extended? A contrary view', unpublished LL.M-dissertation, 
UCT 1987. 
See for instance Davidson, 'Insider trading - a reply to Brian Kantor', (1991) 21 
Businessman's Law at 94 who is of the opinion that allowing insider trading on the 
JSE would result in a loss of credibility on the part of the stock market as an 
institution, idem at 96. This approach is, however, intuitive or even emotional rather 
than based on empirical findings. 
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first issue to be considered was, of course, the caRital market efficiency.432 
Botha433 quoting Manne434 and Wu435, who both stated that insider dealing 
strongly relates to informational efficiency436, raises this point in the South 
African economic literature. 
Some empirical studies have been carried out by Bhana437 (disputed and 
criticised438 though) indicating abnormal returns on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE). Bhana argues that the semi-strong form of the 'efficient 
capital market hypothesis' (EMCH), ie that all publicly available 
information is reflected by the share price, cannot be applied to the JSE.439 
If this thesis were supported by more empirical research440, it would be a 
setback for any attempt to regulate insider dealing, because all insider 










Botha op cit at 57. 
Op cit at 60. 
Op cit. 
Wu, 'An economist looks at section 16 of the SEA of 1934', (1968) 29 Columbia 
Law Review 260 at 2-66-269. 
Botha op cit at 57 fn 1. 
Bhana, 'Ta,ke-over announcements and insider trading activity on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange', (1987) SA Journal Bus Mgmt 198~ for further empirical research 
see the references in Botha op cit at 59 indicating indeed that the informational 
efficiency on the JSE is rather weak. 
RC. van den Honert & G.D.I. Barr, 'A comment on take-over announcements and 
insider trading activity on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange', SA Journal of Bus 
Mgmt 1989 at 93~ indirectly critisised also by Botha op cit note 19 at 67 who thinks 
that the informational efficiency would seem to have been better under the olds 233. 
Bhana op cit at 207. 
See, however, Bhana, 'Significant changes in dividend policy and insider trading 
activity on the JSE', (1991) 22(4) SA Journal Bus Mgmt 75 at 81, who ascertains 
that - concerning insider trading prior to dividend announcements - the existence of 
large insider profits is inconsistent with the strong form of the EMCH~ see also 
Davidson and Solomon, 'The agency origins of insider trading', (1991) 22(4) Journ 
Bus Mgmt 87, who analyse insider trading as an agency problem. 
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B. European Law 
Since the European Communities441 adopted the 'Council Directive 
coordinating regulations on insider dealing (89/592/EEC)'442 on the 
18th November 1989, insider trading provisions became part of the 
European capital market law. In order to effectively counter insider trading 
at an international level, the Member States of the Council of Europe have 
agreed on a 'convention on insider trading'443, the main goals of which are 
to enhance the exchange of information between Member States (in terms of 
the convention the 'Parties'),444 and mutual assistance in criminal 
matters445• This, rightly, takes into account that ' given the ease of present-
day communications, securities operations are carried out by persons not 
resident in that State' ( ie the State on whose market the insider transactions 
are carried out).446 








According to the Treaty of Maastricht we will further talk of the European Union 
(EU), but at the time of the approval of the insider dealing Directive by the European 
Council, there were still the European Communities. 
OJ No L 334/30. 
Opened for signature on 20 Apr 1989; (Parliamentary Assembly 27 Jan 1989, Doc 
5993 addendum; reprinted for instance in: Hopt/Wymeersch (eds) op cit note 36 at 
388 et seq.; for an overview of the convention and the goals persued by it see 
Lowry, 'The international approach to insider trading: The Council of Europe's 
convention', (1990) Journal of Bus Law 460; for a wider context. eg the 
Community's attempt to create a single regulatory framework for a European 
securities market see the excellent overview provided by Garzaniti/Pope, 'Sin,gle 
market-making: EC regulation of securities markets', 14 Comp Law 1993 at 43. 
Chapter II of the convention. Artt 2-11. 
Chapter III of the convention. 
Cf para 4 of the pr~ble to the aforementioned convention. 
See, therefore, English comments on the Directive and its implementation in English 
domestic law: Davies, 'The European Community's Directive on insider dealing: 
From company law to securities markets regulation?', (1991) 11 Oxf Journ of Legal 
Studies 92; Tridimas, 'Insider trading: European harmonisation and national law 
reform'. (1991) 40 Intern and Compar Law Quarterly 919; Ashe, 'The Directive on 
insider dealing', 13 Comp Lawy 1992 at 15; Dine, 'Implementation of the EC 
insider trading Directive in the UK'. 14 Comp Lawy 1993 at 61; Rider and Ashe. 
(' 
122 
on insider dealing, a closer look at the European Directive is needed, 
because the Directive finally resulted in a new domestic legislation in these 
Member States. The Directive has raised considerable interest in the 
literature.449 What will be said in this subsection is equally true for both 
England and Germany. 
I. How European law :works - some general remarks 
Some preliminary remarks on European law are essential for the 
understanding of the English and the German insider trading provisions. 
'The insider dealing diective', in: Andenas/Kenyon-Slade, 'EC financial market 
regulation and company law', London, 1993, chapter 12. 
448 For the German interpretation of the Directive see Hopt op cit (ZGR 1991); also 
Hopt, 'The European insider dealing Directive', (1991) 27 CMLR 51; Grunewald, 
'Neue Regeln zum Insiderhandel', ZBB 1990 at 128; Schodermaier/Wallach, 'Die 
Insider-Richtlinie der Europaischen Gemeinschaft,' EuZW 1990 at 122; Claussen, 
'Neues zur kommenden Insidergesetzgebung (II)', ZBB 1992 at 73; Tippach, 
'Marktdaten im ktinftigen Insiderrecht?', WM 1993 at 1269; the possible economic 
impact of the Directive is discussed by Ott/Schaf er, 'Okonomische Auswirkungen 
der EG-Insider-Regulierung in Deutschland', ZBB 199!' at 226; see further 
Htibscher, 'Die Umsetzung der Regelung der Insider-Geschafte in Deutschland' in: 
Btischgen/Schneider, 'Der europaische Binnenmarkt 1992' at 315; Stumpf, 'EG-
Insiderrecht: Die Insider-Richtlinie als Bestandteil eines europaischen 
Kapitalmarktrechts', 1990 Jahrbuch Junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 31, who 
places the Directive in the context of the European capital market law. 
449 See the bibliographical references given above; a detailed comparative analysis is 
provided by Wymeersch, 'The Insider Trading Prohibition in the EC Member 
States', in: Hopt/Wymeersch op cit at 65; Pingel, 'The EC Directive of 1989', in: 
Emmanuel Gaillard ( ed), 'Insider trading - the laws of Europe, the United States 
and Japan', Boston, 1991, 5; Schodermeier/Wallach, 'The EEC insider Directive 
approaching final adoption', 5 Journal of Intern Banking Law 1989 at 234; for a 
South African standpoint see Van Zyl/Joubert, 'The European Union Directive on 
insider trading: A model for South Africa?', (1994) 6 SA Mere U 291, these 
authors state that the Directive fails to determine effective (criminal) sanctions, idem 
at 301. It should be clarified that the EU is not competent to impose sanctions on 
individuals and therefore correctly refrained from such provision; for an analysis of 
the European Directives (including the insider Directive) on the harmonization of 
company law see Delport (1992) 4 SA Mere lJ 198. 
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Though the main decision-making body in this process is still the European 
Council, which consists of representatives of the governments of the 
Member States, in recent years there has been an increase in legislative 
power in favour of the European Parliament.450 
European law consists of several categories of statutes and rules which 
differ to a large extent in application and impact. The first very important 
source of law is the 'regulation' (dt.: Verordnung) as a form through which 
the EEC and further the EU can make legal rules for the Member States. 
The 'regulation' is a very strong legal measure because it is directly binding 
and applicable in all the European countries. It is self-executory and 
directly applicable, so that no further act by the Member States is necessary. 
There is, for instance, no need to transform such 'regulations' in national 
law. It is, however, not possible to use the 'regulation' for legal issues with 
regard to citizens, especially not where criminal law is involved,451 as is the 
case with the Insider Dealing Directive. These matters still fall within the 
competence of the Member States. For this reason the insider problem 
could not be dealt with through a regulation. 
The other way of making European law is the 'recommendation' (dt.: 
Empfehlung). The Commission makes use of this form when it wants to 
express an opinion on a specific and relevant matter. Its advantage is that 
there is no need to justify it or even pass it in the European Parliament. 
Because many of these recommendations have subsequently resulted in a 
Directive or a regulation452, Member States are given the opportunity to 
450 Marking Hall was the single European Act in 1986 which considerably widened the 
powers conferred on the European Parliament, namely that no legally binding rule 
can be made against the express will of the majority of the members of Parliament. 
451 To my knowledge there is not a single writer who expressed the view that criminal 
law would fall within the competence of the European Union. For the dominant 
opinion, within the EU, see OJ EEC No C 35, 8 Feb 1988 at 23 sub No 1.7; Lord 
Cockfield, in sessions of the European Parliament, 15 Jun 1988, No 2-366/150; for 
the German view see Tiedemann, 'Europaisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und 
Strafrecht', NJW 1993 at 23. The same view is taken by the English literature, see 
for instance Hannigan, 'Regulating insider dealing', JIBL 1989, 11 at 14. 
452 Especially in capital market matters see EEC recommendation OJ EEC No L 212, 
20 Aug 1977 at 37 et seq. which has had considerable impact on the present legal 
system with regard to securities markets, see Welter, 'Die MaBnahmen der 
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think about the contents and are invited to state their opinion. 
The disadvantage of a recommendation is that it is not binding at all. 
The ref ore, it does not bring about any formal change in the law of the 
Member States. Because insider trading was regarded by the governing 
bodies of the EC as an important matter comparable to money 
laundering453, there was no doubt that a recommendation was not an 
appropriate means of harmonizing the laws on insider dealing in the 
Member States. 
II. European decision with regard to the legal means by 
which insider trading was finally addressed 
For the above reasons the European legislator considered a Directive to be 
the most appropriate way of ensuring conformity among insider trading 
laws in Europe, thus creating equal market and investor protection on the 
competing capital markets of all Member States.,. The insider dealing 
Directive was received without dissenting vote in the Council, indicating 
that none of the Member States governments were opposed to it, and it was 
also passed by a vast majority in the European Parliament. 
III. Functioning and interpretation of a Directive 
After the final text of a Directive has been passed by the European 
Parliament, it has to be transformed by the Member States into their 
respective national laws. To achieve this, a special (national) act is required. 
For this purpose it would, for example, not suffice that the pre-existing law 
in accordance with the Directiye, or that it has been the prevailing opinion 
of the courts (eg in Germany), or that it reflects the position at common 
law (eg in England).454 New national legislation becomes necessary when a 
Directive is adopted. 
It is important to note that any national Court whose members are uncertain 
453 
454 
Europaischen Gemeinschaf ten im Bereich der Insidergeschaf te', in: B iischgen/ 
Schneider op cit 315 at 318. 
Sir Leon Brittain, 'Money laundering', in: L., Ethique des Marches Financiers, 
Publie sous la direction de Jean-Victor Louis et Diego Devos, Brussel, 1991 at 15. 
Hilf, 'Die Richtlinie der EG - ohne Richtung, ohne Linie?', EuR 1993, 1 (14); 
Wagenbaur, 'Umsetzung von BG-Recht in deutsches Recht und ihre 
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about the meaning of a section in the national law, which is based on 
European law (regardless of whether it stems from a regulation or from a 
Directive), is obliged to ask for clarification by the European Court of 
Jusitce455, cf Art 177 EUT. 
In general, different methods of interpretation are applied by the European 
Court. First, the Court considers the wording and thus attempts to reach an 
objective interpretation.456 This is not an easy task, because the text is 
authentic in all languages of the Member States.457 Secondly (and most 
importantly), the Court uses teleological interpretation, ie takes into 
consideration the intentions of a Directive.458 Most often reference is made 
to such intentions in view of harmonising national laws in the common 
market. It is of particular importance that the intentions of the European 
legislation will bind the national courts when they need to interpret the 
national law which is based on a Directive.459. Therefore, it is most 
important to analyse what precisely these intentions (the 'telos') are. 
Usually, those intentions are outlined in the preamble of a 'Directive'. The 
Directive and the national law based on it need to be interpreted in the light 
of the 'telos' which is explained in a preamble.460 Thus a Directive does not 
lose its importance once it has been transposed into the domestic laws. 
Thirdly, and only where the above principles provide no ansewer, the 
European Court refers to 'historical' interpretation (ie subjective methods 
gesetzgeberische Problematik'. ZG 1988. 303 at 305. 
455 Everling. 'Vorabentscheidungsverfahren vor dem Gerichtshof der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften'. Baden-Baden, 1986 at 27 et seq. 
456 ECtJ ECR 1976, 455 (472 f., 479) - Gabrielle Defrenne; see Bredimares, 'Methods 
of Interpretation and Comunity Law'. Amsterdam, Oxford. New York, 1978. for an 
early. but still comprehensive overview of the interpretational approaches of the 
European Court of Justice. 
\ 
457 See the excellent article written by my academic teacher, Prof. Dr. Dr. he Lutter, 
'Zur Auslegung angeglichenen Rechts', JZ 1992, 593 at 599. 
458 ECtJ ECR 1985. 2655 (2668) - Kommission ./. Deutschland; in the literature see 
Bleckmann, 'Probleme der Auslegung von EWG-Richtlinien'. RIW 1987, 929 at 
933; Lutter op cit at 602 et seq.; see also the former judge at the European Court of 
Justice. Prof. Dr. Everling. 'Zur Auslegung des <lurch EG-Richtlinien angeglichenen 
national en Rechts'. ZGR 1992, 376 at 386. 
459 ECtJ ECR 1989, 3533 (3546) - Nijman; Lutter op cit at 604 et seq. 
460 Lutter op cit at 600; Bleckmann op cit at 930. 
126 
of interpretation). And this only when so-called secondary461 European 
Law (eg 'Directive' or 'Regulation') has to be interpreted.462 This has 
occured very rarely. Practically no importance has therefore been attached 
to subjective interpretational methods. And because national legislators are 
bound by a 'Directive', it is indeed pointless to turn to national debates 
about the final text of the law in national Parliaments. Whatever their 
national intentions might be when they made the law, these would be 
ignored by the European Court of Justice if the European intention was 
different. 
In England, the recent House of Lords deci~ion in Pepper ( Inspector of 
Taxes) v Hart 463 reversed a longstanding rule that debates in Parliament on 
legislation could not be used to establish the meaning of the legislation. 
Thus, the historical-subjective dimension of interpretation is now 
permissible in the English Courts. But for the afore-mentioned reasons, if 
European law is at issue, this approach is permissible.464 The European 
Court has the power to reject any interpretation submitted by national 
Parliaments. 
461 The term 'primary European law' includes only the Treaties of Rome and 
modifications apported to them such as the Single European Act 1986. All other 
legislative actions, in particular Directives and Regulations, are subsumable under. 
the term Secondary Law, see Ipsen, 'Europaisches Gemeinschaftsrecht', 1972 at 
111. With regard to Directives, the European Court of Justice takes into 
consideration the drafts which preceded the text of a Directive that was finally 
adopted, cf, for instance, ECtJ ECR 1985, 3909 at 3930 - Mainfrucht 
Obstverwertung~ see Lutter op at 599 et seq. 
462 See ECtJ ECR 1976, 153 (160) - Stiddeutsche Zucker -. 
463 [1993] 1 All ER 42. 
464 Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the view expressed by Alcock op cit at 67, 
is far too optimistic with regard to the guidance in interpretation given by Minister 
Nelson's interesting 'explanations' on the new provisions on insider trading in the 
CJA 1993 Part V. Whenever an interpretational problem is at issue, the European 
Court will certainly not consider a national legislator's reasoning as a guideline. 
C. 
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England: From the Companies Securities Act 1985 to 
the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (Part V) 
Until 1980, the restrictions on insider trading in the United Kingdom were 
extremely limited. There was no statutory prohibition of insider practices, 
nor did the common law make insider trading actionable.465 
In the leading case of Percival v Wright,466 the Chancery Devision of the 
High Court held that a corporate director owed a fiduciary duty only to the 
' company - not to its members - thus fi~ot obliged to disclose information 
about the company to the shareholders before trading with them. 
Although the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers and the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) disapproved467 of the practices of insider trading and 
'tipping', their rules and guidelines were not strictly enforced.468 Insider 
dealing was first made a criminal offence by the Companies Act 1980. Since 
1985 insider dealing regulations were contained in the Company Securities 
Act (CSA), also named Insider Dealing Act (IDA).469 
Many provisions of the CSA originate with the 1980 Companies Act.470 
Through the Financial Services Act 1986 certain enforcement provisions 
were implemented.471 
Part V of the 1993 Criminal Justice Act (CJA), which received Royal 
Assent in July 1993, seeks to implement the European Community Council 
Directive co-ordinating regulations on insider dealing.472 The provisions of 






Poser, 'International Securities Regulation', Boston, London, 1991 at 159. 
[1902] 2 Ch 421. 
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, Rule 4.1. 
Poser op cit at 160. 
Hannigan.' Insider Dealing', 2nd edition, London, 1994, at 14 et seq.~ Both 
abbreviations (CSA and IDA) will be used hereinafter when reference is made to the 
former English law on insider trading. 
470 Davies op cit at 98~ Hannigan at 14~ Gore-Browne on Companies, 44th Edition, 
Supplement 17, Bristol, 1994, §12.18 at 12.024. 
471 See Rider/Abrams/Ferran 'Guide to the Financial Services Act 1986', 2nd edition, 
Bicester, Oxfordshire, 1989 at 130 et seq. 
472 For_ an overview of the present legislation see Lomnicka, 'The new Insider dealing 
provisions: Criminal Justice Act 1993, Part V', Joum of Business Law 1994 at 173. 
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on or after 1 March 1994, wholly superseding the Company Securities Act 
1985. The provisions contained in Part V of the CJA 1993 also reflect how 
Parliament and City have reacted to the European Directive.473 
Even though Part V of the CJA 1993 completely replaces the 1985 Act, it 
does not seek to consolidate all provisions which are relevant to insider 
dealing. For example, the provisions relating to investigation remain part 
of the Financial Services Act 1986.474 The Criminal Justice Bill, which 
introduced the Government's views on those aspects of the law which 
required modification, met a barrage of criticism from the professions and 
the City. The criticism focused on the broadening of the offences to catch 
conduct, which was thought to be unobjectionable and even beneficial for 
the market. The Government was forced to introduce completely redrafted 
sections in the committee stage in the House of Commons.475 
Whilst many of the constituent elements of the three main insider trading 
offences remain similar to those in the 1985 Companies Securities Act, they 
have been refashioned and modified in certain important respects. 
The ref ore, both jurisprudence and experier,.ce of the earlier legislation must 
be regarded with suspicion as far as its applicability to the new law is 
concemed.476 This is all the more true because the interpretation will from 
now on depend largely on the conception and definitions provided by the 
European Directive. It is conceivable that, should a divergence between the 
Directive and the 1993 Act become apparent, litigants, assuming that they 
have a viable cause of action, might seek to utilise the provisions of the 
Directive in a suit against an insider.477 
Consequently, not a single item of really relevant insider dealing case-law is 
available at present. The recently reported decision of the Court of Appeal 
in R v Goodman478, was still based on the 1985 (Insider Dealing) Act, 







Wotherspoon, 'Insider Dealing - The New Law: Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 
1993', (1994) 57 Modem Law Review 419 at 420. 
Gore-Brown, at 12.024. 
Gore-Brown, idem at 12.025. 
Gore-Brown op cit at 12.024. 
Gore-Brown, idem §12.22 at 12.031. 
[1994] 1 BCLC 352. 
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D. Germany 
Until July 1994 one could say without hesitation that Germany had very few 
laws on securities.479 The capital market, especially in regard to the Stock 
Exchange, was relatively undeveloped. However, since 1993, the Stock 
Exchange in Frankfurt (which is the most important one in Germany)480 
has undergone extensive development both legally and economically. The 
former predominance of smaller companies (Gesellschaft mit beschrankter 
Haftung, GmbH; engl.: limited liaµility) was due to family ownership and 
the reluctance to comply with more burdensome disclosure requirements 
and increased rights of workers to participate in management (so-called 
'Mitbestimmung') which accompany a conversion into stock corporations. 
Now that the need for international co-operation is felt by all, Frankfurt 
and the German legislature have become concerned about capital market 
structures. The implementation of the European Directive was incorporated 
in a new Act on securites trading ('Wertpapierhandelsgesetz')481 • This new 
Securities Trading Act and extensive amendments482 of the Stock Exchange 
Act ('Borsengesetz') form part of the most important legal project on 






Poser op cit at 394 et seq.; see also Mennicke, 'Insider regulation in Germany: the 
change from self-regulation to criminal law', 15 Comp Lawy 1994, 155 at 155. 
Altogether there are eight German stock exchanges: Frankfurt, Dtisseldorf, Berlin, 
Hamburg, Munich, Hannover, Stuttgart and Bremen. Of these, Frankfurt is by far 
the largest and most significant. It is appropriate to refer to 'Frankfurt' when talking 
about the German capital markets. 
Abbreviated hereinafter as 'WpHG'. 
Among the most important are: the creation of a new enforcement agency, the 
Federal Authority for the Supervision of Trading in Securities (Bundesauf sichtsa~t 
fiir den Wertpapierhandel), the legal acceptance of the installation of IBIS (the new 
electronic trading system) and new rules for funds-management - cf the introductory 
remarks in Schwark, Kommentar zum Borsengesetz, 2. Aufl., 1994, Einleitung. 
483 BR-Drucks. 585/94, 17 Jun 94. 
484 For an overview of the provisions contained in the legislation, in particular the 
European perspective of the recent development see Krimphove, 'Das zweite 
Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz', JZ 1994 at 23; see also Weber, 'Deutsches 
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Formerly, the German law did not provide any particular provisions on 
insider trading. Neither provisions related to the misuse of information (in 
the Stock Corporations Act, dt.: Aktiengesetz), nor provisions on securities 
fraud (in the Stock Exchange Act, dt.: Borsengesetz), provided adequate 
tools for combatting insider trading.485 There was only a Code of 
Voluntary Insider Trading Guidelines, a system which combined both 
inefficiently and deficiently486 compliance rules with self-regulation. The 
Guidelines did not have the force of law, because adherence was based upon 
a dual system of contract. 
The system was established to function as follows.487 First, there was a 
contract between an umbrella body and its corporate members. Secondly, 
the corporations were then held to require their senior management, 
supervisory board and other potential insiders to abstain from insider 
trading. This was to be enforced by contract between the corporation and 
the potential insider. In most cases such agreements were embodied ie the 
contract of employment. 
One of the major deficiencies was perfectly illustrated by the recent 
Steinkiihler case488. Steinkiihler, former chairman of the Metal Workers' 
Union and member of the supervisory board of Daimler Benz, had not -
previous to his alleged insider dealing - entered into a contract and was 
therefore not bound by the Guidelines. Consequently, the Board of 
Inquiry489 of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange was unable to investigate the 
Kapitalmarktrecht im Umbruch', NJW 1994 at 2849. 
485 Cf Mennicke op cit at 155. 
486 Hauschka/Harm, 'Zur Reformbediirftigkeit des deutschen Insiderrechts', BB 1988 
at 1189; see also Mennicke, op cit at 156 et seq. 
487 Cf Baumbach/Duden/Hopt, Handelsgesetzbuch, 28ed, Miinchen 1989 at 1470 et 
seq. 
488 Referred to in Mennicke op cit at 155; this case has also incited - for the first time in 
Germany - the interest of the public, see reports in newspapers, for instance, FAZ 
No 114, 18 May 1993 at 13 et seq.; Der Spiegel 21/1993 at 37,; Stem, 27 May 
1993, 32 at 36; Die Zeit, 28 May 1993 at 25. 
489 Established at each of the German stock exchanges already in 1971 according to the 
Rules of Procedure (Verf ahrensordnung) in order to investigate insider dealings 
which were within the scope of the Guidelines ( as revised in 1988) and the Broker 
and Investment Adviser Rules (Handler- und Beraterregeln). 
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case.490 The humorous aspect of the Steinktihler case was that, according to 
the philosophy of the Confederation of German Trade Unions, the self-
regulatory system was not sufficient. They opposed it on principle; and the 
Confederation's members would generally not enter into the 
aforementioned contracts, and thus not adhere to the voluntary 
regulation.491 As a result of this Mr Steinktihler was not even bound 
contractually, although the Trade Unions always wanted stricter legal and 
statutory rules on insider trading to be promulgated. 
The old system is now completely superaded by the regulations of the 
2nd Finanzmarktforderungs-Gesetz. The 'new' (ie the first) German 
insider trading provisions have been influenced in their terminology by 
Anglo-American examples. English expressions such as 'insider' are used in 
the official German texts.492 The long tradition of English insider trading 
provisions in general, and the lively English debate, influenced to a large 
extent the final wording of the European Directive, which finally became 
the source of the ;German' (it is regarded above of all as 'Community 
Law') law on insider trading. Therefore, the English legal development 
deserved far more consideration by the German legislator than it was 
actually given. 
It is interesting to note that most German economists who expressed thei~ 
views on the new insider dealing prohibitions stated that, economically, it 
would not make much sense to regulate the phenomenon of insider trading 
at all.493 They refer mainly to capital market theory, market processes 
theories, and to agency relationship theory, which have been dealt with in 
Part I of this study. The debate on this issue is still going on, even though 
the new law came into force on the 1st of January 1995. 
490 Mennicke, op cit at 156. 
491 Dingeldey, 'lnsiderhandel und Strafrecht' at 37. 
492 The term 'insider' is used in official German language and also in the legal 
provisions, whereas the adequate transformation 'lnnenseiter', suggested in the 
70ties by Hom, 'Wertpapiergeschafte von Innenseitem als Regelungsproblem', 
(1972) ZHR 136 at 369, was never received with approval. 
493 Schomer op cit at 247 et seq.; Schneider op cit at 1429 et seq.; for the view that only 
some aspects of insider trading should be regulated see Lahmann, 'V erbot des 
Insiderhandels, Okonomische Analyse', Mtinchen, Berlin, 1994; in favour of a 
regulation on a voluntary basis Schmidt op cit at 38. 
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Chapter 2: The definition of 'inside information 
The s~rting point for any legal discussion of insider trading must be a 
consideration of what is 'inside information', the possession of which is the 
key element to fall within the statutory provisions. We can debate and argue 
at length whether or not non-corporate people such as market-insiders (eg: 
brokers, analysts, or market makers) should fall within the scope of the 
dealing prohibition; but without a definition of the information on which 
the insider may not trade the prohibiton would not be clear. 'Inside' 
information will also to a certain extent define the 'insider': if, for instance, 
market information is not caught within the ambit of this definition, a 
broker is not an insider, because he has access only to market information 
(unless he receives information from a company insider, of course). 
A. Basic criteria for 'inside information' 
In all legislation there are three important parts of the information-
definition: non-public, price-sensitivity, and scope. All insider legislation 
contain variations on these main themes. At this stage we shall not explain 
in detail the possibilities of these variations, because this will be part of the 
comparative analysis. Here we shall only consider the basic concepts. 
Questions such as whether or not the information must result in a 5% price 
change on announcement, or whether it must be generally available before 
it can be regarded as public, will be dealt with further on in the analysis of 
the different laws. 
'Non-public' can be interpreted as not yet published, or as not yet d!gested 
by market participants. Where one chooses 'not published', it becomes 
necessary to define the media through which the information is usually 
published. For instance, is publication in a newspaper necessary, or is the 
ticker-tape on the Stock Exchange sufficient? If time for proper 
consideration of the information is required, is one day sufficient? It is 
obvious that dealings are facilitated, if the information is 'public' at the 
very moment it comes through on the ticker-tape. Where that is the case, 
early trading after announcement would not be insider trading. If, 
however, new data need to be digested, much more trading will be regarded 
as 'insider' trading. Hence the trading volume will decrease which may have 
negative effects on the liquidity of the market. 
The second key problem is the 'price-sensitivity' of information. Price-· 
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sensitivity can be interpreted in an objective or in a subjective way. 
Information is objectively price-sensitive, for instance, where the legislation 
provides for a price change of more than 3% after release. The debate 
under such a system would be whether or not 3% is enough. 
A subjective interpretation is applied where it is required that (groups of) 
traders need to assume that the information is price-sensitive. Such an 
approach is, for instance, when one asks whether 'the reasonable 
investor'494 would have regarded the respective information as important 
for his trading decision. Whether an ex-ante view needs to be applied or 
whether it is perhaps better to define price-sensitivity ex post (ie after the 
price reaction has taken place), this needs to be discussed later. A subjective 
approach normally results in a more vague interpretation, and the insider 
sometimes does not know whether or not his transactions are prohibited. 
Thirdly, it is important to understand that the scope of information can 
vary. If market inform~tion such as trading volumes is encompassed, the 
number of insider transactions prohibited will drastically increase. Then, of 
course, the term 'market information' needs further clarification. For 
instance, is political information to be included, or changing of interest 
rates (central bank policy), or recommendations of brokers to their 
customers? If the legislator decides that only company information is 
potential insider knowledge, one will have to examine whether or not take-
overs and bids are company information. One could argue that these are 
market transactions as opposed to, for instance, new product development 
within a company (ie clearly endogenous information). 
At this stage it suffices to observe that these three criteria can be used as 
variables to extend or narrow the scope of stock transactions which fall 
within the ambit of insider dealing prohibitions. 
494 The 'reasonable investor'-approach is highly debated, see, for instance, Newmann, 
Jr./Herrmann/Ritis, 'Basic truths: the implications of t};te fraud-on-the-market 
theory', (20) Joum of Corporation Summer 95, 571 at 583 et seq, who say that 
'materiality should be viewed from a standoint of a professional investor, because 
they play the key role in setting the market price'. 
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B. Inside information in South African law 
I. Overview: the elements of 'inside information' 
The definition of 'inside information' is now contained in s 440F of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973. According to s 440F(l) the insider must 
'knowingly deal in a security on the basis of unpublished price-sensitive 
information in respect of that security.' 
For the information to fall within this definition it has to relate 'to matters 
in respect of the internal affairs of a company or its operations, assets, 
earning power or involvement as offeror or offeree company in an affected 
transaction or proposed affected transaction;'495. An 'affected transaction' 
means any transaction (including a transaction which forms part of a series 
of transactions) or scheme, whatever form it 01ay take, which -
(a) taking into account any securities held before such transaction or 
scheme has or will have the effect of -
(i) vesting control of any company ... in any person ... in whom 
control did not vest prior to such transaction or scheme or 
(ii) any person ... acquiring or becoming the sole holder of all the 
securities .... 496 
Information falls within this definition only if it is 'not generally available 
to the reasonable investor in the relevant markets for that security' .497 The 
test to be applied is whether a reasonable investor would have been aware 
of the information.498 'Generally available' in terms of the legislation means 
'available in the sense that such steps have been taken, and such time has 
elapsed that it can reasonably be expected that such information as referred 
to in paragraph (a) (ie unpublished price-sensitive information in respect of 
a security) is or should be known to such investor as referred to in 






Sec. 440A, definition of 'affected transaction' amended bys l(c) A 69/90 with effect 
from 1.2.1991, see Schoeman op cit at 10-204A. 
Sec. 440F(2)(a)(ii). 
Jooste op cit at 594. 
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relevant markets for that security).'499 This seems to have broadened the 
spectrum of acceptable modes of publication500 compared to the former 
legislation. 
The last required element by the law is that the information is pnce-
sensitive. For the purpose of s 440F this condition is met when 'it (ie the 
information) would reasonably be expected to affect materially the price of 
such security, if it were generally available'.501 This appears to be the same 
requirement as in the former s 233, even though the word 'expected' in 
s 233 was not qualified by the word 'reasonably'.502 
II. Some important changes to the old law concerning the 
definition of 'information' 
Unlike the former s 233, the new definition recognises the need to provide 
for effective dissemination of inside information, and to give outsiders an 
opportunity to digest the information, a recognition which was not reflected 
in the formulation of the former s 233.503 
In particular it has to be noted that, while an insider could perhaps avoid 
commission of the offence in s 233 by, for example, publishing the relevant 
information in an obscure part of some minor local newspaper or on a 
radio programme of limited appeal504 in the early hours of the morning, 
such dissemination would clearly not meet the criteria laid down by the new 
s 44OF.505 Furthermore, under the old legislation, it would have been 








Jooste op cit at 594. 
Sec. 440F(2)(a)(iii). 
Jooste op cit at 595. 
Jooste op cit at 593; see also Jooste op cit (Businessman's Law) at 249. 
For a detailed criticism of the old s 233 see Rider (!977 SAU) at 445. Yet. one 
could have argued that the words 'publicly announced' encompasses at least a means 
of communication that is likely to be received by a significant number of interested 
persons. even though it was doubtful whether this reading would stand up to a 
proper examination. cf Rider. idem at 445. 
505 Jooste op cit (1990 SAU) at 595; see also Jooste op cit at 249. 
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instantaneously with, publication of the information.506 
Yet, the old s 233 offered a fairly clear indication of how the term 
'unpublished' has to be interpreted, in that it formulated 'on a stock 
exchange or in a newspaper or through the medium of the radio or 
television'. The new Act does not require publication in any particular 
manner, and thereby introduces the test of general availability.507 
On the other hand, it is no longer necessary to prove that the accused dealt 
'in any way to his advantage, directly or indirectly' as was stipulated in the 
old s 233 although that was a very broad508 approach. 
Whereas 'price-sensitive' information under s 233 of the old Act had to 
relate to 'a transaction or proposed transaction of the company or of the 
affairs of the company', it will furthermore fall under the legislation if it 
relates to ' ... affajrs of a company or its operations, assets, earning power 
1509 or ... 510. 
Jooste511 raises the question whether by means of the inclusion of 'earning 
power' market information is brought within the scope of s 440F which 
was not the case under the old legislation.512 This issue will be discussed 
below. 
Moreover, s 233 merely spoke of information which, if published, 'may be 
expected to affect the price of the shares', without clarifying the matter any 
f urther.513 The new provisions define this element of the offence in a much 









Jooste op cit at 593. 
Jooste, idem at 594. 
Rider op cit at 444 posits that this interpretation would cover a situation where the 
insider dealt on behalf of someone whose profit as a consequence would yield some 
financial advantage to the insider. 
My emphasis. 
Sec. 440F(2)(a)(i). 
Op cit at 594 et seq. 
But see Rider op cit at 444 who said that market information would seem to be 
included. With respect, this must be due to an interpretational error. The issue arises 
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the old Act, however, was certainly narrower in this respect. 
Luiz op cit at 329. 
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scope of the crime is an issue that merits further analysis. 
III. Analysing the elements · of the definition 
We shall now consider the individual elements of the definition of inside 
information more closely. It is important to bear in mind that insiders not 
only deal on positive company news, but to an even larger extent on 
negative data in order to avoid losses on publication. 
1. Information in respect of a security 
The first issue to be considered is the content of insider information for it 
to fall within the scope of the legislation. Irrespective of any legislative 
requirements with regard to publication, if the information does not fall 
within the scope of the insider dealing provisions, then anyone would be 
permitted to deal on it, whether or not the news was important. 
a) What must the information relate to? 
The South African insider trading law provides a list of matters to which 
the information must relate, if it is to be included within the prohibition. As 
we will see below, this is neither the case in the English nor in the current 
German insider trading provisions. 
aa) 'Internal affairs' of the company 
First, information can relate 'to matters of the internal affairs of a company 
or its operations, assets ... ', cf s 440F(2)(a)(i). 'Internal affairs' includes 
both 'operations' and 'assets', and is thus the generic term referring to both. 
The following events and affairs are within this definition: 
- A breakthrough in a technical development or in that of a new drug 
or medicine; a large sale of goods; a major strike in mining operations; 
a bank's maintanance of a credit line when the company is in financial 
trouble. 
- A medicine, drug or technical article proving to be faulty or 
defective and having to be recalled from the market; a declaration of 
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insolvency.514 
The following also have to be regarded as potential insider information: 
- The appointment of important personalities to the board of directors; 
changes in capital, the issuing of new shares or debentures. 
- Information contained in the annual balance-sheet and in earning 
announcements (both types of information applying also to combined 
companies), and dividend announcements. 
This list is not intended to be complete but gives at least an overview of 
some of the events to which those occupied with the detection515 of insider 
trading can relate abnormal movements in share prices or specifically high 
trade volumes to possible events. 
The terms 'affected transactions' and 'proposed affected transactions' are 
intended to include fusions and mergers. It is submitted that they also 
encompass processes of decombination and demergers because they are the 
'actus contrarius' of mergers and have an equally important effect on the 
capital structure of the company. Unlike the old s 233, insiders both of the 
offeror and the off eree company fall within the legislation.516 Taking into 
account the definition of 'affected transaction' in s 440A, the acqusition of 
substantial positions in other (stock) companies by either a company or a 
natural person is also within the legislation. 
cc) Is 'market information' induded in the term 'earning power'? 
At first sight, 'earning power' would seem to form part of the internal 
affairs of a company since it relates to the dynamics of internal 
514 Remember that insiders are very likely to sell before the announcement of negative 
news, Seyhun op cit at 176 who provides empirical data for this finding. 
515 In Germany detection is effected via 'Sima' (ie System zur integrierten Marktanalyse 
which allows an analysis of all price and turnover figures, cf FAZ 17.5.1995 'Ftinf 
Borsen tiberwachen mit Sima'. 
516 But see Rider at 444 ' ... or information that another company intended a take-over 
bid would seem to be included'. His interpretation is incorrect because s 233 was 
limited to 'information concerning a transaction ... of the company' (my emphasis). 
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development or the building up of earning facilities such as new machines 
or a new product series in a competitive market. 
The term 'earning power' could also be interpreted so as to include affairs 
external to a company. Since 'earning power' is also affected by measures 
external to the company, this element could bring market information 
within the scope of s 440F.517 Market information is data about the market 
for a company's securities rather than about the company itself.518 
Take, for example, the information that the government prop<>ses to re-
open trade links with a specific country, a fact which can significantly 
increase the market for a particular company's product.519 One must bear 
in mind that, if such situations were covered by the term, this would bring 
about a major extension of the regulation of insider dealing,520 in that 
political issues, exchange rates, or changes in the prices of raw materials 
could fall within the legislation - thus extending also the scope of possible 
insiders. We shall see later that the European insider trading laws provide a 
fairly comprehensive list of examples of such 'market information'. 
The problem here is one of interpretation of the statutes. As statute law is 
deemed to be a reflection of coherent and logical thought,521 it 1s 
appropriate to start with the formulation itself. A textual argument m 
favour of including market data is that the list in s 440F(2)(a)(i) 1s 
formulated disjunctively ('or'), indicating things of a different nature. 
Firstly, we have already seen that 'operations, assets' although expressed 
disjunctively are two features of the generic term 'internal affairs'. 
'Earning power' is not separated by a disjunction but, on the contrary, is 
mentioned in the same line as operations and assets. The ref ore, it would 
seem more logical to interpret it in the same way as the two aforementioned 
terms. 
Secondly, the section runs 'internal affairs of a company or its ... earnmg 
517 
518 
Jooste op cit at 595. 
Branson. 'Insider Trading-II'. 1982 Journal of Bus Law 413 at 414~ cf also Jooste 
op cit at 594 et seq. 
519 Jooste. idem at 594. 
520 Jooste. idem at 595. 
521 Devenish. 'The nature of legal reasoning in the interpretation of statutes', (1991) 
2 Stell LR 224 at 225. 
140 
power' and also 'information, in respect of a 522 security'. All this restricts 
the relation of the information to a single company. It is, however, the very 
nature of market information, that it is related to more than one security 
( or company), if not, as for example political decisions, to the market as a 
whole. 
But no section should be interpreted without taking into consideration its 
surroundings, in particular the intentions of the law .523 The mischief rule, 
for instance, demands that one bears in mind what sort of mischief the 
legislation intended to ban.524 Applying this rule one could come to the 
erroneous conclusion that, wherever one is confronted with a problem of 
mischief, there is space for an extensive reading ie analogous interpretation. 
However, there are certain limitations to such an approach. The insider 
prohibition is part of the statutory criminal law of South Africa and its 
interpretation is therefore bound by the principle of legality525. The 
principle of legality implies that the legislature ought not to create crimes 
with a vague content, although there is nothing to prevent the South African 
parliament from doing so526 ( the new South African Constitution may have 
changed that, but it seems too early to take such a change for granted, and 
as yet there is still no case law). The least we can say is that the South 
African courts may interpret an ambiguous criminal provision quite strictly 
according to the letter of the law, and thus interpret it in favour of the 
accused. 527 
522 All emphases are mine. 
523 See Cockram, 'The interpretation of statutes', 3rd edition, Cape Town, Wetton, 
Johannesburg, 1987 at 44 et seq.; What the legislature meant to say neither the court 
nor anyone else can tell . . . . The intention must be deduced from what the legislature 
has said, not arrived at by conjecture of what the legislature might or ought to have 
meant, Wessels Jin Seluka v Suskin & Salkow 1912 TPD 258 at 265 et seq. 
524 Cockram, idem at 48. 
525 See R v Marais (1889) 6 SC 367; R v Forlee (1917) TPD 52; S v Solomon (1973) 
(4) 644 (C); S v Smith (1973) (3) 945 (O); S v von Molendorff (1987) (1) SA 135 
(T) 169 et seq.; see for the elements of this principle Snyman, 'Enkele opmerkings 
526 
527 
oor die legaliteitsbeginsel in die strafreg', (54) THRHR 1991 at 629-635. 
Snyman, 'Strafreg (Criminai Law)', 3rd edition 1992, sub 'Die legaliteitsbeginsel' at 
33-49. 
Snyman, idem, quoting Moss v Sissons 1907 EDC 156 at 157; Ackermann 1931 
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One consequence of that rule is that analogous interpretation is not 
allowed.528 A good example of this is provided by S v Smith529, where the 
accused was acquitted because the court refused to extend the scope of the 
provision (in that case prohibiting the possession of indecent photographic 
matter) so as to include photostatic material in the possession of the accused. 
There should be a high degree of rigidity in the definition of crimes;530 in 
case of doubt, an act should rather fall outside the scope of the actus reus of 
the crime. Consequently, since the law did not clearly include market 
information, dealing on such data is not within the scope of the insider 
trading prohibition. 
Moreover, the starting point for the analysis of market information is 
always the data about the trades ( eg volumes, options, identities of buyers 
or sellers) in a particular security.531 But none of these are related to the 
'earning power' and can therefore not be included. Consequently, it would 
seem that the issue of including market data was not raised by the South 
African legislator. 
Since there is, with regard to the interpretation of statutes, a presumption in 
favour of applying statutes in their more obvious meaning,532 it must be 
assumed that market information is not within the scope of the 1990 Act.533 
b,..,_) ___ ,...3,,C=oL&n .... f .uid .... e,u.n .... t..... ia ..... l_' ....,i n .... f ..... ou..r ..... m .... aucti~· O.u..nL.L? 
With regard to the scope of inside information we must consider one 
further question, namely, whether the information has to originate from a 





OPD at 69; S v Sachs 1953 1 SA 392 (A) at 399-400; and S v Stassen 1965 4 SA 
131 (f) at 134. 
Snyman, idem at 31 -et seq. 
1973 3 SA 945 (0). 
Schreiner JA in S v Sibiya 1955 4 SA 247 (A) at 256. 
See infra, group (v); see also below, chapter 4, 'offences and defences' in the 
English insider system which provides certain defences when the insider dealt on the 
strength of such market information, and it was reasonable for someone in his 
position to do so (cf Sched 1 to the CJA 1993 Part V). 
532 Devenish op cit at 225 quoting MacConnick, 'Legal reasoning and legal theory', 
(1978) at 207 et seq. 
533 This is also the opinion expressed in the King Tast Group Report at 8. 
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v Jamieson & Others534 the problem of different classes of confidential 
information was raised.535 
English courts allow an equitable remedy on the broad premise that he who 
has received information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of 
it.536 Therefore, in the English Law we need to consider the protection of 
confidential information as one possible remedy against insider dealing.537 
In Harvey Tiling Co v Rodomac538 it was decided, however, that the 'action 
for breach of confidence' in the English law is not available in the South 
African law of trade secrets. 
In South African Law protection of confidential information may be based 
upon breach of contract.539 Thus, if the relevant information is truly of a 
confidential nature (ie it is treated confidentially and known to a closed 
circle)540, it can be protected ;is a trade secret.541 This distinction is clear-
cut and helps identify the different qualities of inside information and trade 
secrets, the latter protected as a proprietory interest, the former not to be 
misused at the detriment of other participants on the capital markets. 




1992 (3) SA 520 (W). 
Cf Pistorius/Visser, 'Confidential information and the danger of confusing 
classifications', (1993) 5 SA Mere LJ 330. 
For example Seager v Copydex Ltd 1967 2 All ER 415 (CA) at 419~ it should, 
however, be noted that it is sometimes difficult to determine what actually was 
confidential and what not, see Joubert, 'Die reg en inligting', (1985) 18 De Jure 34 
at 42~ see also Pistorius, 'Confidential information and the rights of employees', 
(1993) 1 Juta's Bus Law 13~ who argues that 'confidential' information is 
information not known to the general public. 
537 Rider, 'Abuse of inside information', (1977) 127 The New Law Journal 830 at 832 
who is of the opinion that the confidentiality of the information was an essential 
requirement for insider dealing. 
538 Cf Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd & Another 1977 (1) SA 316 
(T)~ cf Pistorius/Visser supra note 270 at 331. 
539 Pistorius/Visser, idem at 331. 
540 Cf Harvey Tiling v Rodomac op cit at 323 and 325 .. 
541 See Pistorius/Visser op cit at 344~ see also Havenga, 'Company directors - fiduciary 
duties, corporate opportunities and confidential information', (1989) 1 SA Mere 
LJ 122 at 123. 
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production costs or trade secrets, which is treated as confidential 
information, can at the same time constitute inside information. The 
question is, however, whether inside information is necessarily confidential. 
Under the old s 233 it was not necessary for the insider to have obtained 
the information in the course of his office or through it.542 Since inside 
information under the new s 440F can even be obtained through 'theft', it 
is evident that no relation of trust and confidence would need to pre-exist 
between the insider and the company. Thus the confidentiality of the 
information is no relevant criterion for the South African insider trading 
prohibition. 
2. 'Unpublished' information 
While the 1973 Act imposed liability only on insiders as defined in 
s 229543, the 1990 Act imposes liability on persons more or less generally. 
It seems therefore, that prohibited is no longer insider trading, but rather 
trading on inside information .544 Because of this it is very important to 
define clearly and thoroughly the term 'information' as the key element in 
the definition the offence. 
The information has to be 'unpublished', cf s 440F(2)(a). According to the 
capital market mechanisms examined in Part I, information is reflected in 
share (and option/future/debenture etc.) prices immediately after the release 
of the new data. This element is the ref ore central to the definition; it is 
directly opposed to the term 'inside'. 
a) Generally available 
Unlike the old s 233, the new Act does not require the information to have 
been published. Rather the information needs to be incorporated in the 
(resonable) investor's decision to buy, to hold, or to sell. The time which 
has elapsed after the publication is difficult to determine, because every 




Criticised by Rider op cit at 444. 
Sec. 229 of the old Act. as amended. eventually repealed by s 6 of Act 78 of 1989 
with effect from 1 February 1991. cf Henochsberg on the Companies Act, 5th 
edition. edited by Philip M Meskin. Durban. 1994 at 443. 
See Luiz op cit at 330. 
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of acceptable modes of publication, each case must be resolved by the courts 
on the basis of a 'resonable investor' test to see whether the particular 
method of dissemination suffices.545 Jooste.546 argues that this is an objective 
'resonable investor' test. But the objectivity of the test is not so obvious. 
Textually, the 'investor' in s 440F(2)(a)(ii) is the reasonable investor 
'[only]547 in the relevant markets for that security'. This formulation is 
quite different from the view taken by US courts when defining, for 
instance, the price-sensitivity of the information. In the cited cases the 
'reasonable man' or 'reasonable investor'-concept is never limited to refer 
only to investors in relevant markets for the security.548 This is important 
because some shares are very rarely or not at all sought by the normal 
investor, but only by professionals who, according to their skills and 
information systems, will have absorbed the information more rapidly than 
the average investor - who normaUy puts his money in blue chips anyway. 
Also, it is evident that insider trading is at times more likely to occur in 
lesser capitalized firms.549 
The objectivity of the test can therefore only be a relative objectivity. It is 
submitted that the test that ought to be applied is a combined subjective-
objective test. It should be subjective insofar as it concerns the group of 
investors who normally constitute the market for the security 
(securities/companies) to which the information refers - and objective 
insofar as this group's normal standard of absorbing news of a similar kind 
is concerned. This interpretation guarantees more certainty for the investor, 
while mainting a reasonable degree of flexibility at the same time. It should 
be provided that, as soon as the Johannesburg Stock Exchange becomes 





Jooste op cit at 594. 
Idem at 594. 
My addition. 
See TGS op cit note 1 at 849: 'facts which. if disclosed, would be reasonably likely 
to have a substantial market effect'. See also TSC Industries Inc v Northway. Inc 
(1976) 426 US 438 at 449. In this decision the US Supreme Court held that inside 
information included inferences which a reasonable investor would draw from facts 
in his possession. 
549 Schafer/Ott op cit at 228 et seq. 
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the time which has to elapse after publication is reduced 550. 
Nevertheless, this subjective-objective test may sometimes cause uncertainty 
and thus create a dilemma for potential dealers.551 The definition contained 
in the 1990 Act leaves it to the courts to decide whether or not sufficient 
steps had been taken, and sufficient time had elapsed to allow the conclusion 
that the information was genenllly available when the accused dealt on the 
basis of such information.552 The flexibility can be mitigated only by 
applying this subjective-objective test which demands careful consideration 
in each case of both new data and relevant market for the security 
concerned. 
b) Time to 'digest' the informational contents 
The information need not be generally known. It is sufficient that it can be 
reasonably expected that it is known, or should 553 be known to the 
investors. This is indeed an objective element. But it still gives the courts 
enough discretion to decide whether 'such steps have been taken and 554 
such time has elapsed'. The emphasis is added to make it clear that both 
demands must be satisfied. Even in cases where all publishing requirements 
are fulfilled by a company the insider who deals may still commit an 
offence. 
This 'digestion time' for the information is part of the element of general 
availability. This seems to be an important issue for the South African 
legislator. Sec 440F(2) of the 1989 Act intended to restrict dealing for 24 
hours after the announcement of the information. 
In any event, the time limit effectively placed insiders (and tipees) at a 
disadvantage, because other traders were able deal as soon as the 







See Bhana op cit at 206: 'However, these results do not support the semi-strong 
form EMH since the market reaction to new public information continues for a 
period of five trading days after the announcement.' 
Jooste op cit at 594. 
Luiz op cit at 331. 
My emphasis. 
My emphasis. 
See comments on s 440F of the 1989 Act, for instance, Luiz op cit at 331. 
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the new s 440F. The uncertainty which the formulation creates among 
potential insiders serves to keep them away from the markets. It would 
seem, however, that their abstention reduces market liquidity, thus bringing 
about an economically inefficient result. In this respect it is doubtful 
whether the definition contained in s 440F is in line with modem economic 
and share price theory. 
c) Interim remarks on the concept underlying the South African 
provisions on insider trading 
We shall pause here and contemplate for a moment the rationale of the 
provisions. As mentioned above, the 'fraud' requirement of the 1989 Act 
was abandoned. Yet the US American philosophy of investor protection still 
shines through in the provisions. According to the US position, information 
is 'material' where there is a substantial likelihood that the information will 
change the 'total mix' of the information available to the investor.556 Thus 
the scope of the definition turns upon the need to protect the investor in the 
relevant market. The same is true for the publication requirement in the 
South African provisions. It is not defined at precisely which moment the 
information can be deemed to 'have been made public'. 
It will be the task of the courts to trace, depending on the facts of each case, 
this moment in relation to the investors who are supposed to carry out or to 
have carried out transactions in the affected securities. Whenever the 
investors tend to react rather late upon the release of new data, the 
information will remain 'unpublished' in terms of s 440F(2)(a)(ii) and (b) 
even longer than the 24 hours of the 1989 Act. 
All this effort is made to enhance investor protection at the expense of 
possible insider traders. They incur an increased risk when dealing around 
the time of publication. The investor is thus pictured as an individual person 
expressing his wish for self-determination also in investment decisions. His 
free will is to be protected against lack of information upon which his 
decision is based. The underlying philosophy of the South African law on 
insider trading is the protection of individuals. 
556 See Basic v Levinson, 108 (S Ct) at 983~ see also TSC Ind v Northway, Inc 426 
US 438 (1976) at 449. 
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d) Particular problems concerning the publication element 
As noted above, the courts have to decide whether any particular method of 
dissemination suffices. After an examination of the basic rationale of the 
law, it should be possible to deal with some particular problems of the 
definition in this regard. 
aa) Is it sufficient to inform the shareholders? 
The shareholder needs to be informed about his company. This can happen 
through posting of annual statements, or placing information before the 
annual meeting, or through lodging of information with the Registrar. The 
question which has to be dealt with here is whether or not these ways of 
informing the shareholders are sufficient to meet the requirements of the 
publication element. In other words, is the information published if the 
shareholder is informed through either of these ways? 
Jooste557 considers that the legislature should have been more specific in 
this regard. The purpose of such annual statements is certainly to keep the 
shareholders duly informed about their company. These statements do not, 
however, serve the interests of potential investors in the capital markets. 
Investors need timely disclosure for investment decisions rather than 
information about past events (as is the case in these statements). 
The main purpose of the publication requirement in the insider trading 
context is to facilitate (quick) investment decisions for outsiders, and 
thereby reducing their risk of suffering losses from insider trading. Annual 
statements cannot serve this purpose, because they are published too late. 
Annual statements are sent only to shareholders, not, however, to any 
potential shareholder, nor to the market as a whole. The purpose of the 
publication requirement in the insider trading prohibition is to inform all 
market participants. With regard to price-sensitive information, the <!apital 
markets must take priority over the shareholders because the market is the 
place where funds are raised for future investments. Moreover, the capital 
market is the place where insider dealing occurs, and where the ordinary 
investors (including those who are not yet shareholders) need to be 
protected. Therefore, no single information can be 'public' which is not 
available to the participants in the capital market. 
557 Op cit at 594. 
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The same applies to information lodged with the Registrar. No lodgement 
of information with the registrar, in terms of s 9(1) of the 1973 Act is 
made early enough for the information to become 'public' in the sense of 
the insider trading provisions.558 Neither posting of the annual financial 
statements of a company in which price-sensitive information is disclosed to 
shareholders, nor the placing of such statements before the annual general 
meeting, is sufficient publication for the purposes of s 440F. 
bb) Ticker tapes and financia1 journals 
Another question is whether it would be sufficient for the information to be 
disclosed on a ticker tape. In a well-functioning market the informational 
process through Stock Exchange tickers is very relevant in the daily 
practice of professional participants. Professionals such as financial 
intermediaries should be informed as soon as possible by the comanies. The 
most used medium for them is the ticker fed by Reuter, DPA and other 
international news information systems. One would therefore expect that 
information which is available on ticker is treated as duly published. 
Yet, here again, we should distinguish two phases in the information 
process. The first takes place when information is passed on to Reuter or 
another system. This does not yet 'make' the information 'public', though. 
The same (ie that it does not meet the publication requirement) is true for 
the formulation 'such steps have been taken' or 'such time has elapsed', 
because the information at that stage is not publicly available. 
The second phase takes place when the information comes in on the ticker. 
New data is incorporated into the share price only after that phase. From 
this moment onwards the information can be regarded as having been 'made 
public'. However, the South African legislation decided otherwise. As was 
suggested above, the underlying concept of the South African insider 
provisions is that the individual investor needs even more protection. Since 
the tickers are available only to professionals such as banks, brokers or 
dealers, the individual still needs to be granted time to 'digest' the 
information. Hence, publication through ticker is not sufficient for the 
information to be regarded as 'published' under the present South African 
insider trading prohibition. 
558 Jooste op cit at 594 raises this question. 
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Yet there seems to be one exception: once it is accepted that 'made public' 
has to be defined in relation to the relevant groups of investors, information 
is 'published' as soon as it is available on ticker tape, provided that the 
security is traded only by professionals because it 'can be expected to be 
known to such an investor'. 
cc) The language problem in South Africa 
In South Africa there is also the 'issue of different official languages. In 
which language or languages does the information need to be published for 
it to meet the requirements of the insider trading provisions. South Africa 
now counts no less than 11 official languages. The first question is whether 
publication in any one of the official languages will suffice.559 Jooste560 
raises the question whether publication in a black language should not also 
be necessary, particularly considering the fact that the share-incentive 
schemes of some large listed companies have resulted in considerable 
numbers of black shareholders. 
It is necessary here to reconsider the underlying concept of the law. 
Investor protection demands that the shareholder in the affected security 
should reasonably be expected to be aware of the information. The decision 
in which languages the information needs to be published in order to fulfil 
the publication requirement will depend on the 'relevant markets' of the 
shares. This introduces yet another element of subjectivity. Undoubtedly, 
this adds to the uncertainty already created by the vagueness of the 
definition. Yet, bearing in mind the underlying philosophy of the South 
African insider prohibition (ie maximum small investor protection), this 
meets the rationale of the law. Where securities of a company which has 
black shareholders are affected, the information must also be published in 
their language. If not, the necessary steps to 'make the information public' 
have not been taken. It is a consequence of the ratio legis that, by dealing 
around the time of publication of new data, the insider will incur the risk of 
contravention. The concept may be criticised but it was chosen by the 
legislation. 
Nevertheless it is suggested that for the information to be 'made public', it 
ought to have been published in English, too. In spite of all the recent 
559 Jooste, idem at 594. 
560 Idem at 594. 
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political developments in South Af ria, it still seems that English is the 
prevailing language in commerce and economics in general. Moreover, we 
can observe a tendency which is that a growing number of people are 
reaching a higher level of education, resulting, amongst other things, in an 
increased spread of English. Taking this into account it seems reasonable to 
demand publication also and generally in English. 
3. Price-Sensitivity 
The final element of the definition is that the information must be price-
sensi tive. Sec. 440F(2)(a)(iii) requires that it 'would reasonably be 
expected to affect materially the price of such security if it were generally 
available'. 
At first sight, it seems that there is nothing in the 1990 Act to help the 
prospective investor decide whether information is price-sensitive or not, 
and whether such information would materially affect the price of the 
securities.561 Yet this is an important issue: depending on what is required 
. by the element of price-sensitivity the scope of this information that falls 
within the legislation will eventually be defined. Therefore it would only 
seem fair to give insiders some clearer instructions as to when they will 
incur the risk of contravention. 
Sec. 233 of the old Act did not qualify the word 'expected' by the word 
'reasonably'. This was criticised because the provision did not indicate 
whether the test of materiality was an objective or a subjective 
evaluation.562 The word 'reasonably' connotes an objective standard.563 We 
should raise the question of whether this objectivity is related to the 
relevant market, ie the investors who normally trade in the affected 
sect,trity, or whether this is a 'reasonable man' approach similar to that 
prevailing in the US insider law. 
As has already been suggested, the publication requirement of the insider 
trading prohibition needs to be interpreted in relation to the normal 
investor in that security. This interpretation serves as a means of limiting 
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under the South African provisions. 
With regard to the price-sensitivity element of the definition it must be 
borne in mind that the information is relevant to the market as the whole. 
On release of new company data all investors are called to revise their 
previous investment decisions. This informational process is at the very 
heart of the allocative functions of the capital market. Therefore, it is more 
appropriate here to refer to the investors at large so that the price-
sensitivity of the information has to be evaluated through the eyes of a 
reasonable investor. Only this form of an objective test is in line with the 
South African concept of investor protection, and the rationale to enhance 
decisions taken by free and informed individuals. 
Jooste564 quoting Gore-Brown565 thinks that it 1s not enough for the 
information to be likely to influence most investors in arriving at a decision 
whether to buy or to sell the relevant security, if it is not also likely 
materially to affect the market price. The price effect and investor reaction 
are but two sides of the same coin. Without a majority of investors 
changing their mind about the evaluation of a security, the price of that 
security is hardly likely to change at all, because the share price is 
economically conceived to balance heterogenous expectations on future 
income streams.566 
It has further to be noted that it is enough that the information is likely to 
influence the market price. It is therefore not necessary to prove that the 
price did actually change on release of the information.567 The actual price 
shift can be a matter of hindsight only to a very small extent. This is in line 
with modem economic theory because, when insider trades occur, most of 
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IV. Evaluation of the South African definition 
The South African definition of what constitutes 'inside information' is 
based on a rationale which aims to reduce the systematic risk of non-
informed investors being outperformed by insiders who make use of 
(institutional) informational imbalances. Clearly, the intention of the law is 
to strengthen investor protection. 
In order to achieve this, the law provides a list of potential inside 
information. This list is sufficiently comprehensive to include all relevant 
internal company data. Since the information does not have to be 
confidential, the definition could also include market data. It is submitted, 
however, that market information is not caught within the scope of the 
definition. If such data are really a relevant source of losses to insiders, this 
gap is to be regarded as a shortcoming. 
The scope of the 'insider'-definition is far less important than the definition 
of 'trading on the strengh of' inside information. Inside information is the 
key element of the offence. It is therefore all the more regrettable that not 
enough light has been shed on the question of when information is 'inside'. 
The central element of all inside information is that the information is non-
public. Consequently, it would seem imperative for the law to be 
particularly meticulous when defining the criteria required for this element. 
However, both the means of publication and the time which must elapse 
after the publication are largely left open to the discretion of the courts. 
The same is true for the application of these requirements in terms of a 
'resonable investor' test. It is submitted that such formulation will create a 
high degree of uncertainty for potential dealers. 
Not only could this prove to be a deterrent for insiders, but also for 
professional dealers which will cause a negative effect on trading volumes 
and hence on market liquidity. In this respect both former versions, ie the 
1973 Act (ie published equals made public) and the 1989 Act (ie published 
plus 24 hours equals made public) offered more clearcut definitions. 
One has to be sceptical as to whether the discretion given to the courts will 
make things easier, or stimulate activities which are important for market 
liquidity. It is suggested that it would have been better to stick to the 
clearcut older texts. A modern approach would also have taken the 
mechanisms of market efficiency more into consideration. 
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The 'digestion time' provided for in the new prov1s1on 1s unclear and 
therefore not valuable. Such an element is also not in line with modem 
economic knowledge about the incorporation of news into share prices. A 
well-functioning market and its mechanisms provide more investor 
protection than does a ban on insiders, particularly, if this ban is so vaguely 
shaped that it becomes a deterrent for innocent trades. 
It is submitted that the definition which is originally based on the idea of 
investor protection will turn out to be a hindrance for market efficiency 
and thus be counterproductive also in terms of investor protection. 
Even if insiders carry out their transactions at the expense of other traders, 
no loss will occur to an outsider from the moment in which the price has 
adjusted to the new informational situation. It would therefore have been 
preferable to define the moment of publication according to the price 
adjustment process. But the South African insider provisions do not allow 
for an interpretation that 'such time has elapsed' (ie the information is 
'public') when the price of the security reflects the new information. Only 
this would take into account both modern economic theory and investor 
protection, for when information is reflected in the share price, it becomes 
impossible for the insider to profit from this information. 
Instead, for the information to be public it must be expected to be known to 
the 'reasonable investor', whoever he might be. Thus, not even information 
published in accordance with all regular publishing requirements can safely 
be regarded as 'made public' in terms of the insider provisions. For the 
intended investor protection it is irrelevant whether or not the investor 
knows the information, as long as the price is 'correct' (ie it reflects the 
current supply of information). 
The definition of 'inside' sticks one-sidedly to the concept of insider dealing 
as a fraudulent act, and does not bear in mind the functioning of impersonal 
stock mar!'ets. This mistaken approach is reflected in s 440F(4)(b): there, 
all dealings are included (ie not only on stock markets). As discussed 
earlier, face-to-face dealings and dealings on impersonal stock markets need 
to be regulated in a different way. 
Economically, in a properly functioning market, no investor would be 
likely to suffer any loss after the information has been 'published' through 
the Stock Exchange ticker. This aspect of price adjustment should have been 
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taken into account by the South African legislation. At least in cases where 
there is no major price shift after an insider traded, it should be judged in 
favour of the accused. This interpretation would, as we have seen, be in line 
with the concept of investor protection, but it would at the same time 
mitigate the effect of the vagueness of the publication requirement. If the 
courts do not follow this interpretation, it would seem that the market loses 
liquidity which would constitute a major restriction for foreign investors, 
and this would certainly produce worse effects on the economy than some 
laxity in the application of the insider trading prohibition. 
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C. The definition of inside information in the Directive 
Since the Member States of the European Union must comply with the 
provisions of the Directive, it is appropriate, before entering into the details 
of the laws of England and Germany, to examine the European definition of 
inside information. The Directive itself has been given extensive attention in 
the Ii terature568. 
I. Starting point: the wording of the definition 
Article 1 of the Directive runs: 
II. 
'For the purposes of this Directive: 
1. 'inside information' shall mean information which has not been 
made public of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers of 
transferrable securities or to one or several securities, which, if it 
were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the 
price of the transferable security or securities in question'. 
Definitions and interpretation of a Directive 
It has to be noted that there are no further instructions as to the meaning 
'made public' or 'significant effect'. On the contrary, the definition is 
formulated in a very abstract way, leaving some of its main elements to the 
discretion of the national Parliaments. Certain parts of the definitions have 
a highly hypothetical character. Therefore, the national legislators had to 
bear in mind the importance of the preamble to the Directive. After all, the 
European Court would base a decision on the teleological aspects provided 
by that preamble. 
The preamble to the Directive is based on Article 100A of the Treaty of 
Rome which reveals the main purpose of European legal measures, namely, 
that both regulation and administrative action which 'directly affect the 
functioning of the common market'569 need to be harmonised in the 
Member States. The aim of our interpretation is therefore to provide an 
understanding of the text as a means of harmonising the national laws. With 
regard to insider trading there is also a very practical reason for doing so; 
568 See notes 447-449 above. 
569 Ashe op cit (1992 Company Lawyer) at 16. 
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all important European companies have their shares quoted on many if not 
all European stock markets. It is therefore important that information 
relating to such companies is treated equally in all stock markets. In other 
words, insiders should be treated the same throughout Europe. 
According to Art 189 III of the Treaty of Rome, Directives are binding 
for the Member States, not within them. This means that a Directive does 
not normally have binding effects for the people in the Mmember States. 
They need to be transposed into domestic law before they will be binding 
for individuals.570 Art 189 III also provides that a Directive should always 
leave enough discretion for the Member States to formulate provisions 
which are appropriate to their national law systems.571 Without leaving this 
'space' a Directive may not fit into the national laws and may the ref ore be 
experienced as an authoritarian act from Brussels. Article 6 of the insider 
Directive, for instance, provides that 'each member state may adopt 
provisions more stringent than those laid down by this Directive'. 
III. The elements of inside information 
According to this definition information must be 'of a precise nature'. This 
requirement is an attempt to distinguish between rumour (or idle 
. speculation) and hard facts.572 The wording may raise a problem in that a 
narrow reading may result in the requirement that one isolated fact must 
have a significant effect on share prices.573 As Ashe574 argues, such an 






Bleckmann, 'Europarecht', 5. Aufl., Miinchen, Koln, 1990, at 83. 
If complete harmonization were envisaged by the EU, it would have been necessary 
to adopt a regulation~ for a comprehensive overview of this problem see Bleckmann 
op cit at 87. Since the Directive on insider dealing leaves enough space for the 
Member States to modify the scope of the provisions (cf Art 6), it would not seem 
that narrow definitions go beyond what is prescribed by a Directive. 
See Claussen op cit at 276 who argues that such 'facts' require events which are 
already terminated. For the English literature see Ashe op cit at 16 who, it is 
submitted, correctly, argues that the term also includes information about future 
events. The view of Claussen excludes, for instance, a forthcoming take-over bid, 
an interpretation is not desirable under any insider trading regulation. 
See Ashe op cit at 16. 
Idem, at 16. 
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of all available data: it is impossible to determine the exact impact of an 
isolated piece of information. It would seem that the definition must be 
understood to cover situations where information consists of several facts 
which - taken altogether - cause a shift in share prices. 
Another question is whether or not the insider would be guilty who had 
access only to some facts, and not to the complete information. It would 
seem that, as long as it cannot be established that those facts which the 
insider knew of were indeed decisive for the change in share prices, the 
prosecution must fail. 
The second element of the definition of inside information is that such 
information has 'not been made public'. The basic intention of this element 
can be summarised as 'the aim to neutralise the normal advantage of an 
insider'.575 What is questionable, however, is the degree to which this 
should be the done, ie how far this advantage should be equalled out. As 
was noted above576, there is nothing wrong with informational advantages 
in general. 
Some English commentators, citing the case SEC v TGS,577 emphasise that 
the investors should be placed on an ,~ual footing.578 They suggest that the 
information loses its inside status only when a good faith investor acting 
with due care can obtain knowledge of it.579 'Not have been made public' 
can therefore not be equated with 'not yet published' .580 
It is submitted that this view has to be rejected. As far as secondary 
European Law is concerned, the European Court of Justice at times ~pplies 
the historic method of interpretation, ie takes into consideration the 
formulation of drafts of Directives. Before the insider Directive was 








Idem, at 16. 
See 'morality of insider trading', Part I, chapter 1, A, II. 
SEC v TGS Co 401 F 2d 833, and Mitchell v TGS Co 446 F 2d 90, 103 (10th Cir 
1971) cert denied. 
Tridimas op cit (European harmonisation) at 930~ Ashe op cit at 16. 
Tridimas, idem at 930. 
Tridimas, idem at 930. 
COM (87) 111 final (1987) OJ No C 153/8. 
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for the insider Directive582. Those drafts defined 'inside information' in 
their Articles 6 as 'not generally known' (in the proposal) or as 'not 
accessible to the public or not available to the public' (in the amended 
proposal). Both formulations address the public at large and define 'inside' 
in terms of the general investor, which would support the approach 
suggested by- the English commentators. It is clear, however, that this 
approach does not underlie the final Directive. On the contrary, these 
changes583 reveal a gradual departure from the 'equal footing' approach the 
requirements of which would be met only by the very first wording, ie 
'generally known'. 
The third characteristic element of the definition is the qualitative test of 
price sensitivity. Information is material only when, if disclosed, its effect 
on the market price would be likely to be significant. The concept of 
materiality has an inherent vagueness, and it is difficult to provide guidance 
as to how substantial the impact must be in order to satisfy the test.584 What 
may or may not be significant will also vary from share to share. The test 
proposed in the Directive may therefore be criticised as vague.585 In the 
German literature the materiality-element is a significant issue because the 
courts' power to impose criminals sanctions is strictly limited by the 
objective wording of a penal statute such as insider trading prohibition. 
It has to be noted that none of the elements of the definition give any 
further guidance as to the meaning of 'inside information'. 'Non-public', 
'significant effect' and 'precise' could describe any information, and 
'relating to one or several issuers or securities' appears to be relatively 
vague with regard to the informational contents. This is regrettable, because 
the Directive stipulates that companies must publish all information which 
may have a significant effect on the share prices has to be published586• This 
creates much uncertainty for the companies. 






COM (88) 549. final (1988) OJ No C 277/13. 
For this textual development and its impact on the interpretation of the final Directive 
cf Tippach op cit, Part I, chap 4, V, 3, a. 
Tridimas op cit at 930., 
A~he op cit at 17. 
Article 7 malting reference to the provisions of Sch C 5(a) of the Annex to Directive 
79/279 EEC OJ No L66, 16.3.1979, at 21. 
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insider trading prov1s1ons in rather vague terms, because in most cases 
insiders would exploit the same type of information.587 Moreover, this 
would seem to create too much uncertainty with regard to the reach of the 
prohibition. The only guidance provided by the text is that the information 
can relate either to 'issuers' or to 'securities', thus including both company 
and market information. 
587 Empirical evidtrnce shows, however, that in the USA insiders have become more 
reluctant to trade immediately before take-over announcements .and eamining 
announcements, see Seyhun op cit at 173 et seq.; this effect appears to be due to 
relevant case-law, particularly to the Chiarella decision, 588 F 2nd 1358 (2d Cir 
1978), rev'd 100 S Ct 1108 (1980), much more than to changes in regulations or an 
increase supply of statutory remedies, such as provided by the ITSA 1984 and the 
ITSFEA (1988), see Aldave, 'The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement 
Act of 1988: Aq Analysis and Appraisal', (1988) 52 Albany Law Review 893. 
Whatever the reason may be for this finding, the present author takes the view that 
market participants will be satisfied with the fact that they are not outperformed on 
the basis of exactly this type of information, simply because it is so obvious that 
high profits can be gained from such information. The economic finding that insiders 
outperform the market on an average of 8-12%, however, would not seem to 
demoralize them, taking into account that they can still discount a certain percentage 
of the price of shares. 
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D. Inside information in the English legal concept 
I. Overview: the elements of the English definition 
The definition of the term 'inside information'588 in the English law is long 
and complex and breaks down into four cumulative components. All four 
must be present for the information to be 'inside information'.589 
First, 'inside information' means information which relates either to 
'parti6ular securities'590 or to a 'particular issuer591 of securities' or to 
'particular issuers of securities' .592 Also, information shall be treated as 
relating to an issuer of securities which is a company, not only where it is 
about the company, but also where it may affect the company's business 
prospects.593 This latter provision has been criticised as extending the n~t 
too broadly.594 




For the purpose of this section and section 57, 'inside information' means 
information which relates to 
particular securities or to a particular issuer of securities or to particular issuers of 
securities and not to securities generally or to issuers of securities generally; 
(b) is specific or precise; 
(c) has not been made public; and 
(d) if it were made public would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of 
any securities. 
Lomnicka op cit at 176. 
'Securities' is defined in s 54, see chapter 4 'offences and defences'. 
Defined ins 60 (2) as 'any company, public sector body or individual by which or 
by whom the securities have been or are to be issued.' 
'Company' is defined in s 60 (3)(a) to mean any body (whether or not incorporated) 
which is not a public sector body, wherever incorporated or constituted, thus 
covering foreign bodies (as was the case under the 1985 Act). 'Public sector body' 
means (i) any government, (ii) any local authority, (iii) any international organisation 
the members of which include the UK or another Member State, (iv) the Bank of 
England or (v) the central bank of any sovereign state, cf s 60 (3)(b). 
592 Sec. 56(l)(a). 
593 Sec. 60(4). 
594 Hannigan op cit at 60. 
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In the parliamentary debates it was said that the provision embraced almost 
everything, from information which had only an indirect bearing on the 
business to activities of competitors, industry trends and the state of the 
economy in general.595 In particular, investment analysts would be drawn 
further into the legislative net, since any briefings were likely to include 
information about the company's business prospects which may in turn 
affect the prospects of other companies in the same sector.596 The Treasqry 
argued, however, that the code against insider dealing could not be effective 
unless it applied to dealings on the basis of information about business 
prospects, which is highly price sensitive with respect to certain companies' 
securities, but does not relate to the companies themselves.597 
Sectoral or other information stemming from outside the company may be 
better referred to as 'external' or 'market' information. Since the final draft 
of the Directive, it has been a question whether the European law would 
encompass such information. We shall turn to this problem below when 
dealing with 'government data' and 'market information'. 
Secondly, in order to be included in the definition, the information has to 
be 'specific or precise'. The need to establish possession of specific or 
precise information represents an amalgam of the Directive's use of the 
term 'precise' and the retention of the word 'specific' of the 1985 
Companies Securities Act598. This element of the definition has been 
expressed disjunctively, but the distinction is not readily apparent, for 
neither term is defined elsewhere in the legislation. 
Thirdly, the information must not have been 'made public'. Sec. 58 is 
devoted to sp~lling out the meaning of this phrase, stating that its provisions 
'are not exhaustive with regard to the meaning of that expression'599. 
I 
The information is 'made public', if any one of the four situations enlisted 
in s 56(2) of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1993 (Part V) is present. 






HL Debs, vol 540, 3 Dec 1992, col 1495. 
HC Debs, Session 1992-93, Standing Committee B, 10 June 1993, cols 196-197~ 
see.also Hannigan op cit at 60 et seq. 
Treasury commentary on the original draft of the Criminal Justice Bill (Oct 1992) 
para 15. 
Wotherspoon op cit at 421. 
Sec. 58(1) CJA 1993. 
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a 'regulated market1600 for the purpose of informing investors and their 
professional advisors601 ; or is contained in public records, ie in records 
which by virtue of any enactment are open to inspection by the public;602 or 
can be readily acquired by those likely to deal in any securities;603 or 1s 
derived from information which has been made public604• 
To complicate the matter further, s 58(3) of the CJA 1993 then lists five 
circumstances when information may 605 still be treated as 'made public' 
despite the circumstances. This wording appears to give the courts large 
discretion, depending on the facts, to decide one way or the other.606 Four 
of these .circumstances are relevant. 
The first two of these circumstances are that the information: can be 
'acquired only by diligence or expertise';607 or is communicated to a 
'section of the public and not to the public at large'608• The use of the latter 
phrase suggests that it is not enough to communicate the information to a 
group with a common characteristic, eg a group of analysts. The group has 
to be representative of 'the public'.609 Moreover, the information may be 
treated as 'made public' when it can be 'acquired only by observation'.610 
The two further circumstances where the information 'may' be treated as 












As defined ins 60(1) of the CJA 1993. 
Sec. 58(2)(a). 
Sec. 58(2)(b). 
Sec. 58(2)(c), meaning securities (i) to which the information relates or (ii) of an 
issuer to whom the information relates. 
Sec. 58(2)(d). This is directly derived from the Preamble to the Directive which 
stipulates in the last but one paragraph that 'estimates developed from publicly 
available data cannot be regarded as inside information and ... any transaction carried 
out on the basis of such estimates does not constitute insider dealing . . . . ' 
My emphasis. 
Lomnicka op cit at 178. 
Sec. 58 (3)(a). This alternative is questionable because it appears to open a special 
defence to particularly skilled persons like investment bankers who are often 
involved in insider trading. 
Sec. 58 (3)(b). 
Lomnicka op cit at 178 fn 55. 
Sec. 58 (3)(c). 
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fee'611 ; or is published outside the United Kingdom.612 Fears were 
expressed in Parliament that the last part of the provision might enable 
potential insiders to cause the publication of the information in an obscure 
foreign newspaper and thus provide them with a defence.613 
Fourthly, in order to qualify as 'inside information', the information must, 
'if it were made public be likely to have a significant effect on the price of 
any securities'.614 The use of the adjective 'significant' means that the 
information must potentially have a major impact on the price. Potentially 
trivial movements in price are not enough. 615 The price impact of 
information is, however, very hard to predict because it depends on several 
variables such as the liquidity of the company's shares and the prevailing 
general market conditions.616 The Stock Exchange's recent consultative 
paper on the subject concedes617 that it is impos~ible to formulate an 
exhaustive definition of 'price-sensitivity'. This dilemma also occurred in 
Germany and has been given attention in the German literature. 
II. Comparison to the former law 
It is necessary to pause for a moment to compare this new definition of 
inside information with the former English law because the comparison will 
further clarify the contents of the new statutes. 
Under the 1985 Companies Securities Act (CSA)618, too, in order to 







Sec. 58 (3)(d). 
Sec. 58 (3)(e). 
See Lomnicka (1994 Journal of Business Law) at 178 fn 58. This fear was 
particularly relevant under the former South African insider dealing provisions, 
see Rider op cit (1977 SALT) at 445. 
Sec. 56 (l)(d). 
Lomnicka op cit at 178. 
Wotherspoon op cit at 424. Other variables could be: market Jiquidity, ways in 
which the information is released (newpaper headline or rgular information with the 
Registrar), or sectoral information. 
617 London SE, Consultative Document on, the Dissemination of Price Information 
(nov 1993) at 6. 
618 For an excellent cmprehensive overview of the old provisions see Gower, 
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concerned to have 'information as an insider'.619 The onus was on the 
prosecution to prove that this was the case. An insider was either 'connected 
with a company'620 or worked as a 'public servant'621. 
Without a detailed interpretation by the courts the following were looked 
upon as price sensitive inside information: advance knowledge of an 
imminent take-over; knowledge of a forthcoming placement of new shares 
in combination with the implementation of a financial recovery 
programme;622 knowledge of a significant change in the investment policy 
of a unit trust; change in the structure of a specialised energy trust623. 
According to the definition of inside information in the 1985 Act, the 
information had to be held by an insider by virtue of his position, and it had 
to be information which it would have been reasonable to expect a person in 
that position not to disclose, except for the proper performance of his 
duties.624 Moreover, the information had to be non-public and price-
sensitive, two elements which remained the same in the new provision but 
which were less carefully moulded in the old Act. 
1. Confidentiality of the information 
The word 'confidential' did not appear in the old Act, but was regarded as a 
fair summary of the Inside Dealing Act (IDA)' s rquirement that the 
information must have been held 'by virtue of a position' and that the 
holder of the position would not disclose it 'except for the proper 
performance of his duties'.625 It was thus clear that the IDA aimed to 
'Principles of modern company law', London, 1992 at 624-642. 







Rider/Abrams/Ferran op cit at 136 et seq.; for the corresponding provisions in the 
1993 Act see s 52(1) (dealing), s 52(2) (encouraging and disclosing). 
For the term 'connection' see Rider/Abrams/Ferran op cit at 136 et seq. 
Defined ins 173(2)(a-c) FSA 1986, inserted as s 2(4) in the IDA. 
R v Cross [1990] Cr App R 115. 
See for these examples Tridimas op cit at 931; see also Suter, 'The regulation of 
insider dealing in Britain', London, 1989 at 103 et seq. 
Sections 1(1),1(2),1(3), 2(1)(b),2 (4) of the IDA 1985. 
See Alcock op cit at 68; see also Prentice, 'Companies Act 1980', London: 
(Butterworth), 1980 at 301; cf also Suter op cit at 99; for the old Act see Hannigan, 
'Insider dealing', 1st edition, London, 1988 at 78. 
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impose liability on anyone who knew or ought to have realized that there 
had been a breach of confidence which allowed him to profit from that 
breach by dealing in corporate securities. 626 
Unlike the other parts of the definition, the test to be applied in order to 
establish a breach of confidence was an objective one.627 The adoption of 
such a fiduciary model meant that insider dealing provisions concentrated 
upon the relationship between the trader and the company to which the 
fiduciary duty was owed, rather than upon the relationship between the 
trader and the other party to the security transaction or, more generally, 
with other traders in the market. 628 




Alcock op cit at 68; Rider/Abrams/Ferran op cit (Fin. Services Act 1986) at 137. 
Suter op cit at 99. 
This suggestion was made by Davies op cit at 94, although he considered the market 
approach offered by the European Directive. Such a way of determining the actus 
reus of insider dealing is not convincing. The 'relationship' between the parties 
involved in transactions on impersonal markets cannot be decisive where the 
'affected securitie's do not imply such a relationship, for example transactions in 
bonds; but see Botha, 'Directors' fiduciary duties to bondholders? Some 
relationships between corporate financial management and fiduciary law', (1993) 
5 SA Mere LJ 2F,7, are of a different nature, ie whether the managers owe certain 
duties not to engage in unexpected and risky borrowing, cf idem at 293 et seq.; or 
take; as a further example of a situation which does not lead to fiduciary relations, 
the transaction in rights (options) where such a right is traded, but not executed so 
that the other party never became a shareholder. Dealings in derivatives do not seem 
to create any fiduciary obligations at all. 
629 Alcock op cit at 68, is of the opinion that, without some qualifications to Art 1(1) of 
the Directive, this provision endangers all securities markets, particularly those 
relying on a market-making system. He puts the question of how a market maker 
could possily make continuous two-way prices other than by reacting to every scrap 
of information or rumour he receives, no matter where it comes from. 
Any answer to this question is related to the market-maker exemption, rather than to 
the conceptual approach of 'breach of confidence', because the market-maker is 
under no duty of confidence to a company, and can therefore only be caught as a 
secondary insider. It is also widely accepted in the economic literature that in most 
cases the market-maker suffers a loss from dealing with insiders, see Demsetz op cit 
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breach of confidence was required), it is important to note that the concept 
of a breach of confidence did not become part of the European Directive. 
Davies630 was amongst the first English commentators who recognised the 
actual result which was brought about by discarding the confidentiality-
element, namely, a shift from company law to .securities markets regulation. 
These implications are discussed below in the chapter 'insider defined'. 
One further point must be made with regard to the definition of inside 
information because of the above conceptual change. The remaining 
elements in the definition are 'non-public' and 'price-sensitive'. After the 
abandonment of the requirement of 'connection with the company' these 
elements must now, under the new law, be looked upon as the most 
important elements .631 They must therefore be defined in precise terms. 
2. 'Non-public' and 'price-sensitiv' 
Under the 1985 Act632, the information had to meet two requirements in 
order to be regarded as 'unpublished' and 'price sensitive', ie it had to: 
and 
(i) relate to specific matters relating or of concern (directly or 
indirectly) to that company, ie it was not sufficient to be of a general 
nature relating or of concern to that company633 
(ii) be not generally known to those persons accustomed or likely to 
deal in those securities but which would, if it were generally known by 
them, be likely materially to affect the price of those securities.634 
According to Rider635 element (i) was obscure. He criticised the fact that it 
(corporate control) at 316; see also Fenn/Mc Guire/Prentice op cit (informational 
imbalances) at 8. 
630 Davies op cit at 99, and at 102. Nevertheless, Davies argues that the fiduciary 
doctrine can still be applied to the new law even though this must be done in a more 
sophisticated way, idem at 97; see also Hannigan op cit (1st ed) at 81. 
631 Davies, idem at 102. 
632 See Hannigan op cit (Insider Dealing) at 52. 
633 Sec. lO(a) IDA. 
634 Sec. lO(b) IDA. 
635 Rider, 'Insider Trading', London, 1983 at 22. 
167 
was not clear whether the specificity-requirement would relate to the 
information or rather to its importance for a company. He suggested that it 
would be preferable to define 'specific' in relation to the information 
itself.636 His opinion was indirectly accepted by the European Directive 
which added the element 'precise' to the definition of the information. Here 
the Directive proves to be, at least partly, a result of the English debate. As 
mentioned above the modelling of the term 'non-public' has been granted 
much more attention in the new law. 
The latter part of (ii) was almost identical to Art 1(1) of the Directive. But 
the former approach (ie 'persons accustomed to ... ') was also criticised for 
being unclear.637 Interestingly though, a Singapore Court in Public 
Prosecutor v Ghoudrie638 interpreted exactly these elements so as to mean 
'precise' and able to 'markedly affect the price'. 
III. Analysis of the elements of the 'information' 
The question of what is inside information has to be objectively assessed and 
it is a question of fact in each case whether or not the information possesses 
these characteristics.639 Let us therefore now consider the elements of the 
definition according to the new law. 
1. The elements 'precise' and 'specific' under the Criminal 
Justice Act (Part V) 1993 
The information has to be either 'specific' or 'precise' in order to fall 
within the legislation. This brings ab01,1t an extension of the old law which 
only used the term 'specific'. The new term is due to the European 





Rider and Ashe, 'Insider Crime - The new law', Bristol, 1993 at ;30~ see also 
Rider/Abrams/Ferran at 137; see also Hannigan op cit at 52. 
Hannigan op cit at 67. 
Reported by Rider, '(Singapore) The Court of Appeal 'defines' inside information', 
2 Comp Lawy 1981 at 141 et seq. 
Hannigan, idem at 59. 
168 
a) The Directiv~'s use of the te~ 
The Directive stipulates that the laws in the Member States should regard as 
potential inside information only a 'precise' piece of information.640 
According to the explanatory statements of the European Commission, this 
element requires that the information be more solid than a mere rumour. 
This does not exclude the possibility that price changes are sometimes due 
to information that can be confirmed only later. On the contrary: as we 
have seen in the Part I, some 'rumours', such as, for instance, price and 
trading signals, are factors that will often result in a change of the price of 
securities (derivatively informed trading).641 In both cases the un-informed 
trader does not know anything about the contents of the 'real' information, 
which is released only later. Such derivatively informed trading would not 
convey any actual information about the state of a company, but rather 
indicate an altered state through transactions by insiders. Yet it needs to be 
considered as valuable inside information. 
Market authorities will probably not be able to distinguish between 
informed and un-informed trading. On the other hand, if a person knows 
that an alleged rumour is wrong, he will be able to profit from this 
knowledge and buy, for instance, put or call options or, as a professional 
market participant, go short642 in the potentially affected share. 
h) Difference between 'precise' and 'detailed' 
There is, however, another problem with regard to 'precise'. In some cases 
an insider will impart only fragments of the information. These fragments 
are then assembled to complete data by the recipient of the information. 
In a recent prosecution for insider dealing643, some relevant data had been 
640 Art 1(1) of the Directive. 
641 Therefore, the term derivativlely informed trading might be slightly misleading. 
Nevertheless, these tradings result in a better pricing of the security concerned, see 
Gilson and Kraakman op cit at 578 et seq. 
642 Short sale in the language of the Stock Exchange means selling stock that the seller 
does not yet possess at the time of the sale. 
643 Before Judge Selwood, Inner London Crown Court, 17 Jan 1994, see Nakajima, 
'Putting the pieces together - insider liability', 15 Comp Lawy 1994 at 88. 
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given644 to Staines and Morrisey by Priddle, a tax specialist working for 
KPMG. Priddle disclosed certain details of a forthcoming takeover bid, 
such as price earning ratio, approximate share price of the target company, 
and the sector in which the firm operated. Priddle did not, however, 
disclose the identity of the actual parties of the deal645• At first sight, the 
question here seems to be whether or not the information was precise. 
Inside information need not be precise in every respect. It is sufficient for 
the recipient to be able to identify the relevant issuer by piecing together 
parts of the information. Some authors646 argue that the defendants dealt on 
inside information. This is certainly correct.647 But these authors did not 
raise the right question, because the information itself (ie the identity of the 
target company) was absolutely precise at the time when the securities 
transaction occurred! Thus, doubtlessly, Staines and Morrisey were in 
possession of a 'precise' piece of inside information. For the definition of 
what constitutes 'information', it is of no importance648 how the insider 
trader was informed. It is important what the trader finally knew, 
regardless of whether the trader had originally been given a complete piece 
of information. 
The real problem in this case was whether or not Priddle supplied his two 
friends with full and precise information, ie whether or not he passed on 
inside information. If he did not mention the names of the parties to the 
takeover (not even in a metaphoric way), then it must be established that he 





It is reported that this happened during a meal, ie at an informal meeting. This 
reminds us of Manne' s idea of an 'information clearing house'. 
Aaronson Brothers and Glunz, a German timber products company. 
Nakajima op cit, idem. 
The result is in line with and based on TSC Industries, Inc v Northway, Inc (1976) 
426 US 438, at 449. In this decision the US Supreme Court held that inside 
information includes inferences which a reasonable investor would draw from facts 
in his possession. 
648 It may, however, be important for the definition of the insider! 
If, for instance, the prohibition does not cover situations where a person trades as a 
secondary insider, or, where it is provided that for the recipient to be an insider he 
must obtain the complete information from a direct insider, then the source of the 
information would be relevant because otherwise the trade would not be prohibited. 
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together and to reach the correct conclusion (ie the complete information). 
This would be proved, for instance, if Priddle knew about the professional 
skills of his friends. 
c) 'or specific' 
In order to be regarded as 'inside' the information must also be specific. In 
this regard s 56(1)(b) of the CJA 1993 contains a deviation from the 
definition in Art 1(1) of the Directive in that the Directive requires that the 
information is 'precise', but not 'specific'. In general, the question of how 
far Member States may alter definitions pre-formulated in a Directive, 
poses some problems. However, in the case of the Insider Directive, this is 
not the case, because Art 6 leaves it open to the Member States to adopt 
provisions more stringent than those laid down by the Directive. Since a 
disjunctively added term such as 'specific' broadens the scope of potential 
inside information, more dealings become prohibited. Here the English law 
is more stringent than the European law. 
We still have to find out the exact difference between 'specific' and 
'precise'. An example given in the literature is a take-over situation, with 
the distinction as follows: 'specific' information is that a bid as such was 
going to be made. 'Precise' information is the price at which that bid was 
going to be made. On that basis, 'precise' information means narrow, exact 
and definitive information.649 Yet the Directive included 'precise' only to 
distinguish facts from rumour, certainly not in order to exclude take-over 
bids from the scope of inside informatiop! 
The intention of the law is probably to include information which relates to 
a company (ie that the information 'firm-specific'), even though this 
information might not yet be 'precise' for an outsider. It is suggested that as 
soon as the impact of that information on the one firm becomes predictable 
for an insider, the information is 'specific'. An example for this is where a 
new kind of medicine has been discovered. Only he who knows how 
important this breakthrough is for the producing company would possess 
'specific' information. Outsiders who might have heard about the new 
product, but who are not able to assess the value of it for the firm would 
not possess 'specific' information. 
649 Cf Hannigan op cit at 63. 
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2, The information 'has been made public' 
The information must not have been 'made public' in order to be 'inside' 
information. 650 
This creates a problem with regard to the European law because the 
definition contained in Art 1(1) of the Directive only stipulates that the 
information should be non-public. The English legislator has defined this 
element in a lengthy way, as a result of which the English definition seems 
to be quite different from the European . Yet, even though it is much more 
detailed, the English definition is probably compatible with the Directive, 
provided it does not narrow down the scope of Art 1(1) too much. 
Above all, it is striking that the legislator should have worked so 
extensively on the new definition. In the original drafts of the Criminal 
Justice Bill introduced in the House of Lords, no assistance was given as to 
what was meant by 'made public'.651 The Treasury Commentary noted that 
it would not be helpful to provide a detailed definition, because of 'the risk 
of causing difficulties for legitimate activities or seriously undermining the 
effectiveness of the legislation•.652 
Why then was this part of the definition detailed with such extreme 
precision? In order to answer this question we must first consider what was 
thought to have been wrong with the preceding definition in the 1985 
Companies Securities Act. 
a) The definition contained in the 1985 Act (CSA) 
The Company Securities Act 1985 (CSA, also referred to as Insider 
Trading Act, IDA) had provided that the information must 'not be 
generally known to those persons who were accustomed or would be likely 
to deal in those securities'.653 This was criticised as being unclear.654 In 
fact, there were various views on this provision. It was argued that the 
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professionals.655 Rider656 suggested that the dissemination of information to 
the investing public was not required. It was also argued that the market 
must have 'internalised' the information,657 and that the information must 
have been fully reflected in the price of the securities658. 
It is evident that this element of the former definition must have created a 
considerable amount of uncertainty. For instance, transactions carried out 
by insiders before the market had assimilated the information were 
probably not safe under the 1985 Act.659 Thus the price had to adjust 
before insiders were able to trade safely.660 If, however, the question of 
when professionals are allowed to deal had been considered more carefully, 
the shorter definition in the old Act might have been clearer than the more 
detailed but somewhat contradictory version under the new law. 
b) Uncertainty tackled under the new Act? 
We shall now examine whether the new English law has coped with the 
problems of uncertainty posed by the old Act. At a further stage of the legal 
process of modelling the definitions, the Treasury suggested that it would 
provide extra-statutory guidelines. But critics argued that, on a matter 
which was such an important element in a criminal offence, guidelines were 
insufficient. The Government subsequently said that 'when information has 
and has not been made public is the single issue that had caused most 
concern to the organisations with which the Government has been 
discussing the Bi11'661. 
Sec. 58 of the CJA 1993 is made up of two alternative meanings of 'public'. 
The first possibility is that sufficient steps have been taken so that the 
information has in fact 'been made public'. The second possibility is that the 
information 'may be treated' as made public. In order for this alternative to 
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CJA 1993 must be present.662 We shall see that especially these 
'circumstances' have been modelled under the strong influence of certain 
interest groups in the financial industry. 
aa) Information 'published according to market - rules' 
Sec. 58(2)(a) of the CJA 1993 provides that information is made public if it 
is published in accordance with the rules of a regulated market. This covers 
situations where information has been released by the Stock Exchange's 
Regulatory News Service (RNS) as required by the listing Rules.663 This, it 
would seem, has the effect that information which issuers wish to notify664 
must be delivered in the form of an announcement to the Company 
Announcement Office (CAO). The Stock Exchange then arranges for the 
prompt publication of announcements through the RNS, which operates 
between 7.30am and 6.00pm. Announcements notified up until 5.30pm are 
released on the day of receipt. It would be at this point, for example, if 
there was an announcement on TOPIC (ie one of the Stock Exchange 
announcement systems), that it would be 'made public' for the purposes of 
s 58(2)(a) of the CJA 1993.665 
Rider and Ashe666 criticise this part of the definition, because (although it 
has the advantage of clarity) it has the disadvantage of creating uncertainty 
with regard to the time when insiders may deal. Quoting Hopt667, they 
suggest that the Directive must be interpreted in such a way that insiders 
have to wait for the market to assimilate the information. To allow insiders 
to deal on publication of the information would give them an advantage 







Hannigan op cit at 67. 
Hannigan at 68. 
Notification according to the Listing Rules. Chapter 9. The release of price sensitive 
information is important. The Stock Exchange working party issued a document 
called 'Guidance on the dissemination of price sensitive information'. In this 
document it is recommended that such information is exclusively released through 
the CAO. See Smith, 'Release of price sensitive information: Stock Exchange 
guidance', 15 Comp Lawy 1994 at 89. 
Rider and Ashe op cit at 34. 
Idem, at 34. 
Op cit at 51. 
174 
starting blocks the instant the information became public, and before it has 
had its full impact on price.668 The preamble to the Directive, however, 
sought to protect investors who need to be 'placed on an equal footing'.669 
With respect, a complete quotation of the Directive would correct this view. 
The preamble to the Directive runs: 
'for the market to ... play its role effectively, every measure should be 
taken to ensure that the market operates smoothly; whereas, the smooth 
operation ... depends to a large extent on the confidence it inspires in 
investors; whereas the factors on which such confidence depends 
include the assurance afforded to investors that they are placed on an 
equal footing and that they will be protected against the improper use 
of inside information' .... 670 
Confidence may at times be different from 'equal footing'. As we have seen 
above, the content of a Directive has to be interpreted in the light of its 
preamble. Without entering into a discussion of all the interpretational 
details of this preamble, it is obvious that the intention of the Directive was 
to ensure the functioning of the market, and not in the first place to 
guarantee the maximum of investor protection.671 Therefore, as far as the 
European law is concerned, the definition of 'made public' implies that the 
information should be absorbed by the market. One might be able to 
criticise this result de lege f erenda, but is a matter fact de lege lata. 
Another problem is raised by s 58(2)(a) of the CJA 1993. The RNS 1s a 
service to which one has to subscribe. Thus, even though information is 
announced to the CAO as required by the Stock Exchange' s Listing Rules, it 
is, at least initially, obtainable only by those who subscribe to the service.672 
However, the great majority of banks, brokers, agents, and intermediaries 
have sul;>scribed, so that this problem does not exist in practice. It is 
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bb) Registered information 
Data contained in records which by virtue of any enactment are open to 
inspection by the public is 'made public' according to s 58(2)(b) of the CJA 
1993. Of course, information registered at the Companies House or at the 
Patents Registry also falls within the scope of the provision.673 
The essential requirement here is that the records must be open to 
inspection by the public, which excludes publication in obscure registers. It 
was suggested674 that this alternative might encompass the Official Gazette, 
but it seems not to be included within the provision, for, while it is ari 
official record, it is not a record which by virtue of any enactment is open 
for inspection by the public (although many public libraries may subscribe 
to it).675 This is a weak point in the legislation, beccl,use one of the first 
things that would seem to need clarification is whether publication in such 
an important document as the Official Gazette is included in the definition 
of 'made public'. 
cc) Information readily acquired by people 'Jikely to deal' 
Information is further 'made public' in terms of s 58(2)(c) CJA 1993 when 
it can be readily acquired by those likely to deal in any securities to which 
or to whose issuer the information relates. This formulation contains an 
element of the old 1985 Act ie 'those likely to deal',676 which ~eemed to be 
difficult to apply in practice. Yet, there is a very important difference. 
Under the CJA 1993 it is sufficient that the information may be readily 
acquired, even if it is not 'known' (!) by those likely to deal.677 
Hannigan678 argues that it is not clear whether information ts 'readily 
acquired' if it can be obtained on networks more expensive and less widely 
available than TOPIC. This is unconvincng. Either information can be 
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cannot. To extend the networks which an issuer can use to publish relevant 
data via s 58(2)(c) of the CJA 1993 would lose sight of the importance of 
the publishing requirements. If a network is not even suitable for the 
purpose of publishing the information according to the Listing Rules, it can 
certainly not make the information 'public' according to the insider trading 
provision, because 'public' would still mean more or less the same under 
those provisions.679 It is therefore submitted that 'those likely to deal' 
cannot be reached through a network which would not fall under s 58(2)(a) 
of the CJA 1993. 
Rider and Ashe680 argue that, if information can be 'readily acquired' by 
the market, this information is already likely to have made its price impact 
and can therefore not to be regarded as inside information. These authors 
tend to over-estimate the element of 'price-sensitivity'. If the English 
legislation had had the intention to make sure that the information has its 
full impact on prices before insiders are allowed to trade, it would have 
chosen a definition like in the South African law (ie which allows for extra 
time to digest the news). But this was not the case. Thus information need 
not be 'readily acquired' by the whole market for it to be 'public'. 
On the other hand, the formulation 'those likely to deal', although criticised 
for being awkward, is an important element for the correct interpretation 
of the Directive.681 However, it would seem that 'persons likely to 
deal'ought to have been defined more precisely. 
679 It seems appropriate to refer here to the principle of 'linguistic economy'. ie the 
recognition of the 'own-meaning' of each of the structural components of meaning 
of the enactment must be pursued, except in instances where words, phrases or 
sentences are employed ex abundanti cautela, see Du Plessis. 'The interpretation of 
statutes', Durban, 1986~ see, however, Cockram, 'The interpretation of statutes', 
3rd edition. Cape Town, Wetton. 1987 at 40. for the exeption from the above 
interpretational rule in cases where two statutes which contain the same words must 
be read differently. for instance. in a technical statute. The reference to context 
makes it necessary to look at the purpose of the statutory provision and should, if 
one is found. produce a 'purposive construction'. see Ashworth. 'Interpreting 
criminal statutes: A crisis of legality?', (1991) 107 uw Quarter Review 419 at 428. 
680 Op cit at 35. 
681 Tippach op cit at 120. 
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dd) Information derived from published data - the problem of 
research recommendations by analysts 
Sec. 58(2)(d) of the CJA 1993 provides that information is also public if it 
is derived from information which has already been made public. It 
becomes obvious from the debates and the Treasury Commentary that this 
provision intends to make clear that information derived by analysts from 
previous information, which had already been made public, is not itself 
inside information. 682 
This provision is a direct result of the transposition of the European Insider 
Directive. The preamble to the Directive stipulates that ' ... estimates 
developed from publicly available data cannot be regarded as inside 
information and ... any transaction carried out on the basis of such estimates 
does not constitute insider dealing ... '683. 
This does not, however, exclude that the fact that a recommendation made 
to the customers of a bank can be regarded as inside information. Suppose, 
for instance, a colleague learns of the analyst~s recommendation ahead of its 
publication and deals on his own behalf. Did he possess inside information? 
It could be argued that he is within the legislation, ie that he dealt while in 
possession of inside information. In this instance, knowledge of the 
recommendation itself would not constitute inside information; but the fact 
that such a recommendation was about to be made would constitute insider 
knowledge. 684 This is assuming that all the other elements (most 
importantly the significant effect on the share price) are present.685 Since 
recommendations by influential analysts often lead to price shifts, it is 
correct to subsume such information under the legal definition. 
Yet, the problem of recommendations does not seem to be whether or not 
the information 'has been made public', but rather, whether the information 
can at all be regarded as information within the legislation. One could argue 
that the information does not stem from inside a company but is related to 
the shares of that company, which means that it is market information.686 
682 See Treasury Commentary op cit para 27; Hannigan, op cit at 68. 
683 Preamble to the Directive, para 13. 
684 Hannigan op cit at 69. 
685 Hannigan, idem at 69. 
686 See below, 3: group (v). 
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Genuine research recommendations by analysts based on public information 
(unlike situation where the analyst bases his recommendation on a meeting 
with the company chairman) are treated as information which 'has been 
made public' and not as inside.687 Hannigan688 thinks that it may eventually 
be difficult to distinguish between these two scenarios. 
A US court has summarised this problem by saying that 'a skilled analyst 
with knowledge of the company and the industry may piece seemingly 
inconsequential data together with public information into a mosaic which 
reveals material non-public 689 information. Whenever manager and 
analyst meet elsewhere than in public, there is a risk that the analysts will 
emerge with inside material information.690 
Rider and Ashe691 think that the danger recounted by that court should not 
arise in the UK, provided that the mosaic which contains the inside 
information is derived from information which has been made public. 
This is indeed a critical issue because in practice these scenarios would not 
occur separately, but, in most cases, both sorts of information will be 
mixed. The analyst may have derived his evaluation from public data, and 
later he finds his opinion confirmed by the chairman during a firm visit 
(the latter would certainly be inside information). Would his subsequent 
recommendation then be based on 'public' or on 'inside'information? All 
this leaves us with much uncertainty, and it also reveals that strong 
influence of interest groups does not result in clearcut definitions. 
c) Information which 'may be treated' as made public 
Further provisions of the CJA 1993 provide for situations where 
information 'treated' as having been made public, even though at first sight 
the circumstances may indicate otherwise. The fact that the information 






Hannigan op cit at 68. 
Idem, at 68 fn 39. 
My emphasis. 
Elkind v Liggett & Myers, Inc 635 F 2d 156 (2d Cir 1980) at 165; see also Rider 
and Ashe, op cit at 35. 
Rider and Ashe, idem at 36. 
179 
'made public'. The issue is then a matter for the courts to decide.692 
English commentators think that these provisions are not entirely 
satisfactory but the Government claimed in debate693 that it was important 
to insert these examples of information which may be treated as having 
been made public, because many people felt that unless such examples were 
included, information might be considered 'not made public'. 694 Originally, 
as a result of pressure by the securities industry, the Government wished to 
issue non-statutory guidance notes. This was abandoned, though, and 
replaced by a statutory basis for what could tum out to be what Rider and 
Ash call a 'plea in mitigation'.695 They think that defendants would always 
try to refer to these examples, claiming that none of them was actu~lly 
'fulfilled'.6% The Minister said, however, that only697 'if a recipient of the 
information had considered that it had been made public, should the 
information be treated as if it had been made public'.698 
All this is not very convincing. Even if one wants to apply these provisions 
with all the exceptional circumstances in which information 'may' be 
regarded as being made public, the burden of proof is still on the 
prosecution. Thus the courts will have to establish that the insider 
intentionally made use of inside data. Consequently, there must be evidence 
that none of the exceptions contained in s 58(3) is applicable, and thus' it 
will never be the insider who needs to prove their appli~bility. 
A particularly negative side-effect of these exceptional circumstances is that 
they render the underlying concept of the law unclear. The only persons 
who profit from such 'exceptions' are secondary insiders from the financial 
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influence of these 'City' people. Since most big insider cases699 occur in 
connection with investment bankers and other financial intermediaries, 
these provisions will help rather than deter such insiders. 
aa) Information that can be 'acquired only by persons exerc1smg 
d•1• ' • I ugence or expertise 
Sec. 58(3) of the CJA 1993 goes on to provide that information may be 
'treated as made public' if it can be acquired only by diligence or 
expertise.7°0 A typical situation where information can be acquired only 
through diligence might be where an analyst consults large numbers of 
technical scientific journals or an obscure foreign journal, and discovers 
information which will affect a new product.701 Information in an obsure 
foreign journal needs to be distinguished from s 58(3)(e) (ie 'published 
outside the UK'), for information in an obscure journal is not 'published' in 
the true sense of the word. Only then would it be possible to subsume the 
publication under s 58(3)(e). If the journal is 'obscure', the only alternative 
under which this can be subsumed is provided by s 58(3)(a). 
Wotherspoon702 suggests an assiduous investment analyst who reads through 
relevant but obscure technical journals seeking information may safely issue 
recommendations to his fund manager. But is this convincing? The 
formulation 'may be treated' gives the courts a large degree of discretion. It 
therefore depends on the courts how this concept of 'exceptional 
circumstances' is going to be applied. Until there is some case law available 
on this question we have no certainty with regard to such recommendations. 
Instead, the analyst must be careful when his professional advice is based on 
information of that kind. Yet, in the long run, especially if the exceptions 
are generously applied, the view will no doubt prove right. 
bb) Information is communicated to a 'section of the public' 
A piece of information that is communicated only to a section of the public 
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alternative covers situations where information is released on an expensive 
market information service, depending on the scope of the service.704 
The formulation suggests that it is not enough to communicate the 
information to a group with a common characteristic, eg the group of 
'analysts'. The group has to be representative of 'the public'.705 The absence 
of an adjective qualifying 'section' allows the court a considerable degree of 
latitude in cases where there has been only partial public disclosure of 
significant information. 706 
Hannigan 707 asks whether information is communicated to a section of the 
public if it is the subject of a press release issued to newspapers, radio or 
television stations prior to the Stock Exchange announcement. Since radio 
etc get the information prior to the Stock Exchange announcement system, 
it is unlikely that information could be regarded as made public when 
communicated to a radio station.7°8 The example furnished by Hannigan 
would thus never be within the scope of the provision - even if the 
information were not embargoed. Television, radio and newspapers address 
the public at large, and not only a section of the public. It is hence unlikely 
that a court would apply this provision when information is so released. 
cc) Information can be acquired only_hy~ 
Information may also be treated as 'made public' when it can be 'acquired 
only by observation'709. Wotherspoon710 furnishes the example of a 
manufacturing company's storage yards that have in recent months 
stockpiled finished goods, a fact that may be regarded as a disclosure 
concerning the state of the company's order book. This is probably wrong, 
because the state of the order book can be acquired verbally as well. 
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consider is -whether a factory chimney smoking at night could be regarded 
as public information, since everybody could go and see a smoking chimney 
and take the view that the factory was working overtime, or whether it 
would be regarded as information that had not been promulgated or made 
public. The point is that the court can decide the matter taking into account 
all of the circumstances.' 
This example is hardly better than the first one, because the fact that a 
chimney is smoking at night certainly lacks the element of precision which 
is necessary for the information to fall within the legislation. Nor is it 
specific712, because a smoking chimney cannot possibly alter the opinion on 
a whole company (we are talking about LSE-quoted companies!). 
Moreover, the state of the factory (company) may as well be communicated 
verbally. This alternative is obscure.713 
dd) Information is 'communicated only orl payment of a fee' 
If the information 'is communicated only on payment of a fee', it may also 
be regarded as 'made public'.714 This seems to cover situations where an 
investor is in possession of information as a result of subscribing to an 
information service or having read an industry research report. In the 
Parliamentary debate it was said that the point here is that 'payment clearly 
cannot have the effect of preventing information from becoming public, but 
payment itself cannot be sufficient to make information public'.715 
In other words, payment is just a factor which the court considers in 
deciding whether or not the information has been made public.716 It is 
submitted that this provision again reveals the extent to which the 
exceptions are moulded in favour of the financial service people. It should 
be clear that any payment for information with the intention of making use 
of it as inside data in order to make profit in securities transactions, cannot 
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ee) Information has been 'published outside the UK' 
The final alternative containing a description of exceptional circumstances 
in which information may be treated as having been made public is that of 
information published outside the United Kingdom.717 Fears were expressed 
in Parliament that the last part of the provision could enable potential 
insiders to cause the publication of the information in an obscure foreign 
newspaper, and thus provide them with a defence.718 This was also an issue 
under the former South African legisiation.719 
English commentators quote as examples the New York Times72°, The Wall 
Street Journal721, Die Zeit722 or Handelsblatt723 - as opposed to information 
carried solely in local or regional (the Tonga Evening News724) 
newspapers.725 It is appropriate to distinguish between the alternatives (a) 
(ie information 'acquired by expertise') and the one dealt with here. 
'Expertise' may encompass an obscure journal which does not normally 
contain relevant market information. However, and not only textually, there 
has to be a difference between the first alternative and this one. 
It is important to note that the wording encompasses information only when 
it is 'published' outside the United Kingdom. Expertise and diligence, 
however, can neither mean 'published' according to the English (listing) 
rules, nor can it be understood to include information which is contained in 
obscure technical journals. On the contrary, obscure journals would seem to 
fall within the scope of s 58(3)(a) of the CJA 1993. Therefore, 'published' 
must be interpreted in this context to mean publishing instruments 
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information may 'be treated as made public', if it has (ie without the 
discretion given by the English legislator) to be regarded as 'made public' 
according to the legislation in that other country. It would not seem to make 
a difference which kind of publication this is. Thus, radio, television, 
informational systems, Stock Exchange Tickers and newspapers are 
included as long as they 'make the information public' in the other country. 
It was argued that the prosecution should fail where the defence is able to 
show that the publication was regularly read by experts because of the 
consistent quality of its coverage of their field of interest.726 Again, it 
would seem that the defence cannot be required to provide evidence that the 
information 'may be treated' as made public but, on the contrary, the onus 
is on the prosecution to establish that it was still (ie at the time of the 
dealing) 'insidei information. 
In the House of Lords the point was made that given the modern speed and 
ease of communication, it is difficult to conceive situations in which 
information is available abroad, but cannot be obtained in the UK.727 This 
approach is convincing. The only thing which could happen is that the 
different trading hours (caused by the time difference eg between Tokyo 
and London) would result in a later publication in London. Normally, 
however, prices of shares which are traded worldwide adjust very fast to 
the new data available on a foreign Stock Exchange, so that London stock 
prices can be expected to react more on the changed price in Tokyo than to 
the information itself. 
d) CJA 1993: extra time to digest the news? A conclusion 
As we saw in our examination of the South African definition of inside 
information,728 it is conceivable that news items, although publicly 
available, may still, in terms of the insider trading laws, be regarded as 
'inside', thus leading to a criminal offence when this information is used for 
capital market transactions. The law would then provide for some extra 
time after the publication before insiders are allowed to trade. 
726 Col 184 (remarks of the Opposition spokesman Mr Alistair Darling MP). 
727 HL Debs, Session 1992-93, 3 Dec 1992, col 1503~ Hannigan op cit at 72. 
728 The South African legislator has provided a digesting time of 24h which must have 
elapsed after the release of the information in order to prevent the trader from insider 
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The English insider dealing provisions make one thing clear: insiders are 
allowed to deal on publication. Whether or not this is satisfactory for 
outsiders - the very moment the information is published, insiders can start 
putting orders in the market. Rider and Ashe729 regret this, because it gives 
insiders an · advantage over the rest of the market. This seems to be even 
more the case when information is only 'treated' as made public because 
insiders seem to be able to trade at an even earlier stage of the pnce 
adjustment process. 
These authors refer to the Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS) case730 where it was 
held that insiders must wait for the market to absorb the news. Yet, the 
facts of that case were different from the situation envisaged by the new 
English law. In TGS the relevant information was 'published' only at a 
press conference, after which orders were given before the information had 
reached the market. Since journalists on a press conference do not even 
constitute a sector of the public730a, the information would neither be 
regarded as 'made public' nor 'may' it 'be treated as made public'. 
Consequently, the fears of Rider and Ashe arenot well-founded. 
3. Market information and government data 
It is an interesting question whether insider trading provisions are wide 
enough to encompass information such as Government figures or financial 
data. Would knowledge of the Government's foreign borrowing plans, for 
example, or UK trade figures, or the information that interest rates are to 
go up or down, be seen as inside information? 
In England, indeed, there have in the past been allegations of large dealing 
in gilts and other securities as a result of a leak about ERM entry in 
October 1990, and again in September 1992 ahead of the Government's 
L7.27bn foreign currency loan.731 
It is appropriate to clarify the notion of 'market information' before 
entering into a detailed discussion, for it seems that there is considerable 
confusion about what the term is meant to include. To this end it is helpful 
to divide market-related news into certain groups which can, in a second 
liability. 
729 Op cit at 34. 
730 SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co 401 F 2d 833 (2d Cir 1968). 
730a The task of journalists in any medium is to inform the public - thus they cannot be 
considered a section of the 'public at large' which is the actual meaning of 'public'. 
731 See Hannigan at 62 who gives some additional references, idem at 62 fn 10. 
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step, be connected with the text of the law .732 Neither groups nor examples 
should be regarded as conclusive, but allow further information to be more 
easily classified. The five groups are: 
a) 
(i) Political news: governmental decisions, embargo resolutions, death 
or illness of a politician, law-projects; wars, natural disasters. 
(ii) Exchange rates, currencies, natural resources: changes in exchange 
rates by the Federal Reserve Banks, order volume in currency-
dealings, activities of the Federal Reserve on the markets, prices of 
resources such as oil, metals or other. 
(iii) Statistics concerning the whole economy: price rates, 
unemployment numbers, GNP, number of business breakdowns in a 
given period. 
(iv) Statistical material concerning sectors of the industry: see 
information sub iii wjth regard to one specific industrial sector, for 
instance number of new cars in the previous month, used capacities in 
factories; the development of a new technique to produce artificial 
diamonds (which would affect firms in that branch in South Africa). 
(v) Securities dealings: order volume, individuals buying or selling 
stakes, buys by big investment houses or funds, investment advice or 
recommendations ( either buy or sell or hold) to be published, price 
stabilisation dealings. 
Does the English law encompass market information? 
Firstly, s 52 of the CJA 1993 (ie the insider prohibition) does not apply to 
anything done by an individual acting on behalf of a public sector body in 
pursuit of monetary policies or policies with respect to exchange rates or 
the management of public debt or foreign exchange reserves.733 This is 
striking because, if data such as exchange rates were not looked upon as 
insider-relevant information, the exemption provided in s 63(1) of the CJA 
1993 ie that 'an individual acting on behalf of a public sector body in 
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In order to reduce the risk of insider dealing on Government data, the 
Central Statistical Office announced in February 1993 that it was further 
restricting the circulation of economic data prior to publication. 734 Thus, 
the Government appears to have recognized the relevance of such 
information for insiders. This perspective is in line with the recognition 
that under the new law the scope of persons regarded as insiders is far 
wider than it used to be under the 1985 Act (CSA), so that a person 
working in the public sector now falls within the legislation, even without 
being specified as public servant by statutory instrument.735 The 
abandonment of the confidentiality requirement is also of importance here. 
Data which is external to a company could hardly be included under a 
regime that places restrictions only on dealings where the information needs 
to be part of a fiduciary relationship with a company. 
Secondly, according to s 60(4) of the CJA 1993, information shall be 
treated as relating to an issuer also where it may affect the company's 
business prospects.736 The emphasised part of the formulation reveals that 
the new law seeks to make the definition of information sufficiently broad 
to encompass a broader system of data than just news originating from 
inside the companies. 
News about major customers, suppliers, creditors, debtors can all have an 
affect on the company's business prospects.737 Similarly, if a regulatory 
body decides to. licence operator B in an area where company A has 
previously had a monopoly, then this will affect the prospects of both 
companies A and B, and also those companies likely to take advantage of the 
relaxation. Such information would therefore fall within the scope of 
s 60(4) of the CJA 1993,738 although it is not 'internal' company data. 
We should note, however, that this type of information is within the scope 
of s 60(4) only where insider transactions are carried out in the shares of 
company A. Where an insider deals in shares of the competitor companies, 
the information would be within s 56(1)(a) of the CJA 1993 since it relates 
directly to an issuer of securities. 
734 Hannigan op cit at 62 giving additional reference. idem at 62 fn 12. 
735 Hannigan at 82. 
736 My emphasis. 
737 Hannigan op cit at 60. 
73.8 Hannigan. idem at 60. 
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Thirdly, it is interesting to consider another defence, namely, that 'an 
individual is not guilty of insider dealing if he shows that (i) the 
information was market information and (ii) that it was reasonable for an 
individual in his position to have acted as he did'.739 Market information for 
the purpose of this defence is information listed in para 4 of Sched 1. It 
encompasses information about 'facts', namely that (a) securities of a 
particular kind have been or are to be acquired or disposed of, (b) that 
securities have not been acquired, (c) the number of securities acquired or 
whose acquisition is considered, (d) the price at which they are to be 
acquired, or (e) the identity of the persons involved. 
Dealing on the strength of this type of data does not in itself constitute a 
defence unless it can also be established that the insider acted reasonably for 
an individual in his position. This clearly indicates that such market 
information is within the scope of the insider dealing prohibition. 
Thus the way is generally open to include market information. But it is not 
clear whether or not all market data are included. This issue has, once 
again, to be seen against the background of the Directive. If the definition 
provided by the Directive encompassed market information, the English 
law would be underinclusive when narrowing down the scope of 
information too much. 
b) The Directive and 'Market Information' 
Whilst the provisions of a Directive do not have a horizontal effect, it is 
clear that courts are bound to interpret the English law to give effect to 
Community obligations.740 It is appropriate to apply the different methods 
of interpretation discussed above which the European Court would choose 
in order to establish whether market information falls within the scope of 
the definition or not. At the time of the preparations for the new insider 
legislation in Germany, this question was raised because the inclusion of any 
kind of external information meant a radical change to the pre-existing self-
739 Sched 1 para 4. This provision will be dealt with at greater length below, chap 4 sub 
'offences and defences'. 
740 Marleasing SA v La Commercial International de Alimentation SA, 1992 CMLR 
305~ see on this issue also Gore-Brown, § 12.22 at 12.031. 
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regulatory system,741 
The European Court of Justice would presumably start with an objective 
analysis examining the wording of Art 1(1) of the Directive. In this 
definition there is no textual restriction to internal company information. 
On the contrary, according to Art 1(1) information is included which 
either relates 'to one or several issuers of transferable securities or to one 
or several transferable securities'. 
The Directive relates to ' ... issuers or ... securities'. This has been expressed 
disjunctively but the intention of the distinction is not readily apparent, 
because one would presuppose as an economic fact that the value of the firm 
is, more or less, mirrored in the price of its shares. Thus it is not obvious 
why the Directive distinguishes between information relating to an issuer 
and information relating to securities. It would seem that all public (and 
sufficiently important) information about a company does affect the 
company's securities and, vice versa, that no relevant information relating 
to a security would result in a lasting shift in security prices if the company 
itself was not at all affected by that information. 
A good example for this interaction between security and company is the 
volume of trades following the information that an insider has executed a 
transaction. Here we have to remember how information is incorporated in 
the price of a security: the trades subsequent to the insider's trades are not 
'informed trades' (ie the traders do not have the actual information, yet 
they know that an insider has traded), but are so-called derivatively 
informed tradings. The other market participants react upon such a 'trade 
signal' sent out by the insider trader who is supposedly in possession of 
non-public information. Market participants, who observe trades and 
'recognize' an insider, do possess information only about the identity of a 
trader, which in itself is market information (ie information in the sense of 
para 4 of Sched l(e): 'identity of persons involved'). But only if the true 
insider really possessed relevant information prior to his transaction, would 
the shift in security price be a lasting one. Otherwise the price re-adjusts at 
the former level. 
Derivatively informed trading by market participants who react on price or 
volume signals constitutes another fine example for the interaction between 
741 Tippach op cit (Marktdaten) at 1269 et seq. 
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the 'effect on securities' and the 'value of the firm'. Despite the fact that 
security price and firm value normally correspond, one can observe that, 
depending on whether a piece of information is internal or external to a 
company, its influence is different. Information from inside the company, 
once it has been made public, influences the appreciation of the investors 
towards the company, and the change in the security price is subsequent. 
In the case of external information investors' assessment of the company 
(or the companies) changes because of the conclusions drawn from 
derivative facts such as insider trades, price signals, or a shift in base metal 
prices which affect the prospects of a specific industrial sector eg the 
chemical or the mining industry. 
We can observe the same phenomenon where political information such as 
the Government's decision to join an international organisation or a 
monetary system (EU, ERM, ECU or other) is concerned. A shift in 
security prices subsequent to this kind of information does not occur 
because of its direct relation to 'one or several issuers', but because 
investors think that conditions for securities trades in general or for a 
speci~c sector have changed. Such information relates to securities and only 
indirectly to issuers. It is therefore market information. 
It has become clear that the disjunctive expression (ie 'relates to issuers or 
securities') used by the Directive intends to encompass both company and 
market information. It is necessary for market information to be related 
only to one or several securities because otherwise the information cannot 
be subsumed under these alternatives, and could not, therefore, be regarded 
as inside information. Information related to the market m general, 
however, does not fall within the definition of the Directive. 
Hence information which can be classified in the above groups (i) (ie 
political news) or (iii) (ie statistics concerning the whole economy) are not 
within the scope of the definition of the European law.742 Other methods of 
European interpretation, in particular the teleological interpretation, lead to 
a confirmation of this result.743 
742 
743 
Tippach op cit at 1273 et seq. 
Tippach at 1270 et seq. 
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c) The English definition in the light of the Directive 
In the light of the telos set by the European Insider Directive, the 
interpretational analysis of the English definition suggested by Hannigan is 
probably correct. She thinks that borrowing requirements and interest rates 
can have a significant effect on the gilts markets744 (remember that gilts are 
now, under the CJA 1993, included within the statutory definition of 
'securities'). Information concerning those requirements or the interest 
rates can the ref ore be regarded as information that relates to particular 
securities - and is therefore market information. 
The wide scope of the provision is tempered by the fact that it provides 
only one element of the definition, and so, while most information is within 
the scope of this provision, much of it falls at hurdles. In particular, it will 
often happen that information does not have a significant effect on the price 
of 'any' securities.745 
Hannigan also suggests that not all economic data is caught, and furnishes 
the example of information about UK trade figures of inflation which 
would not be included, because it is information that does not relate to 
particular securities or particular issuers of securities generally.746 This is 
in line with s 56(1)(a) of the CJ.A. 1993 which stipulates that information 
'relates to ... and not to securities or issuers of securities generally'. 
' 
Gore-Brown747 thinks that the bank rate is not caught. This would certainly 
be a flaw in the provision because this kind of information is vital for 
capital ~arkets (and, of course, for insiders). Here we have to wait for case 
law. Nevertheless, the general impression is that, as far as market 
information is concerned the English legislator has perfectly understood the 
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4. p . . . . r1ce-sens1tiuty 
The final aspect of the definition of 'inside information' is the price 
sensitivity of the information. The fact that the information, if made public, 
would be likely to have a significant effect on prices is probably the 
essential feature of the definition. It is this criterion which matters, rather 
than the issue of how 'qualitative' the information really is. At the end of 
the day price-sensitivity will be the most determining factor when a jury 
considers whether or not information is relevant. Therefore, Rider and 
Ashe748 regard the price-impact as more important even than the 
information itself. This, however, is doubtful. The purpose of the 
legislation seems to be clear. As a result, only information that is likely to 
have a significant impact is within the reach of the law.749 
Yet no guidance has in fact been given as to what precisely amounts to a 
significant effect.750 Gore-Brown concludes that 'we are talking about 
unexpected and sensational events'. It seems doubtful, if not exaggerated, to 
require that the information must be 'sensational'; and 'unexpected' is in 
fact little more than a synonym for 'not made public'. Besides, to whom 
should the information appear sensational? In every case there are probably 
numerous different views, depending on whether it is the appreciation of 
private clients or that of professional analysts. Even if the information is 
not 'sensational', it may render the trader able to outperform the market. It 
would seem to be the legislator~ s task to mark the line between insider 
dealing and dealing on information which 'may or may not' be relevant to 
markets and investors. The definition should certainly encompass less 
information than 'any data', but more than just 'sensational' news. 
No guidance has been given, because, as the Treasury commentary noted, 
the range of securities which is covered by the legislation is such that it 
would not be practical to indicate what precisely is significant.751 Thus the 
significance of the price change does not purport to have a universal 
indicator such as a fixed percentage of the expected price shift. For 
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certainly be very different from that of options or shares752 - even as price 
a reaction on the same information. 
A starting point for an interpretation of what price sensitive means is to call 
for caution: it is possible to misjudge the formulation 'if made public ... 
would be likely .. .' as meaning either 'whether it will have an effect'; or 
whether that effect will be significant.753 Both interpretations are 
wrong,7-54 because the actual effect which the information has on the 
security price is not in itself decisive. Both could only really be tested at the 
moment when the information is released, not, however, when the insider 
trading occurs, ie where, by definition, the information is not known to the 
public and can therefore not have an actual price impact yet.755 Yet to carry 
out a transaction, where the price reaction occurs after the transaction, but 
before the announcement of the information to the public is made, is 
certainly insider trading 
Nevertheless, most English commentators think that there will be an 
element of hindsight here because the courts will know the price movement 
which did in fact occur after the information had been made public. Thus it 
would seem that, where the insider has dealt close to the time of 
publication, evidence of the price sensitivity can be shown by the effect the 
information had on the market.756 This thought was expressed by Knox J. in 
Cha~e Manhatten Equities Ltd v Goodman757: 
'I am satisfied that it (ie the inside information) would, if generally 
known, have been likely materially to affect the price of the company., s 
shares. The proof of the pudding is in the eating in that when the 
suspension (ie a pending announcement of the inside information) was 
lifted, the price of the company., s shares was sharply down.' 
The actual impact of the information when it is disclosed can be used as an 
indicator of 'price sensitivity' only where the insider transaction occurs at a 
752 Hannigan op cit at 74. 
753 Hannigan, idem at 74. 
754 Hannigan, idem at 74. 
755 Cf Rider and Ashe op cit at 37. 
756 Rider and Ashe at 37; Gore-Brown op cit at §12.22.3, and at 12.035. 
757 [1991] BCLC 897 at 931. 
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point in time proximate to the disclosure of the information.758 Otherwise it 
would be too difficult to prove that the trade was based on the information. 
But taking into account the skills and the routine of most (real) insiders, it 
will hardly ever occur that they deal close to announcement. The above 
interpretations are therefore too restrictive. 
The evaluation will depend on the facts. It is impossible to analyse the 
English concept by reference to quantification.759 Rider and Ashe160 in 
particular make reference to the US case of Elkind v Liggett & Myers, 
Inc761, in which it was held that the fact that a company's shares dropped 
113/4 points on disclosure of information did not establish price sensitivity 
in view of the fact that a substantial decline in the company's shares was not 
uncommon. This is an important point: the courts probably have to take 
into consideration the usual volatility of the shares in order to establish 
what kind of price shift is substantial for a specific security. 
It is also important to note that a significant change in price is not the only 
means of establishing that inside information is price-sensitive. The net is 
cast wider because, for the purposes of defining inside information, 'price 
includes value'.762 'Value' is a wider concept than price, and it is hard to see 
that 'price' encompasses 'value' other than in an indicative character.763 
This complicates the matter further, because the price of a particular 
security may or may not reflect its value. The value of a security is an 
estimation for which the price is in most cases the best guide.764 Neither in 
the Directive nor in the English law is the actual price change a qualifying 
factor that determines the inside character of the information. Thus the 
word 'value' seems to direct the attention more to the importance of the 
contents of the news. 
For these reasons Rider and Ashe suggest that the courts must propound a 
'reasonable investor' test relative to the securities in question and leave the 
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, Industries Inc v Northway Inc765, has been adopted by the Australian 
legislature. Section 1002C of the Corporation Act reads as follows: ' ... a 
reasonable person would be taken to expect information to have a material 
effect on the price ... if the information would be likely to influence 
persons who commonly invest in securities .. .'766_ 
These authors concede, however, that the above approach does not really 
help. Except in the most blatantly obvious767 cases, there must be a careful 
analysis of the evidence supporting what is 'a significant effect' on the 
price.768 In some cases the matter will have to be dealt with by expert 
evidence.769 Gore-Brown770 says rightly that it is to be hoped that the courts 
will not become bogged down with the theory of pricing and valuation. 
IV, Evaluating the English definition of 'inside information' 
The English law defines inside information as such in a very abstract 
manner which is in accordance with the European Directive. At first sight, 
no guidance is given as to the informational contents, thus, on principle, it 
encompasses market information as well as company data. The definition is 
also sufficiently broad to encompass two conceptual approaches, namely 
'functioning of the market' and 'investor protection'. 
Conceptually, it is to be noted that the confidentiality requirement has gone. 
The underlying idea of the definition is the ref ore not to protect information 
as an asset of the company (so-called business property approach). The 
mam issue has been the definition of the element 'made public'. The 
outcome is to some extent in contrast to the approach chosen by the 
765 426 us 438 (1976). 
766 Australian Corporation Act 1989, s 1002C, inserted by Sched 4 to the Corporation 
Legislation Amenment Act 1991; for the considerations which lead to the changes to 
previous rules see Tomasic, 'Insider trading law reform in Australia', (1991) 
9 Comp and Sec Law Journal 121; see also Baxt/Maxwell/Bajada, 'Stock markets 
and the securities industry, Law and practice', 3rd edition, Sydney, Melbourne, 
1988 at 228 et seq. 
767 Sensational?, one is inclined to ask. 
768 Rider and Ashe op cit at 38. 
769 Rider and Ashe, idem at 37. 
770 Op cit at §12.22.3, and at 12.035. 
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Directive, and will probably result m various problems concerning the 
interpretation of the statutes. 
To start with, it is important to note that in terms of the English definition 
of inside information, 'price includes value'. Unlike all the other legislation 
examined herein, this element refers to the importance of the informational 
contents, yet without providing any specified contents. Nevertheless, it is 
certainly appropriate to take this equation into consideration when interpret 
ing 'price-sensitivity'. This directs the attention away from the mere price 
reaction. 
Price reactions may occur immediately after the release of new 
information; and yet they are always difficult to measure, because usually 
more than one piece of information contribute to a price shift. Other 
factors, such as the general market situation, or the previous performance 
on the leading Stock Exchanges of the world (ie New York, Tokyo, 
Frankfurt, London) are also important factors. And even where one 
observes a change in the share price that can be related to a single news 
item - how much change would amount to a 'significant' effect on the share 
price? 5%, 2-3%? And what percentage is really significant to the often 
quoted reasonable investor? We simply do not know. This has to be 
considered in every case brought against an insider. 
Once the importance of the information is accepted as a more valuable 
criterion, 'price-sensitivity' can be interpreted with more clarity: the 
concept becomes open to certain lists of potential inside information. The 
third part of this study undertakes to enlist some of the most important 
types of information. 
The 'value'-approach will also help identify the subjective evaluation of the 
information by insiders. Once information appears in a model-list of 
valuable information, it becomes easier to establish that a transaction was 
based on a particular information. And even without such a list it is easier 
for the courts to evaluate the importance of information in terms of their 
'value' for the company. Here the English law has chosen a subtle and at the 
same time practical approach which will help resolve some of the 
uncertainties arising from the word 'price-sensitivity'. As we will see 
below, the µerman legislation has unfortunately left this point open. 
It would have been preferable to say, though, that news published outside 
the UK is 'made public' and not merely that such information 'can be 
treated' as made public. Whenever news about an international company is 
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published on a foreign market (according to their publication rules), the 
price adjustment normally takes place all over the world.771 Hence this part 
of the definition is defective. This leads us to the evaluation of the element 
of 'made public'. 
The definition of 'made public' in the English law must be criticised 
because insiders are offered too many defences with regard to this element 
of the definition. The law provides too many situations where information 
'may be regarded as made public', although, in fact, it is not yet published. 
This seems to narrow the scope of the prohibition unnecessarily. The more 
skilled the insiders amongst the City people are, the more easily they can 
violate the rules without being caught. 
The textual fault is that the publication requirements of the insider trading 
provisions are not in line with the publication rules in general. It is 
submitted that it is too difficult to prove mens rea in cases where this 
element becomes an issue. In the case of s 53(l)(b) of the CJA 1993, for 
instance, it appears that it is far from clear when an individual is able to 
prove that he 'believed' the information was 'disclosed widely enough'. 
To a similar extent it remains unclear when and how the insider can show 
that he would have dealt in securities whether or not he had been in 
possession of the information. If the insider had dealt anyway, he would 
have done so without the intention of using inside information. In terms of 
the law he would not have dealt in order to make profit (or avoid a loss) on 
the strengh of inside information. The prosecution must also establish when 
the information is 'readily acquired by those likely to deal', cf s 58 (2)(c) 
of the CJA 1993. This formulation confuses rather than illuminates. 
The new definition of inside information has altered the position on the 
question of 'timely dealing', because it categorically states that information 
'is made public', if it is published in accordance with the lillles of a 
regulated market. Once it is published, an insider can deal even if the 
market has not had any time to absorb such information.772 This approach 
treats insiders in a friendly manner, and is thus apt to avoid uncertainties 
created by vague publication requirements eg in the South African law. 
Yet the English definition goes beyond this, providing for various 
771 
772 
Tippach op cit at 85 et seq. 
Hannigaµ op cit at 70. 
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circumstances in which the information 'may be treated' as made public 
even though it is not officially available. Hannigan773 asks 'why was this 
section included?', and then goes on to suggest that 'its effect may be simply 
to highlight the uncertainty as to whether or not information is public, and 
that in itself may make prosecutions more unlikely'.774 It is submitted that, 
examining the various elements of 'made public', we can detect the 
considerable influence exercised by the City to bend the rules in accordance 
with their needs and to their benefit. At closer examination of the situations 
depicted in s 58(3)(a)-(e) of the CJA 1993 we find that the essence of the 
provisions is that they benefit775 financial service people who are next in 
line to gain access to information before the gneral public does. 
The provisions bring about much uncertainty because the decision whether 
the information may in a particular case be treated as made public is left to 
the discretion of the courts. It is submitted, however, that this uncertainty 
will be tackled in favour of these financial service people, because it is 
difficult to prove men's rea with regard to non-public information, once it 
is accepted that the information 'can be treated' as made public. 
The same tendency underlies s 58(2)(c) of the CJA 1993 according to 
which information is made public if 'it can be readily acquired by those 
likely to deal in any securities', a formulation which again extends the 
regular publishing rules in favour of the City people. Wotherspoon 776 is 
probably right to suggest that, on behalf of this alternative, the assiduous 
investor is finally given the opportunity to act more safely. Both 
alternatives (ie 'can be treated' and 'readily acquired') can be criticised 
because they open up special defences to skilled persons. All this is brought 
about by the unconvincing definition of 'made public' that gives no further 
guidance for the application. The discretion lies with the courts. But to 
make proper use of such discretion it would have been helpful if the 
legislator had provided an identifiable underlying concept of insider 
773 Op cit at 72. 
774 Idem, at 72. 
775 The interpretational approach to determine those who profit from a certain regulation 
was first suggested by Stigler, 'The theory of economic regulation', Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 2 (1971) at 3; in an insider regulation context 
see Manne (Cato Journal) at 941 et seq. 
776 Op cit note at 423. 
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trading. Unfortunately, there is none. 
The underlying concept is certainly not to strengthen investor confidence, 
because existing informational asymmetries are maintained through the 
laxity of the element of 'made public'. Nor can we trace the 'business 
property approach' as an underlying concept, because the confidentiality 
requirement of the old Act is gone. Is market protection the new English 
concept, such as it was envisaged by the Directive? Certainly not, for of all 
the market participants (ie companies, investors, insiders, financial business 
industry) only the financial service people are given further protection. 
They are the second best informed market participants. Given the high 
degree of protection offered to them, they will be able to exploit inside 
information more than anybody else. Hence the redistributional effect of 
insider trading prohibitions is almost entirely in their favour, and not, for 
instance, in the favour of the small investors. 
The absence of an underlying concept will pose enormous practical 
problems. If the intention of the law is not readily apparent, on what 
concept will the courts base their decision? Given this vagueness it may be 
doubted whether the English insider provisions will effectively help deter 
insider trading. It is likely that cases will not end with a conviction, but, 
instead, in a renewed attempt to clarify some or other point by the law, 
perhaps under less influence from the City. 
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E. The German definition of 'inside information' 
Inside information is defined in § 13(1) Nr. 3 within Artikel 1 of the 
'Gesetz Uber den Wertpapierhandel und zur Anderung 
borsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften'777 
(ie Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz), whose 'Artikel 1' is the 'Gesetz 
tiber den Wertpapierhandel' (engl.: Securities Trading Act), hereinafter 
abbreviated as 'WpHG'. The Gennan778 wording is: 
777 
( 1) Insider ist, wer 
1. 
2. 
3. aufgrund seines Berufs oder ... bestimmungsgemaB 
Kenntnis von einer nicht off entlich bekannten Tatsache hat, die sich auf 
einen oder mehrere Emittenten von Insiderpapieren oder auf 
Insiderpapiere bezieht und die geeignet ist, im Falle ihres offentlichen 
BT Drucksache 12/6679 of 27 Jan 1994; see the excellent detailed analysis provided 
by Ktimpel, 'Bank- und Borsenrecht', Koln, 1995 at 1156-1227; see the detailed 
article by Assmann, 'Das neue deutsche Insiderrecht', ZGR 1994 -at 494; for the 
view of a German practitioner see the article by Peltzer, 'Die neue Insiderregelung im 
Entwurf des Zweiten Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz', ZIP 1994 at 746. 
778 English translation taken from Mohr, 'Insider- und Borsenrecht, German insider and 
stock exchange law', Frankfurt/M, 1994 at 80 et seq.: 
(1) An insider is any person who 
1. ( ... ) 
2. ( ... ) 
3. by reason of his profession ( ... ) 
has knowledge of a fact which is not publicly available, relating to one or more 
issuers of insider securities or to insider securities, and which is prone, if it were to 
become publicly available, to substantially influence the market price of an insider 
security ('insider fact'). 
'Prone' must be understood in the sense of being 'generally suitable or fit' to 
influence. It must, however, be clarified that the information only needs to be likely 
to be 'prone' as opposed to !prone in relation to the particular case' in the sense that 
it would be necessary for an actual price shift to have taken place. 
General note: The translations of the German texts cited are taken from Mohr, 
'Insider- und Borsenrecht', so long as no other reference is given. 
I 
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Bekanntwerdens den Kurs der Insiderpapiere erheblich zu beeinflussen 
(Insidertatsache). 
The technique chosen by the German legislator is the definition in brackets, 
which means that the term which is defined appears in brackets at the end of 
the definition. The formulation is quite similar to the one in the European 
Directive with two exceptions: the first is that § 13 WpHG speaks of 
'lnsiderpapieren' (ie 'insider securities') instead of 'securities'; the second is 
that the term 'information' has been replaced by 'lnsidertatsache', dropping 
the word 'precise' which is used by the Directive. The hypothetical 
character of the European definition has been maintained without any 
attempt to provide further guidance as, for instance, in the English law. 
l. Elements of the definition 
It ts necessary to consider here the German definition of the insider: 
According to § 13(1) WpHG, an insider is 'a person who, as a member of a 
supervisory board, ... has knowledge of inside information'. From this one 
must conclude that there is no 'insider per se' under the German statutes,779 
not even the member of a supervisory board is, by virtue of his position, an 
insider, unless he has inside knowledge. 
Hence an insider can only be a person who has inside information,780 
irrespective of his or her profession. The interpretation of the term 
'insider' therefore depends on the definition of inside information. 
1. 'Insidertatsache' (engl.: 'insider fact') 
The term Insidertatsache is difficult because the noun 'Tatsache' is not easy 
to interpret. It is typi~l of the German language to construct a new noun 
from a noun and an adjective. 
779 But see, for an interpretation of the Directive which accepts the 'per se-insider', 
W ymeersch op cit at 70 who contends that 'there will be no strict requirement to 
prov~ their possession of that particular information'. Since the criminal sanctions do 
not fall within the competence of the European Legislature, the interpretation of 
criminal statutes must exclusively relate to national courts. Therefore, the view 
expressed by Wymeersch is not acceptable. 
780 Assmann, 'Das ktinftige deutsche Insiderrecht (II)', AG 1994, 237 at 241. 
a) 
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The 'Tatsache' as a result of transposing 'precise (see the 
Directive) information' into German domestic law 
'Tatsache' (engl.: fact) is a difficult term in German jurisprudential 
language. It has to be distinguished from personal judgements and 
evaluations, a task which at times poses severe problems. For instance, 
would it be fact or judgement to assert that 'merchant A pays slowly'? 
A 'Tatsache' must be provable or at least be open to empirical analysis. It 
must therefore be 'precise', although this adjective is not explicitly used in 
the provisions. The courts would decide that a statement contains a 
'Tatsache' rather than a judgement, if the validity of the contents can be 
ascertained, in other words if it can be proved either true or false.781 
Dealing on a 'true tip' (ie without knowledge of the insiqe. information as 
such) is therefore not caught within the legislation (see below). 
It would, however, be a mistake to confine the meaning of 'Tatsache' to 
mere factual events782 as the translation might suggest. The term would 
seem to include, for example, predictions of the earnings of a company, 
although they can only be realized in the future. And this wider 
interpretation makes sense: since most of the pricing of stock is based on 
expectations, a 'pure facts' interpretation would narrow too much the scope 
of potentially relevant information. 
KtimpeJ783 refers to 'eingetretene' (engl.: something has already happened) 
Tatsache as the best interpretation. Nevertheless, he subsumes 
bevorstehende Zahlungsunfahigkeit (ie 'impending' insolvence) under the 
term. The latter is certainly correct from the point of view of relevance for 
the stock price, but difficult with regard to 'eingetretene' Tatsache. 
KtimpeJ784 is of the opinion that the decision whether an impending 
insolvency can be qualified as an insider fact depends on whether or not the 
critical financial situation can still be improved. This is correct as long as 





See the decision in BGH NJW 1983 at 2248 et seq.; see also Erman-Schiemann, 
Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, § 824, no 2. 
This was, however, the opinion of Claussen op cit in his comment on the possible 
transposition of the Directive into German domestic law. 
Op cit (Ban,k- und Borsenrecht) at 1166. 
Ibid, at 1166 et seq., referring to BT-Drucks. 12/6679 op cit at 48. 
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requirements,785 because such a financial situation would certainly have to 
be reported to the Stock Exchange Supervisory Board. 
Just like the English law on insider trading, the German law has omitted to 
explain more precisely what can be regarded as potential information. No 
further guidance as to what can be the possible content of the information 
has been provided. The range of possible solutions is thus far reaching. The 
former German lnsiderhandels-Richtlinien (IHR), for example, provided a 
combination of a detailed list of possible insider facts and a general clause 
(dt.: 'Generalklausel')786. Such a general clause was used in most European 
countries before the adoption of the Directive.787 
No information is an 'lnsidertatsache' under the German law, if it is based 
exclusively on information which is already publicly known ('offentliche 
Tatsachen').788 It has to be noted, however, that news based on information 
which will be published only at a later stage, is caught within the 
definition.789 This part of the provision has been copied from the preamble 
to the Directive. It provides protection for financial analysts. This makes 
sense because skilled work on publicly available data is generally protected. 
b) In particular: the element of 'precision' 
The element 'precise' of the Directive is now embedded in the word 
'Tatsachen' (facts). Commentators agreed that 'information' must contain a 
'factual' nucleus ie that mere speculation or supposition would not fall 
within the definition. It was argued that this element also intended to 
exclude stock exchange rumours790. 







See Tippach op cit (Insider-Handelsverbot) at 135 et seq. 
Rtirnker, 'Zur Auslegung der Insiderhandels-Richtlinien', BB 1972, 1208 at 1209. 
Wymeersch op cit at 115 et seq. 
§ 13(2) WpHG. 
Assmann op cit (1994 AG) at 245. 
Claussen op cit · at 276; for the point of view of a German practitioner see 
Grundmann, 'Neuregelung des Insiderhandels-Verbotes', ZKW 1992, 12 at 13; 
from an international point of view see Mann and Lustgarten, 'Internationalization of 
Insider Trading Enforcement', in: Hopt and Wymeersch op cit (European Insider 
dealing) .339 at 374. 
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not know what exactly to make of the element 'precise' in the Directive. 
For instance, must the information be 'true' or 'correct'? A trader who 
knows that new information is 'wrong' (eg only a rumour) would certainly 
possess valuable and 'precise' information.791 If this knowledge stems from 
an inside source, the insider is able to profit from it. It is hence submitted 
that 'precise' does not mean 'probable' in the sense that it is likely to 
become reality; rather the term 'precise' means that an intention must be 
'precise'. Take, for example, the price per share of a public offer. It is not 
necessary that the public offer is really made, as long as there is an 
intention to make an offer at a certain price. 
c) Market information 
The 'Tatsache' must relate to 'one or several issuers or to one or several 
securities'. This additionaJ792 element enables us to differentiate between 
company information which relates to issuers, and market information that 
relates to securities.793 It would seem that market information which relates 
to securities generally does not fall within the definition in the Directive.794 
This view795, however, is disputed, directly by Assmann796, and indirectly 
by Hopt797, both of whom think that all types of market information can be 
seen as inside information as long as they have a substantial price impact. 




Grunewald op cit at 132. 
The addition of this element requires a wider range of data to be covered by the term, 
see also Ktimpel op cit (Bank- und Borsenrecht) at 1168. 
See for a general overview Branson (Insider trading II) at 414~ cf the analysis by 
Fleischer/Mundheim/Murphy op cit at 799. Their view is, however, based on the old 
'disclose or abstain'-rule, and can therefore not be applied to our problem. 
794 The English legislator has accurately transformed the Directive in this regard. 
795 Which has received approval by Caspari op cit (ZGR 1994) at 540, who was in 
charge for the 'Regierungsentwurf' (ie the Governmental draft law). 
796 AG 1994 at 243, and in Assmann/Schneider op cit (Wertpapierhandels-Gesetz) at 
113 et seq.~ see also Ktimpel op cit (Bank- und Borsenrecht) at 1169 who is 
criticised by Assmann in Assmann Schneider op cit (W ertpapierhandelsgesetz) at 
114 for 'being unclear'. 
797 Hopt, 'Rechtsprobleme des europaischen und deutschen Insiderrechts', BFuP 1994, 
85 at 90. 
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which dealing on any informational advantage is a wrongful act, 
irrespective of the nature of the inf ormation.798 Yet, since the objective 
wording is a strict interpretational boundary under the German Penal Code, 
their view is probably not acceptable, because there is no room for 
teleological interpretation. 
· The German text 'oder auf lnsiderpapiere' (English: 'or insider securities') 
deviates from the Directive and is sufficiently broad to cover all types of 
market information: shares, options, bonds, futures, warrants etc. 
Textually, we can observe that the original (ie European) distinction 
between general data (eg about markets, currencies, political events) and 
data which relates to a definable circle of securities (eg information about a 
specific branch or about trading volumes in a group of shares) is gone. In 
this regard the German version of the transposition of the Directive differs 
from the English one. 
It is submitted that an interpretation which conforms with the wording of 
the Directive ~nd excludes information relating to securities in general is 
more appropriate. Narrower interpretation is also the principle of priority 
of the European law. On this principle, it is generally accepted that the 
transposed European law, which is based on a Directive, has to be 
interpreted in the light of that Directive. 
798 See Assmann op cit (1994 AG II) at 243 et seq. 
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2. 'nicht offentlich hekannt' (engl.: not publicly known) 
The element of 'not publicly known' is basically the same as m every 
insider law and describes no more than the synonym of 'inside'. It does not, 
however, provide any indication as to the contents of the information. Also, 
it contains the same circular definition as the European, the South African 
(and presumably all insider trading prohibitions), namely that 'public' is no 
more than the opposite of 'inside'. No concept can be derived from the text, 
neither economically in the sense that information is no longer 'inside' 
where it is incorporated in the new price; nor, juristically, in the sense that 
publishing rules must have been complied with. 
a) Terms similar to inside information 
: Terms similar to 'inside information' are used in the German Aktiengesetz 
(AktG, engl.: Stock corporation Act) and in the German Criminal Code 
(StGB)799: these are 'confidential informatjon' and 'secrets'. None of these 
can, however, determine the meaning of 'inside' information.800 Whenever 
confidentiality is or was an element of a definition, this is ( or was) 
expressly mentioned by the law.soi Neither the Directive nor the WpHG 
require the information to be confidential or secret. This element has 
therefore been dropped. It is submitted that the term 'non public' in the 
German insider trading law does, conceptually, not intend to protect 
fiduciary relationships or business properties. 
b) Different views 
Subsequent to the adoption of the Directive, two different interpretations 
have been submitted. The first is that information is 'publicly known' when 
published through mass media (eg radio, television, press) thus ensuring 
that small investors are aware of the information.802 This , however, was 
clearly not the intention of the Directive,803 and therefore this view has to 
799 See §§ 93, 404 AktG, 203 et seq. StGB, see also § 333 HGB (Commercial Law 
Code); see Assmann op cit at 241. 
800 Assmann, idem at 241. 
801 Cf No 1 of the former (self-regulatory) IHR 
802 Cf Claussen op cit at 276; cf also Schodermaier/Wallach op cit at 123. 
803 Tippach op cit (Marktdaten). 
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be rejected. 
The second interpretation is that the information must be available either 
through the mass media, tickers804, dpa or Reuters805. The legislator in its 
'Begrtindung', ie the official grounds and substantiation of the new law, has 
created the term 'Bereichsoffentlichkeit1806 (ie 'public' in a sector of the 
public). This concept is far narrower than that of the public at large and 
seems to enocompass only professional market participants.807 
It is important to remember that the intentions of the European legislator 
would prevail over national legal reasoning and, what is more, that the 
courts in Germany are in no way bound by the official grounds for the 
legislation (Legislativ-Begriindung). Nevertheless, such an interpretation 
seems to be in line with the conceptual purposes of the law. Informational 
imbalances are a structural element of entrepreneurship; and of every 
private business raising funds on public securities markets in general. Thus 
it is never possible to attain an equal treatment of all market participants -
which remains a vain ideal. In economics, such ideals had to be rejected as 
'nirvana approaches1808. An important point to consider, however, is the 
question whether it is the financial services people who will benefit from 
the 'Bereichs-Off entlichkeit approach'. 
c) Analysts, and the problem of press conferences 
Given the preferential treatment of the financial services industry, it is not 
surprising that in the German literature it is art issue of particular interest 
whether, in situations where analysts are concerned, the term 'public' 
should be interpreted in a different way. Some writers suggested809 that 
analysts should be required to wait 24 hours after the publication of the 
information on ticker before they can pursue their transactions. 810 This 
804 Hopt op cit (ZGR 1991) at 30. 
805 Ktimpel op cit (Bank- und Borsenrecht) at 1171. 
806 Regierungsentwurf ( engl.: draft law submitted by the Government) fur ein 'Zweites 
Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz'. BR Drucks. 793/93 presented 5 Nov 1993 at 46. 
807 For attempts of explanations see Assmann op cit at 242; and Tippach op cit at 81 et 
seq.; see also Weber. 'Das neue deutsche Insiderrecht' at 163. 
808 See Part I of this study. 
809 Claussen op cit at 278. his suggestion for a Code. namely § 3(1) Nr. 2. 
810 See also Hopt op cit (1991 ZGR) at 30. 
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view must be rejected for being contrary to the Directive.811 
Another problematic issue is whether information can be regarded as 
'publicly known' when released at a (generally accessible) press conference. 
Assmann812 thinks that even a publicly accessible press conference is not an 
appropriate means of making information public. There is only a limited 
number of people who can attend such a press co,iference. Thus 
information 'released' there cannot reach the '(relevant) sector of the 
public', which constitutes 'Bereichsoffentlichkeit'. Consequently, new data 
must be filed on ticker tape before transactions may be carried out. 
3. 'geeignet, den Kurs ... erheblich zu beeinflussen' 
('prone813, if it were to become publicly available, to 
substantially influence the price of an insider security) 
The last requirement of § 13(1) WptJ:G is that the information must 'be 
prone to substantially influence' the market price of an insider security (ie 
shares, options, futures, warrants etc), if it 'were to be made public'. Much 
attention has already been given to the requirement of price sensitivity. This1 
element of the definition has raised a lot of interest because it is particularly 
imprecise. Also, it must be measured ex post, ie after the publication, which 
makes it a lot more difficult to handle. 
The issue in the German law is, amongst other things, that in penal law the 
objective wording must be extremely clear and unambiguous because any 
analogous interpretation - including the theological approach favoured by 
the Directive and by the European Court of Justice is strictly forbidden by 
Artikel 103(2) Grundgesetz (engl.: the German Fundamental Law).814 Thus 
811 See Assmann op cit at 241. 
812 Idem, at 242. 
813 See the translation submitted by Mohr op cit. 
814 See BVerfGE 25, 286~ see BVerfGE 64, 389~ the main historic reason for this 
requirement is the 'Analogienovelle' under the NS regime which required analogy to 
the disadvantage of the accused. 
A perfect example of how strictly the rule can be applied is the early decision RGSt 
29, 111 (116) in which a conviction was reversed, because the defendant had stolen 
electric energy which was not subsumable under § 242 StGB which requires that a 
'thing' is stolen. A thing is conceived to be solid, thus energy did not fall under this 
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the meaning of 'geeignet' must not remain vague. 
For example, it would seem to be unacceptable under the German insider 
law to adopt the materiality definition prevalent in the United States without 
major modifications. Materiality in the USA815 today is an open-ended. 
concept816 with enormous flexibility. Particularly when so-called soft 
definition - at that time it was held that electricity could also be 'fluid'. This led to the 
adoption of § 248c StGB 'misaproppriation of electric energy' on the 9th April 
1990; see also the decision in RGSt 32, 165 (167). This interpretational limit does 
certainly not apply less strict since it was expressly inserted in the Grundgesetz. 
It is important to note that this strict interpretational limitation to the objective 
wording of the law is specifically German, but see for this approach in the South 
African criminal law Snyman op cit (legaliteitsbeginsel). In England, however, the 
view is different, following the influential dicta of Lord Reid in DPD v Otewell 
[1970] AC 642 at 649. With regard to insider trading, the House of Lords 
emphasized that it is the objectives and not the letter of the Act which should 
determine the scope of the regulation, cf A-G's reference (No 1 in 1988) [1989] 
2 All ER 1 at 5 et seq. 
It has to be noted, however, that despite frequent allusions to the intention or intent 
of the legislature, the trouble about judicial appeals of that kind is that they appear to 
be highly ambiguous, see Bankowski/MacCormick, 'Statutory interpretation in the 
United Kingdom', in: MacCormick/Summers, 'Interpreting statutes - A comparative 
study', 359 at 386 et seq.; the articulation of the approach to interpretation in A-G's 
ref (No 1 in 1988) makes it important to emphasise that the 'meaning in context' rule 
may not be the same as what is sometimes called the 'plain meaning' rule. It might 
be argued that wherever a case goes to appeal about the meaning of a word or words 
in a statute, there is bound to be a possible disagreement about the meaning, and 
therefore to proclaim that one meaning is 'plain' contains its own refutation, see 
Ashworth op cit at 428; yet one should bear in mind that there are some approved 
ways of ascertaining legislative purposes, Ashworth, idem at 430 et seq. 
815 See the excellent article by Brudney, 'A note on materiality and soft information', 
(1989) 75 Virginia Law Review 723 whose suggestion is that interpretation should 
indeed vary with the context in which the information is placed, idem at 738. In 
terms of the German Penal Code, however, such a view would have to be rejected 
because it would not be generally applicable, it would seem to lack the precision 
which is required by the Grundgesetz. 
816 See the Basic Inc. decision, 108 S Ct at 987 et seq. 
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information817 is at issue, the decision of the courts is not easy to fore see. 
This effect, coupled with the principles applied by the SEC,818 namely that 
all information which may influence the investment decision of the other 
party must be disclosed,819 leads to a subjective definition. 
Such a concept may also result in a different scope of information 
depending on the co-contractants. In other words, the importance of an 
information is defined by the personality of the parties involved. For 
instance, a professional analyst may need less substantial information than a 
private investor to buy the 'right' security. US courts define information as 
'altering the total mix of inf ormation'820• This approach would not be 
acceptable under the German penal provisions. 
Another subjective test, which was applied in the Texas Gulf Sulphur 
case821, is the so-called 'proof of the pudding'-test, which defines inside 
information as information which caused insiders to carry out their 
transactions. The 'reasonable investor'-test which is normally applied by the 
courts, is subjective, too.822 All these subjective interpretations seem 




See Brudney op cit at 757 (ie information about merger transactions which will be 
carried out in the near future). 
See for instance Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961). 
Idem, at 911; see also the formulation in Texas Gulf Sulphur op cit note 1 at 844: 
'facts which affect the desire of investors to buy, sell or hold'. 
820 See Basic, 108 S. Ct., at 983; identical formulation in TSC Industries v Northway, 
821 
822 
Inc 426 US 438 (1976) at 449. 
Op cit note 1. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur at 849: 'facts which, if disclosed, would be reasonably likely to 
have a substantial market effect'; see also List v. Fashion Park, Inc 340 F 2d 457 
(2nd Cir1965) at 462; but see also TGS op cit at 849; Basic Inc v Levinson, 108 S 
Ct 978 (1988) at 987: 'material upon a balancing of both the indicated probability 
that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in the light of the 
totality of the company activity'. Yet, is this precise enough? A German Court would 
probably doubt that. 
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a) Different opinions on the interpretation of 'price-sensitivity' 
Although the view has been expressed that the determination whether 
information is price-sensitive would depend on the facts of each individual 
case823, it is obvious that in practice more concrete points of orientation824 
are needed. This is true not only for the insiders themselves, but also for 
the public prosecutor, and the supervisory bodies on the stock exchanges. 
At this stage it is even doubtful whether the wording of the law is consistent 
with the German 'Bestimmtheitsgebot'825 (ie nulla poena sine lege, see 
Fundamental Law, Article 103 II GG), creating the obligation for the 
legislator to be absolutely precise. If Penal law is not precise it is declared 
invalid. Thus far, the following three interpretations have been 
submitted. 826 
aa) 'Actual price shift' of a certain percentage (%-approach) 
Claussen827 submitted that the requirement would be fulfilled in situations 
where the security price actually changes. He suggested different 
percentages between 15%828 and 10%829. This means that the information 
would fall within the definition only if the price of the security should 
change by 10 (or 15, or 20, or 5) % on release of this information. 
An argument in support of this interpretation could be the certainty it might 
create. The courts can easily compare the last price before the 
announcement of the new information and the first 'new' price. If, and only 
if, a 5% (or other percentage specified by the law) price shift occurs, then 
the information is within the scope of the definition, wheras if it fails to 
823 BT-Drucks. 12/6679 at 48. 
824 Claussen, 'Das neue Insiderrecht', DB 1994, 27 at 30; see Hopt op cit at 32; see 
Ktimpel, 'Zurn Begriff der Insidertatsache', WM 1994, 2137 at 2139. 
825 See for this problem Ktimpel op cit (Bank- und Borsenrecht) at 1180, referring to 
Tippach op cit (Marktdaten) and Peltzer op cit (ZIP 1994). 
826 For an overview see Ktimpel, idem at 2137, who rejects the %-approach. 
827 Op cit (ZBB) at 279; see his suggestion for a transformation of the Directive, in 
particular § 3(1) No 4; interestingly, an alteration of security prices as a criterion for 
the courts is also envisaged by Hopt op cit (ZGR) at 32. 
828 Op cit at 278. 
829 Op cit (DB 1994) at 30. 
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change the price by 5% on the very day of the publication, it is not. Firstly, 
this interp~etation is certainly contrary to the objective wording of the text 
'geeignet', which requires that the information is prone or can generally be 
expected to produce a price change, not, however, that it actually does so. 
Secondly, this interpretation makes no sense economically, because often the 
impact of new data is accurately anticipated by market participants, and thus 
the price shift on the day of the publication is considerably lower than the 
whole impact of the information.830 The 'whole impact' is, however, meant 
by 'geei gnet'. 
Thirdly, if information can be subsumed under the definition only on 
release (ie later than the transaction takes place!), it would produce 
retroactive effect - and that constitutes a clear violation against the 
abovementioned German principle of strict and objective interpretation of 
penal law. For these reasons Claussen's view has to be rejected.831 
Other authors are of the opinion that information is 'geeignet', ie price-
sensitive, if the official (or, sometimes an independent person) market 
lJ}aker (dt.: Makler) who deals ih security which the information relates to, 
adds a '+' (plus) or a '-' (minus) to the first quotation of the day. According 
to the rules of the Stock Exchange this means that the 'Borsenmakler' 
expects a certain price alteration for this share to happen during the day. 
The minimum price alteration which he must expect (taking into 
consideration the orders which he already has), must amount to 5% in a 
share or 1,5% of the nominal value of a bond.832 
830 This process of incorporating new data in share prices is very well depicted by 
Gilson and Kraakman op cit at 572 who argue very interestingly that information 
which is accessible to significant portions of the analyst community can properly be 
called 'public' even though it is manifestly not. 
831 For a detailed analysis of the arguments against this view see Tippach op cit at 121 et 
832 
seq. For arguments against Claussen's view see also Ktimpel op cit (lnsider-
Tatsache) at 2140 et seq. 
See Assmann op cit (Das neue dt. Insiderrecht) at 515; Assmann in Assmann and 
Schneider op cit at 120 et seq.; Kiimpel op cit at 2140 et seq.; see also Caspari. 'Die 
geplante Insiderregelung in der Praxis'. ZGR 1994. 530 at 541; it is interesting to 
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An argument in favour of this interpretation might be that the official 
broker is a market participant whose pricing and whose transactions 
directly reflect the opinions of the market.833 It is worthwhile recalling 
here that, economically, the market maker might be the most important 
market participant with regard to insider trading prohibitions because he is 
the most likely to suffer losses from insider trading. Also, this addition on 
the quotation board would signal price shifts in a way which allows other 
traders to rethink their own investment strategies. 
At first sight, this does perhaps sound convincing. Yet, such an 
interpretation would create enormous difficulties. First of all it has to be 
noted that the '+/-' theory is quite similar to the above 'percentage 
interpretation' in that the inside quality of the information would be 
recognized only retroactively, that is on publication. The insider may have 
carried out his transaction ( or sold the information) 4 or 5 weeks before 
this happens without ever knowing that, in fact, he dealt on 'inside' 
information. 
Secondly, it would turn out to be difficult for the prosecution who has to 
prove men's rea. How could they possibly show that the insider 'knew' that 
the broker adds '+' or '-' to the quotation on day X of the publication. On 
the contrary: the insider wants the price to shift gradually, so that he cannot 
be detected at all. Yet, in any event, it is indispensable for the prosecution 
to link the information to the insider's subjective evaluation of it. 
Also, what should happen if the insider dealt in options without even 
thinking of the price shift of the share? How should one decide in cases 
where the insider sells the shares (which he bought on the strength on inside 
knowledge) before the information is published (because the share price has 
already reached the level which the insider expected)? And what happens if 
the broker simply makes a mistake and forgets to add signs on the board, or 
misinterprets the volumes of orders he has got in the early morning? All 
these are possible cases of insider trading where the +/- theory must fail. 
Another decisive counterargument is that some very important information 
is incorporated into the share price only over time. For instance, it took the 
Frankfurt market about two weeks fully to reflect the acquisition of Rover 
note that Mr Caspari was responsible for the submission of the draft. ie the 
'Regierungsentwurr op cit. 
833 See BT Drucks. 12/6679 at 47. 
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by BMW. At times, major price changes are not completed within a day, so 
that no '+/-' ever appears on the quotation board, although the all-inclusive 
price change is important. Thus, although '+/-' might give some indication 
of trend, it can never amount to an interpretation of price sensjtivity in the 
sense that it must be fulfilled as a condition to subs.ume a piece of 
information under the law. Nor can it be sensible that dealing on the 
strength of secret knowledge is not insider trading, when the price shift 
takes place before the information is released. The latter is, in fact, how 
information is economically incorporated in prices. The suggested 
interpretation is therefore also not in line with economic findings. 
cc) Harmonisation with European publication rules 
Both the above views exhibit another shortcoming. Insider trading 
prohibitions should be closely connected to publication rules. Particularly in 
the United States juristic doctrine it is accepted that prohibiting insider 
dealing will enhance prompt and early disclosure (thus: 'disclose or 
abstain').834 This interconnection of two sets of rules is not taken into 
consideration by either of the two above interpretations. 
Whether information results in a pre-determined price shift may become 
important only where civil action is brought against the insider. In that case 
one needs to measure the damage suffered by the other party to an insider 
transaction. Since neither the European, the English835 nor the German 
insider laws stipulate such a civil liability, this actual price shift is not 
important. I have therefore submitted elsewhere836 that the European, and 
consequently the German laws are open to an interpretation which links the 
definition of 'information' to the publication requirements on a European 
level. 
Where information is required to be published under the European rules on 
publication, it should be deemed inside information irrespective of the price 
834 See for instance Speed v Transamerica Corp 99 F Supp 808, 829 (D Del 1951); 
Cady, Robert & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961) and, most importantly, in the Texas Gulf 
Sulphur case op cit note 1. 
835 See, however, McVea, 'Fashioning a system of civil penalties for insider dealing: 
Sections 61 and 62 of the Financial Services Act 1986, Joum of Business Law, 
1996 at 344, as the main English proponent of civil remedies against insiders. 
836 Tippach op cit at 135 et seq. 
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shift achieved on its r~lease. In terms of European harmonisation this would 
also bring about further legal assimilation of the Directive through the 
interpretation of national courts. Another advantage of this approach is that 
it can be further developed and refined by means of European publication 
requirements. Whenever the European law adds a new type of information 
that has to be published, the list of inside information is also extended. 
dd)c__ _ ____.a..H..,.,o'--"'p""""t '....,s'--'o"-lp.,,.i ..... m ..... • o,.....n 
Another view has been suggested by Hopt837, who prefers to interpret this 
element as an objective market impact test. The important factor would then 
be whether or not the information is objectively prone to influence the 
price.838 The price shift potential is decisive, not the actual price change.839 
Referring to the 'potential' is certainly correct. This test implies a reference 
to the price reaction, not, however, to the informational contents. Hopt840 
suggests that his interpretation is contrary to the 'reasonable man'-test, 
according to which the evaluation of a 'normal' investor leads to a 
classification of the information as price-s~nsitive. 
An objective 'market impact' test raises several problems. Firstly, it implies 
that a price change can be linked to a particular piece of information. But it 
often occurs that a variety of information is released on the saipe day so 
that it is not possible to determine the specific part of the price shift which 
is due to each information. Also, there are other influences such as the 
'general atmosphere' on the Stock Ex~hange, which make it impossible to 
relate one specific information to the total price shift. What is more, a 
convincing economic theory which would explain the price determination 
profess under the realistic assumption that expectations are heterogenous, 
has not yet been developed.84-1 
Secondly, the same type of information can result in different price 
837 Op cit (1991 ZGR) at 32. 
838 Idem at 34-. A similar view is expressed by Ki.impel op cit (Bank- und Borsenrecht) 
at 1174, who says that the primary interpretational concern would be 'die Hohe des 
zu erwartenden Kursausschlages', ie the objective ex ante potential price impact. 
839 Idem at 32 
840 Idem at 32~ it is interesting to note that English commentators explicitly try to apply 
the reasonable man test, see for example Rider and Ashe op cit (Insider crime) at 37. 
841 Schneider op cit at 1434. 
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reactions depending on a variety of factors. 842 It makes a big difference 
whether publication is in an official organ or an obsure journal. 
Thirdly, the objective price potential of information needs to be based on 
empirical research.843 Since specific information is singular and does not 
occur periodically, it is too difficult to furnish empirical data. Information 
which is generally prone to change share prices cannot be evaluated in the 
context of each individual case. Hopt's interpretation must therefore either 
accept that a certain percentage of price movement suffices (which Hopt844 
finally admits), or one must find new criteria for the 'substantial influence', 
as long as such empirical data on price reaction is not available. Hopt did 
not, however, suggest any such new criteria. 
Fourthly, even if it were possible to classify the objective market impact of 
a piece of information, the suggested view does not present a convincing 
criterion of how to determine the element of 'substantiality'. Would a price 
change of 3%, 5% or 10% be sufficient? And if so, why? Given all these 
unresolved problems Hopt' s opinion is probably not acceptable. 
II. Evaluation of the definition of the 'Insider-Tatsache' 
(inside information) in § 13 WpHG 
It is immediately apparent that the wording of the German insider dealing 
provisions resembles that of the Directive. It is questionable, though, 
whether the legislature has actually transposed the Directive into domestic 
law or whether it has, instead, copied the European source without really 
incorporating it into German law. 
The only readily apparent transposition ts the lnsider-'Tatsache' which 
replaces the term 'precise information' in the Directive. Yet, not even this 
does really take into account the the economics of inside information. 
842 Renner, 'Der Schutz des Kapitalanlegers gegen die Ausnutzung von Informations-
vorteilen' at 50 et seq., who points out that there is a number of variables that can, 
according to the particular circumstances of the stock exchange, provoke price shifts 
which are not predictable. 
843 
844 
See Ballwieser, 'lnsiderrecht und positive Aktienkurstheorie', (1976) 28 zfbf 231 at 
238 and at 240 et seq. 
Op cit (ZBB) at 279. 
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'Tatsache' may be interpreted by the German courts845 as 'fact', thus failing 
to take into account some of the most insider-relevant information, eg a 
forthcoming take-over bid. Such a take-over is a future event, a plan, not 
yet a provable fact which seems to be required by the traditional definition 
of a 'Tatsache'. The Courts may then refer to the 'fact'/'Tatsache' that a 
take-over is planned. Yet such an interpretation does not fully take into 
account the original wording of the Directive (ie 'precise'). Besides, this 
interpretation blurs a good deal of the precision which the legislator 
intended to create through the word 'Tatsache'. 
On the other hand, clearly, it would seem unwise not to include pre-take-
over situations, because they create the largest amount of insider trading · 
possibilities. All this results in much uncertainty for the insiders concerned. 
It is submitted that the law should clarify that a company's clear-cut 
intention to announce a take-over, is included in the definition, even though 
the take-over might eventually not be carried out. 
As far as market information is concerned, the wording of the German 
definition does not correspond to the Directive because 'lnsiderpapiere' 
( engl.: 'insider securities') would encompass all types of market 
information - as opposed to the Directive which limits the scope to such 
information which concerns either one or several issuers of securities. 
Under the Directive, for instance, Government data, public debt, political 
news, and information from the Central Statistical Office would be 
excluded, although they can possibly affect the market as a whole. It is 
worth discussing at a later stage whether it would be preferrable to include 
all market information rather than excluding some types. For the German 
courts, however, it would be possible to deviate from the broader German 
wording (and apply the Directive), even under the doctrine of the strictly 
objective interpretation, because this would be a deviation in favour of the 
defendant. Such deviations are, of course, allowed by the Penal Code and by 
the Constitution. 
No indication at all has been given to the interpretation of the element 'non-
public'. This term has simply been copied from the Directive; and the 
Directive is indeed not very illuminating because 'non-public' is no more 
than a synonym for 'inside'. Thus, on this point, the law contains little more 
845 Following the view submitted by Claussen op cit (1992 ZBB) at 276 et seq. 
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than a pleonasm. 
The same is true of the approach provided in the official grounds, eg the 
concept of 'being known by a sector of the public', meaning the Stock 
Exchange (financial services) people, the so-called 'Bereichsoffentlichkeit'. 
While this may seem acceptable at first sight, it may eventually result in 
some serious problems: first of all, it is difficult to determine which 
persons constitute 'a sector' of the public. This was also a problem under 
the former English law acc~rding to which 'non-public' meant 'not 
generally known to those persons who are accustomed or would be likely to 
deal in those securities -~-'846.847 Instead of learning from the English 
example, the German law has repeated the flaw. Bearing in mind the 
intention of the law to protect the market as a whole, it would seem to be 
too narrow an interpretation to say that 'those persons' ar~ the market-
makers.848 On the other hand, it does not seem correct to say that it is the 
investing public as a whole who are aimed at by the provision.849 
Secondly, there is the issue of timing, ie the relevant moment when the 
people of a specific 'sector' acqire information: would the definition refer 
to the first moment when the information is acquired, or does it refer to the 
time when the information has been digested? Clearly, a great number of 
possible moments are conceivable. This adds to the uncertainty. 
Thirdly, 'Bereichsoffentlichkeit' does not take into accou,nt the fact that 
sometimes most of the impact of the information is anticipated by the 
market participants and is therefore already reflected in the share prices at 
the moment of publication. Then, however, it no longer makes sense to 
impose sanctions on the insider, because he could actually make no profit 
out of a quasi-public information.850 
Last but not least, the form which the German legislation has given to the 
element of price-+sensitivity has to be evaluated. In this respect it is apparent 
that a 'transposition' of the Directive in the true sense of that word has not 






Sec. lO(b) of the CSA 1985. 
Very sceptical as regards this element as such Wotherspoon op cit at 422. 
Gore-Browne op cit at 12.034. 
See Mc Vea op cit at 71. 
See Gilson and Kraakman op cit at 572. 
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smce 'prone to materially influence the prices' is at the heart of the 
definition of inside information. Two interpretational approaches to this 
problem had to be rejected: firstly, the one which suggests that an actual 
price shift needs to occur, and secondly that the information is 'geeignet ... ' 
if, on the qay <;>fits publication, the broker who deals the share adds '+/-' to 
the quotation board. 
On the whole the transposition of the Directive is relatively poor. The 
German legislator has not made use of a proper terminology in that we find 
English words in the statutes. This is not a fault in itself, because everybody 
knows more or less what insider dealing means. Yet it shows how new all 
the concepts are to the German law. 
Given the predominance of statutory rules in Germany and the strict 
interpretational limits in penal law set by the objective wording, the law 
should have provided more clarity and guidance with regard to the 
underlying concept. This all the more because, for a conviction under the 
German criminal law, it must be proved that the concept or value which is 
protected by a statutory provision has somehow been damaged. For 
instance, when would the 'integrity of the market' be damaged? 
The only excuse for all this is that it was the first attempt made by the 
German legislator to cope with the insider trading problem, which is 
admittedly a very complicated matter. Proposals for an amendment of the 
law can be expected. 
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Chapter 3: 'Insider' defined 
After the discussion of the constituent element of 'inside information', it is 
now appropriate to examine how the 'insider' is defined in the three laws. 
This is the second basic problem that must be dealt with by every legislation 
on insider trading. The concept of this definition determines the circle of 
persons who, if they are in possession of material non•public information, 
must not trade on it. One can distinguish between persons who are inside a 
company, ie the 'classical' corporate insiders, eg directors or employees; 
and those who are not connected with the company whose securities are 
~ff ected by the information. We shall now examine the three laws in turn. 
A. South Africa 
Textually, the South African legal definition of 'the insider' is the broadest 
of the three enactments. Yet, as we shall see, it lacks conceptual coherence 
and is therefore not likely to be very efficient. 
I. Considering the changes to the previous law 
Sec. 233 of the 1973 Act as originally enacted proceded by enumeration in 
order to define the insider. 'Every director, past director, officer, or 
person who has knowledge of ... ' would be held liable if he deals on inside 
information. These insiders were more closely defined in s 229 and s 1 of 
the Companies Act. Because of the major extensions brought about by the 
1990 Act there is little point examining those provisions in detai1851 . It 
should, however, be noted that, in addition to those persons, s 231(1) 
provided that in case of proposed transactions of the company, directors 
'shall forthwith852 by resolution determine which officers of the company, 
whose names have not already been entered in the register (ie of insiders" 
interests), are to be taken to be possessed ... of that information in the 
course of their respective duties and shall cause the names of such officers 
to be entered in the said register'. 
Thus persons within the company were at the heart of the prohibition. As a 
851 
852 
See Rider op cit ( 1977 SAU) at 442 et seq. 
Directors who fail to do this are guilty of a criminal offence, cf s 232(2). 
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result, the scope of 'insiders' was limited to such persons who would be in 
possession of information because of their immediate relationship with a 
company or with the directors of a company. 
Yet, even with respect to the so-called classical company insiders, s 233 
seemed to be defective because it diq not even ensnare all such persons: a 
person other than defined in this provision who obtained information by 
virtue of a relationship of trust or another contractual relationship would 
not have fallen within the s 233 net.853 
The former definition of the insider was completely revised when the 1973 
Companies Act was amended. The broadened concept was already to be 
found in the amendment of the Act in 1989, which applied to 'any director, 
past director or officer of a company or any person connected with the 
company having knowledge of any information likely .. .'854. This wording 
was similar to that of the original provision of the 1973 Act. Yet, the 1989 
amendment then went on to extend the insider trading prohibition to 'any 
other person, having directly or indirectly received from any 855 person 
mentioned in paragraph (a) (ie the persons enlisted above) such 
information, .. .'856. It is therefore clear that the decisive step to extend the 
scope of the provisions on insider trading occurred in the 1989 amendment. 
Since then insider trading, for instance, by tipees857 has been encompassed. 






Jooste op cit (1990 SAU) at 596. 
Sec. 440A(2)(a) of the 1989 Act. 
My emphasis. 
Sec. 440A(2)(b) of the 1989 Act. 
The /expression 'tippee' is certainly not an elegant one. It was removed (after having 
been used in the Criminal Justice Bill 1993) when first presented to the House of 
Lords because the word drew strong opposition from their Lordship as being 'a 
monstrosity, a perfectly awful word, ambiguous slang' (see Parliamentary Debates, 
HL, 19 Nov 1992, cols 756-767). 
It has been adopted not only in the literature, but also by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Chiarella v US 445 US 222 (1980). Therefore, despite its 
deficiencies and inconveniences, it is used because it depicts well what happens, ie 
someone who is not a source insider but receiving information; this is also the 
prevailing view in the English literature, see, for instance, Tridimas, 'The House of 
Lords rules on insider trading', (1989) 59 Modem Law Review 851 at 855. 
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force) would have been that those 'other persons' would have fallen within 
the legislation only if they had 'directly or indirectly received 1858 the 
information from a company insider. 859 One could have argued that certain 
ways of acquiring information might not have been covered by the word 
'received', namely the possession of information through theft or espionage. 
However, this gap has been filled by the present legislation. Section 440F of 
the 1990 Act now refers to 'any' person who deals in a security on the basis 
of material non-public information. Thus so-called primary insiders are 
within the definition as well as the so-called secondary insider. 
II, Analysing the insider as defined in the 1990 Act 
The 1990 Act does not include categories of insiders. Instead, it describes 
methods of acquiring information. It refers to 'any person who ... deals in a 
security on the basis of unpublished price-sensitive information ... , shall be 
guilty of an offence if such person knows that such information has been 
obtained ... '860. What follows then is the description of these ways of 
acquiring the information. Thus, theoretically, anybody can, under 
circumstances analysed hereinafter, commit the offence of insider trading. 
This approach is textually fairly broad, and differs markedly from the 
approach chosen by the Directive. This is quite interesting, because the 
Directive is generally considered to be quite widely encompassing. 
1, How to 'obtain' information to be within the definition 
'Any' person is prohibited from dealing in securities if 'such person' knows 





(a) by virtue of a relationship of trust or any other contractual 
relationship, whether or not the person concerned is a party to that 
relationship; or 
(b) through espionage, theft, bribery, fraud, misrepresentation, or 
any other wrongful method, irrespective of the nature thereof.861 
My emphasis. 
Sec. 440A(2)(b) of the 1989 Act. 
Sec. 440F(l). 
Sec. 440F(l)(a), (b). 
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It is apparent that the new definition is based on a fairly broad conception 
of an insider. A wide range of relationships is covered, from at the one 
extreme a relationship of 'trust' to 'fraud' at the other. This may indicate 
that the source of the information is no longer of great importance. Instead, 
what is important is that the information is used in securities markets. 
The word 'obtained' is to a certain extent ambiguous: it may mean procured 
or gained as a result of purpose and effort, or it may simply mean 
'acquired' or 'got'.862 Given the purpose of the law it is submitted in 
Henochsberg863 that the second or wider meaning should be applied. This 
view is supported by an English decision rendered by the House of 
Lords,864 in which it was held that the insider 'obtained' information if he 
acquired or got it without any effort on his part. Let us now consider these 
methods of obtaining information in more detail. 
a) Relationship of trust or contractual relationship 
A 'relationship of trust' is the first category of the definition. It includes a 
fiduciary relationship, such as between a company and its directors, senior 
executives, financial advisers, or attorneys.865 For the purposes of this 
provision, it is, clearly, immaterial how the relationship of trust arises or 
what the nature or terms of the contract may be.866 In the literature, it is 
assumed,867 that the legislature here intends to focus on the fiduciary 
relationship between a director of a company and the company itself. This 
is misleading insofar as it could be thought to maintain the approach of 
'primary' and 'secondary' insider trading. This distinction, however, is not 
generally relevant under the new provisions. 








See Henochsberg op cit (Companies Act) at 977. 
In Henochsberg, idem at 977. 
See R v Fisher [1988] 4 BCC 360, on appeal sub nom Attorney General~s 
Reference (No 1 of 1988), [1989] 2 All ER 1, affirming the decision of the Court 
of Appeal [1989] 1 All ER 321, [1989] 2 WLR 195~ for a comment on the 
decision see Tridimas op cit (1989 Modem Law Review) at 851. 
Jooste op cit (1990 SALJ) at 596. 
Henochsberg op cit at 978. 
Henochsberg, idem at 978. 
Op cit at 596. 
224 
in which there is an expectation of confidentiality between the parties, 
would also be included in this category. This view is certainly correct. 
Unlike the formulation in the old s 233, the new formulation encompasses 
relationships other than those of trust, eg mere contractual relationships. A 
consultant or a professor who is contractually bound to give expert opinion 
would therefore seem to fall within this category. 
The 'insider'869 dealer need not be a party to that relationship. The person 
who actually deals can be an outsider not only to the company, but also to 
the contractual relationship. The law does not require that the information 
be passed voluntarily to a tipee. It may also be passed on inadvertently 
because the state of mind of the person, from whom the inside information 
is received, is irrelevant.870 Indeed it would seem that the law does not even 
require that the information be passed on. It is sufficient that the person 
who deals on the strength of it knows where it stems from. Thus a tipee can 
also obtain the information by mere coincidence. Jooste871 furnishes the 
example of a third party who overhears the conversation of two directors 
about an imminent take-over. The third party's dealing falls within the 
ambit of s 440F despite the fact that the directors may be totally unaware 
of his presence. 
The only requirement is that the person who deals knows that such 
information 'has ( originally872) been obtained by virtue of such a 
relationship. Thus, the so-called tipee falls within this alternative of the 
provision in cases where the insider 'by virtue of a relationship of trust' 
passes on the information to the tipee. But it must be proved in each ~ase 
that the tipee was actually aware of the pre-existing relationship of trust. 
This may be difficult when the source of the information is not obvious. 
The same applies in the case of a tipee who obtains the tip through another 
tipee.873 The more remote from the source of information the tipee is 
situated, the more difficult will it be to establish that the tipee knew about 






Sec. 440F(l)(a) speaks of the 'person concerned'. 
Jooste op cit at 596 et seq.~ Henochsberg op cit at 977. 
Op cit at 597. 
My addition. 
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introduced this requirement, since it poses problems for the prosecution. 
Why had this old element (ie relationship of trust, or connection to the 
company) of the former law to be maintained? This is all the more 
surprising because the legislation was based on the hypothesis that insider 
trading could harm other market participants874; and the new approach 
clearly protects fiduciary relationships more than securities markets. 
b) Espionage, theft, and misrepresentation 
'Any person', who knows that access to the inside information was gained 
'through theft, espionage, bribery, fraud, misrepresentation or any other 
wrongful method, irrespective of the nature thereof875, is prohibited from 
dealing on this information. It would seem that this provision is broad 
enough to encompass practically all methods of obtaining the information 
illegally. Other 'wrongful methods' could be violence, threat, or duress. 
This shows that the prohibition is not limited to primary or to secondary 
insiders. A person, who gains inside information by virtue of a relationship 
of trust with one company, can, at another time - obtain information about 
another company through bribery - while remaining an outsider to that 
other company. It is apparent that the terms 'insider' and 'outsider' do no 
longer have much significance. 
2. Primary inside.-s and secondary insiders - and some 
remarks on the use of these terms 
The law does not speak of 'primary' or 'secondary' insiders. Nevertheless, 
these terms are quite often used in juristic literature.876 They were 
originally designed to distinguish the classical company insiders from other 
people who obtain inside information only when an insider passes it on to 
them. The approach underlying such a distinction was a rather restricted 
one; it existed in conjunction with certain provisions requiring the keeping 
of registers as the only means of protection against insider dealing. 




Which is in fact very difficult to support, see for a closer consideration of this 
problem Wang op cit ('Who is harmed') at 1217. 
Sec. 440F(l)(b). 
See, for intance, Jooste op cit at 596. 
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African law. When we discuss the European insider definition, we shall see 
that the concept of 'primary' insider trading may also vary between 
different laws because the new conceptual approach no longer exclusively 
applies to 'classical' insiders. The mere use of the term would therefore 
evoke ambiguity. The legislator has done well not use those terms. 
3. Yet, some are not caught ... 
Before evaluating the South African insider concept, it is useful to examine 
the cases in which a person dealing on non-public information is not 
regarded as an insider, and does therefc;,re not commit an offence. 
In the context of s 44OF(l)(b), 'misrepresentation' must certainly be 
construed ejusdem generis with the words 'espionage' and 'theft'877 because 
both these words are also used in the same provision. The intention of the 
law is to encompass fraudulent misrepresentation. The law indicates by the 
words 'other wrongful' that it refers exclusively to wrongful conduct. 
Thus, dealing on inside information obtained through innocent or negligent 
misrepresentation is not covered by the provision.878 
The only offence in terms of the law is insider 'dealing'. Neither 
counselling nor procuring of information have been outlawed.879 This is 
I 
different from the European approach. Thus a director who passes on the 
information to an outsider is not guilty of an offence (he could at best be 
held liable for aiding and abetting), even if he knows that the 'outsider' will 
deal on the basis of that same information.880 
This would be different only if the 'outsider' dealt on behalf of, or for the 
benefit of, the director. In the latter case the director would deal 
'indirectly188l which is also prohibited by the Iaw.882 It would seem that no 
other ( eg indirect) advantage which is given to the director for the passing 
on of the information is included in 'dealing indirectly'. The fact that a 
direct9r, who gives a 'tip' based on inside information, would not be caught 
877 Henochsberg op cit at 978. 
878 Henochsberg. idem at 978. 
879 Jooste op cit at 597. 
880 Jooste, idem at 596. 
881 Sec. 440F(l). 
882 Jooste op cit at 596. 
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as an insider in terms of s 440F, seems rather surprising and will be dealt 
with in more detail below (see the chapter on 'offences'). 
III. 
l. 
Evaluation of the definition of the insider in South 
Africa - what is the underlying concept? 
On the purpose of this evitluation 
The evaluation of the insider definition clarifies two things: firstly, the 
concept which underlies the provisions on insider dealing in general, and, 
secondly, how far the definition of the insider is in line with this concept. 
The evaluation process will thus reveal the extent to which the intentions of 
the legislator have been transformed into the actual law. 
The evaluation also illuminates the policy which underlies the legislation as 
a whole, namely that of the protection of the individual investor. For this to 
become obvious, the definition of the insider must be examined together 
with the definition of inside information. We have seen that the definition 
of what.constitutes inside information is very vague, with the consequence 
that professional investors run a high risk of criminalisation. This might 
protect investors in that insiders are deterred, but it is certainly not 
beneficial for the capital market, because its liquidity is reduced. 
2. Textual criticism 
The intention is to cast the penal net widely.883 Hence one expects the 
definition of the insider to be very far-reaching. And this is indeed the case. 
The provision encompasses ·'any person' regardless of his profession or his 
relationship with an issuer of securities. In this respect, the definition is 
sufficiently broad to cover all situations where an investor has an 
informational advantage over the other party. The provision is in line with 
the intention to afford maximum investor protection which is also reflected 
in the creation of a civil remedy in a subsection of s 440F(4). 
The technique used by the legislature is interesting. Instead of providing a 
list of primary and ~econdary insiders, the mere possession of inside 
information is rtow sufficient. The law does rtot even specify the methods by 
883 See Henochsberg op cit at 976 et seq. 
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which the person who deals must have obtained the information. This 
approach is good because it focuses on the essential element of insider 
trading prohibitions, namely, the trading on non-public information. 
This approach is in line with the devices applied by market authorities to 
detect insider trading. On impersonal markets, these devices necessarily 
work without taking into consideration the personality of the trader. In 
other words, for detection devices, any trader could be an insider trader. 
The approach chosen by the South African legislature also corresponds to 
the economics of the theory of detection. It would seem, therefore, that as 
far as investor protection is concerned, the insider definition converts the 
intentions of the legislator into the text of the law. But it remains a 
shortcoming that no prohibition is imposed on the insider who passes on the 
information to another person.884 
The prohibition does, however, contain an inappropriate qualification: the 
person who finally deals on the strength of the information must know that 
it was obtained either through a fiduciary relationship or through a 
wrongful method. This element indirectly maintains the distinction between 
primary and secondary insiders. It is submitted that the law has to a certain 
extent blurred the benefits of the investor protection approach by moulding 
it into concepts that relate, historically, to an extended version of the 
former company insider approach. This element brings about textual and, 
above all, conceptual inconsistency. 
The defence wiH of course try to raise the following two arguments: firstly, 
that the alleged insider was not in possession of the information at the time 
that the trade occurred; secondly, and (what will be particularly difficult to 
prove) that the decision to buy or to sell was not based885 on the 
information, although the insider had knowledge of it. And, on top of all 
this, the prosecution must establish that the insider knew where the 
information originated from. This is unnecessarily complicated. 
It is submitted that the law also requires that the particular inside 




Jooste op cit at 596. 
Sec. 440F(l) says 'on the basis of ... '. 
The argument of the prosecution will be based upon the fact that the trade occurred 
shortly before the publication of the news or, that the volume of the trade was 
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In the case of a professional dealer this can turn out to be very difficult to 
establish because professionals gather a great deal of relevant public data 
which may ultimately have caused their trade decision. They will try to 
raise the defence that some other piece of information made them decide to 
deal. This requirement further complicates effective prosecution. 
3. Conceptual criticism 
The formulation 'any person' is sufficiently broad to lend itself to the 
conceptual basis of individual protection. Whether investor protection is 
really an issue in modern insider trading still needs to be discussed. The 
Directive, for instance, intends much more to protect the functioning of the 
markets. At this stage of the examination, however, the question is whether 
the South African legislature has succeeded in moulding the text to reflect 
its own policy of investor protection. 
A classic887 counter-argument against the proponents of insider trading is to 
say that allowing it does not result in the recompense for (insider-) 
entrepreneurs which the proponents wish. Since many insiders do not have 
enough capital to exploit the information, the profits that should reward 
them for their entrepreneurial work are redistributed to other people. The 
only way for insiders to profit would then be to sell the information to 
outsiders who can exploit the information. In terms of 'investor protection', 
however, it is then a major shortcoming of the South African insider 
provisions that such imparting of inside knowledge is not banned. 
What is more, there is an apparent lack of coherence in the policy 
underlying the South African insider definition. If its purpose is investor 
protection, the source of the information should really be irrelevant, as 
long as it can be established that the trader was in possession of inside 
information. The fact that the insider knew where the information 
originated from does not strengthen the policy of investor protection. For 
the protection of the markets (and thus also for the investors) it is of 
importance only that the dealer had inside information. But this 
requirement is already contained in the word 'knowingly'888 in 
887 
888 
exceptionally high either with regard to the average trade volumes of the affected 
share, or with regard to the average trade volumes of the alleged insider dealer. 
See, for instance, Schotland op cit ('Unsafe at any price'). 
For the necessity of men's rea as indicated by the word 'knowingly' see below in the 
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s 440F(l),889 and did not need to be added again to the insider definition. 
Emphasis on investor protection aside, it is conceivable that insider rules 
are developed with the declared aim of protecting business rights. The 
'property rights' approach, although often leading to a result in favour of 
insider dealing (see Manne's now seminal work in 1966890: non-public 
information is a corporate asset). In terms of the 'property rights' approach 
(not, however, in Manne's) the wrong committed is that of theft or 
conversion because the information belongs to the firm.891 Here the 
question of where and how the trader acquired his knowledge (an aspect 
less central to the 'fairness' approach) becomes important. 
In the tipping situation, the 'tipee' is in the position of a person receiving 
stolen property.892 Only if the policy underlying the South African insider 
prohibition were indeed the protection of business rights, would there be a 
good reason to require that the insider dealer had knowledge of 'how the 
information was acquired'. 
If the main purpose of the law had been to protect the company against 
breaches of fiduciary relationships, it would have been necessary to extend 
the ban to include the act of imparting such knowledge. Yet, as we can 
conclude from the complete absence of a corporate remedy, the aim of the 
ban was certainly not that of business protection.893. The only remedy 
created is in favour of the other party to the insider transaction. 
Since the South African legislature sought to place investors on an equal 
footing and to enhance investor protection, the element 'knows that such 
information has been obtained' is inappropriate, and will put an 





chapter 'offences and defences'. 
See Jooste op cit at 592. 
Op cit (Stock Market); his position was dealt with in Part I of this study. 
Scott op cit (Journal of Legal Studies) at 814. 
For a fine description of this concept see Scott op cit at 814, who also endeavours to 
apply this concept to the Texas Gulf Sulphur case 401 F 2d 833 (2d Cir 1968) and 
to United States v Chiarella 588 F 2d 1358 (2d Cir 1978), rev'd, 100 S Ct 1108 
(1980); for an interpretation of the Chiarella case in the light of different approaches 
see also Macey op cit ('From fairness to contract') at 207 et seq. 
893 See, for instance, s 16(b) of the US American SEA 1934; for a detailed analysis of 
this provision see Carlton and Fischel op cit at 891 et seq. 
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It is submitted that the insider definition is an unbalanced mixture of three 
theories applied to insider cases in the USA: the 'equal access' theory; the 
'fiduciary' theory; and the 'misappropriation' theory894. As under - the 
repealed sections, the South African definition of 'inside information' 
makes it very difficult to prove a contravention. Essentially, the definition 
of the insider remains conceptually vague and incoherent, which will 
probably result in various difficulties for the prosecution. Hence, it is 
doubtful whether the law brings about the intended deterrent effect. 
894 Dealt with in Part I of this study~ see Kraakrnan. 'The legal theory of insider trading 
regulation in the United States'. in Hopt/Wymeersch (eds) op cit (European insider 
dealing) at 39~ see also Scott op cit at 801-818. 
232 
B. The 'insider' as defined by the European Directive 
It is useful to consider the policy of the Directive before entering into a 
detailed analysis of the English and the German insider laws. Two different 
patterns emerge from the insider-definitions which were applicable in the 
Member States before the European Directive came into force. According 
to the first pattern the 'insider' was defined by means of a list which was 
sometimes supplemented by a more general clause. The second pattern 
sought to define the insider by reference to more general criteria, eg 
'directors and employees of a comany', or 'persons in possession of price-
sensitive information'. The Directive attempts to reconcile these two 
patterns, an_d that resulted in a very comprehensive definition.895 
I. The wording of the Directive 
The definition of the 'insider' is contained in articles 4 and 2 para 1. The 
Directive stipulates in Art 4, that 
'Each member state shall also impose the prohibition provided for in 
article 2 on any person other than those referred to in that article who 
with full knowledge of the facts possesses inside information, the direct 
or indirect source of which could not be other than a person referred 
to in article 2.' 
It is obvious that Art 4 refers to the so-called tipees (ie persons who receive 
information as opposed to generating it). Their trading is called secondary 
insider trading. Thus, the so-called 'secondary' insider trading is also 
caught by the European definition. The central provision, however, is 
contained in Art 2 para 1 of the Directive which reads: 
895 
Each member state shall prohibit any person who: 
- by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management 
or supervisory bodies of 'the issuer, 
- by virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer, or 
- because he has access to such information by virtue of the 
exercise of his employment, profession or duties, 
possesses inside information, from taking advantage of that 
information with full knowledge of the facts by acquiring or disposing 
See Tridimas op cit at 924. 
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of, for his own account or for the account of a third party, either 
directly of indirectly, transferable securities of the issuer or issuers to 
which that information relates. 
The Directive does not use the terms 'primary' or 'secondary' insiders. 
Given the scope of the provisions relating to 'tipees', it may appear 
pointless to spend much time and effort seeking to determine whether a 
person is a primary insider.896 However, the Directive does not impose the 
same restrictions on all insiders. The ref ore, one has to make the distinction. 
Surprisingly, so-called secondary insiders are prohibited only from dealing 
on the basis of inside information,897 not, however, from counselling. 
Given the aim of the Directive to protect the markets, and taking into 
account the economic finding that all kinds of insider trading (ie including 
transactions by secondarily informed traders) have the same effect upon the 
markets, one would have expected that such trading is also prohibited. 
II. Groups of insiders and conceptual approaches 
Under Art 2 para 1, there are three categories of persons both legal and 
natural who are not permitted to trade when in possession of inside 
information.898 Art 2 para 2 makes it clear that 'where the person referred 
to in paragraph 1 is a company or other type of legal person, the 
prohibition ... shall apply to the natural persons who take part in the 
decision to carry out the transaction for the account of the legal person 
concerned.' The Directive here sticks to the principle 'societas delinquere 
non potest'. It does not go so far as to make members of the management 
responsible for contraventions of the law committed by their employees as 
is the case in the United States.899 The definition is also sufficiently broad to 
896 
897 
Gore-Browne op cit at 12.039. 
Art 6 of the Directive provides that the Member States 'may extend the scope of the 
prohibition ... and impose on persons referred to in Art 4 (ie other persons who 
possess inside information) the prohibitions laid down in Art 3 (ie disclose 
information, recommend, or procur a third party, on the basis of that information).' 
898 See Ashe op cit (The Directive on insider dealing) at 17. 
899 See Linklater and McElyea, 'Die Auswirkung von 'Corporate Compliance Codes' 
auf die strafrechtliche Haftung eines Untemehmens unter den US-amerikanischen 
'Federal Sentencing Guidelines'', RIW 1994 at 117. 
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encompass market insiders. 
Of the aformentioned categories of insiders, the third (ie 'insider by virtue 
of employment, profession, or duties) is the broadest, encompassing as 
'primary' insiders all those who have access to inside information by virtue 
of their professional status.900 This encompasses the employees of the 
company itself, but also other persons such. as bankers, auditors, lawyers 
and those who, though not a part of the company, are close to it.901 
! Tridimas902 suggests that the test as to whether someone falls within this 
category is completely subjective, depending on a person's access to 
information and, whether he gains access by virtue of his position. The 
subjectivity is mainly on the side of the company that decides whether an 
employee has professional access to certain types of information or not. 
Vice versa, whenever information is sensitive, the management is deemed to 
know which employees have access to it. And only that makes the insider 
status of a person become an objective fact. 
Tridimas903 also thinks that in some respects the approach of the Directive 
is close to the US misappropriation theory904. But this is highly 
questionable. The preamble to the Directive points out the central role of 
the functioning of securities markets. The misappropriation theory, on the 
other hand, protects information as a 'property right'. The wrongful act of 
the insider may be the 'deceitful exploitation of information belonging to a 
third person',905 whereas the wrongful act committed by the insider in 
terms of the Directive is to deal on a securities market. The Directive is 
concerned not so much with the relationship between the insider and the 
company, but with the potential relation between the insider and the other 








Ashe op cit at 17. 
Ashe, idem at 17. 
Op cit at 924. 
Op cit at 924 
See Aldave, 'Misappropriation: A general theory', (1984) 13 Hofstra Law Review 
10 t in Part I of this study this approach was discarded. 
Aldave, idem at 121~ see also Chief J Burger dissenting in the Chiarella case 445 US 
222 at 241. 
See Davies op cit (Direc~ive on insider trading) at 102 et seq.~ Tridimas op cit at 926. 
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therefore not the misappropriation theory.907 
The question is whether the Directive requires at least some kind of 
substantial connection between the insider's profession ( or employment) and 
the company.908 In this regard it is important to note that the Directive 
extends the insider-definition to tipees. It is not required for a tip to have 
been obtained in the exercise of his profession or the carrying out of 
duties.909 The only relevant requirement is that the tipee uses inside data 
'with full knowledge of the facts 1910. By this formulation the Directive 
focuses on the tipee (if he trades) rather than on the source of the 
information.911 It is submitted that the wording ' ... inside information, the 
direct or indirect source of which could not be other than a person referred 
to in article 2'912 indicates that not only situations where information is 
explicitly passed on, but also situations where information is obtained 
through theft (or another wrongful method), are included in the Directive. 
Hence a connection between company and insider trader is not required. 
III. Some remarks on the value of this definition 
The Directive seeks to broaden the scope of persons that fall within the 
ambit of the definition. Art 4 demonstrates that the underlying policy is to 
pin liability on tipees who have the information itself, not on those who 
receive a tip based on the information.913 The intention of the European law 
is thus to protect securities markets, not, however, property rights or 
fiduciary relationships between insider and company. 
Bearing this in mind the Directive should rather not have provided insider 
categories. It seems that the definition is still (partly) based on the outdated 
concept of the 'company insider'. It has to be noted, too, that the old 








Hopt op cit (ZGR 1991) at 20 et seq. 
See Davies op cit at 97; see Tridimas op cit at 926 et seq.; both authors support the 
interpretation which requires a link between insider and issuer. 
Tridimas op cit at 928. 
Art 4 of the Directive. 
Ashe op cit at 18. 
Art 4 of the Directive. 
See Ashe, idem at 18. 
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the market' nor the 'protection of outsiders' are particularly helpful when 
defining the insider on the basis of that old company insider approach. 
What, for instance, is the possible damage to the market, if someone trades 
100 shares, be he an insider or not? One would have expected a definition 
which takes into account that the possession of information is more 
important for the capital markets than the question of where the 
information originates from. In this, respect the actual wording of the 
Directive is not consistent with th~ intentions laid out in the preamble. 
It is submitted that the Directive leaves the Member States to do a large 
amount of legislative work, for instance, to extend the prohibition to 
counselling and procuring the information. In order to harmonise the 
provisions in the Member States, it would have been better to mould more 
clearcut definitions which also reflect the intentions of the law. 
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C. 'Insiders' under the English Law 
It is interesting to examine now whether the English law has maintained its 
own approach to insider trading. We shall see that there are certain 
deviations from the European law. 
I. Overview of the definition 
We shall begin with a brief overview of the new English definition of the 
insider, which has brought about some changes in terminology and - due to 
the European influence ... some 'new groups' of insiders. 
1. Terminology 
Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA) does not use the terms 
'primary' and 'secondary' insider (nor the term 'tipee'). Given that these 
terms are widely used in practice and literature, some commentators think, 
however, that they will also be used by the courts.914 
2. Groups of insiders 
The CJA uses the concept of having information 'from an inside source' 
and then defines 'inside source' exhaustively915 as having information either 
(i) by virtue of status916 or, 
(ii) if the direct or indirect source of his information 1s a person 
within para (i).917 
Thus, there are two categories ·of 'insider': 
(a) 'primary' insiders who have access to the information by 
virtue of their status918 and 
(b) 'secondary' insiders or 'tipees' who got the information from 
914 See Lomnicka op cit ('The new insider dealing provisions') at 179. 
915 The exact formulation is: ' ... if and only if', so as to emphasise the exclusive 
charakter of this element, cf s 57(2) of the CJA 1993. 
916 Sec. 57(2)(a)(i) and (ii). 
917 Sec. 57(2)(b); see Lomnicka op cit at 179. 
918 Sec. 57(2)(a); see Lomnicka op cit at 179. 
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a primary insider.919 
The first group of insiders (ie the so-called primary insiders) col'ISi.stl of 
persons who have information through 
(i) either 'being connected'920 with the issuer921 of securities as 
director, employee or shareholder of the issuer922 
or 
(ii) having access to the information 'by virtue of ... employment, 
office or profession. ,923 
The second group (ie the so-called secondary insiders) consists of persons 
whose 'direct or indirect source of ... information' is a person of the first 
group.924 Thus, anyone who has information emanating from a primary 
insider, no matter how long the chain925 of communication is, may be 
referred to as a secondary insider. 
In order to commit the insider-offence (ie dealing, encouraging to deal, or 
disclosing the information), the person who deals, encourages, or discloses 
must have 'information as an insider'.926 This is the case where he has the 
information from an inside source, either through his position or through a 
person who occupies such a position.927 The statute makes it clear that both 











Sec. 57(2)(b); see Lomnicka op cit at 179. 
Nota bene that the term 'connected' does not mean that there has to be a link of 
confidentiality between the person and the issuer of the shares. 
Defined ins 60(2) as 'any company, public sector body or individual by which or 
-
by whom the securities have been or are to be issued.' 
Sec. 57(2)(a)(i). 
Sec. 57(2)(a)(ii). 
Sec. 57(2)(b); see Lomnicka op cit at 179. 
Lomnicka op cit at 179 fn 76, who correctly remarks that problems of proof will 
become more difficult, the longer the chain is. 
Sec. 52(1) ie dealing; s 52(2) ie encouraging and disclosing; Lomnicka at 180. 
Sec. 57(2); see Hannigan op cit (1994 Insider dealing) at 77 et seq. 
Sec. 57(2) provides that a person has information from an inside source 'if and 
only if ' (my emphasis) he has it (ie the information) through .. .'. This again 
reveals the extent to which the new law is still under the influence of the old patterns, 
eg the insider being 'inside' something rather than simply being a person who deals 
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an insider if and only if he has information and knows that it stems from 
an inside source.929 
Put another way, in order for an individual to have 'information as an 
insider' he must be an 'insider' in the sense of having access to inside 
information either as primary or secondary insider, and he must know 
both that the information is 'inside' and that he is an insider.930 
II. Changes to the old law 
Probably the most significant change in the law is the abandonment of the 
traditional requirement in English legal thinking, namely, that the insider 
should in some way be 'connected' with the company in whose securities he 
makes his illicit profit.931 
The previous law in England imposed liability for 'primary insider dealing' 
on three categories of insiders. All three of them had to have either a legal 
or at least a moral duty of confidentiality towards the company.932 Under 
s 9 of the Company Securities Act 1985 an insider was a person connected 
with a company; this encompassed (a) directors; (b) officers and 
employees; and (c) those in a professional or business relationship with the 
company.933 The scope of that definition was limited by the requirement 
that an insider had to occupy a position which may reasonably be expected 
to give him access to unpublished price-sensitive information.934 Thus an 
office-cleaner taking the opportunity to rummage through waste-paper bins 
or desks was not considered a primary insider, since his access to 
information gleaned in .this enterprising manner was in breach of his duties 








on the strength of inside information. Only the latter would befit the European 
market approach. 
Halsbury's Laws of England, Cumulative Supplement 1994, paras 1060-1066, vol 
7(1) (reissue) at 61. 
Lomnicka op cit at 180. 
Gore-Browne op cit at 12.035. 
Gore-Browne, idem at 12.036. 
Hannigan op cit at 78. 
Hannigan, idem at 78. 
Gore-Browne op cit at 12.036; Wotherspoon op cit at 425. 
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Because the confidentiality requirement has now been dispensed with,936 the 
new Act seems to impose considerably wider potential liability than the 
former lygislation.937 For instance, it seems that the office cleaner will now 
be caught. The new law (in accordance with the Directive) does not, 
however, confer an 'automatic insider status' on any category of persons.938 
Art 2 of the Directive stipulates that a person shall be prohibited from 
taking advantage of information which he possesses 'by virtue of ... '. This is 
transposed into the English domestic law in s 57(1)(b) of the CJA which 
requires that the person has information 'if and only if he has it ... from an 
inside source'. It is obvious that information which is obtained by a 
manager from an external source would not make him an insider in this 
category, because he does not obtain it 'by virtue' of his position. Another 
result of the abandonment of the 'connection'-requirement there is no 
longer a time-limit939 beyond which a person ceases to be 'connected'.940 
Shareholders were previously not included as insiders under the Company 
Securities Act 1985 (CSA), although clause 63 of the Companies Bill 
1978941 would have included substantial shareholders, defined as 'holding in 
excess of 5 % of the share capital'. The position under the CSA was that, if 
shareholders were to be caught, it was as tipees.942 
The Company Securities Act 1985 required that the tipee 'obtained', 
directly or indirectly, unpublished price-sensitive information from a 
primary insider. It was an issue under the old law whether 'obtained' had 
the connotation of having the information 'as a result of one's effort' .943 
That issue is 'dead' and no longer relevant with the dropping of the concept 
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individual to have been knowingly connected with a company at any time in the 
preceding 6 months. 
Lomnicka op cit at 179, fn 69. 
See Pigott, 'The companies Bill 1978 and company law reform', in: Rider (ed), 
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recipient or has actively procured the information.944 
III. Who exactly is an insider? 
Let us first examine the 'classical' insider in order to clarify the extension 
of insider concepts that have been brought about by the Directive and its 
transposition into the new English provisions . 
1. Directors and shadow directors 
If a person possesses inside inf ortnation ( as defined in s 56 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1993 Part V) and knows that he has it 'through being a 
dire~tor', he is an 'insider' according to s 57(1), (2)(a)(i) of the new Act. 
Directors form the most straightforward and most easily identified category 
of insiders.945 All directors, executive and non-executive, are included in 
this part of the definition.946 
Shadow directors are not specifically included, although the Department of 
Trade and Industry had proposed their inclusion.947 A shadow director is 
defined as a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the 
directors of the company are accustomed to act.948 The shadow director is 
expressly included in many other areas of company legislation.949 Since the 
legislatm;,e left them out where insider trading is concerned, this omission 
can be assumed to be a deli berate one. Shadow directors can therefore not 
be subsumed under the term 'director' .950 
Hannigan951 rightly adds that a limitation is to be noted here, namely, that 
the person must have the information through being a director; In the 









Hannigan, idem at 87. 
Hannigan, idem at 78. 
Hannigan, idem at 78. 
Law on Insider Dealing, a Consultative Document (Dec 1989, DTI), para 2.25. 
Sec. 741(2) of the Companies Act (CA) 1985. 
For instance ss 309, 319, 320, 321, 322, 330-346 of the CA 1985~ cf Lomnick:a op 
cit at 179 fn 71. 
Hannigan op cit at 78~ Lomnicka op cit at fn 71. 
Idem, at 79. 
242 
some other position or connection, he is not caught by this prov1s1on 
although he may have fallen foul of tfie tipee provision. The burden of 
proof is on the prosecution to show that the person was indeed in possession 
of the relevant information.952 
2. Having the information 'through being' an employee of 
an issuer of securities 
A person is also considered having information from an inside source, if he 
has it through being ' ... an employee of an issuer'.953 The issue here is 
whether an employee must have access to the information in order to fall 
within the ambit of this provision, and if so, what type of access. 
Under the Company Securities Act 1985, a person, in order to be caught as 
an insider, had to occupy a position which could reasonably have been 
expected to give access to information'.954 Some English commentators955 
suggest that a person, in order to fall within the new definition, must have 
'access' to the information by virtue of that employment. Thus, it may seem 





Under the old CSA 1985 this was clearly expressed in the case John Morris Cross 
by Mccowan LJ, (1990) 91 Cr App R 115, at 120: 'The prosecution plainly have to 
prove all the matters in section 1(1)'. For an overview of the former legislation see 
Poser op cit (International securities regulation) at 163 et seq.~ see also Halsbury's 
Laws of England Vol 7(1), London, 1988 paras 1060-1069; for a comprehensive 
history of insider trading legislation see Naylor op cit (The use of criminal sanctions 
I) at 55 et seq.; for a South African comparative analysis see Botha, 'Control of 
insider trading in South Africa: A comparative analysis', (1991) 3 SA Mere LJ 1. 
Sec. 57(2)(a)(i). 
Sec. 9 CSA 1985; cf Hannigan op cit note 207 at 79. 
Gore-Browne op cit at 12.037 et seq; Rider and Ashe op cit (Insider crime) at 41, 
who argue that a window cleaner could hardly be said to have gained access to inside 
information by virtue of his employment. It should be borne in mind, however, that 
if the cleaner is not an insider, then the person who receives the information from 
him will not be within the scope of the insider-definition, however important this 
second person is for the securities markets ( example: a broker has bribed the 
window cleaner to look out for information). This again reveals that, although in 
terms of their 'Preambles and intentions' the new provisions seem to convey a new 
market approach, they in fact do not so. 
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would not be regarded as information to which that individual had access to 
by virtue of that employment.956 
H is submitted that this interpretation is probably not correct. The element 
of access does no longer appear in the legislation. Employees are insiders, if 
they have the information through being an employee, even though they do 
not occupy a position of access.957 The terminology 'having access' also 
applies to situations where no regular access is given to someone, but his 
employment opens up the possibility of obtaining the information outside 
his 'normal' duties, but through a wrongful act (eg the window cleaner 
breaks into the desk where sensitive information is kept) or coincidence. 
Take, for example, the case of a junior employee who happens to see 
documents containing information when he goes to the print room.958 
In the preamble to the Directive recommendations are exempted only when 
they are based on public information. H~nce other recommendations will 
fall within the scope of the insider trading prohibition, irrespective of how 
much of his own work the analyst, who works for a financial 
conglomerate, put into the production of the new information, eg that 'it is 
good to buy XY-shares now'. The fact that an employee produced valuable 
information does the ref ore not mean that he cannot be an insider, at least so 
long as he is working for a company. Also, the information belongs, in 
practically all cases, to the employer. In the chemical industry, for instance, 
working contracts will normally contain a clause which says that inventions 
made by the employee during his employment belong the employer. 
A comparison with the text of the new German law makes it clear what the 
formulation would look like if the 'access to information' is intended 
exclusively to comprise 'regular' access through one's work. 
§ 13(l)(No 3) WpHG reads: 
(1) An insider is any person who ... 
3. by reason of his professipn, business or function and when 
executing his appointed 959 activities ... 
956 Gore-Browne op cit at 12.037. 
957 Hannigan op cit at 79. • 
958 Hannigan, idem at 79. 
959 My emphasis. 
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The result of such a formulation960 is that all persons are excluded who gain 
access to sensitive information through a wrongful act or by coincidence 
while being an employee. If the English legislature had wanted to achieve 
this outcome, it would have certainly added a similar wording. From the 
fact that it did not, we can conclude that it wanted those cases to fall within 
the ambit of the prohibition. This view is supported by the English 
deviation from the Directive according to which (at least in the English961 
version) only the employee who 
'because he has access to such information by virtue of the exercise of 
his employment, profession or duties' 
shall be prohibited from taking advantage of that inf ormation.962 
The present formulation of the English law makes sense, if one bears in 
mind that the approach preferred by the Directive is a wider one than that 
contained in the former English law. The Directive seeks to protect the 
integrity of the markets rather than to criminalise the abuse of a position or 
relationship with a company.963 
On the other hand, the protection of relationships of trust or confidence 
within a company has not at all been mentioned as an aim of regulation. The 
English criminal law ( unlike the interpretational limits under the German 
constitutional law) allows for an approach which is based on the objectives 
and not the letter of the Act,964 thus also taking into consideration the 
960 It has to be noted at this juncture that the German formulation is not in line with the 
European Directive, and that it contains major shortcomings. 
961 The German version of the Directive (ie 'auf grund seiner Tatigkeit', although 
translated into English: 'by virtue of his employment'), on the other hand, is open to 
an interpretation which includes the situation where the employee's access to the 
information is not based on the execution of his functions; see Hopt, 'Zurn neuen 
W ertpapierhandelsgesetz - Stellungsnahme fiir den FinanzausschuB des Deutschen 
Bundestages', in: WM-Festgabe filr Thorwald Hellner zum 65. Geburtstag am 




Cf Art 2(1) of the Directive. 
Hannigan op cit at 81. 
See dictum of Lord Reid in OPP v Otewell [1968] 3 All ER 153 at 157, [1970] 
AC 642 at 649. 
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intentions of Parliament.965 It must, however, be borne in mind that the 
intentions of the European legislator (ie market protection) are more 
important fpr the analysis of the European Court than any national 
legislative debate or intention. 
It is submitted that, when the courts decide that a person deals on the 
strength of inside information, but his possession of the information is not 
covered by the formulation 'having access', this person then falls within the 
alternative of 'having the information through being an employee'. This is 
reasonable because of the shortcomings of the alternative of 'having access'. 
3. Shareholders 
An insider is also someone who has inside information through being a 
shareholder.966 Shareholders were not rega'rded as 'access-insiders' under 
the Company Securities Act 1985. Their omission from the legislation 
certainly raised some questions, in particular with regard to the position of 
institutional or controlling shareholders, who most certainly have 
informational advantages.967 Shareholders have now been included without 
limitation in the sense that there has been no attempt to identify substantial 
shareholders or to set a threshold.%8 This is good law and fully in line with 
Art 2 of the Directive. 
One might be lead to think that not all shareholders should be regarded as 
insiders.969 In the US, for example, based on case-law, only controlling 
shareholders are regarded as insiders. This is because such persons are 
likely to have a similar degree of access to information as a director.970 
But there is nothing curious about this inclusion, if one bears in mind, once 
again, that the Directive focuses our attention on the abuse of inside 
information, rather than on the abuse of specific positions. In every case, 







See A-G's reference [1989] 2 All ER 1 at 5, by Lord Lowry. 
Sec. 57(2)(a)(i). 
Hannigan op cit at 80~ Rider and Ashe op cit at 41. 
Hannigan, idem at 80. 
This is the view is expressed in the English literature, for instance, by Rider and 
Ashe op cit at 41. 
Rider and Ashe op cit at 41. 
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through being a shareholder, and not in some other capacity ,971 a 
requirement which provides sufficient protection. A shareholder who has 
no inside information has nothing to fear by the breadth of the category, 
because he does still not fall within it.972 
4. Having access to the information by virtue of his 
employment, office or profession 
Persons are included as insiders who have inside information through 
having access to it 'by virtue of their employment, office or profession'.973 
This formulation extends the prohibition to people such as solicitors, 
auditors, lawyers, architects, surveyors, bankers, brokers, advertising and 
public relations agencies, consultants, management consultants, and 
investment advisors.974 This again is good law, because the focus is on 
'having inside information', not, however, on 'having a connection with an 
issuer of securities'. 
The attractiveness of this category is that it should make it easier to 
prosecute people who obtain inside information through their work rather 
than directly from the company. The importance of this category is self-
evident.975 The above persons have easy access to inside information and 
often sufficient knowledge about securities markets to exploit the 
inf ormation.976 The category seems open-ended, but there is an important 
limitation, namely, that the person must have inside information by virtue 
of his employment, office or profession.977 This depends on how the courts 
interpret the requirement 'by virtue of their employment'. 
On this issue the views expressed in the literature differ. Some think that 
the new provision, unlike that in the former law, casts the net considerably 








Hannigan op cit at 80. 
Hannigan op cit 80. 
Sec. 57(2)(a)(ii). 
Wotherspoon op cit at 425~ cf also Hannigan op cit at 81. 
Hannigan, idem at 81. 
Hannigan, idem at 81. 
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Tippach op cit (lnsider-Handelsverbot) at 163 et seq. 
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someone's desk now fall within the legislation.978 
Rider and Ashe979 and Gore-Browne980 think it is unlikely that a court 
would hold that the information is obtained 'through having access', if it is 
generated by the employee himself. These commentators are of the opinion 
that in such situations the employee does not have access to the information 
which has. an existence independent of himself. It would therefore be more 
accurate to say that the information is obtained 'through being an 
employee'981 . If the employee were not in his position, eg working for the 
investment department of a bank, he would not have been able to generate 
the n~w information. From this we can conclude that a piece of information 
has an existence which is legally independent of the person who has 
generated it. In most cases this is so because the information (as an asset)-
belongs to the employer and not to the person who has produced it. 
Let us assume that a financial journalist buys shares of a company ahead of 
the publication of his own favourable article on that company. If his view is 
based on inside information, his purchase would doubtlessly constitute 
insider trading. But even if it is based on publicly available data, it would 
be insider dealing because his own buying shortly before publication is not 
based on the public information, but rather on his expectation that the price 
of the share will rise as a consequence of his article being published. 
Indeed, often a price shift on the stock exchange is due to such a 
recommendation. The mere fact that such a recommendation is about to be 
published can therefore be regarded as price sensitive information and, 
consequently, dealing on the strength of this information is insider dealing. 
Incidentally, this is a good example of a market information. In any event, 
the fact that he generated the information does not exempt him from the 
insider trading prohibition. 
Another problem may arise in situations where someone overhears a 





Gore-Browne op cit at 12.037; cf also Hannigan op cit at 81. who thinks that a court 
would be more likely to believe that the new wording is indicative of a new 
approach; but see, also in support of this interpretation, yet still based on the 
Directive, Hopt op cit (The European insider dealing Directive) at 51. 
Op cit at 42. 
Op cit at 12.037. 
Sec. 57(2)(a)(i). 
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barman at the local golf club become an insider if he overhears inside 
information being discussed by a couple of senior executives as he takes 
their order?982 The question is whether there must be a functional link 
between the person's employment and the company to which the 
information relates. Tridimas983 argues that there is a need for such a link 
because the final text of the Directive is opposed to both the Commission's 
earlier proposal and the amended proposal.984 Both proposals required that 
the information must have been obtained 'in the exercise or the person's 
duties. This would be a convincing if the text of a Directive wer~ not valid 
in all official languages. The German text of the proposals, however, is: 
'in Austibung (ie 'in the exercise') seines Berufs ... Insider-
Inf ormationen er halt.' 
This means that the person must obtain the information through a functional 
link with the employment. According to the final text, however, it is 
sufficient for the person to have 'Zugang' (engl.: 'access') to the 
information because of his employment. 'Zugang' comprises both regular 
(,lccess and coincidential knowledge, even obtaining the information through 
a wrongful act, so long as the possibility of misappropriating the 
information was in one way or the other opened up by the employment. 
Thus, in sum, the barman is neither definitely within the legislation nor 
definitely excluded from the legislation. The ambiguity may very well 
eventually cause the European Court of Justice to be asked to give a 
preliminary ruling on this issue.985 
If the prosecution shows that the barman 'knew' that the executives (whose 
conversation he overheard) were insiders, he would be regarded as having 
obtained the information from an inside source, and hence be liable as a 
tipee.986 This approach is not very convincing, because the notion of a 
'tipee' is that of a person being tipped rather than of someone overhearing a 






This is an example furnished by Wotherspoon op cit at 426. 
Op cit at 926 et seq. 
COM (87) 111 fin. Art 2~ COM (88) 549 fin. OF C 277/13 from 27 Oct 1988. 
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Dine op cit at 6~~ see also Wotherspoon op cit at 426. 
See W otherspoon. idem at 426. 
249 
doubtful. Finally, it must be borne in mind that, if the barman is not an 
insider, a person who is tipped by him is also not liable under the tipee 
provision, because his information does not originate from an inside source 
- no matter how extensively he exploits the information or damages the 
functioning of the markets. 
s. 'Other persons' 
An important question is whether persons such as printers, financial 
advisors, journalists are within the scope of the new definition.987 
a) Printers, editors, and distributors 
Printers, editors, and distributors are clearly within the new legislation.988 
Under the former law there were allegations of insider dealings in drug 
company shares ahead of articles appearing in journals such as the British 
Medical Journal with regard to cancer treatment, or AIDS drugs.989 Such 
matters would not necessarily have been considered insider dealing within 
98? The US jurjsdiction in the Chiarella case, US v Chiarella (1980) 445 US 222, 63 L 
Ed 2d 348, 100 S Ct 1108, and in the Winans case, US v Winans 612 F Supp 827 
(SONY 1985), had to decide whether persons who bear such professional functions 
could be regarded as insiders. Winans was convicted of insider dealing, largely, it 
would seem, on the basis that he had taken confidential business information from 
the Wall Street Journal. The printer (Chiarella) who had dealt ahead of a take-over 
situation after he had (like Winans) 'by virtue of his job' obtained information 
regarding the target, was finally not convicted. 
988 
989 
In these decisions the courts got bogged down in considerations whether these 
persons were duty-bound to disclose the information. It is submitted that there is no 
ch~racteristic difference between the printer and the financial journalist which would 
sufficiently support the findings of the courts (the printer had, for instance, regular 
access to information,about forthcoming take-over situations). 
In an English case, a journalist was convicted. See Re an inquiry under the 
Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 [1988] 1 All ER 203. The US-
dilemma stems from rule 10 b-5 which was designed to combat fraudulent acts in 
face-to-face situations rather than dealings on stock exchange markets. 
Hannigan op cit at 85. 
See Hannigan, idem at 85. 
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the terms of the Company Securities Act 1985, because these persons were 
not 'connected' with the companies in whose shares they allegedly dealt; and 
they were not tipees either, since no source-insider was involved.990 
b) Investment analysts and journalists 
On principle, there should be no doubt that investment analysts, bankers, 
and other financial services people fall within the definition. It is probably 
with respect to investment analysts that there has qeen the greatest widening 
of the provisions, because they were not 'connected with companies' under 
the Company Securities Act 1985.991 
As a group of potential insiders they can either be subsumed under 'the 
person who has information through being an employee' or 'by virtue of 
the exercise of his profession'. Gore-Browne992 furnishes the example of a 
financial journalist who deals ahead of his own recommendation, and 
assumes that his recommendation is not inside information, because he has 
no 'access' to it, and the information has no existence independently of 
himself as a person. It is submitted that the journalist does indeed possess 
inside information 'through being an employee'. Otherwise a very obvious 
example of insider trading would not be caught; and, of course, this 
journalist would not know that a recommendation is about to be made ( even 
though made by himself), if he didn't l}ave his job. 
c) Public servants 
Many public servants and regulatory officials have, by virtue of their 
office, access to inside information. Under the Company Securities Act 
1985 (CSA) it was necessary to identify each group as public servants by 
statutory instrument.993 The new law does away with this by simply using 
the general category of 'those who have access to the information by virtue 





Hannigan, idem at 85. 
Hannigan, idem at 84. 
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' 
So, for example, the new definition includes officers and employees of the 
Take-over Panel who were not public servants for the purposes of the 
former law.994 This extension is good because, economically, it would not 
seem to make a real difference whether or not the insider is connected with 
a company. In this regard the English law is now very much in line with 
modern economic findings. 
'Tipee' liability is the third category of insider liability created by the CJA 
I 
1993. A derivatively informed person must, in order to be liable, know that 
the information is 'inside'. He must also know that he has information from 
an 'inside source'.995 A tipee has information from an inside source only if 
'the direct or indirect source of his information is a person within 
paragraph (a)'996, eg persons who have the information either 'through 
being a director ... ' or 'by virtue of his employment ... 'm. 
As mentioned above, the requirement that the tipee must have obtained the 
information either actively or passively has been removed. It suffices for 
the individual concerned to know that the source of the information was an 
insider. The liability of the tipee does not depend on the liability of the 
person who tips. For instance, it may occur that, in the course of 
negotiations, inside information is passsed on bona fide to a person.998 
The problems of proof with respect to tipees become particularly acute, 
when one applies the prohibitions further down the line to sub-tipees. 
Certainly, the legislation, by referring to persons whose 'indirect' source is 
an insider, envisages the inclusion of the sub-tipee.999 In practice it is very 
difficult to establish that the sub-tipee had information from an inside 
source and that he knew the information was from such source, particularly 
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become diluted, perhaps exaggerated or changed_lOoo 
Must the tipee (or even the sub-tipee) be aware of the identity of the inside 
source? Rider and Ashe1001 think that it is rather unlikely that a court would 
hold that knowledge of identity was crucial,1002 Nevertheless, it is uncertain 
whether the courts will decide that the (sub-) tipee must know the identity 
of the primary insider or the intermediate person or both1003 in order to be 
caught within the definition. 
There is a surprising deficiency in the ti pee provision. Sec. 52( 1) of the 
CJA 1993 creates liability only where an 'individual has information as an 
insider'. Having information as an insider is specified in s 57. It is 
necessary not only for the insider, but also for the tipee, to have known the 
'information'. Yet, not all tipees come to know the information itself. As a 
point of fact, the classic 'tip' does not contain inside information as such, 
but runs, for example, 'buy X Ltd or sell Y Ltd'.1004 Where such a true tip 
is passed on, the recipient is outside the provision, as he has not got the 
'information', whereas the tipper himself is held Hable for 'encouraging to 
deal'.1005 This peculiar result is based on the wording of Art 4 of the 
Directive which stipulates that the recipient must 'with full knowledge of 
the facts posssess inside information'. 
1000 Rider and Ashe op cit at 45. 
lOOl Idem, at 46. 
1002 Lord Lowry, in an obiter dictum, [1989] 2 All ER 1 at 7, seemed to indicate that in 
relation to the phrase 'knowingly obtained' in s 1(3) CSA. the tipee must know 
from whom he obtained the· information. See Tridimas op cit at 855. who rightly 
suggests that such an approach is over-restrictive. 
1003 Tridimas op cit (1989 Modem Law Review) at 855. 
1004 Rider and Ashe op cit at 45. 
1005 Hannigan op cit at 88. 
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V. Evaluating the English definition of the insider 
1. Some general remarks 
We have seen that the Directive leaves most of the conceptual work 
concerning the insider-definition to the Member States. It is therefore 
inecessary to consider not only whether the English concept underlying the 
definition deviates from the Directive, but also whether the definition is 
coherent in itself. The new law does not make use of the terms primary and 
secondary insider. This is good because these terms are not helpful. 
The law no longer requir~that a person is connected with a company to be 
an insider. Under the old Act, for instance, the employee of Airline A 
would not have been constrained from buying Airline B "s shares unless the 
information related to a transaction beween Airline A and Airline B. The 
effect of the CJA 1993 is to make him an insider of Airline B by virtue of 
the information he holds1006, or rather by virtue of his knowledge as an 
employee of A or B. This is a giant step: conceptually, this moves away 
from the requirement of the old approach based on fiduciary 
relationships 1007• Thi~ could result in the application of the market 
protection approach as suggested by the Directive. The ,;1bandonment of the 
requirement that a person had to be connected with the company in the 
preceding six months in order to be an insider points in the same direction. 
It is obvious that there is now a wider insider potential, which corresponds 
to the market protection approach. 
2. The primary, 'access' or 'source' insider 
The Criminal Justce Act 1993 has clarified certain matters that were not 
readily apparent under the former provisions. It is good law that public 
servants are included as such. One no longer has to establish that they are 
public servants by statutory instrument under s 2 of the CSA 1985. 
The same is true for editors, financial advisors, printers and journalists; for 
they need no longer be 'connected' with the company. Yet, with journalists 
and financial analysts there could be a problem with self-generated 
1006 Rider and Ashe op cit at 43. 
1007 For the old view see Rider op cit (1977 The New Law Journal). 
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information. 'Access' to information means that the information must have 
an existence independant of the person who has acess to it. Two possible 
interpretations would help to avoid this. Firstly, one can argue that the fact 
that the information is going to be published does in itself constitute inside 
information, and hence 'access' can be subsumed under the alternative 'by 
virtue of the employment'. Secondly, such situations may be covered by the 
alternative 'through being an employee'. 
Nevertheless, this question should not have been left open. We have to wait 
for the courts to decide and, as Hannigan1008 puts it, 'a court might bring 
back an access-type restriction by the back door'. The legislation here does 
not improve the conceptual inconsistencies left by the Directive, but rather 
bases itself on the Directive's relatively vague formulations. The 'access' 
requirement ought not to be part of the law, because it make sense only 
where fiduciary principals or companies are protected by insider dealing 
provision. For the protection of securities markets, however, it is irrelevant 
whether the person had access to information, or just saw it on the desk of 
someone who works in the same department. 
What is positive is that the English law has extended the scope of the 
Directive by referring to the employee twice: firstly as an insider 'through 
being an emplayee' and, secondly, as 'having access by virtue of his 
employment'. Certainly, this is a step in the right direction. 
However, both formulations give rise to interpretational problems. It is not 
certain whether a person who obtains the information through a wrongful 
act falls within the ambit of the definition. For an employee, the 
formulation is sufficiently broad to cover 'access through wrongful act'. 
For persons who are not employees, however, this is not so clear. This is a 
shortcoming of the law. The South African definition of the insider, for 
instance, is sufficiently broad to encompass both. 
It is also not certain whether persons who get the information by chance (eg 
a taxidriver overhearing a conversation of two fiancial advisors) are 
included. And since the concept is unclear, it is difficult to anticipate how a 
court would decide this question. 
1008 Op cit at 79. 
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3. The definition extends to tipees 
The concept of market protection does not require that the recipient of the 
information knows who passed on the original information, ie the primary 
insider at the inside source.1009 It is clear that tipee liability has been 
extended because the inside source no longer needs to have a connection 
with the issuer. 1010 It is a major shortcoming that the tipee must possess the 
information, for there is no tipee liability when he receives a true tip. In 
this regard it is impossible to interpret the law according to the intentions 
of Parliament, because the wording is absolutely clear. This is in line with 
the Directive, but not with reality, because for the recipient it is the tip 
which counts, not the information as such. What is even worse is the fact 
that the tipee must be acquitted even when he admits that his transaction was 
based on an inside tip. Such legislation cannot be correct. 
4. Conceptual evaluation 
On principle, the approach which was suggested by the Directive, ie that 
insider trading restrictions should enhance market protection, is reflected in 
the English insider definition. Nevertheless, the law does not accomplish the 
conceptual work which the Directive left it to do. 
The problem of the inside information being obtained through a wrongful 
act was not addressed at all. In this regard, the vague outlines of the 
Directive are merely copied. Thus we do not know whether situations 
where information is obtained through misrepresentation or another 
wrongful act are covered. The same is true where such wrongful acts are 
committed by employees. 
Even though the concept of 'market protection' does not include the 
protection of business property, it does not exclude the exploitation of 
information which is business property. The reason is that investors on 
securities markets do not attach so much importance to the source of the 
informations. So why not simply include all ways of obtaining information, 
as long as it is still 'inside'? A good argument for such a position is that, 
economically, (as we have seen in Part I), it makes no difference who deals 
on the strength of 'hidden' information. 
1009 
1010 
Under the CSA 1985 this was also not certain, see Tridimas op cit at 855. 
Rider and Ashe op cit at 43. 
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It is regrettable that all persons who obtajn inside information through 
industrial espionage, are excluded from the list of direct insiders. This may 
turn out to be particularly unhelpful for the realisation of the intentions of 
the law. If the thief is not an insider, the information does not originate 
from an inside source. Thus the recipient ( eg the person who gave the order 
to steal the information) is not an insider, and would therefore be free to 
deal. 
It has to be hoped the courts will interpret the statutes in view of the 
conceptual approach of market protection. The task of incorporating this 
new concept in the 'insider'-definition has not yet been accomplished. The 
legislation does not present a coherent picture. It is submitted that the 
English legislation will have to revise its concepts in order to align the 
provisions to modern theory. 
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D. Germany 
First an overview of the legislation will be given. The different categories 
of insiders will be discussed in turn, starting with classic insiders, and then 
proceeding to tippess and sub-tipees. 
I. The text 
The definition of the 'insider' is laid down in § 13(1) Nr.1-3 WpHG. The 
term 'insider' refers to all persons listed in this provision. 
( 1) Insider ist, wer 
1. al-s Mitglied der Geschaftsfiihrung- oder Aufsichtsorgans oder 
als personlich haftender Gesellschafter des Emittentert oder eines 
mit dem Emittenten verbundenen Unternehmens, 
2. aufgrund seiner Beteiligung am Kapital des Emittenten oder 
eines mit dem Emittenten verbundenen Unternehmens oder 
3. aufgrund seines Berufes oder seiner Tatigkeit oder seiner 
Auf gabe bestimmungsgemaB 
Kenntnis von ... hat, ... .1011 
This definition is more or less the same as in the Directive, with one major 
exception, ie No 3 which stipulates that an insider is only who 'by virtue' of 
his profession or the exercise of his duties possesses inside information. 
This formulation seems to exclude all people within a company or an 
enterpris~ who do not have access to information as a result of their job. 
For instance, someone who misappropriates inside information, to which he 
has not normally access, would not seem to be caught as an insider, for he 
would not fall within the definition. This result is not in line with the 
Directive,1012 and it is certa~inly not very sensible. 
1011 English as translated by Mohr op cit at 81 et seq.: 
( 1) An insider is any person who 
1. as a member of any managing or supervisory organ or as a personally liable 
partner of an issuer or of an enterprise connected with an issuer, 
2. by reason of his participation in the capital of the issuer or of an enterprise 
connected with the issuer or 
3. by reason of his profession, business or function and when executing his 
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The second part of the definition of the insider 1s contained m § 14(2) 
WpHG which runs: 
Einem Dritten, der Kenntnis von einer Insidertatsache hat, ist es 
verboten, unter Ausnutzung dieser Kenntnis Insiderpapiere . . . zu 
erwerben ... .1013 
This formulation is intended to catch tipees, but the provision is deficient 
because it does not with sufficient clarity define the way, in which the 'third 
party' must come into possession of the information. 
. II. The structure of the definition and market protection 
The definition does not even attempt to introduce a coherent concept to the 
wording of the Directive which is copied. Both forms of defining insiders, 
ie enlisting company insiders and extension through a general criterion, are 
maintained. The provision falls short of the Directive in that company 
in,siders are caught only if their employment gives them access to the 
information. This seems to emphasize the fiduciary relationships, although 
the element of confidentiality has clearly been eliminated. 
If the legislation is really intended to protect markets, it should not have re-
introduced such old elements via a side entrance. Conceptually, the 
definition is defective, bearing in mind that the protection of the market is 




has knowledge of a fact (, .. ). 
As for No 3. the present writer suggests that a more appropriate translation would be 
'by virtue of his profession. employment or the exercise of his duties'. Otherwise 
the translation would result in a deviation from the official English version of the 
Directive although the German text is identical. 
For an intensive criticism of this departure from the Directive see Hopt op cit (WM-
Festgabe) at 30. 
" 
English translation by Mohr op cit at 83: 
(2) It is forbidden for a third party who has knowledge of an isider fact to acquire or 
dispose of insider securities .... 
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III. The insider as defined in §§ .J.J.. 14 WpHG 
By and large, the definition resembles the English one because it is also 
based to a high degree on the Directive. We shall examine at more length 
the deviations from the Directive, and the differe1;1ces from the English law. 
1. Insider 'through' professional activities 
It is obvious that the classic concept of primary and secondary insiders has 
been abandoned. Those who obtain information by reason of t-heir 
professional duties or through being directors do not represent a 
'homogenous' group of persons. The provision includes equally those who 
are managers in an enterprise and those who work there as secretaries.1014 
The breadth of the formulation has given rise to the same sort or fears in 
the City of Frankfurt as they did in the city of London.1015 
a) Directors, managers, and liable partners 
An insider is any person who has knowledge of a non-public fact as a 
member of a managing ('Vorstand'), or supervisory ('Aufsichtsrat'1016) 
organ, or as a personally liable partner of an issuer or of an enterprise 
connected with an issuer.1017 A fiduciary relationship is not required1018. 
aa) Di rectors of the enterprise 
The first group encompasses insiders within the company: directors, 
managers, liable partners. All these people are classic insiders. 1019 It is 
important to note -that the prosecµtion must prove that the person had the 
1014 
1015 
See Claussen op cit at 271. 
See Ernst, WM 1990 at 461: 'Alle Borsianer zuktinftig Insider?' (all stock exchange 
people insiders in future?'). 
1016 The first famous insider case in Germany was the Steinktihler-case. Mr Steinktihler 




18 May 1993 at 13 et seq. For an analysis of the duties of the 'Aufsichtsrat' see 
Lutter, 'Information und Vertraulichkeit im Aufsichtsrat', 2nd edition, 1984. 
§ 13(1)(No 1) WpHG. 
Assmann and Schneider op cit (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) at 101. 
Pingel op cit at 10. 
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information and that he had it 'through being' a director or liable partner. 
bb) Directors of a connected enterprise 
The second group consists of insiders who work for another company. A 
director or manager is an insider not only with regard to his own company, 
but also with regard to a connected company. This element extends the 
definition of the Directive which stipulated in its Art 2(1) that an insider is 
someone who is director or manager of 'the' ie his own company. One 
needs to define circumstances where a company is 'connected' to another 
company. Since there is no explanation in the WpHG, the literature refers 
to the definition contained in § 15 AktG.1020 
b) Shareholders 
Shareholders have sensibly been includedl021 in the definition, since they 
can influence1022 the actions of the company. This part of the definition is 
also perfectly in line with the Directive. Every shareholder is a potential 
insider. The prosecution must prove the link of causality between the 
person having the information and his position as a shareholder. There is no 
need to refer only to substantial shareholders nor to set a limit of the share 
position.1023 This is certainly correct, because it is in line with modern 
economic theory, according to which it does not really matter who carries 
out the share transactions, as long as they are based on inside knowledge. 
c) Profession, business or function 
An insider is also any person who, by reason of his profession, business or 
function and when executing his appointed activities (the German text says: 
'wer bestimmungsgemafi Kenntnis hat'), has knowledge of inside 
inf ormation.1024 This formulation may cause problems. The deviation from 
1020 Assmann op cit (ZGR 1994) at 505. 
1021 § 13 I Nr. 2 WpHG. 
1022 According to Lutter, 'Zur Treuepficht des Gro8aktionars', JZ 1976 at 225, the 
influence of substantial shareholders should correspond to their (fiduciary) duties. 
1023 BT -Drucks 12/6679 at 46; Assmann op cit at 506. 
1024 § 13 I Nr. 3 WpHG. 
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the Directive was intentional 1025 and has been criticised by Hopt,1026 
It is under this category that we must subsume the secretary when she types 
a document which contains price-sensitive information. 1027 And, apart from 
the secretary, all persons fall within the scope of this category who have 
certain functions which give them access to information. Such persons are 
consultants, lawyers, financial service people and so forth. It must be noted, 
however, that they become insiders if, and only if, their access to the 
information is part of their regular job, ie they obtain the knowledge 'when 
executing' their appointed activities. 
This formulation results in two very important restrictions. Firstly, a 
person whose employment does not as such open access to information does 
not fall within the definition. Such persons are cleaners and trainees from 
another department of the firm. The above-mentioned barman, for instance, 
who overhears a conversation of two senior executives, is not an insider, 
because his employment does not provide access to sensitive information. 
Yet, he may be caught by the wider formulation in § 14(2) WpHG as 'a 
third party who has knowledge of an insider fact'; if so, however, he is as a 
recipient who is not forbidden to communicate the information to another 
person. This problem will be dealt with below in the rubric 'tipees'. As far 
as cleaning personnel or the barman are concerned, the fact that they are 
not included is perhaps not so important. 
Secondly, and probably more importantly, is the fact that the information 
must be obtained 'when executing his functions'. This is very restrictive 
because any person who works within an enterprise is an insider if and only 
if his own duties give access to price-sensitive information. Even a clerk 
who works at the other end of the desk is not included. Compared to the 
former English law which stipulated that a person had to be connected with 
a company, the German formulation is even more restrictive. The person 
concerned must know about the insider fact because that fact is 'connected' 
to his personal work within the company. This is a questionable approach. 
But the problems do not stop at this point. A person who knows the insider 




Official reasons. BT-Drucks. 12/6679 at 46. 
See Hopt op cit (WM-Festgabe). 
See Claussen op cit at 271. 
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without permission, opens a document on the desk of another employee) is 
not within the provision. At best these persons could be regarded as 
recipien(s or tipees under § 14(2) WpHG. But then they are liable only for 
procuring the information, which renders their liability in fact incomplete. 
2. 'Dritte' (ie third parties), die Insiderkenntnis haben (ie 
who have knowledge of an insider fact) 
A third party who has knowledge of an insider fact 1s prohibited from 
acquiring or disposing of insider securities . . . by exploiting such 
knowledge.1028 This provision is aimed at tipees.1029 The inclusion of these 
'third parties'1030 was much debated in the course of the legislative 
preparations. The Government, at a certain stage, was reluctant to even 
include tipees at all. Fortunately, this idea was dropped. 
The present formulation is very wide and seems to include anyone who is in 
possession of inside information. This again is a major deviation from the 
Directive which provided in its Art 4 to include persons other than those 
dealt with hereinbefore who 
'with full knowledge of the facts possess inside information, the direct 
or indirect source of which could not be other than a person referred 
to in article 2 (ie insiders through their profession or work)'. 
The only thing which is now required by the German law is that the third 
party has knowledge of an inside fact without knowing how the information 
1028 § 14(2) WpHG, (dt.:): 'Einem Dritten, der Kenntnis von einer Insidertatsache hat, 
ist es verboten, unter Ausnutzung dieser Kenntnis Insiderpapiere . . . zu erwerben 
oder zu verauBern.' 
1029 For Gemtan comments on the tippee-issue see, above all, Hopt op cit (BFuP 1994) 
at 91~ see also Hopt op cit note 141 at 35 et seq., and at 47 (sub 'Tipping').Hopt 
argues that the tippee-issue is not so important. Given the economic apects (above all 
the 'derivatively informed trading'), however, the tippee-problem is certainly more 
than a mere 'Nebenkriegsschauplatz', and Hopt probably underestimates the 
importance of the tipee-issue. 
1030 For an interesting comparative overview see Siebel 'Der Sekundar-Insider', in: 
Bierich/Hommelhoff/Kropff (eds), 'Unternehmensfilhrung im Recht', Festschrift 
ftir Johannes Semler zum 70. Geburtstag am 28. April 1993, Berlin, 1993 at 955. 
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was obtained.1031 Assmann1032 suggests that it is irrelevant where the 
information stems from or who was at the source of it. 
Since a national law must be interpreted in the light of the Directive, 
Assmann 's view cannot be correct. The German Courts are able to re-
introduce the omitted requirement of the 'inside source' when tipee liability 
is at issue. And, in practice, it is very difficult to establish whether or not 
the window cleaner ( or the barman) dealt on the strength of hidden 
information without knowing that the information was inside, ie that it 
originated from an inside source. 
Other persons who obtain the information by mere coincidence should not 
be included, because they have no responsibility for the proper functioning 
of the securities markets, and can therefore not really damage it. In terms 
of market protection, it woul~ make sense to include only those persons 
who have such responsibility because only then could they really carry out 
transactions which affect the market in a negative way - and thus be 
detrimental to both the f unctioniQ.g of the market and investor protection in 
the democratic sense developed in Part I. 
Another serious shortcoming of the German legislation is the same as that 
to be found in the English legislation. The law stipulates that the tipee (the 
'third party') is forbidden to acquire or dispose of securities, if he has 
knowledge of an insider fact,1033 Thus the tipee will not fall foul of the 
provision if he is (whether as a matter of fact or because the prosecution 
fails to prove the contrary) in possession only of a valuable tip such as 'it is 
profitable to buy the shares of XY now', but not of the information as such. 
In most cases, however, this is exactly what happens because the recipient of 
such a tip is not really interested why he should buy as long as the source of 




Claussen op cit (DB 1994) at 28~ Assmann op cit at 508 follows that view. 
Idem at 508 et seq. 
§ 14(2) WpHG. 
264 
JV. The value of the German insider-definition 
1. Direct insiders 
The 'direct' or 'source' insiders are correctly not called primary insiders. 
Apart from the terminological benefits, however, the provision contains 
several shortcomings, some of which are major. 
Even managers or directors who obtain the information through a wrongful 
act; eg espionage, do not fall within the ambit of the definition. They must 
have the information as a result of their position. They may be caught as 
tipees, but this does not seem to make much sense. This is regrettable 
because it does not effectively protect the market. 
Unlike the definition in the Directive the employee is caught if, and only if, 
he has access to the information when executing his appointed functions. 
This restriction stipulated by the German law does not correspond with the 
European law, and does not fit in the conceptual framework. Where market 
protection is envisaged, the legislation should have included employees, 
irrespective of where the information originates from, as long as 
informational imbalances are exploited. 
2. The so-called 'tipees' 
The tipee provision is very defective. An interpretation which sticks to the 
letter of the law will result in almost everybody being caught by the term 
'third party', irrespective of their profession, function or responsibility1034 
for the market. This even includes managers who misappropriate the 
information, and who, instead, should be caught as 'direct' insiders. The 
fact that they merely are within the scope of the tipee provision privileges 
persons who obtain the information through a wrongful act. What is more, 
these persons are not even prohibited from counselling or procuring the 
information. This cannot be good law. 
Any share transaction which is based on a true tip is excluded from the 
prohibition. This excludes most forms of classic tipping. As in the new 
English law, this is a result of the formulation provided by the Directive. 
1034 The aspect of responsibility will be introduced below when we consider a new 
conceptual approach to the insider definition. 
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The text of the national law ought to be amended. This is possible because 
the scope of a Directive is only a minimum standard. The national law 
should not be less inclusive than the Directive, but can certainly be more 
far-reaching. Another argument to extend the provision is that the German 
courts cannot broaden the scope of the criminal statute through teleological 
interpretation. The legislator should have provided that the scope of the 
tipee provision is narrower and that, on the other hand, all tipees are 
prohibited from procuring and counselling. 
3. Conceptual criticism 
The definition is in itself neither m line with the envisaged market 
protection approach, nor does it correspond to the wording of the Directive 
in its decisive passages. On the whole, the conceptual work that was left to 
be done by the Member States has not been accomplished, neither with 
regard to direct insiders nor to tipees. It has in fact been accomplished to an 
even lesser degree than in England. 
Particulary the fact that the employee must have the information through 
his regular work makes it obvious that this part of the definition is based on 
the old fiduciary concept rather than on market protection. It was the 
declared intention to give up the old approach in favour of market 
prot~tion. The result, however, is unsatisfactory. It is not appare~t which 
new concept replaces the old one. The whole text lacks sufficient clarity to 
enable one to determine with precision who is an insider and who is not. 
This is particularly regrettable because in German criminal law it must be 
proved that the accused violated the good or value (dt.: Rechtsgut) which is 
protected by the provision. And this, of course, is very difficult when the 
value or good itself is not properly defined. 
Where the German insider definition sticks to the Directive, it merely 
copies its text without truly realising the concept of market protection. 
Deviations from the Directive result in some major shortcomings. Here 
again, the only excuse is that this is the first legislative attempt to cope with 
the problem of insider trading. 
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Chapter 4: Offences and defences 
After the comparative examination of elements of inside information and of 
who actually is an insider, we must now consider the kinds of transactions 
such persons are prohibited from carrying out. 
Economically, there are certain limitations as to how and when inside 
information can be exploited on securities markets. Insiders have to act 
quickly - otherwise, in competitive markets, other market participants make 
the profit. Their first alternative is to buy or sell securities, options or 
futures etc. Insiders can do so on their own account or on someone else.,s. 
In both cases it is obvious that the market can be affected in a negative way, 
if it is affected at all. If the insider buys on someone else.,s account, the 
transaction as such remains the same. 
Their second alternative is to refrain from trading eg buying stock when 
they know that negative information is about to be published. Incidentally, 
this is an importantl035 form of insider trading that no one can do anything 
about. Take for instance the fund manager in whose portfolio the stock is 
already contained. The stock may be sold or not as conditions dictate. 
However, with inside information, the manager would know when to sell 
and when not to. Whether the market is affected or not by abstaining need 
not be considered, because the omission to transact has never been 
criminalised by any legislation. The reason for this is very simple: it is 
impossible to prove. 
Thirdly, the information can be passed on to others, either as such or as a 
'tip' which is based on the information. For this purpose the information 
can be sold or it can be given gratuitously to a relative or a friend. In 
Part I of this study it was found that, if those recipients effected securities 
transactions, they would harm the market just as much as would the insider 
himself. Tipee trading is probably more harmful. Insiders who trade 
enhance price efficiency because they trigger derivatively informed trading. 
Tipee trading does not have this positive effect, because they are seldom 
identified as informed traders, hence they do not 'signal'1036• 
1035 See Manne op cit (Cato Journal) at 939, who states that this is the form of insider 
trading that may be the dominant method of using inside information. 




The imparting of the information itself does not directly affect the 
functioning of the market. It would therefore seem illogical for the 
imparting of the information to be criminalised. However, procuring or 
counselling on the strength of inside information enlarges the circle of 
people who are able to exploit the information. No-one can ever be certain 
of the number of people who possess inside information due to imparting 
and procuring. The uncertainty about the risk to the market provides a 
strong argument in favour of extending the prohibition to imparting. 
We shall now compare the varying degrees to which the thre~ laws have 
criminalised the behaviour of persons who misuse inside information, 
whether through acting (directly or indirectly) on the stock market or 
through imparting their knowledge. 
A. Sooth Africa 
The present South African law has brought about some important changes 
to the pre-existing law. In general, liability has been extended. 
I. The offences 
1. What is prohibited? 
With regard to the actual prohibition the South African key prov1s1on 
provides that 'any person who, whether directly or indirectly, knowingly 
deals in a security on the basis of ... , shall be guilty of an offence if such 
person knows that ... _1037 One of the major difficulties for the prosecution 
is to prove that the defendant dealt on the basis of information. We shall 
later consider the way 1038 the South African law seeks to facilitate this. It 
has to be noted that no offence is committed if the insider merely decides on 
the basis of inside information not to deal, even though, if he had not 
possessed that information, he would certainly have dealt. That approach is 
correct. 
The law prohibits direct and indirect dealings 'on the basis' of inside 
information. This formulation gives rise to the question whether dealing on 
1037 Sec. 440F(l) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
1038 See below sub '6'. 
268 
the strength of pointed hints (ie so-called 'true tips') and recommendations 
eg 'buy shares in X' are included. 1039 Jooste1040 suggests that the friend who 
received the true tip deals 'indirectly' on the strength of the information 
which forms the basis for the hint or recommendation. 
Although, no doubt, it was the intention to include such deals, the text of the 
law does not so provide. Sec. 440F(3) of the Companies Act provides 
certain rebuttable inferences sub conditione that 'it is proved that: (a) 'the 
accused was in possession of unpublished price-sensitive information ... '. 
This formulation, which is aimed at facilitating the prosecutions~s burden, 
makes it abundantly clear that one thing must always be proved, namely the 
possession of information. Dealing on the basis of tips is therefore not 
caught by the present legislation. This is an important issue for the tipees. 
2. Changes to previous legislation 
Unlike the old s 233, s 440F of the Companies Act makes secondary 
insider dealing an offence, too. The old legislation only included dealings in 
'shares or debentures', although Henochsberg1041 took the view that s 233 
encompassed the act of procuring or exercising an option to purchase 
shares, or the sale of such option. The latter was probably not included, 
because selling an option is dealiQ.g in a right to buy or sell shares, not, 
however, dealing in shares. The new provisions encompass both. 
Yet the most significant change is the fact that the law no longer requires 
that the insider deals in any way to his advantage. Although the old 
requirement was said to be suitably broad in this respect, it would have 
been difficult to establish this element in practice.1042 The abandonment of 
this requirement conceptually results in the new definition of price 
sensitivity which is now defined as ' ... reasonably be expected to affect 
materially the price ... '.1043• An insider would probably not have been 
caught under the old law, if he had waited until the price shift had 






Jooste op cit (1990 SAU) at 5en. 
Idem at 5en. 
See Henochsberg on the Companies Act 4 ed (1985) ed Philip H Meskin at 371. 
Rider op cit (1977 SAU) at 444. 
Sec. 440F(2)(a)(iii). 
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information before the actual price shift took place. The result of the new 
law is that it is neither necessary for an actual price shift to occur, nor for 
the insider to have retained a profit. 
3. Mens rea 
The use of the word 'knowingly' in s 440F( 1) of the Companies Act makes 
it clear that lJlens rea is a sine qua non for the offence to be committed.1044 
The word 'knowingly' is one of the clearest indications that mens rea is an 
element of the offence.1045 It also implies that the required form of mens 
rea is dolus1046 rather than culpa)047 Henochsbergl048 says that intention to 
deal in contravention of the section is a prerequisite for a conviction. It 
would, however, not be essential for the accused to be aware of s 440F or 
of the particular penalties for the contravention of s 440F.1049 
4. Dealing in a 'securit_y' 
'Security' does not only mean shares. It also includes stock and debentures 
convertible into shares, and any rights or interests in a company, or in 
respect of any such shares, stock or debentues. It further includes any 
'financial instrument' as defined in the Financial Markets Control Act, 1989 
(Act No 55 of 1989))050 In terms of s 38 of Act No 55 of 19891051 
options on stock or shares or on debentures, notes or units and rights 
thereto, futur~s, options on indices and so forth are clearly included.1°52 
This list is fairly complete and rightly implies that inside information can 










See Jooste op cit at 592. 
See Gaumont B.ritish Distributors Ltd v Henry [1939] 2 All ER 808. 
Dolus directus and dolus eventualis, see Jooste (The criminal aspects) at 23. 
See S v Bezuidenhout 1979 (3) SA 1325 (T) at 1327F-G. 
Op cit (Companies Act 5th ed) at 977. 
See Jooste op cit at 592. 
Sec. 444A(l) sub 'security'. The definition of 'security' was substituted by s l(f) 
of Act 69 of 1990 with effect from 1 Feb 1991. 
Sec. 1 'Definitions' of the Stock Exchanges Control Ad No 1 of 1985. 
See, however, the doubts expressed with regard to the scope of the term 'security' 
by the King Task Group op cit at W. 
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members' interest in a close corporation is, however, exempted,1053 
although such a corporation is in fact a corporate bodyl0.54_1055 
5. What are 'indirect' dealings? 
The law further prohibits 'indirect' dealings.1056 This formulation is said to 
cover the acquisition and exercise of options and pre-emption rights 
relating to shares or debentures,1057 It is submitted that such an 
interpretation would still be based on the incomplete list of securities under 
the old legislation. There is no need to further extend the term 'security', 
because the present law indeed includes all relevant securities. Hence, the 
question arises, what is an 'indirect' dealing? 
The Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act1058 had 
already considered this.1059 Although the Report resulted in the formulation 
'deals in any way to his advantage, directly or indirectly', it s~emed that 
indirect deals were included by the legislation. Thus the interpretation of 
the present law can refer to that under s 233, in terms of which indirect 
dealing meant to cover situations where nominees, spouses, or children 
were used. It is submitted that the term 'indirect' dealing in s 440F( 1) is 
also meant to cover these1060 situations. 
6. Facilitating the prosecution's burden of proof 
The South African law provides a certain facilitation for the prosecution. It 
provides that, 'if at criminal proceedings at which an accused is charged 
with an offence ... it is proved that (a) the accused was in possession of ... 
information ... ; or (b) ... information was obtained ... , he or she shall be 






See s 2(2) of the Close Corporation Act 1984. 
Henochsberg op cit at 976. 
Sec. 440F(l) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
1o57 Jooste op cit at 593. 
1058 Van Wyk de Vries Report, RP 45/1970. 
1059 Rider op cit at 444. 
1060 Henochsberg op cit at 977 says that nominee-situations are within the ambit of the 
prohibition. 
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security on the basis of such information; ... to have known that such 
information was so obtained.1061 
This rebuttable inference in s 440F(3) formulates m a statute what was 
ruled in the decision S v De Blom.1062 To dispel the inference, the accused 
must produce evidence that he did not know that his act was contrary to 
law. He would, for instance, lack knowledge of unlawfulness where he acts 
'under bona fide ignorance of the law'. Joostel063 suggests that such 
ignorance could exist simply because the accused is unaware of the existence 
of s 440F, or because he has been wrongly advised. 
7. Counselling and procuring 
The insider who passes on the information to an outsider is not guilty of an 
offence, even if the outsider commits an offence on the basis of the 
information. For example, where a director passes on price-sensitive 
information to a friend, fully aware of the fact that this friend will deal, he 
himself does not contravene s 440F.1064 
II. Offences that can be committed by tipees 
The South African law treats tipies like insiders. The recipients of inside 
information are prohibited from dealing. They are, however, not held 
liable when they deal on the strength of a true tip. Like insiders they are not 
prohibited from counselling and procuring the information. 
III. Is the penal net cast widely enough? 
It was observed that the intention of the legislation was to cast the penal net 
widely .1065 This view is supported by the fact that the law does not provide 
any defences. The law addresses neither the problem of imputation of 





lcr!7 (3) SA 513 (A)~ see Jooste op cit at 592. 
See Jooste, idem at 592. 
1064 Jooste, idem at 596. See also the King Task Group Report op cit at 14. 
1065 Henochsberg op cit at 976. 
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potential conflicts of interest. 1066 Would, for instance, a defence be 
available for a bank's retail department, if inside information were used in 
favour of a client to whom they owe full disclosure? Should the bank be 
encouraged to erect a chinese wall in order to prevent 1067 the information 
from penetrating the retail department?1068 
It is a serious shortcoming that no prohibition is imposed on the insider 
who passes on the information, even if the outsider were to deal on the 
strength of the information.The fact that counselling and procuring are not 
outlawed is suprising. The law provides that insiders must know where the 
information stems from. Thus it would seem that the prosecution must 
uncover the source. But then, of course, the source can be prosecuted as 
well. 
The above omission is all the more surprising since the legislation intended 
to protect investors against the misuse of inside information. The more the 
information spreads the more it is likely to be misused. It seems obvious 
that the scope of the prohibition should be extended to include the act of 




See Jooste op cit at 597 et seq.~ above all see the excellent book by Goode (ed), 
'Conflicts of interest in the changing financial world', London, 1986~ these conflicts 
need not necessarily be addressed by statutory rules, however, since South African 
financial institutions may also adopt self-regulatory measures, see Malan, 'Legal 
aspects of the regulation of financial institutions', TSAR 1989 at 553. 
For arguments against full imputation of knowledge see Hagemann/Grinstein, 'The 
mythology of aggregate corporate knowledge: A deconstruction', vol 65 George 
Washington Law Rev 1997, 210 at 218 et seq. 
With regard to the 'Chinese Wall'-problem see for an English point of view McVea 
op cit (Financial conglomerates)~ for a German perspective on this manifold problem 
see Tippach op cit at 231 et seq. 
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B. The European Directive 
I. Transactions by insiders . which are prohibited 
The Directive cannot prohibit any transaction in the sense that the 
prohibition is directly1069 applicable. Instead, the prohibitions provided by 
the Directive must be enforced by each Member State.1°70 Their laws can be 
stricter, and the range of prohibited transactions wider1071. 
E~sentially, there are three prohibitions set out in the Directive.1°72 Firstly, 
persons who possess inside information shall be prohibited from taking 
advantage of that information by acquiring or disposing of - for his own 
account or for the account of a third party - transferrable securities of the 
issuer or issuers to whom that information relates.'1073 This applies ortly 
when the insider deals with full knowledge of the facts. Consequently, it 
must be shown that the insider acted wilfully; mere carelessness while in 
possession of inside information is not enough.1074 
The term 'transferrable securities' as defined in Art 1(2) of the Directive 
includes, amongst others, shares, debt securities, contracts or rights to 
subscribe for, acquire or dispose of such securities, future contracts, 
options and financial futures in respect of such secutities, and index 
contracts in respect of such securities. The definition is sufficiently 
broad,1075 and thus the prosecution, if it fails, will certainly not fail because 
the security which was the object of the alleged insider deal has not been 
included in the law as an 'insider security'. 
Secondly, the insider shall be prohibited from disclosing inside information 
to any third party unless such disclosure is made in the normal course of the 
1069 See above, Part II, chap 1, B. 




Art 6 runs: 'Each Member State may adopt provisions more stringent than those 
laid down by this Directive or additional provisions .... In particular it may extend 
the scope of the prohibition laid down in Art 2 .... ' (The emphases ate mine). 
Ashe op cit (The Directive) at 18. 
Art 2(1) of the Directive. 
1074 Ashe op cit at 18. 
1075 Ashe, idem at 18. 
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exercise of his ~mployment, profession or duties.1°76 Unlike the South 
African concept, this approach is well defined: the protection of the 
securities market requires that the source of the inside information must not 
divulge its knowledge. It is interesting that the Directive takes into account 
that there are certain professional duties1077 which require that information 
is disclosed, eg information has to be registered with an administrative body 
or must be disclosed during a criminal inquiry or prosecution. 
Thirdly, the Member States shall prohibit insiders from recommending or 
procuring a third party, on the basis of that inside information, to acquire 
or dispose of transferable securities .. .1°78. Thus not only passing on the 
information as such to others is a prohibited action under the European law, 
but also using the information for 'inside' recommendations. 
II. Transactions by persons other than primary insiders 
The Member States must also impose the prohibition provided for in Art 2 
(ie the dealing prohibition) of the Directive on any person other than those 
persons referred to in that article who, with full knowledge of the facts, 
possesses inside information, the direct or indirect source of which could 
not be a person other than a person referred to in Art 2 (ie a primary 
insider).1079 Each Member State may ... impose on persons referred to in 
Art 4 (ie the so-called tipees) the prohibitions laid down in Art 3 (ie 
disclosing, procuring and recommending).1080 It has to ·be noted, however, 
that the Directive only requires recipients of information to be prohibited 
from dealing, not from procuring or counselling. 
1076 Art 3(a) of the Directive. 
1077 For a factual example see R v Fisher [1988] 4 BCC 360. 
1078 Art 3(b) of the Directive. 
1079 Art 4. 
1080 Art 6. 
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III. The Directive as a source of national laws 
As we have seen above, both the prohibition imposed on insiders and on 
tipees leave much legislative work be done by Jhe Member States. 
Moreover, neither g~neral nor special defences have been provided by the 
Directive. This was a wise step because it is particularly difficult to outline 
offences and defences, given the fact that penal law falls within the 




It is helpful to start our examination with the English provisions because 
they are much more detailed than the German statutes. 
I. Insider offences under the English law 
Like m the Directive, the CJA 1993 provides three different offences 
committable by insiders. Some differ in wording from the Directive due to 
the implementation process of the Directive. Under the English provisions 
the following are considered wrongful acts: disclosing the information, 
dealing on the strength of it, and encouraging others to deal ( or to counsel). 
The prohibitions apply only to individuals, thus a company cannot be 
charged. However, those who procure a company to deal, eg managers, are 
certainly within the scope of the prohibition,1081 although they do not act on 
their own behalf. It is also very important to note that the prohibitions 
apply to both direct insiders and tipees. 
1. Territorial scope of Part V of the CJA 1993 
The territorial scope of the English provisions is uncertain. The purpose of 
the Directive was to create a community-wide system of insider dealing 
regulations.1082 One must ask therefore whether 'dealing on a regulated 
market' (this is the formulation used by the Directive) encompasses dealings 
outside a national jurisdiction once the Directive is implemented, and the 
national law has merely copied this formulation. The term 'regulated 
markets' would certainly emcompass markets outside the UK. Yet the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 requires a territorial link between the insider 
offence and the UK. The intention of this is to prevent certain forms of 
insider dealing 1083 eg insider dealing on other regulated markets through 
the use of professional intermediares based in the UK. 
To commit the dealing offence (as opposed to the disclosure or the 
1081 Hannigan op cit at 91~ for the potential danger created by companies purchasing or 
redeeming their own shares see Cranston. 'Insider dealing again'. (1990) Journal of 
Business Law at 444. 
1082 Gore-Browne op cit at 12.044. 
1083 Parliamentary Debates. HL. 19 Nov 1992. col 774 (per the Earl of Caithness). 
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encouraging offences) it is necessary for the insider that 
(i) he was within the UK at the time when he is alleged to have done 
any act constituting or forming part of the alleged dealing; 1084 
or 
(ii) the regulated market on which the dealing is alleged to have 
occurred is one which, by an order made by the Treasury, is identified 
(whether by name or by reference to criteria prescribed by the order) 
as being, for the purpose of this Part, regulated in the UK; 1085 
or 
(iii) the professional intermediary was within the UK at the time when 
he is alleged to have done anything by means of which the offence is 
alleged to have been committed.1086 
The disclosure and encouragement offences cannot be committed unless the 
insider is within the UK when he discloses the information ( or encourages 
others to deal), or the recipient of the information (or encouragement) is 
within the UK when he receives the information.1087 
Tipping persons overseas from the UK by telephone would therefore be 
within the insider dealing offence, and so would be tipping a person within 
the UK jurisdiction from a telephone abroad. 1088 
The following examples probably fall within the territorial scope of the 
CJA 1993 if all the other requirements are met: 1089 dealing in securities of a 
UK company on the London Stoek Exchange; or of a French company on 
the London Stock Exchange; telephoning from the UK an order to purchase 
securities of a company listed in a European Stock Exchange; dealing in 
Spanish Government stock in London; an Irish dealer who relies on a 
London intermediary to deal in shares quoted in Dublin; English resident 
dealer who relies on an intermediary based in Northern Ireland to buy 











Rider and Ashe op cit at 60~ see also Gore-Browne op cit at 12.044 et seq. 
Rider and Ashe op cit at 59. 
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contract for differences in New York; French resident, dealing in a French 
security listed in London; UK resident, procuring his Cayman company to 
deal in securities on diverse markets. 
2. The dealing offence 
The primary prohibition is cast on dealing on the strength of inside 
information. But which actions are included in this general formulation? 
A person 'deals in securities' if (i) he acquires or disposes of the securities 
(whether as principal or agent);l090 or (ii) he procures, directly or 
indirectly, an acquisition or disposal of the securities by any other 
person.1091 
It does not need to be shown that the insider dealt because of the inside 
information. It is sufficient to prove that he was an insider as defined by the 
law, and that he dealt at a time when he had such information. This avoids 
the difficult problems of proof which would otherwise arise.1092 
A person 'deals in securities' if he acquires or disposes of these whether as 
principal or agent. In a situation where a securities firm's employee deals, 
not on his own account, but on the firm's account, the employee is liable 
even though he dealt as an agent1093 and even though he did not gain from 
the transaction.1094 
This formulation also covers situations where an agent deals on an 
execution basis1095 (ie he carries out an order by his principal). It would 
seem unfair to the principal who gave the instruction without having inside 
information, if the agent then feels inhibited from carrying out the order. 
For cases like that a special defence (see text below) is available for 
principal/agent situations. This defence allows the agent to act on 
instructions10% - so long as the agent does not use the inside information. 
1090 Sec. 55(l)(a). 
1091 Sec. 55(1)(b). 
1092 Hannigan op cit at 92. 
1093 Hannigan op cit at 92 et seq. 
1094 Rider and Ashe op cit at 48. 
1095 Rider and Ashe, idem at 48. 
1096 Rider and Ashe, idem at 48. 
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a) Acquisitions and disposals 
Acquisitions and disposals are the central issue of the matter. But not all 
acquisitions or disposals are direct. 'Acquire' includes: 
(i) agreeing to acquire the security;1097 and 
(ii) entering into a contract which creates the security_1098 
'Dispose' includes agreeing to dispose of the security; 1099 and bringing to an 
end a contract which created the security.1100 
Subpoint (i) covers situations not only where the dealer acquires or disposes 
of legal title to the securities, but also where the dealer has only agreed to 
acquire or dispose of the securities because he has bought and sold in the 
same account, without ever actually taking legal title to the security. 1101 
Subpoint (ii) takes into account that in the derivative markets there are no 
securities to be acquired 9r disposed of, but ·entering into the contract has 
the effect of creating a new security. This applies particularly to dealing in 
options, index contracts and other contracts for differences.1 102 
b) Procuring an acquisition or disposal 
A person also deals in securities if he procures, directly or indirectly, an 
acquisition or disposal of the securities by another person. This is important 
because it covers numerous situations where the insider does not deal 
himself but through an agent, a nominee or a third party.1 103 The other 
person can be his agent, his nominee or a person who is acting 'at his 
direction',1104 although these examples are not exhaustive.1105 Also, 














See HC Debates, Session 1992-93, Standing Committee B, col 168, 10 Jun 1993. 
HC Debates, idem. 




innocent agent, eg a professional dealer or simply a friend to deal for him. 
Another example would be an insider who deals through a company which 
he controls. Here the insider procures the dealing by means of another 
person acting at his direction.1106 
Some disquiet was expressed m the House of Commons Standing 
Committe B1107 at the scope of the formulation 'at his direction'. It was 
said that this might include - what is not intended - a person who has inside 
information but whose investment portfolio is handled by someone else on a 
discretionary basis (eg by a fund manager). The Economic Secretary, in 
reply, stated that, apart from the fact that there is a statutory defence 
(s 53(l)(c), see text below), the person who gives a general direction to 
another to manage his affairs, would not have 'directed' and therefore not 
have procured. This is certainly correct because the information must be 
exploited in some way to give rise to a sanction. And without a 'specific' 
direction to deal, there would be no such exploitation. 
c) Price-affected securitY-
Sec. 56(2) of the CJA 1993 provides that securities are 'price-affected' by 
inside information only if the information, if made public, would be likely 
to have a significant effect on its price. This broadens (ie compared to the 
CSA 1985) the prohibition so as to cover dealings in any security which is 
price-affected. 
This requirement generates an interesting side effect. If the information is 
about company A which is a component of the Ff-SE 100 Index, an insider 
is prohibited to deal in securities of A, but he can deal in an index option, 
since the Index is not a price-affected security in relation to that 
information. 1108 
The offences contained in the old legislation (ie the Company Securities Act 
1985) covered transactions in share debentures, options, and contracts for 
differences. Art 1(2) of the Directive provided that any dealing in 




Hannigan op cit at 93. 
Col 167 (per Ainswoth MP). 
See Hannigan op cit at 94; see also DTI Consultative Document, 'The law on insider 
dealing', Dec 1989 paras 2.19, 2.20. 
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securities had to be added by the new law. Now futures, warrants, most 
derivatives1109, depository receipts, loan stock, or gilts issued by central 
government, other public bodies1110, local authorities and the Bank of 
England, 1111 are also covered.1112 
However, unit trusts, currency and commodity derivatives remain excluded 
from the prohibition.11 13 So do commodity futures and commodity 
options1114. This would seem to conflict with the term 'regulated market' 
used by the legislation. Since commodity options are traded on regulated 
markets, it is not apparent why they were excluded. Actually, the omission 
is regrettable because commodity options can yield enormous profits. 
Another point of criticism is that price-affected securities must not only be 
listed in Sched 2, but must also meet the conditions specified by the 
Treasury by statutory instrument.1115 This formulation is likely to create 
confusion because a security may be mentioned in the Schedule but is 
nevertheless excluded via Treasury instrument. This could prevent dealings 
which are not prohibited by the law. Since dealings enhance the liquidity of 
the markets, this is contrary to the intended protection of the market. 
The relevant statutory instrument issued by the Treasury is 'The Insider 
Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) Order 1994' (SI No 187) which 
came into force on 1 Mar 1994. According to Sched 2 the security either 
needs to be listed in a State within the European Economic Area, or it has 
to be admitted to dealing on, or has its price quoted on ( or at least under the 









Hannigan op cit nat 97. 
See s 60(3)(b). 
For the complete list see CJA 1993 Part V Sched 2 or see Hannigan op cit at 95 et 
seq.; see also Gore-Browne op cit at 12.028 et seq. 
Wotherspoon op cit at 427. 
Wotherspoon op cit at 427. 
Hannigan op cit at 97. 
Sec. 54(1)(b). 
Artt 5-8 of the aforementioned Order; on the Regulated Market Order in general see 
Alcock, 'Insider dealing', 16 Comp Lawy 1995 at 21. 
d) 
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Dealing on a 'regulated market' or 'relying on or acting as a 
professional intermediary' 
The final requirement which must be satisfied is that the acquisition or 
disposal occurs oh a regulated market, or that the person who deals relies 
on a professional intermediary, or is himself acting as a professional 
intermediary.1117 For the dealing to be prohibited it must occur on one of 
the 'regulated markets'1118, and must be effected by a market maker or a 
stockbroker. 
A 'regulated market' means any market, however operated, which, by an 
order made by the Treasury, is identified (whether by name or by 
reference to criteria prescribed in the order) as a regulated market for the 
purposes of Part V of the CJA 1993.1119 The International Stock Exchange, 
the London Securities and Derivatives Exchange (OMLX) and the 
International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) are currently recognised 
as regulated markets.1120 
A professional intermediary is a person who carries on a business (not only 
incidentally to some other activity or because he occasionally conducts such 
activities) 1121 consisting of an activity mentioned in subsection (2): ie 
acquiring or disposing of securities whether as principal or agent, or acting 
as an intermediary between persons taking part in any dealing in 
securitiesll22. He either holds himself out to the public as willing to engage 
in any such b'usiness,1123 or is employed by such a person1124. In order to 
prove ~hat a person who dealt relied on a professional intermediary, it is 
necessary to establish that the professional intermediary carried out the 
activities in relation to-that dealing.1125 











Hannigan op cit at 99. 
Sec. 60(1). 
Wotherspoon op cit at 43 2. 
Sec. 59(3)(a) and (b). 
Sec. 59(2)(a) and (b). 
Sec. 59(1)(a). 
Sec. 59(l)(b). 
Sec. 59(4);see also Hannigan op cit at 100. 
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a dealing by a professional intermediary.1126 This means that, when a 
professional intermediary deals with another professional intermediary ( or 
with a private client) in an off-market face-to-face transaction (and, of 
course, this transaction being based on inside information), the transaction 
is within the scope of the 'dealing' prohibition.1127 Thus a dealing through 
which a securities house purchases a large stake in a company from a 
particular shareholder, is within this definition. There may, however, be a 
defence available under the market information defence1128 (see below sub 
'defences'). 
It is interesting to note that this provision also seems to cover situations 
where a professional intermediary acts as an intermediary between two 
private clients who deal off-market.1129 This is astonishing, for the intention 
of the Directive is to enhance confidence in the securities markets. The 
scope of the Directive is therefore limited to dealings on exchange markets, 
irrespective of whether professional intermediaries are involved. As a 
result of this requirement (ie that a professional intermediary needs to be 
involved) that the law covers OTC markets, which is particularly important 
in the derivatives area.1130 
Only face-to-face transactions between private clients are excluded, because 
the Government maintained the view that it was up to the investors to 
protect themselves by seeking such information as they regarded to b~ 
necessary from each other.1131 This is a sensible approach which accurately 
reflects the intentions of the Directive. It also shows that it is indeed not 
correct to penalise private deals effected through an intermediary; and it 
also suggests that the inclusion of face-to-face dealings in the German 
insider prohibition is more than questionable. 
1126 Sec. 52(3). 
1127 Hannigan op cit at 100. 
1128 Hannigan, idem at 100. 
1129 See Hannigan, idem at 100. 
1130 Hannigan, idem at 100. 
1131 DTI Consultative Document op cit para 2.11. 
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3. The encouragement offence 
The second offence provided for by the CJA 1993 is that of encouragihg 
another person to deal. A person who has information as an insider is guilty 
of insider 'dealing' if he encourages another person to deal in securities that 
are (whether or not that other person knows it) price-affected securities in 
relation to the information, whilst knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe that the dealing would take place in the circumstances mentioned in 
subsection (3)1132. 
These circumstances are the same as for the dealing offence, namely that the 
trade occurs on a regulated market or through a professional 
intermediary.1 133 The CJA (like the CSA) does not cover situations where 
the insider encourages another person not to deal, but to hold the shares (in 
view of positive information to be announced) or not to buy (where 
negative information is soon expected to be released). 
It is not necessary for the person who has inside information to impart it to 
the person he encourages. Nor is it necessary that the other person should 
know that the securities he is encouraged to buy are price-affected 
securities.1134 Nor that the recipient actu~lly heeded the advice given by 
buying or selling the relevant securities.1135 The actus reus of the offence is 
the imparting of advice to deal.1136 
Unlike the German definition of insider trading the English formulation is 
broad enough to encompass classic tip situations like 'sell company A' as an 
insider offence1137. Under the old legislation the scope of the offence of 
'counselling and procuring' was relatively clear. 
'Encouraging has no such pedigree, and, while clearly being wider than 
counselling and procuring, it remains to be seen how the courts will 
construe it.'1138 It may, for instance, suffice when a director ~t a brokers~ 
1132 Sec. 52(2)(a). 
1133 Sec. 52(3). 
1134 Rider and Ashe op cit at 51. 
1135 W otherspoon op cit at 429 
1136 W otherspoon, idem at 429. 
1137 Rider and Ashe op cit at 51. 
1138 Hannigan op cit (1st ed) at 101. 
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lunch gives an enthusiastic presentation which subsequently results in the 
brokers dealing.1139 
4. The disclosure offence 
The final prohibition relates to 'disclosing' the inside information. A person 
who has information as an insider is also guilty of insider 'dealing' if he 
discloses it, other than in the proper performance of the functions of his 
employment, office or profession, to another person.1140 Disclosure is made 
in the proper performance of a person's functions, when it is directed at 
regulatory authorities or the company's bankers or brokers.1 141 
Under the old law it was necessary to establish that the person 
communicating the knowledge had reasonable cause to believe that the 
recipient would make use of the information for the purpose of dealing.1142 
It is now, at least in theory, easier to establish that an offence has taken 
place. However, the defendant may still avail himself of the defence 
provided by the new legislation, namely that he did not at the time of 
disclosing expect any person to deal in securities. This element is, clearly, 
retained from the old legislation. The difference is that it is now up the 
defendant to establish on the balance of probabilitiesl 143 that he did not 
expect the other person to deal.1144 
On principle, the disclosure offence can be committed whether or not the 
recipient deals.1145 This is in accord with the market protection approach 
chosen by the Directive. The insider cannot foresee whether the recipient 
will deal or pass on the information to others. Thu~ the source-insider who 
imparts his knowledge creates potential dangers to the market. 
1139 Hannigan, idem at l 02. 






Hannigan idem at 102. 
See Hannigan, idem. 
For the burden of proof see R v Cross [1990] BCC 237, [1991] BCLC at 125. 
Hannigan, idem at 103. 
Hannigan, idem at l 02. 
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II. Defences 
The English law provides defences for the accused insider. Even if a person 
meets all of the requirements outlined above and is thus apparently within 
the scope of the prohibitions, he may nevertheless escape conviction because 
a defence permits his conduct which is otherwise prohibited. The accused 
has, however, the burden both of raising a defence and establishing it.1146 
The English law provides several defences, either general or special ones. 
In accordance with the preamble to the Directive, a person who acts on 
behalf of a public sector body in pursuit of monetary policies with respect 
to exchange rates or the management of public debt or foreign exchange 
reserves is exempted.I 147 This does certainly not apply to private 
dealings.1 148 It is submitted, however, that actions on behalf of a public 
sector body are as such potential inside information. Thus, persons who 
deal while they are in possession of such information, eg that the National 
Reserve Bank will lower the general interst rates (NB: this is market 
information), fall within the scope of the insider trading offence. 
1. 'General' defences 
General statutory defences are provided for each offence) 149 They succeed 
if they are proved by the defendant on the balance of probabilities.I 150 The 
burden is on the accused to raise a statutory defence.1151 
a) No profit expected 
In respect of the dealingll52 and the encouragement offences1153, a person is 








Gore-Browne op cit at 12.045. 
Sec. 63 of the CJA 1993. This is not a 'defence', but rather an exemption, cf 
Hannigan at 114 because the person (eg a public servant) would not have to raise it 
as a defence, but instead, as the law puts it, 'the prohibitions do not apply'. 
Hannigan, idem at 114. 
Sec. 53(1), (2), (3). 
Rider and Ashe op cit at 54. 
See R v Cross [1991] BCLC 15, which is a case dealt with under the old CSA 1985. 
Sec. 53(1)(a). 
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result in a profit or to avoid a loss1154 which could be attributed to the fact 
that the information was price-sensitive. 
The paucity of prosecutions under the previous legislation has left the ambit 
of this defence unclear.1 155 For instance, does it cover a person who traded 
to meet an unexpected tax demand, if he timed his transaction to make the 
maximum gain from the· inside information in his possession?1156 
Prentice1157 commenting on the former law, pointed out that the burden of 
proof on the person in such cases should prevent the defence from 
'becoming a convenient escape for the unscrupulous'. The wording of the 
defence in view of the encouragement offence is not sufficiently broad to 
cover situations where the encouragement does not result in a transaction. 
Thus, if the bargain remains executory, _the defence is inapplicable,1158 
However, prosecutions will be rare if completion has not taken place.1159 
b) Not 'on the basis' of the information 
It 1s a defence defence to both the dealing offencel160 and the 
encouragement offence1161 for the accused to show that he would still have 
acted as he did, 'even if he had not possessed the information'. 
To fall within the ambit of this defence, the accused must prove that he in 
any event either planned to deal or to encourage someone else to deal. It 
seems that an insider is entitled to this defence if he acquires inside 
information within the course of a transaction and nonetheless completes 
it.1 162 But apart from situations where the accused can prove that he was 
under financial pressure1163 to sell, it will be difficult for him to prove that 
the information had no influence on the decision to deal. Here again the 
1153 Sec. 53(2)(a). 
1154 In s 53(6) it is expressly provided that, in the context of the defences, a profit will 
also include the avoidance of a loss. 








Wotherspoon, idem at 430. 
'The Companies Act 1980', op cit at 131. 
Gore-Browne op cit at 12.045. 
Rider and Ashe op cit at 54. The present author shares this expectation. 
Sec. 53(l)(c). 
Sec. 53(2)(c). 
Gore-Browne op cit at 12.046. 
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timing of the deal will be important.1164 
Gore-Browne1165 suggests that this defence might also be available to a 
trustee who comes into possession of inside information and finds himself 
impaled on the horns of a dilemma: if he deals, he is commiting an offence, 
and, if he does not, he might well be considered to be in breach of trust or 
even negligent. But it is doubtful whether this defence covers such situations 
at all, where the trustee is in a dilemma between the insider dealing 
prohibition and his obligations under the common law as a trustee or agent. 
The actual problem in these situations is one of conflict of interest; and this 
is certainly not addressed in the vaguely formulated defence to insider 
traders. A defence as such is of minor importance, and the ref ore its 
intention would not seem to be to regulate the important issue of conflicts 
of interest. Moreover, we do not know whether these defences, which were 
not mentioned in the Directive, are in accord with the European law. If 
they are not, they would not even be applicable. It is submitted that the 
above trustee situation is not covered by the defence that the insider would 
have acted the same way even without possession of the inside information. 
c) Infonnation 'assumedly disclosed widely enough' 
A person will not be held liable for dealing or encouraging if he can show 
that at the time of the alleged offence he believed on reasonable grounds 
that the information had been or would be disclosed widely enough to 
ensure that none of the other parties to the transaction would be prejudiced 
because they did not have the respective information.1 166 
This 'closed circle'1167 defence appears to have been introduced to meet the 
merchants banks' and other financial institutions' concerns about the impact 
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See Wotherspoon op cit at 430. 
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defence has (no doubt rightly) been criticised,1168 A suggested example is 
that two parties are in contact with each other who both have information 
that cannot yet be made public.1169 This example is not convincing, because 
in that situation no defence is necessary at all. If, in such a situation, there is 
no exploitation of an informational imbalance there can also be no insider 
trading. And vice versa, if the deal takes place to the advantage of both 
parties ( eg front-running ahead of a forthcoming publication of the 
information), it would seem to be a clear case of insider dealing 
irrespective of whether or not the parties assume the information is 
disclosed widely enough. 
In fact, there seems to be no conceivable example of this defence. It is 
submitted that this special defence is a rather unhappy one. The provision 
reveals with great clarity that the present English legislation is not really 
intended to serve the interests of the market (let alone the interests of small 
investors). The law purports to be in the public interest, but in truth it 
enhances the interests of a particular group of people, namely those who 
work in these markets as financial experts or analysts. It is the ref ore 
unlikely that the law will produce positive effects. In terms of the 
'democratic approach' suggested above1170 such legislation does not reflect a 
majority opinion amongst people interested in capital markets. 
d) Defences to the offence of disclosing information 
The provision that provides defences to the offence of disclosing 
information is slightly different from the one that relates to the dealing 
offence. A person is not guilty of insider dealing by disclosure if he shows 
that he did not expect any person, because of the disclosure, to deal in 
securities in the circumstances of s 52(3) (ie insider dealing on a regulated 
market or through an intermediary);l171 or that, although he had such an 
expectation at the time, he did not expect the dealing to result in a pfofit 
attributable to the fact that the information was price-sensitive) 172 
This is presumably meant to mitigate the breadth of the disclosure offence 
1168 Wotherspoon, idem at 430. 
1169 Rider and Ashe op cit at 55. 
1170 See above, last chapter of Part I. 
1171 Sec. 53(3)(a). 
1172 Sec. 53(3)(b). 
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which disclosing the information accidentally, or even casually in a social 
setting.1173 A defence is available if the insider did 'not expect the other 
person to deal' (ie the person who received the information accidentally). 
Nevertheless, this other person may be liable as a tipee. 1174 The defence 
need not reach any further, because disclosure in the proper performance 
of one"s employment is exempted.1175 
2. Special defences 
In addition to the above general defences, the l~w provides three special 
defences set out in Sched 1 to the Act which can be described as 'market 
defences'll76. The Treasury is empowered to amenµ Sched 1 by statutory 
instrument.1177 The special defences only relate to the dealing and 
encouragement offences.1118 
a) Market maker 
A person is not guilty of insider dealing by virtue of dealing in securities or 
encouraging another person to deal if he can show that he acted in good 
faith in the course ofll79 (i) his business as a market maker,1180 or (ii) his 
emplyoment in the business of a m~rket maker1181. The Schedule can be 
amended in future to allow for the evolution of market practices. These 
defences will probably be used by City professionals when accused of 
insider dealing. However, they have not been relevant in most insider 
dealing cases which have ·been prosecuted to date.1182 
A market maker is a person who holds himself out at all normal times in 
compliance with the rules of a regulated market or an approved 
1173 Hannigan op cit at 116. 
1174 Hannigan, idem at 116. 
1175 Rider and Ashe op cit at 55. 
1176 Rider and Ashe, idem at 56. 
1177 Sec. 53(5). 
1178 Wotherspoon op cit at 431. 
1179 Sched 1, para (1), (1). 
1180 Sched 1, para (1), (l)(a). 
1181 Sched 1, para (1), (l)(b). 
1182 Hannigan op cit at 109 et seq. 
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organisation (ie an international securities self-regulating organisation 
approved under para 25B of Sched 1 to the FSA 1986), 1183 as willing to 
acquire or dispose of securities1184 and is recognised as doing so under 
those rules 1185. Any private dealing by such a professional while in 
possession of sensitive infQrmation is prohibited.1186 
The intention of the law is clear. Market makers are, by definition, obliged 
to set prices at all times. Without a proper defence, their frequent 
possession of inside information would render them unable to deal 
altogether. The market would become inefficient. The former law 1187 
required that the information be acquired in the course of the market 
maker's business. This requirement has rightly been removed 1188 by the 
new legislation1189. 
b) The 'market information' defence 
A person is also . not guilty of insider dealing if he shows that: (i) the 
information which he haq as an insider was 'market information';1190 and 
(ii) it was reasonable for a person in his position to have acted as he did 
despite having that information as an insider at the time. 1191 The market 
information defence intends to cover a variety of 'City situations'. For 
example, the size of the rump on a rights issue is inside information, yet the 
underwriter has to place those securities. Without an exemption, any 
<;lealing or encouraging of others to deal would be criminalised.1192 This 
defence is said to have come into existence because the Government bowed 
to pressure from City practitioners) 193 
Mark~t information is defined as information consisting of one or more of 
1183 Sched 1, para (3). 
1184 Sched 1, para (2)(a). 
1185 Sched 1, para (2)(b). 
1186 Hannigan op cit at 110. 
1187 Cf s 3(1)(d)(i) of the CSA 1985. 
1188 See W otherspoon op cit at 431. 
1189 Following the preamble to the European Directive. 
1190 Sched 1, para 2(1)(a). 
1191 Sched 1, para 2(1)(b). 
1192 See Hannigan op cit at 111. 
1193 See Wotherspoon op cit at 431. 
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the following facts: 1194 
( 1) that securities of a particular kind have been or are to be acquired 
or disposed of, or that their acquisition or disposal is under 
consideration or the subject of negotiation; 
(2) that securities of a particular kind have not been or are not to be 
acquired or disposed of; 
(3) the number of securities acquired or disposed of or to be acquired 
or disposed of, or whose acquisition or disposal is under consideration 
or the subject of negotiation; 
( 4) the price ( or range of prices) at which securities have been or are 
to be acquired or disposed of or the price (or range of prices) at which 
securities whose acquisition or disposal is Under consideration or the 
subject of negotiation may be acquired or disposed of; 
( 5) the identity of the persons involved or likely to be involved in any 
capacity in an acquisition or disposal. 
In short, 'market information' means information about transactions and 
contemplated transactions in shares and the identity of the persons involved. 
A typical example of the envisaged market information was said, by the 
Economic Secretary to HM Treasury, to be when an individual sells a large 
block of shares,1195 and when the publication of that information would 
have a material effect on the share price, as would the knowledge that 
someone intended to sell the block of shares.1196 
It must be noted, however, that this type of market information concerns 
only the market in shares/options. It does neither refer to a group of 
1194 
1195 
Sched 1, para 4 (a)-(e). 
It seems indispensable that we should clarify two things: firstly that in the case of 
such a sale there are actually two types of information, namely, the fact that shares 
are sold and the identity of the seller~ secondly that when the 'individual' is not an 
individual but a moral person, for instance a company, the information that a block 
of shares is disposed of is not market information but company information because 
it relates to the assets of the company. 
1196 Parliamentary Debates, HC, Standing Committee B, 15 Jun 1993, col 216. 
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enterprises nor to statistical data,1197 
Also, it has to be decided in which situations 'it is reasonable for a person in 
his position to have acted as he did'. In determining this, the following must 
be to taken into account: 
(i) the content of the information, 
(ii) the circumstances in which the insider first had the information 
and in what capacity, and 
(iii) the capacity in which the insider now acts.1198 
A practitioner should be guided by the rules of the body which authorises 
him to conduct investment business or the rules of the market in which he is 
dealing.I 199 If, however, the courts accept the City practice as relevant for 
the interpretation of the law, then the City could openly dictate legal 
positions. The capital market is certainly an important feature in our 
society, but this is definitely not a desirable outcome.1200 
There is yet another type of market information defence. A person is not 
guilty if he can show that he acted in connection with an acquisition or 
disposal which was under consideration or the subject of negotiation, with a 
view to facilitating the accomplishment of the acquisition or disposal, and 
that the information arose directly out of his involvement.1201 This 
provision echoes, but in a different language, the defence provided by 
s 3(2) of the CSA 1985, which stated that an individual was not, by reason 
only of his having information relating to any particular transaction, 
prohibited from dealing if he did so in order to facilitate the completion or 
carrying out of the transaction. 
The essence of this defence is to allow a bidder to buy shares in the target in 
advance of a bid, provided that the dealing is done to facilitate or complete 
the company's bid,1202 This, again, is a defence which suits the interests of 
the City people. Also, it fosters the process of conglomerisation because it 
1197 See hereinbefore sub 'market information'. 
098 Sched 1, para 2(2) (a)-(c). 
1199 HC Debates, Session 1992-93, Standing Committee B, 15 Jun 1993, col 217~ cf 




Hannigan op cit at 112~ the present author shares this view. 
Sched 1, para 3. 
Hannigan op cit at 113. 
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facilitates take-overs and buy-outs. 
c) Price stabi Ii sation 
The CSA 1985 provided an exemption for price stabilisation activities, 
which is now repeated in the CJA 1993, Sched 1, para 5. Stabilisation is a 
process whereby the market price of a se~urity is pegged or fixed during 
the period in which a new issue of securities is sold to the public. The 
reason why stabilisation is permitted is that when a new issue is brought to 
the market, the sudden glut will sometimes force the price lower for a 
period of time before buyers are found for the securities on off er.1203 
The procedure to be followed is laid down in SIB Core Rule 29. The effect 
is that the price is kept at a higher level than would otherwise be the case. A 
person is not guilty of insider dealing ( or encouraging) if he shows that he 
acted in conformity with the price stabilisation rules1204 made under s 48 of 
the FSA 1986. These rules require the identification of the period during 
which the stabilisation may occur, the imposition of limits on the price at 
which the manager may stabilise, and the keeping of records in regard to 
the stabilising transactions which were carried out. 
The insider dealing aspect arises from the fact that the fund manager who 
deals in the securities (by buying back what had previously been sold) is 
dealing at a time when he has price-sensitive information, namely that the 
stabilisation is taking place and the circumstances which require that 
stabilisation.1205 
1203 Hannigan. idem at 113. 
1204 Sched 1. para 5. 
1205 Hannigan op cit at 114. 
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III. Some evaluating remarks 
1. Concerning the offences 
With regard to the territorial scope of the insider trading provisions, no 
doubt Hannigan1206 is correct when she says that, given the more or less 
equivalent insider prohibitions in the other Member States and also the non-
EU States within the Eu_ropean Economic Ares, the provisions should 
provide an effective framework of legislation against insider dealing 
throughout Europe. 
The fact that it need not be shown that the insider dealt because of his inside 
knowledge will help facilitate prosecutions. This is different from most 
other legislation on insider dealing, for instance, the South African 
provisions. However, the motivation of the insider trader must be 
considered where the accused raises the defence provided in s 53(l)(a) of 
the CJA 1993, ie that he did not expect the dealing to result in a profit. It is 
then up to the insider to prove that he acted without having the expectation 
to make a profit. This may indeed facilitate the prosecution. 
It is not desirable that insider 'dealing' now covers situations where an 
agent who acts on instructions (for example a bank carrying out the order 
by its customer) merely carries out the instructions. In order to comply 
with the insider dealing prohibition, the bank has to refuse to carry out the 
order. No doubt the customer will ask why; hence the bank would have to 
disclose the information in the proper performance of its professional 
duties, or at least mention that there is price sensitive information. Such 
situations occur frequently. The law should therefore clarify that acting as 
an agent on a principal/agent basis is exempted from the insider dealing 
prohibition, so long as the agent does not use the inside information. 
The term 'regulated market' is not well defined. The definition merely 
provides that a regulated market is identified as such by the Treasury. It is 
apparent that all official stock markets are within the definition, whether 
they take place on a floor or through computer transactions. 
The extension of the dealing offence to OTC markets and even to private 
clients' deals where an intermediary is involved, makes the offence far too 
1206 Idem, at 104. 
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wide. The scope of the prohibition is extended in such a way that it is no 
longer reconcilable with the Directive. In its preamble it is laid down that 
the intention is to protect secondary markets in securities without modifying 
the existing national law on contractual duties, for instance, the duty to 
disclose information. More generally, the situation of face-to-face dealings, 
whether inside information is used or not, should give rise only to civil 
liability, and not to criminal sanctions. In private deals the confidence of 
investors in any public good (eg security and reliability of capital markets) 
is not at stake. There is therefore no gocx:l reason for such a criminalisation. 
2. Concerning the defences 
a) The general dyfences 
The English law provides very detailed general defences. It is questionable 
whether all this was necessary. For instance, the general defences available 
where the defendant 'would have dealt in any event' or where he 'thought 
be 'inside'?) seem to have been designed for the protectio,i needs of the 
financial services people, and do not meet the core of the insider matter. 
They make it readily apparent that some of the crucial definitions were not 
moulded in an appropriate fashion. For instance, if the insider would have 
dealt in any event, he obviously did not have mens rea with regard to the 
offence of insider trading at the moment he first had the intention to deal; 
and the law regards this moment as decisive, not the mere fact that the 
insider had inside information at some later stage. 
Where the information is 'inside', what purpose does this defence (ie the 
insider thought the information was already widely enough disclosed) 
pursue? Either the insider erred about the the fact that the information was 
already public when he dealt (in which case he simply lacks mens rea with 
regard to exploiting an informational advantage) or he simply pretends that 
he thought that the information was already widely enough spread, in which 
case there is no room for a defence. 
If the law had taken into account the economics of insider trading, it would 
rather have defined public as either 'published according to publishing 
rules' or as 'no longer profitable', both of which could be tested 
objectively. As it is, there is no point of reference as to when insiders can 
start trading again. 
Another shortcoming of the legislation is that it does not address the issue 
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of whether inside knowledge is imputed to the head department in a 
financial conglomerate, and to what extent it may then be used in favour of 
clients, for instance, in the retail department. It remains unclear whether 
the SIB-rules concerning Chinese Walls can possibly modify the obligations 
of agents under the common law .1207 This is regrettable because such 
instruments can also be used in favour1208 of the client. 
b) Concerning the special defences 
The 'stabilisation defence' legalises market rigging in the aftermath of an 
issue and the practice, therefore, had to be exempted from the market 
manipulation offence set out in s 47 of the FSA.1209 Most people seem to 
assume that price stabilisation is a good thing. On a closer examination the 
arguments in favour of this price stabilisation are less certain than they 
appear at first sight. The main argument in favour of it is not obvious at all. 
Why is it important to keep prices artificially at a higher price by creating a 
demand which is not real in the sense that investors do not want to buy the 
shares, at least not at the higher price? The market always prices goods or 
shares correctly. If newly issued shares dilute a company's capital, then 
why is it unacceptable for the price of the shares to decline? 
Besides, on the ground of the economic substitution hypothesis1210 (ie that 
no matter in which shares one invests, one always gets the same value in the 
sense of risk and return mixture) it would seem that too much capital has to 
be used to keep the price artificially at a higher level. Why not rather use 
these funds in a more creative way? It is submitted that the better approach 
would be to reach price levels ·through supply and demand rather than 
through artificial and sometimes even manipulative devices whose benefits 
are more than questionable. 
The market maker defence is a sensible one. Given that the economic 
arguments in favour of prohibiting insider trading are, at least in. part, that 
the market maker's bid/ask-spread is widened because of expected losses to 
insiders, it is obvious that these market professionals, who are crucial to the 





See Mcvea op cit at 242-246. 
See Tippach (lnsider-Handelsverbot) at 250 et seq. 
Sec. 48(7) of the FSA and the FSA Stabilisation Order 1988 (SI No 717). 
See Part I of this study, see 'Market mechanisms'. 
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The defences of 'facilitating the accomplishment of an acquisition' and the 
'market information defence' seem to overlap. Buying ahead of a take-over 
bid could be subsumed under both.1211 The City people benefit from this 
defence because they certainly 'facilitate the accomplishment of an 
acquisition' when they buy shares of the target company. Yet the building 
up a block 6f shares ahead of a bid does not only occur because the 
completion of the bid is facilitated. Primarily it occurs because the bid has 
to be at a price higher than the current one, 1212 and the ref ore the buyer of 
the shares will make a good profit without much risk. 
On the whole it appears that City activities are very well protected. 
However, the fact that the law relies on the 'reasonableness of the act' 
where the market information defence can be raised, introduces an element 
of uncertainty. The concept of reasonableness is not generally accepted and 
does not provide the certainty which the markets need.1213 Who would be 
able to determine in advance what is 'reasonable', and hence give clear 
advice on which actions are prohibited? This situation is awkward for legal 
consultants and firms which plan capital market activities, eg a take-ov~r. 
1211 Hannigan op cit at 113; there is also the view that buying ahead of a take-over bid is 
not market information. but company information which concerns the future 
prospects of a company (such as synergy effects which are positive for future 
earnings). see Tippach op cit at 201 et seq. 
1212 Davies. 'The Take-Over Bidder Exemption and the Policy of Disclosure'. in: 
Hopt/Wymeersch (eds) op cit (European Insider Dealing). 243 at 248. ' 
1213 Law Society Company Law Committee. 'The law on insider dealing'. Dec 1992. 
Memorandum No ~1. para 9.2. 
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D. Offences and defences under the German law 
I. The offences 
1. Direct (primary) insiders 
As far as primary insiders are concerned, the German provisions are very 
similar to the English because they are both based on the Directive. Under 
the German provisions a primary insider is not allowed (i) to acquire or 
dispose of insider securities for his own account or the account of others, or 
on behalf of another by exploiting his knowledge of an insider fact.1214 This 
formulation of the law is the same as the English 'dealing offence', and 
encompasses also dealing on the account of another person. 
The insider is also prohibited (ii) from communicating or giving access to 
an insider fact without authorisation to another person.1215 This is by and 
large the same as the 'disclosure offence' in the English law. 
Also, the insider is not allowed (iii) to recommend on the basis of his 
knowledge of an insider fact the acquisition or disposial of insider securities 
to another person.1216 This provision has the same scope as the 
'encouragement offence' in the English law, but is more clear-cut. 
The German word for 'recommend' does not have the same ambiguity as 
the word 'encourage'. The formulation covers situations where the insider 
merely mentions 'the good results of his company' without expressly 
recommending to buy the shares. But where the insider did not foresee thaf 
the recipient of the information would deal, an appropriate defence (which 
is available under the English provisions) seems to be missing. Yet the 
German law has no need for this particular defence. In such a case the 
courts would most probably decide that the insider lacked mens rea with 
regard to recommending, and can therefore not be considered guilty. 
a) Insider securities (dt.: 'Insiderpapiere') 
'Insider securities' are securities which are admitted for trading to a 
domestic stock ~xchange or are traded on the so-called free market (whicrr 
1214 
1215 
§ 14(1) No 1 WpHG. 
§ 14(1) No 2 WpHG. 
300 
is a less regulated section of the official stock market); or are admitted in 
another Member State of the European Community or another contracting 
state of the European Area Treaty to trading on a market within the 
meaning of § (engl.: section) 2 sub-paragraph 1 WpHG.1217 § 2 WpHG 
contains a complete list of insider securities, encompassing shares and 
bonds, participating certificates, option certificates, derivatives traded on 
domestic or foreign markets, rights to subscribe to, acquire or dispose of 
securities, rights to payment of a margin arrived at by reference to a 
change 1n the price securities (ie contracts for difference) and other future 
contracts.1218 
The issue whether the creation of a right is included in the term 'dealing', 
which has been directly addressed by the English Act1219, is not properly 
dealt with by the WpHG. It is submitted that the 'creation of a right' is 
covered by the word 'dealing'. It does not make sense to include all the 
rights within the definition of 'securities', and then throw them out by the 
back door by narrowing down the meaning of 'dealing'. However, so long 
as the security is not admitted on a market there is notthing to 'deal' in. 
Given the strictness of the principle of objective interpretation in German 
penal law, it would have been better to clarify this issue by adding the 
following sentence to § 14(1) No 1 and equally to § 14(2) WpHG: 
'acquisition and disposition of securities include the creation of rights and 
the bringing to an end of contracts by which securities were created.' It is 
submitted that the law be reviewed in this respect. 
b) By exploiting his knowledge1220 
The element of 'exploiting the knowledge' contains one of the main 
problems for the prosecution. It means that the court must be satisfied as to 
the proof of the insider's subjective motivation. The defendant will 
certainly raise all those issues which under the English law are referred to 
as 'defences'. Yet the burden of proof under the German law is in favour of 






§ 14(1) No 3 WpHG. 
§ 12(1) No 1 and 2 WpHG. 
§ 12(2) No 1 to 4 WpHG. 
See s 55(2) and (3) of the CJA 1993. 
The German formulation is: 'unter Ausnutzung seiner Kenntnis'. 
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balance of probabilities. Thus, although the German insider legislati0n does 
not provide for defences as the English law does, the defendant is in a more 
advantageous position. 
For instance, under the English law the insider would have to raise the 
defence that he did not expect the dealing to result in a profit. Ul)der the 
German law the prosecutor will have to prove that the insider has exploited 
the information. For the same reason, the 'defence' that the insider 'thought 
the information had been disclosed widely enough', is also covered by the 
exploitation requirement. The prosecution must prove that the accused 
knew that the information was not yet made public. 
The insider may argue that he erred about the element of 'non-public', or 
that he did not think that his knowledge was still exploitable1221 . The same 
is true for the argument that he 'would have dealt in any event'. It will 
prove to be extremely difficult to establish that the insider indeed wanted to 
exploit the information, ie that he based the transactions on that particular 
piece of information. The courts should therefore take into account that 
someone can make his investment decision by means of information even if 
such information merely confirms facts already known to the insider1222. 
2. Tipees and sub-tipees 
The prohibitions with regard to tipees are laid down in § 14(2) WpHG1223 
according to which it is forbiden for a third party ' ... to acquire or dispose 
of insider ~ecurities for his own account or on account of another or on 
behalf of another by exploiting such knowledge'. 
Hence tipees are not prohibited from passing on the information, although 
the Directive, in its Article 6, opened up the possibility of extending the 
disclosure and encouragement offences to tipees. 
1221 Cf the 'closed circles' defence in the English law. 
1222 With regards to this suggestion see the approach of the Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers in its Statement on Johnson&Firth Brown Ltd/Dunford& Elliot Ltd, 23 Dec 
1976 at 5 referred to by Rider op cit at 831 fn 7. The Panel adopted a similar view in 
that decision. 
1223 Based on Art 4 of the Diretive. 
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II. Defences 
Apparently there are no defences available. Merely transactions effected by 
reason of monetary or currency policy or by reason of the administration 
of the public debt are exempted.1224 Also, the disclosure offence is by 
definitionl225 limited to situations where the disclosure happens without 
authorisation.1226 
As we have seen, the general requirements under the German penal and 
·criminal procedural laws protect the insider at least as well as he may be 
protected under the English defences. If, for instance, it is 'reasonable for 
someone to carry out transactions', although he is in possession of market 
information (in the English law this is a defence), he would probably not 
have 'wanted to exploit' his knowledge and would therefore not meet the 
German requirem~nt needed for conviction. The protection of financial 
services people in Germany and England appears to be much the same. 
Yet some specific defences which are available under the English law, are 
missing. Firstly, the market maker defence, which is regrettable given his 
importance for the securities markets. It must be borne in mind though, that 
the trading system in Germany (the so-called 'auction system') differs 
somewhat from the English trading system on capital markets: there are no 
market makers, the system is exclusively based on official brokers. His 
official duties include the carrying out of a trade at his own risk so long as 
an order on the other side does not exist. This makes it necessary to provide 
him with a special defence. 
Secondly, there is no defence that can facilitate the accomplishment of 
acquisitions, eg take-overs. The reason for this could be the fact that in 






§ 20 WpHG. 
Cf Art 3(a) of the Directive. 
§ 14(1) No 2. 
Mertens, 'Forderung von, Schutz vor, Zwang zu Dbernahmeangeboten', AG 1990, 
252 et seq. 
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III. Evaluating remarks 
1. The offences 
The most difficult problem for the prosecution is to show that the insider 
was 'exploiting his knowledge'. Unlike the English law, this requirement of 
the Directive was transposed into the German domestic law without taking 
into account the difficulties it creates for the prosecution. It is submitted 
that this element considerably reduces the effectiveness of the prohibitions. 
Without any further assistance given to the prosecution it is likely that 
people who are skilled in financial matters will escape, for they are able to 
f umish reasons other than being in possession of the inside information for 
carrying out a transaction in the 'affected' security. 
Passing on the information enlarges the potential dangers of the misuse of 
inside data on securities markets. If one wants to protect the functioning of 
these markets, tipees should be prohibited not only from 'dealing', but also 
from procuring and counselling. It was therefore suggested that the 
provision should be extended so as to include tipping by tipe~s1228, as it was 
mentioned by Art 6 of the European Directive. 
2. The defences 
There are no particular defences under the German law on insider trading. 
The strict interpretational limitation to the objective wording of the 
prohibition, and the necessity for the prosecution to prove all the requisite 
elements (without any facilitation as provided, for instance, in the South 
African law), balance this out. 
1228 See Crystal and Atherton. 'United Kingdom'. in: Gaillard op cit. 171 at 211. 
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Chapter 5: Sanctions 
We have examined the elements of inside information, and what the insider 
is prohibited to do once he is in possession of iq.side information. What 
remains to be considered is the question of which sanctions are appropriate. 
A. Sanctions under the South African statutes 
In South Africa, the present legislation has brought about some major 
changes to the previous systems of sanctions and remedies. Apart from 
increasing the maximum fines, a statutory civil remdy has been created. 
This follows the trend in other countries, such as the US, where the relevant 
authorities have shown a more concerned attitude to both the policing and 
the punishment of insider trading.1229 
I. Criminal sanction 
The penalty for insider trading is now a fine not exceeding R500.000 or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or both such fine and 
such imprisonment.1230 
Compared to the pre-existing penalty of a fine not exceeding RS.000 or 
imprisonment not exceeding a period of two years this seems to be 
dramatically stricter. Yet, considering the enormous rewards which can be 
gained from insider trading, it may appear doubtful whether the penalty is 
sufficiently heavy to provide the necessary deterrent.1231 Botha1232 points 
out that the placing of a ceiling on the amount of the fine might not be 
realistic if a fine is to serve as an effective deterrent. He suggests a 
harmonisation with the penalty provisions of the Income Tax Act which 
provide for additional 'penalty taxes'1233. Besides, one must bear in mind 
that courts hardly ever impose maximum fines. 
1229 Botha, 'Increased maximum fine for insider trading: A realistic and effective 
deterrent?', ( 1990) 107 SAU 504 at 504. 




Jooste op cit at 599. 
Botha op cit at 508. 
Botha, idem at 508. 
305 
Only the future will tell whether the obligation to furnish certain 
information to the Panel, in particular when a person becomes the 
beneficial owner of 10% of the equity security of quoted companies, 1234 is 
an effective means of detection; for one of the pricipal purposes of the 
disclosure appears to be to show the relationship in time of any dealings by 
those required to make disclosure to any particular public announcement of 
price-sensitive inf ormation.1235 
II. Civil remedy 
Given the traditional problems concerning civil liability for insider trading 
under the common law,1236 the legislature considered it necessary, in order 
to create a civil remedy against insiders, to provide a statutory-based 
remedy. The new s 440F( 1) of the Companies Act provides that any person 
who contravenes the criminal provisions is liable to any other person for 
any loss or damage suffered by that person as a result of such 
contravention. 1237 
A different question is whether or not the contract between investor and 







Jooste op cit at 599; Henochsberg op cit at 981. 
That is the interminable story of Percival v Wright, 2 CH 421; see Rider, 'Percival v 
Wright - per incuriam' (1977) 40 Modem Law Review at 471; see, however, for a 
completely different approach Y oran, 'Insider trading in Israel and England', 
Jerusalem, 1972 at 23 et seq., who is of the opinion that a court would have ample 
grounds to distinguish on the facts because the shareholders did not suffer any 
damages in Percival v Wright. The present writer is of the opinion that civil remedies 
are inappropriate because, economically, the insider does not harm other investors. 
Nevertheless, Y oran's view is probably correct because in Percival v Wright the 
transactions were not carried out on impersonal stock markets. In South Africa, 
however, they still stick to a very conservative interpretation of the Percival decision. 
For instance, the view that a director has a direct fiduciary relationship with the 
shareholders is expressed by Engelbrecht, 'Towards a basis of liability for insiper 
directors in South Africa', Master dissertation UCT, 1994 at 39 et seq. 
Sec. 440F(4)(a). 
See for this subpoint Botha, 'The legal status of an insider-dealing contract', (1992) 
4 SA Mere U 83. 
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will not be declared void unless such was the intention of the legislature. 
Voidability is the rule in the case of a contract in violation of a statute 
which imposes a criminal sanction.1239 It would seem that the main intention 
of the law is to reduce the frequency of insider trading, and not to render 
void contracts which involve insider dealing. Thus the better view is that 
contracts on the stock exchange are not unenforceable by reason only of the 
criminal off ence.1240 
Sec. 440F(a) of the Companies Act (ie the prohibition of insider trading), 
applies to both dealings on Stock Exchanges and private dealings. The 
reason for this is that s 440F(4)(b) runs 'in case of dealings in a security on 
a stock exchange or a financial market ... '. This means that subsection (a) 
does necessarily include both types of dealings. This dissertation is 
exclusively about dealings on Stock Exchanges and we shall therefore not 
consider private dealings. 
The civil remedy may cause great difficulties. Firstly, one must establish a 
link of causality1241 between the insider transaction and the damage 
suffered. Secondly, it has to be considered what actually constitutes the 
damage.1242 These problems have been dealt with at length in Part I, so that 
a brief description of the main problems is sufficient here. 
Economic research suggests that the price shift caused by individual insider 
trading is practically zero, because the demand curve for any given stock is 
likely to be perfectly elastic over a very wide range. The damage can 
therefore not have been caused by the insider, but must have been caused by 
something else. Economic research suggests that the price shift happens due 
to certain signals on stock markets (ie signals that insiders are present). 
Take, for example, the dealer who would not have sold his option had he 
known that positive information was about to be released by the company. 
The only thing that would have prevented him from dealing would have 





Metro Western Cape (Pty) Ltd v Ross 1986 (3) SA 181 (A) at 188 F-H per Boshoff 
JA. 
Botha op cit (1992 Mere LJ) at 86 et seq., quoting Knox J in Chase Manhatten 
Equities Ltd v Goodman & others. the reference being [1991] BCLC 8(J7 at 933. 
See for instance Jooste op cit at 603. 
See above, Part I. 
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wrongful act that causes the damage is keeping silence, not, however, 
insider trading. Hence it must be established that the insider was under a 
duty to disclose - and that will lead us exactly to where we were under 
Percival v Wright, ie the necessity to establish such a duty which simply 
does not exist in anonymous dealings on exchange floors. 
Taking into account the economic finding 1243 that, on impersonal markets, 
the gain of the insider does not reflect the loss of the outsider, the civil 
remedy is altogether inappropriate. It is submitted that the statutory civil 
remedy newly created by the South African law is a paper tiger.1244 
Also, what would really be left to be found out in a civil law suit which has 
not previously been found in a criminal proceeding? The civil aspect of the 
whole issue is in fact a minor one. Nevertheless, the view that civil 
sanctions should be imposed is expressed quite frequently.1245 
There is a certain 'argument' (it is submitted that this is a vague feeling 
rather than a substantial argument) which is truly at the base of the 'wish' to 
create a civil remedy. Jooste1246 has put this rather emotional approach into 
words: it 'seems undeniable' that if insider dealing on an exchange market is 
made a criminal offence, it is also 'wrongful' at civil law. 
But is this the correct premise? It is argued that there is no logical necessity 
to regard something as wrongful at civil law simply because the same act is 
a criminal offence. l;'he exchange floor is a public space where everybody 
offers or demands securities rather than a place where a number of 
individual dealings are carried out. Investors in this public space want a 
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enforcement', 15 Comp Lawy 1994, 92 at 96. 
See, for instance, Naylor op cit (The use of criminal sanctions) at 90~ see also 
McVea op cit (Bus Law)~ see also King Report op cit. 
Op cit at 602. 
Schiereck and Weber, 'Parkett, IBIS oder London - Die Priiferenzen institutioneller 
Investoren', 11/96 Die Bank 654, state that fair pricing is one of the most important 
criteria for institutional investors when they decide in which country, and on which 
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functioning of that market. Individual dealings do not really occur because, 
in most cases, offer and demand do not match, for example someone offers 
2.000 shares and 'finds' 100 persons each of them buying 20 of the shares. 
They would not meet in a face-to-face situation, but only in a public space 
like the stock exchange. It is obvious that this public space is protected by 
the criminal sanction. The Directive, for instance, assumes that the 
functioning of the market depends on investors' confidence. The underlying 
concept is that people invest because they feel safer in a public space 
without insiders. This safety is guaranteed by the criminal sanctions. If our 
hypothesis ie that insider trading is economically neutral is true, there is no 
need to create any kind of civil liability for insiders. At least there would 
not be no reason to think that one must regard insider trading as a wrongful 
act at civil law, too. 
B. No sanctions provided in the European Directive 
There are no specific remedies provided in the Directive. This question was 
open to the Member States. The Directive merely says in Art 13: 
'Each member state shall determine the penalties to be applied for 
infringement of the measures taken pursuant to this Directive. The 
penalties shall be sufficient to promte compliance with those measures.' 
We shall now consider the sanctions provided by the two Member States 
whose insider laws have been discussed. The English legislation provides 
rather draconian sanctions. 
Stock Market, they are going to invest (others are: comfort offered by the trading 
system, fast and cheap carrying out of their orders). 
1248 This view is supported by the US Supreme Court in Basic, Inc v Levinson, 485 US 
224 (1988) holding that 'an investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the 
market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price'. See also Khama op cit 
(corporate criminal liability) at 1520 who, correctly, says that public enforcement is 
preferable when victims are not identifiable - which is the case with insider trading. 
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C. England 
The only sanction provided by the Criminal Justice Act 1993 is a criminal 
one. Despite calls for a change in 1990, the Government announced that it 
intended to retain the criminal law as the primary tool . of enforcement 
against insider dealing and this is reflected in the present legislation.1249 
Any individual guilty of insider dealing shall be liable 
(i) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to 
both; 1250 or 
(ii) on conviction on indictment, to a fine or imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding seven years or to both.1251 
The maximum jail sentence had already been raised from two years to 
seven in 1988 by s 48 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The same statutory 
maximum fine is provided bys 6l(l)(b) of the CJA 1993. Yet, since 1980 
only one convicted insider has gone to jail (and then only for a period of 
nine months).1252 The impact of that amendment seems limited because, 
without application, the deterrent effect of a sanction remains vague. 
There is no civil remedy. No contract is void or unenforceable by reason 
only of s 52 of the CJA 1993 (ie the offence of insider trading).1253 Civil 
liability may, however, be possible under s 62 of the FSA 1986 for breach 






Hannigan op cit at 117~ for an instructive comparison with the US securities laws see 
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Fishman, 'A comparison of enforcement of securities law violations in the UK and 
DS', 14 Comp Lawy 1993 at 163. 
Sec. 6l(l)(a). 
Sec. 6l(l)(b). 
Hannigan op cit at 117. 
Sec. 63(2). This was not quite the position under the old Act, cf s 8(3) of the CSA 
1985 in which was provided that 'no transaction is void or voidable by reason only 
that it was entered into in contravention of s 1, 2, 4 or 5 (ie insider dealing)'. Knox J 
found that s 8(3) meant to prevent the disruption of completed Stock Exchange 
transactions, cf [1991] BCLC 897. Where this was not the case the contract was 
considered unenforceable because there had been a case of insider trading. 
1254 For the implications of s 62 see -Poser op cit (International securities regulation) at 
293 et seq.~ see also MacNeil, 'FSA 1986: Does s 62 provide an effective remedy 
for breaches of Conduct of Business Rules?', 15 Comp Lawy 1994 at 172: 
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D. Germany 
The German legislation also opted for criminal sanctions which are 
provided in § 38 W pHG: 
Any person who 
1. acquires or disposes of an insider security contrary to the 
statutory prohibition under § 14 sub-paragraph 1 No 1 (ie insider 
dealing) or sub-paragraph 2 (ie tipee dealing), 
2. passes on or makes available an insider fact contrary to § 14 sub-
paragraph 1 No 2 (ie communicating the information), or 
3. recommends the acquisition or disposal of an insider security 
contrary to § 14 sub-parragraph 1 No 3 (ie recommending on the 
basis of inside information) 
is liable to imprisonment of up to five years or a fine. 
The law further provides that 'the above shall include any act contrary to an 
equivalent prohibition abroad'.1255 This means that an act committed by an 
insider, which contravenes an insider trading prohibition of another 
European country, falls under the German sanction. For instance, insider 
dealing committed by a German resident on a foreign Stock Exchange ( eg 
Paris Stock floor) is contrary to the German law - irrespective of whether 
the French authorities pursue the case or not. 
It does not seem possi hie to impose both a jail sentence and a fine upon the 
convicted. _It is, however, possible to strip the insider of all his profits;1256 
if he is sentenced to jail, he will certainly not keep his profit. The system 
seems to work quite efficiently now. The first two 'Strafbef ehle' (ie penal 
order, a special procedure without trial under the German Penal law) 
imposed fines of DM 540.000,-1257 and DM 600.000,-1258. '(his should help 





§ 38(2) WpHG, 
§§ 73-75 StGB, 
See FAZ Nr. 280, 1.12.1995 at p 32. 
Against Harald Kronseder (member of the family who owns Krones AG). see FAZ 
Nr. 192, 19.8.1995 'Erste GeldbuBe wegen Insiderhandels'. 
1259 Until 13th Octl)ber there were already 15 insider cases, see FAZ Nr. 239, 
14,10.1995 at p 23. Altogether some 44 cases have been dealt with until 5th June 
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with 59 insider cases, four of which resulted in a conviction.1260 
However, under the present German Penal law it would seem impossible to 
impose an order on the convicted individual, for instance a manager or 
director, which disqualifies him from the execution of certain professional 
tasks for a period of time. In order to impose such a disqualification order 
it would be necessary for the convicted director to have used his position so 
as to pursue goals which are contrary to his professional duties while he 
was executing such duties. In other words the indictable offence must be a 
result of the fulfilment of the tasks.1261 
Trading on insider information is, however, not typical of professional 
tasks because tipees and subtipees who are not inside a company can deal on 
it as well.1262 Yet, as the English case law has revealed, such disqualification 
orders can constitute very effective deterrents. It would therefore seem 
advisable for the German legislator to provide for such a 'side'-sanction, 
once the insider has been convicted. 
It is also an issue of interest whether or not the prohibitions laid on insider 
dealing give rise to civil remedies provided by the general civil law .1263 
Civil sanctions are in fact not to be imposed on the insider under the 
German law, because the insider does not cause harm to other investors.1264 
A further question is whether or not a contract not entered into on a stock 
exchange would be void or voidable because one of the parties to the 
contract was in possession of inside information. This problem is caused by 
the fact that the WpHG apparently applies to face-to-face dealings as well as 
to dealings on stock markets. This extension is surely not in accordance 
with the European Directive which, in its preamble, says that the intention 
of the European legislation is to protect the functioning of the secondary 
markets. However, § 1 WpHG says that 'this Act shall apply to trading in 
1996, see 'Die Welt' 5.6.1996 at p 13. 
1260 See the article 'Prachtige Auftragslage bei der Untersuchung von Insiderhandel', 
FAZ Nr. 82, 9.4.1997 at p 25. 
1261 RG St 68, 97~ BGH St 22, 144~ BGH BeschluB of 12 Sep 1994 - 5 StR 487/94 
(LG Limburg), NStZ 1995 at 124. 
1262 The question whether the latter is an appropriate sanction or not, as well as the 
problem of which period such a disqualification order should not exceed will be dealt 
with further on. 
1263 Assmann op cit at 525 thinks that this is the case. 
1264 Tippach op cit at 47 et seq. 
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securities and derivatives, both on and off the stock exchange ... .'. 
It is submitted that this extension is not only contrary to the intention of the 
Directive, but is also not reconcilable with the differences between face-to-
face dealings and dealings on impersonal markets. It is also submitted that 
section 1 of the WpHG should be amended so as to exclude face:..to-face 
situations from the insider trading prohibitions. 
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Part III: Towards a Model Code 
Having examined both the economic implications of insider dealing and the 
legal solutions offered by three different laws, we shall now consider how 
to incorporate our findings in a legal model. The aim is to suggest what a 
Model Code of insider trading should take into consideration. To this effect 
both legal and economic findings need to be taken into account. 
Chapter 1: Economic findings and a Model Code 
Before one can start to formulate legal provisions it is essential to clarify 
the economic hypotheses upon which a Model Code is based. This helps 
define both the legal concept and the actual provisions. 
A. Incorporating economic findings 
First of all, we must ask ourselves how economic findings can be 
incorporated in a Model Code. As we have seen, there are persistent doubts 
as to whether insider dealing should actually be regulated ie prohibited and, 
if so, whether regulation should be based on a statutory criminal sanction. 
All modern economic approaches accept that the investor does not suffer 
much losses due to insider trading. The individual investor does not need 
extensive legal protection. Attention focuses therefore on the attempt to 
maximise social welfare through regulation. This aim is manyf old, and 
amongst its most significant components are the protection of allocational 
functions of the market and the enhancement of price efficiency. 
I. Overall economic findings: uncertainty prevails 
The most important economic finding is that there is no evidence that 
insider trading is in any respect economically harmful. None of the 
examined theories came to the conclusion that insider trading as such is 
economically detrimental to individual investors or to the performance of 
markets. On the contrary, some of the theories explicitly stated that insider 
trading is beneficial for both shareholders and markets. 
Economic theory suggested, too, that the strict prohibitions imposed on 
insiders are the result of the influence of certain interest groups eg the 
financial services industry. This finding was confirmed by our examination 
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of some existing laws, particularly the English law on insider trading. 
Altogether, the provisions discussed lacked a coherent approach to the issue 
of economic theory. The theoretical models that the provisions are based 
upon remain very vague. Yet, as we have seen, a Model Code ought to be 
based on certain economic assumptions. The clarification reached by this 
preliminary work will facilitate the application of the law. It will also 
facilitate the task of revising its provisions, once economic research has 
yielded more convincing theoretical models. 
Taking the economic doubts into consideration one is forced to think that 
de-regulation rather than regulation is inevitably a better solution to the 
problem of insider trading. One economic approach that has been dealt with 
in this examination is based on the premise that the parties involved (ie 
manager insiders and outsider shareholders) should be given the option of 
solving the problem on a contractual basis within the company, rather than 
relying on statutory provisions. The idea behind this suggestion is derived 
from the agency debate in economic literature. Its underlying assumption is 
that, despite certain differences between juristic and economic 
terminologies, managers are the agents of the shareholders. 
A contractual solution may provide managers with further incentives to 
produce valuable information, and thus indirectly enhance the benefits of 
the shareholder principals. This model suggests that companies should be 
given the option to 'opt out' of the regulation. In doing so it reflectis a 
much more pluralistic, 'democratic' approach towards insider trading. 
1. Contracts between managers and shareholders 
Contracts between managers and owners of a company (within the articles 
of the company) could permit insiders to trade on inside knowledge if both 
information and trading are closely related to their management tasks. In 
exchange, managers would have to accept reductions in salary. These 
reductions would, of course, have to be in line with the expected insider 
trading profits. In order to provide the manager with some security, it may 
be necessary to cut the salary less than by the expected gains. In the case of 
opting out, the company's shares would no longer be monitored. Because 
the company will not have to pay for monitoring, transaction costs will be 
reduced, and hence the company's (ie shareholders') profit be increased. 
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Some doubts have been raised about to the feasibility of such contracts.1265 
What would happen, for instance, if the insider cannot make up for the 
reduction in salary, because the information did not yield as much profit on 
the market as the parties had expected (so-called 'ex-post settling-problem'). 
But the same kind of problem is present in other situations, too. Take, for 
example, agreements about additional rewards for a good performance by a 
company, or bonus stocks agreed upon in case the share price stays above a 
pre-fixed limit. By their very nature these contracts have to be re-
negotiated every now and then, at least on the premise of an implied 
clausula rebus sic stantibus. One can therefore assume that managers and 
companies are able to solve the this problem in the insider trading context. 
It is submitted that all these difficulties are minor and, can therefore be left 
to the parties involved. 
2. Agency contracts and financial markets 
The economic uncertainty about insider trading requires a flexible legal 
approach. At this stage, markets lack experience of how these contractual 
solutions work. Such a system should therefore not be 'prescribed' all of a 
sudden and in one go, but has to be introduced with care during a transition 
process. A proper democratic approach should the ref ore provide a 
regulatory system, and at the same time allow firms to opt out should they 
prefer the contractual solution. During the transition process more 
empirical data will be gathered and one would get the necessary feedback 
from all parties concerned: shareholders, firms, managers, brokers, market 
makers, small investors, banks, and financial consultants. Thus, at the 
moment, a Model Code should off er a choice between regulation and 
deregulation, rather than put forward a presciption to opt out. This would 
grant the maximum of alternatives. 
1265 See, for instance, Davidson and Solomon op cit at 88. Another point has been made 
by Schotland op cit at 1451, who says that insiders might be distracted from single-
minded devotion to their work for the corporation. With respect, I doubt this, 
because in competitive markets insiders must react very quickly to beat the market, 
and will thus spend very little time on their trading opportunities. 
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II. 'Opting out' and moral hazard 
The legislative method currently in use provides more and more 
restrictions. However, even increasingly severe punitive measures have not 
effectively deterred insider trading. Our conclusion is that the time has 
come to modify the method rather than individual provisions. Elements of 
deregulation are needed, and companies should have permission to opt out 
of the present regulatory system. Efficiency might be improved by 
deregulation rather than by stricter controls. 
It is necessary to consider some issues concerning firms which do opt out. 
Most doubts have been raised with regard to 'moral hazard'. It has been 
suggested in the literature that insiders should not receive any bonus other 
than shares of their companies until they own a certain percentage of the 
company.1266 The intention behind this is to create responsibilities and at the 
same time to diminish the conflict of interest between principal and agent. 
However, this would not seem to be an appropriate means of 
accomplishing this aim. Today, managers no longer stay with the same 
company for their entire working lives. Hence they are neither able nor 
willing to l,,uild up large blocks of shares of their companies. Many firms 
have simply become too big. How long, for example, would it take the 
manager to get a block of Daimler Benz shares? 
In order to prevent the manager from dealing on the strength of negative 
information (moral hazard), it is suggested that companies should prohibit 
the manager (again by contract) from 'going short' or carrying out so-
called 'empty' sales. Both are sales where the person who sells does not yet 
have the shares, but expects to buy them at a lower price (ie after the public 
announcement of negative information) before he has to deliver them to the 
buyer. Apart from this contractual clause, it is generally more likely that 
control markets for managers ensure that 'moral hazard' does not occur. 
Also, given the tendency of worldwide conglometarisation, it is pointless to 
try to solve the problem of the separation of ownership and control via such 
a restriction in the context of insider trading. The above suggestion to grant 
permission to trade only when managers have reached a certain percentage 
1266 See also Schneider op cit (DB) at 1435~ alternatively, companies could allow 
managers to own, but not to trade their companies' shares, see also Carlton and 
Fischel op cit at 865. 
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of ownership has to be rejected. Only short sales should be prohibited. 
III. Economics of regulation 
The overall economic uncertainty surrounding insider trading makes it 
necessary to allow firms to opt out of the regulatory system. Economic 
findings ought also to be taken into account for the insider trading 
prohibitions that are maintained for firms which prefer to stick to the 
traditional regulatory system. These prohibitions need not necessarily be 
based on the agency approach. 
It was found in Part I that the fiduciary approach to insider dealing ought 
to be discarded because, for the stock markets, there is often no real 
difference between primary and secondary insiders (ie 'tipees'). What 
consequence does this have for insider trading prohibitions? Trades by 
secondary insiders can affect the market in the same way as primary insider 
dealing. Secondary traders should therefore be included in the legal 
definition of 'the insider'. It is necessary to mould the definition sufficiently 
broadly to cover both groups. 
Another important contribution which economic theory makes to the legal 
problem concerns the definition of the key element of 'non-public'. In this 
respect it was found that 'non-public' needs to be brought in line with the 
disclosure rules. Information released on ticker tape or made available in 
any other way to the capital market has to be regarded as 'public'. Thus, 
within the regulatory part of a Model Code, no one should be prohibited 
from dealing on the strength of information that has been published 
according to disclosure rules, or has been released of ticker tape. 
Economic theory also suggests that market information ought to be included 
in the definition of inside information. Since share prices incorporate both 
types of data, ie information indogenous and exoge9-ous to the company, the 
market can be affected by dealing on either of them. Future law must take 
this into consideration and explicitly include market information in the 
definition of inside information. 
Our discussion of economic theory has also yielded the conclusion that the 
production of negative information which can cause 'moral hazard' is 
extremely important. This is also true from the point of view of an 
ordinary investor who is less troubled by a gain (based on positive 
information) which he was unable not realise than by alleged losses caused 
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by late disclosure of negative information. This needs to be taken into 
consideration. Companies may have an interest that none of their managers 
deals on negative information. Even if these companies wish to opt out, they 
might still want their securities to be monitored with regard to negative 
information. This additional option should be granted by a Model Code. Of 
course, if companies wish that their shares are monitored, they have to pay 
a certain amount towards the monitoring costs. 
In the following chapter we shall now discuss what results from the legal 
analysis in which we have applied the above economic findings. This step is 
necessary for our aim, which is to suggest what model insider trading 
provisions ought to take into account. 
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Chapter 2: Results from the comparative examination 
In all three countries the present legislation reflects a transitional process 
between old insider concepts such as 'fairness' or 'morality' and new 
approaches, which seek to ensure market protection. But none of the 
examined laws is based on a clear concept. 
A. Conceptual shortcomings 
Above all, the three laws do not make it clear the economic hypotheses on 
which they are based. Their provisions are also not in line with modern 
economic findings, to say the least. One finds lots of positive-sounding, but 
rather abstract policies such as 'investor protection', 'functioning of the 
market', or 'investor confidence'. But these policies are not really reflected 
by the provisions. 'Investor protection', for instance, is still interpreted as 
absence of individual 'harm' which is allegedly caused by insider 
transactions. Hence the superfluous attempt to create (South Africa) or 
discuss (Europe, England, and Germany) civil remedies against insiders. 
The first thing that a Model Code ought to state clearly is the policy it 
pursues, and the way in which this policy is to be interpreted. 
I. Legal concepts and definitions 
From unclear legal concepts follow vague legal definitions of key elements 
of insider trading. For instance, most of the provisions relating to 'tipees' 
are defective. In the German legislation severe shortcomings with regard to 
the direct insiders is be noted, too. 
II. Market protection approach and a new criterion for the 
definition of the insider 
The most commonly accepted approach to insider trading today is the 
'market protection' approach. But if insider trading prohibitions are to be 
based on the idea of market protection, then this concept needs to be 
clarified. Otherwise it remains vague, and cannot be used in the application 
of the law to individual ca~es. Who, for instance, is an insider in terms of 
market protection? Since the fiduciary concept of defining the insider has 
been discarded, an insider need not owe fiduciary duties to a company. But 
what new criterion must a person meet to be an insider when the intention 
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of the law is to protect the stock markets? First of all we need to discuss 
what market protection actually means. 
A fairly good description of the modern 'market protection' approach can 
be found in the preamble to the Council of Europe's convention on insider 
trading which 
'considers that such behaviour (ie insider dealing) is also proving 
dangerous for the economies of the Member States (ie the allocative 
function of the markets), and in particular for the proper functioning 
of the stock markets; ... '. 
Even though the examined laws take 'market protection' as their starting 
point, their provisions are not in line with it. The different laws are either 
based on individualistic (see civil remedies in South Africa) or fairly one-
sided and group interest-oriented concepts (see defences in England). The 
insider provisions in these countries do not really reflect a proper market 
protection approach. 
Market protection can be interpreted in different ways. A Model Code 
ought to prefer one clear interpretation. It ought to formulate provisions 
which are in line with this interpretation. The economic discussion has 
made it abundantly clear that insider prohibitions are not a device to 
enhance prompt disclosure. 'Market protection' as a term underlying 
criminal statutes ought to be more precise and clear. It is submitted that the 
concept of market protection includes the opportunity for companies to opt 
out of the regulatory scheme. Companies opting out must make a public 
announcement of their decision. An investor who does not want to incur the 
risk of trading with an insi~er of such a company, must be able to avoid 
those companies' securities. 
From the perspective of this modern legal market protection approach 
(chosen, for instance, by the Directive), the public goods protected by the 
law are the functioning of the market and its competitiveness on an 
international level. Once fiduciary or misappropriation concepts are 
discarded, it would, however, seem important to introduce a new criterion 
which serves to describe what is necessary for a person to have or to be in 
order to be called an insider. The transactions of a barman, for instance, do 
not really undermine the proper functioning of the stock market. 
One new criterion to define insiders could be that the person does not only 
possess inside information, but must also bear some kind of responsibility 
towards the stock market. All persons who, for instance, systematically 
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produce company or market data which influence the prices in the market, 
can be regarded as having a certain functional responsibility towards this 
market. This includes directors, managers, substantial shareholders, 
bankers, brokers, financial advisors, market makers and other financial 
intermediaries. 
Other people, such as lower-ranked employees and secretaries, lawyers, and 
advisors, as well as most of the recipients of information who are not 
professionals, lack such a responsibility for the market. They do not 
regularly produce information that is incorporated in stock prices. For such 
persons to be regarded as insiders they should be required to meet an 
additional criterion: they should either come into contact with sensitive 
information on a regular basis, or their specific transaction must be so 
important ( eg large amount of shares traded) that it can undermine 
investors' confidence in the functioni'ng of the market. However, in cases 
where it can be established that the impact of that particular dealing by such 
a person was minor, these persons should not be held liable as insiders. The 
famous problem of office-cleaners, taxi-drivers, or the barman overhearing 
a conversation between two executives can be solved on this basis. All these 
people would not be included in a definition of the insider, because they all 
lack responsibilities to the stock market. 
III. Concluding remarks on underlying concepts 
The most complete and detailed law on insider trading is the English. Yet 
the English provisions do not really seem to prohibit insider trading, but to 
protect dealings by securities industry people. This becomes particularly 
clear when one examines the element of 'non-public'. It is provided that 
information is public when those 'likely to deal can readily acquire it'. This 
serves the interest of only one group because bankers and brokers are 
always 'likely to deal', in fact it is their profession. Our democratic 
approach does not exclude the fostering of group interests. It is, however, 
doubtful whether the functioning of the market is best protected when stock 
market professionals feel safe. A Model Code ought to protect the other 
participants' interest (namely those of shareholders and companies) as well. 
A similar imbalance of interests is created by the English 'defences' to 
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allegedly indictable off ences.1267 Many of these defences are designed for 
the purposes of market professionals. Yet most of these defences are 
superfluous. Take, for example, the defence available when the insider 
'would have dealt in any event'. For a conviction it must be established that 
the insider had the intention to exploit informational imbalances. Hence 
there was simply no need for this defence. In this regard the German 
legislature has been far less loquacious. A Model Code ought to rely on 
clear concepts rather than on spelling out every single detail. It seems that 
most defences need not be expressly stated in provisions since they follow 
from a 'normal' understanding of what insider trading is. 
No doubt financial service people contribute to the allocational functions of 
the market. Yet these people are 'outsiders' compared to firm managers 
who produce the actual information. Where the normal outsider can be 
systematically outperformed by other outsiders (ie market professionals), it 
seems likely that he would prefer to be outperformed by real insiders ( eg 
managers), especially if the manager must accept a reduction in salary in 
return. 
The test to be applied to every insider legislation is whether the 
redistributional effects which it produces serve the investors; interests. If 
not, there is not even market protection in the sense that the investor feels 
protected. Yet none of the examined laws· brought about a clear 
redistributional effect in favour of the investor: the civil remedy provided 
by the South African legislation does not work, and the German law does 
not even reveal which public good is protected. All this leads to highly 
inefficient provisions. If efficiency equals justice (see, for instance, the 
Chicago Law School), these laws are not just, because they are not efficient. 
We shall now examine what can be learned from the comparative analysis, 
and how we can incorporate these legal findings in a Model Code. 
1267 For the group theory approach to insider dealing cf Manne op cit (Cato Journal) at 
941 et seq.~ cf also Haddock/Macey op cit at 314. 
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B. The approach to 'inside information' 
The element of inside information is the essential one because, without 
either good or bad news not generally available, there will be no insider 
dealing. A Model Code ought to be clear about the significance of 'inside 
information'. Most laws (for instance the German) still prefer to discuss at 
length who the 'insider' is, rather than accepting that, on principle, all 
persons in possession of inside information are insiders,1268 and that what 
really counts is the scope of the definition of inside information. 
A Model Code ought to make clear that, currently, any insider trading 
prohibition is based on the semi-strong form of the ECMH (ie the 
hypoth~sis that information is not reflected in the prices of securities if it is 
not generally known). As soon as this hypothesis becomes rebuttable it 
would no longer make sense to regulate insider dealing at all. This has 
important implications for the definition of 'non-public'. 
I. Which information shall be included? 
The first issue that has to be dealt with is the types of information that the 
definition should include. The definition must be sufficiently broad so as to 
ban harmful insider trading. Yet it must also take into account the market~s 
need for liquidity. Too broad a conception of information will reduce the 
amount of beneficial trades and thus decrease market efficiency. A Model 
Code ought to avoid such a result. 
The comparison of the three laws has revealed that only information with 
greater significance has to be included. Information is of significance for 
the price development when market participants would normally buy or sell 
on release of that type of information. It is not certain whether the law 
should narrow the scope of the definition eg through the element of 'price-
sensitivity'. It appears that formulations such as 'information which is likely 
to materially affect the price of a security' result in a high degree of 
uncertainty. No one can be sure which information is caught and which not. 
As a result, 'good' trades may be deterred as well. What is needed is a 
1268 It has been suggested to introduce a new criterion for the definition of the insider. ie 
a criterion which relates to responsibilities a person has towards the stock market, 
and no longer to his position in the companies. 
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list1269 of events which are to be regarded as potential inside information. 
The information in such a list can relate to either companies or markets. 
t. Information relating to companies 
It 1s obvious that both good and bad information about companies 
(including the prospects of the company) must to be included. Let us call 
such information 'internal' 9r 'endogenous' data. All three exa,mined laws 
sensibly include such information. Yet none of the laws provides further 
indication as to how to put flesh on the skeleton. All the provisions defining 
inside information remain abstract in the sense that they merely include 
information that 'relates to a company or to companies'. Does this include, 
for instance, a situation where a member of the board falls ill? He can be 
the most important manager, and still the information might not 'relate to a 
company'. 
A Model Code should be more specific. This is also required by economic 
theory that teaches us that there are only few types of information which 
can really be exploited, such as take-over situations or earning 
announcements. It appears to be a good legal. technique to provide a list of 
information that is potential inside information. Sometimes information that 
has· an impact on stock prices might not be caught, because it is not 
contained in the list. However, legal clarity seems preferable; and if 
excluded information is found to be relevant, the list can always be 
extended. 
2. Market information 
The second basic type of information which needs to be included in the 
definition is 'market' information1210. Such data is 'exogenous' to the 
company, but may nevertheless affect the expectations that investors have 
for the future business prospects, or may alter their present estimation of 
the company.1271 Hence such information can have impact on prices and 
1269 Assmann, in Assmann and Schneider op cit at 116 et seq., rightly refers to a 
'catalogue' of relevant information based on the 'Leitfaden' (engl.: orientation help) 
provided by the German Stock Exchange AG. 
127o Tippach (Marktinformation)~ cf Fleischer/Mundheim/ Murphy op cit at 799 et seq. 
1271 The view expressed hereinbefore (see for instance Hannigan op cit at 113) differs 
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should therefore be included in the defintion. The three examined laws 
differ in this regard. The English and the German insider trading laws 
include market data, yet not all types, whereas the South African law does 
not include it at all. 
Take, for example, a recommendation about a stock ( eg by the retail 
department of a bank), which is based on generally available facts.1272 Such 
a recommendation about a company is certainly not endogenous to that 
company. But surely a recommendation can have positive effects on the 
price of the stock and should therefore be regarded as potential inside 
information. But is it market information? 
A different kind of market information was used by Blyth. In SEC v Blyth 
& Co, Inc.1273 a broker obtained non-public information about the terms of 
new government financings from an employee of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia, who had received it from the Treasury. Blyth effected 
transactions in outstanding government securities. Was this a case of insider 
trading? The terms of new government financings are not company 
information. But maybe it was market information. A Model Code should 
be clear about both cases. 
Another problem is posed by take-over situations. Even though some think 
from the defintion which is given by Aeischer et al op cit at 799, who contend that 
market information refers to information about events or circumstances which affect 
the market for a company's securities, not, however, .the company's assets or 
earning power, idem at 799. Those commentator,s think that a recommendation is 
subsumable under the term 'market information'. This is probably correct because 
such a recommendation does not affect the assets of the company. Yet, it is not only 
the market in the securities of the company which is affected. Even if such a 
recommendation results in an increased demand, the CAP model teaches us that this 
would not alter the price if there is no new information about the company. The price 
reaction subsequent to a recommendation is due investors' altered estimation of the 
company. Without new information (or, if the recommendation is exclusively based 
on publicly available information, a new interpretation of the already available 
information) the price would, on the basis of the hypothesis of perfect substitution, 
definitely not change. Hence the definition suggested here is correct. 
1272 Aeischer et al, idem at 799 
1273 See 'In re Blyth & Co, Inc.', SEC Exchange Act Release No 8499 (Jan 17, 1969), 
in [1967/69 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed Sec Law Rep 77,647. 
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that this is the classic inside infomation, the prevailing opinion1274 in the 
literature takes the view that information about take-overs is market 
information because it mainly concerns share transactions. This would have 
major implications for insider trading laws that do not include this type of 
data (eg the South Africa law). This view is, however, not correct. Taking 
into account the fact that every merger produces synergy effects, a take-
over changes the real (or at least the expected) future earning power of a 
company. Also, if the buying company has carried out the research which 
leads to the take-over (which usually happens because the target's shares are 
found to be priced incorrectly ie too low), and such research is part of the 
company's business activities, then it is obvious that the information is 
endogenous to the buying company. 
On which concept1275 should the inclusion of market information be based? 
It would seem possible to base its inclusion on the old fairness approach, 
because it would seem to be equally unfair to deal on superior knowledge 
about market data. But we have discarded the fairness approach because 
insider trading is not per se unfair. One might also want to refer to 
fiduciary principles. In most cases, however, it is impossible to include 
market information on the basis of a fiduciary relationship, because people 
like the employee of the Federal Reserve Bank do not have a fiduciary 
relationship to shareholders.1276 
Only the suggested version of the market protection approach allows us to 
include market information. The above Blyth case can be solved on this 
basis, too. An employee of the Federal Reserve Bank has certain 
responsibilities towards financial markets. He can therefore be regarded as 
an insider. Hence the information stems from an inside source, and the 
person who finally deals on the strength of that information can be 
regarded as a secondary insider and is therefore liable. 
We must also consider whether trading on market information should be 
1274 See Fleischer et al op cit note 138 at 799~ Davies op cit at 248~ but see McVea op cit 
at 70. I have stated elsewhere, why it is correct to assume that take-overs and 
mergers in general are company information, cf Tippach 'Banken' at 196 et seq. 
1275 For a concise overview of the relevant approaches see Scott op cit at 805-815. 
1276 See Chiarella v US, 445 U.S. 222,231 fn 14 (1980), where the view is rejected that 
those who have regular access to market data are insiders by virtue of the access 
alone, without a relationship between parties that creates duties. 
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monitored when companies 'opt out'. Can the managers and shareholders of 
such companies include market data in their agency contract? The problem 
for such a company may be that market insiders benefit from market 
information who are not bound by the contract between managers and 
shareholders. This means that people can profit from insider trading in a 
company's shares even though they have not accepted a reduction in salary. 
On the other hand, the sooner new information is incorporated in the stock 
price the fairer the pricing. All shareholders benefit from this market 
mechanism. Besides, all monitoring is costly. If the company wants to have 
its shares monitored, this gives rise to transaction costs. It is therefore 
suggested that shareholders should prefer that insider trading on market 
information is not prohibited. 
It is yet another question which types of market information should be 
included in the prohibition. Does it make sense to catch all types of market 
information? It is certainly correct to include recommendations and the 
identity of parties who buy or sell, because both data are likely to influence 
prices. The same is true for statistical data relating to crucial sectors of the 
economy eg the car-producing firms in Germany or mining companies in 
South Africa. Important information for these sectors of the industry would 
be export restrictions or the invention of an ~rtificial diamond. These types 
of information affect the expectations of future income streams of 
companies and should therefore be included. 
It is, however, suggested that political data such as the death of a politician 
or the result of elections should not be included in the definition, even 
though they normally have an impact on securities markets. But this kind of 
political data is not per se related to companies or stock markets. It is 
therefore not an inherent or specific risk when investors buy stock (plot 
prices may also lower when an important politician dies). Several 
observations indicate that it is more appropriate to exclude general political 
data. They are exogenous to both companies and markets. 
Also, the word 'insider' connotates a certain degree of institutionalisation of 
his access to information. Insiders are generally persons in positions which 
allow them to systematically exploit inside knowledge. The production of 
such political information cannot, however, be institutionalised. One cannot 
'produce' major events in politics; rather, they happen incidentally from 
time to time. Hence contraventions would only occur irregularly depending 
on the kind of employment of the person using the information. Outsiders 
would therefore not be demoralised by the constant threat to be 
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outperformed by such insi,ders. And possible demoralisation of investor 
confidence is currently the best reason to prohibit insider trading. 
General political information relates to the market as a whole. Thus trading 
· in any security would have to be controlled irrespective of the identity of 
the trader and the quantity of stock traded. This would increase monitoring 
and detecting costs, which is not beneficial for the market. 
Finally, people who work in such positions hold very important 
administrative functions, and they must therefore be reliable, a fact which 
can justify to insert a clause in their contract of employment1277 which 
prohibits them from dealing in shares shortly before the announcement of 
political events. These people are chosen to maintain crucial functions of the 
state and they deserve some trust. And for them, of course, there is no 
possibility to 'opt out' of the regulatory scheme. 
3. List approach instead of 'materiality' 
The examination of the three laws did not provide much clarity in regard to 
the possible contents of inside information. The South African and the 
German laws require for conviction that the insider deals on the basis of the 
information. The English law seems to require for conviction that he deals 
with view to making a profit. Both have to be criticised. Economically, the 
price of any commodity reflects subjectve measurements of a ~ood's 
utility ,1278 Subjective measurement by investors is therefore a mathematical 
function of the information they have about the commodity. In securities 
markets we find that a variety of opinions are present at all times. Hence 
heterogenous expectations prevail. 
We do not have an economic model which explains how prices adjust under 
the premise that investors have heterogenous expectations. In other words, 
we do not know what a specific investor~s reaction to information looks 
like. The ref ore, if the definition of the information is vague, the courts will 
be unable to identify the piece of information upon which the insider's 
intention to buy or sell was based. And as long as the information upon 
which the insider based his deal cannot be identified, his 'guilt' cannot be 
1277 Barry op cit at 1374 asserts that most government employment contracts specifically 
proscribe use of official information for personal gain. 
1278 Manne op cit (Cato Journal) at 935. 
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proved. Hence the unhappy attempts under the US insider prohibition to 
apply different forms of a 'reasonable man' test to explain why information 
is supposedly material. As we have seen, the 'reasonable man' tests give too 
much discretion to the courts, and therefore create too much insecurity for 
insiders and other traders. Economically, this insecurity results in less 
tradings and decreases the liquidity of the market. 
A Model Code ought to exclude inside information of minor importance 
because trading on such information would be too difficult to detect and 
hence contraventions too difficult to prove. The law should rather provide a 
list of supposedly major events. If one of these events occurs, that will 
suffice to establish that the insider had the information before he dealt. He 
may then raise defences such as 'the information did not have the potential 
to produce relevant price shifts'; but the burden of proof would be upon the 
insider and no longer on the prosecution. 
Today, all laws on insider trading try to achieve the exclusion of less 
important information by adding the requirement of 'material' or 
'materially affect the price'. But how is one to interpret such formulations? 
Normally, no guidance is given by the legislation. The result is that 
subjective views prevail in the judicial practice, even though they may be 
disguised in the objective term of the 'reasonable investor'. 
The English Act sensibly provides that 'inside information' includes 
information which relates to the value of the enterprise. Thus, there is no 
need to establish that the information is (or was expected to be) material for 
the price development. It suffices that the information as such is important 
for the (value of the) company. This approach is good because it results in 
more security. It is also beneficial for the legal analysis, because one does 
not get bogged down in the 'discussion of percentage' like, for instance, 
under the German law. The English law provides a much more pragmatic 
approach in this regard. A Model Code ought to take this into consideration 
and provide a list with important information. The materiality requirement 
should be left out altogether. Information is material in this sense when it is 
contained in such a list. 
Another question is whether or not the law should require an actual price 
shift. None of the examined laws provide for such a requirement. This is 
correct because it is to the insider's benefit if all price shifts have occurred 
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due to derivatively informed trading1279 ( or other insider trading), so that 
he can re-sell the stock before the information is even announced. A 
consequence of that might be that the price does not change at all on 
disclosure, and the insider would not have contravened the law, even though 
he may have realised a huge profit. As long as we assume that insiders are 
acting in the markets, the price shift 'potential'1280 (as opposed to actual 
price shifts) is all we have to look at. Otherwise the regulation would create 
an incentive for the insider to encourage others to deal: because the more 
dealings that take place before the announcement, the smaller the actual 
price shift on day 'X' when the public announcement is finally made. 
For these reasons it is suggested that, instead of applying abstract 
formulations such as 'likely to materially affect prices', the law ought to 
provide a precise list of -what constitutes relevant inside information. From 
an economic point of view this sugge~tion is supported by empirical 
evidence, since it was reported 1281 that more than 80% of all SEC insider 
trading cases involve trading immediately before corporate take-overs and 
earnings announcements. The reason for this may be that it is easier to 
prove insider offences if these major events occur. Taking this into account, 
a Model Code should at least include in a list-definition of inside 
information: take-overs; mergers; the most relevant market data; earning 
anncouncements; and information related to the capital of a company. 
1279 See in particular Givoly/Palmon op cit, who suggest that the insider produces price 
effects through his presence on the market rather than through the information itself. 
1280 See from the point of view of a German economist the very interesting article by 
Loistl, 'Empirisch fundierte Messung kursrelevanter Tatsachen', Die Bank 1995 232 
at 234 et seq. 
1281 Dooley op cit; see also Seyhun op cit. 
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II. The element of 'non-public' 
'Inside' as opposed to 'made public' is used quite frequently in insider 
dealing laws, but on closer examination the term proves to be circular 
because one does simply not find 'inside' information that has already been 
made public. Vice versa, there is no public information which is at the same 
time still inside. A difference between 'not made public' and 'inside' is very 
hard or even impossible to conceive. Only non-public information can 
affect the price of a security. It can be argued that the element of 'non-
public' does not really add anything significant to the term of 'inside' 
information. Defining inside information by reference to information 
which has been made public, appears tautological. 
Economically, if information no longer yields profits to the dealers in 
shares and options, it is no longer inside.1282 But when would that be? We 
simply do not know. We must concede that every definition of the element 
of non-public necessarily produces some uncertainty. The second best 
alternative is then to define this element very precisely and minimise 
uncertainty. Uncertainty is always a hindrance-factor to the efficiency of 
the market.. The definition should therefore be designed in such a way that 
it permits a maximum of beneficial trades. 
As we have seen, the ideal of equal distribution of information amongst 
investors is unachievable. Therefore, there is most probably no need to 
allow for extra-time to digest the news after publication. 
Our discussion of the economics of insider trading has also yielded the 
conclusion that there is a substantial likelihood that outsiders, on an 
average, lose to market professionals. But one has to accept that this is part 
of the general economic structure on share and option markets. 
Professionals have a quicker access to new information. A Model Code of 
insider trading should therefore not try to erase these profits. Where 
shareholders opt out, and thereby deliberately redistribute expected trading 
profits to their insider managers, they would at least know who is making 
these profits. And these 'real' insiders are able to trade long before the 
announcement of the news, a fact which prevents hectic price movements 
shortly before announcements. Such price movements are usually caused by 
secondary insiders who come and buy or sell all at once. 
1282 See R. Schmidt op cit (Aktienkursprognose) at 172. 
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A clearcut definition needs to be found. This was also confirmed by various 
economic theories such as the neo-classical 'freedom approach'. According 
to this economic theory only clear legal definitions enhance freedom. It is 
suggested that the clearest distinction between 'public' and 'non-public' can 
be made at the time of disclosure. Disclosure is understood here in the sense 
of 'disclosed in a legal way' ie according to official disclosure 
requirements. Once the information is published according to the general 
publishing rules, it is no longer 'inside' in terms of the insider prohibition. 
A Model Code ought to define 'non-public' as follows: if the release of the 
information is effected through a company's announcement office on the 
stock market, the information is regarded as published when it comes in on 
ticker tape and is available for those who have access to a ticker. The same 
should apply to data coming in on ticker through the information net. 
This definition should further apply to information published on any stock 
exchange on which the security is traded, because the price adjustment 
process takes place all over the world. If, for instance, information relevant 
for Daimler Benz is published in New York according to the requirements 
of the NYSE, the information should also be 'public' in the German market. 
The English law on insider trading information 'may be treated as public' if 
it is published outside the United Kingdom.1283 This does not take into 
account that traders and markets are connected worldwide, and that price 
adjustment happens quickly no matter on which stock exchange information 
is published. Also, in many cases companies have to publish the information 
on all markets where their shares are traded. 
A Model Code should not further enhance the trading benefits of market 
professionals by extending the scope of information that may or might 'be 
treated' as public. According to the English definition of 'non-public', for 
instance, information may also be treated as public where it can be acquired 
only by persons exercising diligence. 1284 If these exceptional circumstances 
are applied throughout, this will result in a kind of exemption for market 
professionals - given that the definition of 'non-public' is already quite 
favourable for these market professionals. The trading prohibition would 
redistribute wealth from the shareholder to financial service people. In that 
event shareholders should definitely decide to opt out. 
1283 
1284 
Sec. 58 (3) (e) of the Criminal Justice Act 1993. 
Sec. 58 (3) (a) CJA 1993. 
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Further elements, such as 'precise' or 'specific' are not necessary for a 
definition of non-public information. If the information is not 'clear' or 
'specific', for instance, investors will interpret it in different ways and thus 
the price adjustment process will happen slowly enough to afford protection 
for all investors. Economic studies have shown that, where ambiguous 
information is revealed, the price adjusts slowly, and there may even be 
adjustments over several months.1285 It can never really be proved that 
someone dealt on the strength of such information. Hence a certain 
'precision' is already entailed in the concept of information which makes it 
unneccessary to complicate the definition. 
It follows from this approach that we do not have to consider issues such as 
whether the information is 'public' if it is contained in obscure journals. 
Information is generally pot public if the publishing requirements are not 
met. And that is an issue for the law on publishing requirements, not, 
however, for the insider trading provisions. The insider may, however, 
prove that the information was already 'made public' otherwise, and that he 
was therefore unable to realise a profit. 
1285 Carney op cit (Signalling and causation) at 882 fn 'ifl~ see the interesting overview of 
such studies given by Wang op cit ('Some arguments') at 364 f n 60 et seq. 
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C. Who is - and who should he an insid_etl 
We have seen that the three laws do not provide coherent definitions of the 
'insider'. It was argued that the main reason for this is a lack of conceptual 
clarity. In South Africa, for example, the company insider approach is still 
applied to a large extent. If, however, 'investor protection' is the declared 
goal of the legislation, why should the recipient of information have to 
know that the information was obtained through theft (eg in South Africa)? 
Why should the 'tipee' be prohibited to deal only if he is in possesssion of 
the information, but not when he is given a true tip (eg in Germany)? Why 
should the employee not be an insider when he steals information which has 
not previously be~n entrusted to him? Under the English provisions it is 
possible that such an employee would not be considered as an insider, if the 
courts maintain the former fiduciary requirement. In other words these 
provisions do not correspond to the intention of the law to cast the net 
widely enough and to protect the market. 
The South African definition of the insider was found to be the broadest in 
the sense that more persons are included as 'insiders' than under the other 
examined laws. Yet this definition is to a large extent based on the old 
fiduciary approach and is therefore in many aspects under-inclusive. 
Without a clear notion of the protected good, the courts are unable to 
distinguish between beneficial and non-beneficial trades, even though this 
distinction ought to be the ultimate criterion for conviction. Surely when 
the trade is beneficial, the market needs no protection. 
With regard to the German and English laws on insider trading, it is 
necessary to reconsider their attitude towards the situations where a person 
obtains the information through a wrongful act. The contribution of the 
German law to this debate is that it is essential to define the concept very 
precisely. All market participants, especially insiders, must understand what 
the essence of the crime is. Surely stealing of company information is a 
crime irrespective of whether or not it is used for insider trading. And 
because it is irrelevant for the market process whether the information was 
stolen, information obtained through a wrongful act should be included. It 
is suggested that a Model Code ought to include the thief in the insider 
definition. There is also the possibility that the thief sells the information to 
a professional dealer. If the thief is not regarded as an insider, the 
information might not stem from an inside source, and hence the 
professional dealer would not be caught as an insider. 
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A Model Code based on market protection should include in the insider 
definition: directors; managers; people who obtain information due to their · 
profession, either because they have access to it, or because they misuse 
their position and wrongfully obtain it; people who advise (legally, or 
financially) the company and get information through it. Also included 
should be shareholders, although empirical studiesl286 have furnished 
evidence that, with regard to insider trading, even large shareholders are 
less successful than executives. Generally, all the above also meet the 
additional criterion1287 of having certain responsibilities towards the 
market. If they lack such responsibilites the courts may acquit them. 
When companies opt out of the monitoring system, substantial shareholders 
must refrain from insider trading. Once they have agreed that insiders may 
trade in exchange for a reduced salary, the shareholders cannot be allowed 
to profit twice.1288 However, normally, the substantial shareholder gets 
some sort of remuneration for his control function in the company. It is 
therefore conceivable that there is a contract between the substantial 
shareholder and the other shareholders permitting him to deal on inside 
information. In that case his insider trading profits can be regarded as 
remuneration. 
A Model Code should also include as insiders those third parties who obtain 
information through a wrongful act other than theft (these are not included, 
for instance, by the Directive). Surely, alJ market professionals, such as 
research analysts, financial journalists, investment bankers or brokers 
should also be included, since they all have some kind of responsibilities 
towards stock and option markets. It goes without saying that tipees should 
also be included. Such 'recipients' of tips are the real parasites because they 
do not produce valuable information for the company. 




Seyhun op cit at 202-207. 
See above Part II, Chap 2, A, II. 
It has been argued herein that substantial shareholders should be allowed to profit for 
two reasons: firstly, their task of monitoring the management is beneficial to the 
other shareholders~ and secondly, they incur particular risks insofar as their 
investment is not diversified ( exposure to firm-specific risk). See Demsetz op cit at 
313-315~ for the opposite view see for instance Davidson/Solomon op cit (The 
agency origins of insider trading) at 88. 
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the previous paragraphs obtained information by mere coincidence, these 
persons ought not be held liable. A Model Code should provide a special 
defence taking into account the economic finding that investors are deterred 
only when they are systematically outpetformed. This is not the case when a 
person accidentally obtains one piece of information ( eg in the case of the 
barman). Such a person should be able to raise the defence that he was 
unable to outpetform the market on a regular basis. It is suggested that such 
a defence should apply only to the person himself, not, however, when this 
person passes the information on to someone who is able to use such 
information regularly, for instance a broker. In this case it is the broker 
who ought to be held liable for committing insider trading. The other 
person (ie the barman) may be held liable for aiding and abetting, not, 
however, for insider trading, because he cannot normally outpetform the 
market. 
Economic theory furnished good reasons why transactions and the passing 
on of the information by 'recipients' of tips or of information, need to be 
penalised. In terms of price effiency their (ie the ti pees~) trading 1s 
certainly less beneficial for the market than real insider dealing. It 
contributes far less to a correct pricing than insider trading itself. If 
anything, their trades are more likely to upset the balance of the market. A 
Model Code ougth to include them and prohibit their trading. 
What should happen to tipees in cases where the company opts out of the 
regulatory scheme? Sometimes, the insider in such a company does not have 
the financial means to exploit the information he produces. It is submitted 
that the insider should then be allowed to sell the information to such tipees. 
The recipient (tipee) would 'represent' the insider on the market, and the 
other market participants would still sometimes be able to decode the price 
or volume signals that are sent by his trades. 1289 For the shareholder it does 
not make much difference whether he trades with a company insider or a 
recipient, becaQse the cut in salary would remain the same, and the 
shareholder's profit would be increased in any event. The manager would 
have to share the profit with the tipee. Since the manager knows about his 
personal financial situation when he enters into the contract permitting him 
to trade, he can always raise this point during the negotiations. 
1289 Remember that it is not always necessary to know the identity of the trader in order 
to decode such signals. It may therefore be irrelevant who actually trades. 
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D. Offences and defences 
I. The offences 
The offences are twofold: the insider can either carry out direct 
transactions (dealing offence) or he can impart his inside information to 
another party (counselling and procuring offences). 
1. Dealing offences 
A Model Code ought to prohibit every type of insider trading on stock 
markets (ie in all securities, indices, options, futures, warrants) because 
they can all have a disturbing impact on the markets. This holds true 
irrespective of whether the deal is for the insider~ s personal account or the 
account of a third party. If the third party knows about the insider 
transaction, he ought to be held liable for aiding and abetting. The dealing 
prohibition should apply to both access insiders and recipients of 
information, since economic theory teaches us that their transactions can 
have the same effect on the price development. 
It follows from the examination of the three laws that 'dealing' ought to 
encompass all kinds of transfers of securities, rights or the creation and 
putting to an end of such rights1290. Any security can be affected by the 
information, even state bonds, the prices of which react to an increase in 
interest rates. Our examination of the three laws has revealed that their 
provisions try to define 'securities' in all-inclusive lists. This does not seem 
to be the right approach. The term 'securities' ought to include all securities 
which are traded on exchange floors, since it would really make no sense to 
exclude one or other security. Besides, the current list approach makes the 
prohibition unnessecarily long and complicated. A Model Code should 
crisply define securities as all traded securities. 
Our examination has also shown that it is a fundamental requirement of 
most insider trading laws that the dealing be based on the information. It 
seems that only the English law does not so require. The English provisions 
do, however, provide something similar. A defence is available where the 
insider can prove that he had not expected the information to yield a 
1290 See, for instance, s 55 (2) (b) and (3) (b) of the CJA 1993 in England. 
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profit.1291 From this we can conclude that an offence is commited only 
when the insider acted in view of a profit. Yet this formulation brings about 
a result very similar to the formulation 'dealing on the strength of 
information'. He who exploits information wants a gain, and he who expects 
a gain necessarily thinks that his particular information will yield a profit. 
It has to be noted though that the English formulation is favourable for the 
prosecution insofar as the circumstances giving rise to a defence must be 
proved by the accused. It is suggested that a Model Code ought to choose 
the English method. Once it is established that the insider was in possession 
of valuable inside information, he ought to be deemed to have made use of 
it in order to exploit it. It ought to be provided that an insider who traded 
while in possession of inside information has committed the dealing offence 
unless he can raise a defence. This is also in line with the above suggestion 
to limit the scope of potential 'inside information' to a small list of potential 
insider events. It would not appear undue to facilitate the task of the 
prosecution, since only major events are included in that list. 
2. Counselling; procuring the information; or encouraging 
others to deal 
None of the three examined laws extends all prohibitions to tipees who 
counsel or procure information. Under the market protection approach this 
is not consistent, because recipients of inside information represent the 
informational advantage which was originally conferred on the insider. The 
recipient does not seem to induce as much derivatively informed trading as 
the insider, since the market does not easily conclude from his transaction 
the existence of new information. Thus the recipient's transactions are less 
economically beneficial. The same reasoning applies to subtipees. It is 
therefore suggested that a Model Code should include all forms of 
counselling or procurin,g activities by recipients no matter how far they 
may be from the inside source. 
Another shortcoming revealed by the examination of the laws is that 
sometimes the recipient is required to come into posssession of the 
information itself (this is clearly the case under the German law). Yet the 
information is also exploited, where the transaction is based on a tip. Hence 
1291 See s 53 (1) (a) CJA 1993. 
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it is suggested that a Model Code should extend the prohibition and include 
tip-based transactions. 
A Model Code should also clarify that a tip ( or recommendation) is deemed 
to be based on the inside information where it can be established that the 
person who made the recommmendation was in possession of it at the time 
of the recommendation. The fact that a recommendation is about to be 
published, itself constitutes inside information, whether it is based on public 
information or not. The recommendation does not constitute an indictable 
offence, if, and only if, it is based exclusively on public information. The 
following f orrnulation is suggested for a Model Code: A recommendation is 
not based exclusively on public data if the person who made the 
recommendation was in possession of price-sensitive information. There 
would hence be an exemption only where no non-public information is 
involved in the recommendation at all. 
II. The defences 
The example of the English defences has revealed the extent to which the 
law can be influenced by special interest groups. Taking into account that 
the intention of the law is to protect the (small) investor and enhance his 
confidence in the functioning of the market, the kind of defences we find in 
the English law are clearly defective. 
Solely the defence for market makers is appropriate1292 because their duties 
are essential for the market. Trading in order to fulfil these duties should 
be exempted by a Model Code in order to avoid uncertainty amongst these 
professionals. There is also sufficient economic support for this view. 
Economic theory teaches us that information which is shared, and known to 
be shared, by two or more risk neutral market makers engaged in price 
competition, will be fully incorporated in their price quotes, and command 
no bid-ask premium.1293 Thus, provided market making is competitive, 
ordinary investors are protected by the quick dissemination of information 
amongst market makers. Regulation ought to take this economic finding 
into account. 
1292 See for examples 1 (1) (a) and (b) of Sched 1 of the CJA 1993 in England. 
1293 King/Roell op cit (Insider trading) at 169~ see also McVea op cit (Financial 
conglomerates) at 60 et seq. fn 108. 
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However, if the trading by a market maker is not 'professional', but occurs 
on his private behalf, it should to be prosecuted. In this case the market 
maker abuses his position. 
Our examination has revealed that it is good to exempt transactions which 
are effected for political and national economic purposes.1294 Exempting 
such transactions is sensible because by doing so the legislator creates the 
framework of political stability. We simply have to assume that 'State 
actions' are beneficial for those who have conferred their power on the 
State. If these actions are not in the interest of the public good, the State 
will lose legitimate power anyway. A Model Code should therefore include 
this exemption. 
It is doubtful whether one should provide a defence for transactions aimed 
at price stabilisation. We have seen that, if the insider prohibition works 
efficiently, disclosure of new data will result in major price shifts. Insider 
trading provisions implicitly say that sudden price shifts are welcome. If 
this is so, why it should be necessary to smooth the price adjustment prC>Cess 
in cases other than insider trading. From this point of view, a Model Code 
should not exempt price stabilisation from the insider trading prohibitions. 
1294 See, for instance, Article 2 para 4 of the European Directive on insider dealing. 
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E. Appropriate sanctions 
The final issue which has to be dealt with is what sanctions are appropriate 
for the offences committed. This is indeed a most complex problem.1295 As 
highlighted above, insider dealing regulation has an impact on market 
efficiency. This holds also true for the problem of appropriate sanctions. It 
is important to take into account economic models that explain the economic 
consequences of certain sanctions. 
In theory, the 'appropriate' sanction ought to contain an optimal mix of 
certainty of conviction and severity of punishment to minimise the social 
loss of crime.1296 Individuals react to changes in both variables, ie to the 
loss (eg imprisonment) they incur if they are caught, and to the probability 
of being caught and punished.1297 Over the years we have noted a constant 
increase of sanctions without more success in combatting insider trading. It 
seems that the sanctions have been increased qraconically because most 
insiders were not caught. If the probability of being caught is zero, the 
mathematical equation is also zero in the sense that the deterrent effect of 
the sanction has failed, regardless of the severity of the punishment. 
Three possibilities for an appropriate sanction have been mooted. The first 
is that the insider should account to the company. The drawbacks are 
obvious: the company does not normally suffer losses from insider 
trading1298, so why should the company profit from insider trading 
although such trading is not allowed. And where the insider is a substantial 
shareholder and permitted to trade on inside information, he would benefit 
either from insider trading or from the redistribution of the insider gain to 
the company; thus he would be left with a net profit on his dealing. 1299 This 
remedy cannot be appropriate. 
The second possibility is that the other party to the contract should be given 







White, 'Towards a policy basis', (1974) 90 Law Quarterly Review 494 at 507. 
From a South African perspective Botha (The economics of the crime) at 145 et seq. 
Botha, idem at 149. 
NB: The insider trading issue is of course different from the liability of directors' for 
projects in South African and English law. 
White op cit at 502. 
White, idem at 502. 
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approach has already been rejected in the subsection which dealt with the 
sanctions provided by the South African law (cf above p. _304 ~!- -~eq.). 
The third possibility is the one that currently prevails ie the criminal 
sanction. This type of sanction is consistent with the idea of market 
protection because the functioning of the market is a public good. What a 
Model Code needs to determine is the maximum penalty to be imposed. 
Another possible sanction imposed by the courts is banning the insider from 
! the exercise of his professional occupation. In this regard the recent English 
case R v Goodman1301 is paradigmatic. It must be borne in mind, though, 
that the case was decided under the old Company Securities Act 1985. The 
most serious sanction applied to Mr Goodman was under s2 of the Company 
Disqualification Act 1986 (CDA), banning him from being associated with 
the management of a company for a period of ten years. The 1985 CSA 
required the insider to have a defined connection with the company. Mr 
Goodman, a chartered accountant and former chairman of a public 
company, was convicted of insider trading. He had avoided a loss of 
approximately Llm when selling shares ahead of bad news. The first 
problem which arose from the facts was whether the offence had been 
committed 'in connection' with the management. It was held that the test to 
determine if the offence was 'in connection with the ... management ... of a 
company' for the purposes of s 2(1) of the CDA is whether the offence had 
some relevant factual 13oz connection with the management, and not1303 
whether the offence· related to the management of 'a company', eg filing 
returns, or had been committed 'in the course' of managing a company .1304 
As we have seen above, the CJA 1993 does not require that insiders have a 
connection with the corporation, and the ref ore this connection is no longer 
an element of the crime. 'Fhus, for a contravention of the insider dealing 
prohibition, the insider does not even need to have that 'factual' connection 
with the company which is required for a disqualification order. 





[1994] 1 BCLC at 349. 
My emphasis. 
Cf 'Disconnecting insiders'-Comment, 15 Comp Lawy 1994 at 130. The author of 
the comment hopes that the decision by the Court of Appeal will remain good law. 
R v Goodman, [1994] 1 BCLC 349. 
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director ( or some other 'classical insider'), did not preclude the 1986 
Disqualification Act from applying to him. On the other hand, if the CDA 
is applicable to directors in general, why should it not be applicable where 
the director is sentenced under the insider legislation? The new law brought 
about an extension of the insider-definition, not a narrowing of the CDA. 
Disqualifications for insiders raise the question of the conceptual basis of 
the prohibition. The rationale of the new law in England (and in Germany) 
is the protection of the market, and much less, if at all, the protection of the 
company. Thus, arguably, there is no justification to exclude an insider 
from management tasks only because he contravened the insider provisions. 
At the very least, the particular sanction imposed in the Goodman case 
seems disproportionate because Mr Goodman was excluded for 10 years 
from professional duties. After all, the question whether or not insider 
trading is beneficial, remains unanswered. 
The intention of the Disqualification Act is to protect companies and not to 
punish insiders. Mr Goodman's breach of the law has been atoned for after 
his 18 months' imprisonment,13°5 and there was no need to keep him away 
from his profession for so much longer. The market is protected well 
enough when Mr Goodman is prohibited from trading in it. We should 
agree to such a ruling only in cases of serious crimes ( eg selling weapons to 
a crisis area) where the convicted person is found to be morally unworthy 
of representing a company's management. With regard to insider trading, 
on the other hand, it is not even certain whether such trading is socially 
harmful. As far as deterrence is concerned the Goodman decision may 
prove quite efficient, but it does not seem to be fair and equitable. 
A Model provision ought to provide for disqualification orders only if the 
majority of the monitored companies desire this sanction. The reason for 
this is that such disqualifications reflect a good deal of company protection. 
It is also suggested that the disqualification should not exceed 3 years 
(excluding the time of imprisonment). 
An optimal sanction equals the harm (eg a fine), properly increased for the 
chance of not being detected, plus the variable enforcement cost of 
1305 9 Months served and the balance was suspended, see R v Goodman [1994] 
2 BCLC 349 at 350. 
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imposing the fine.1 306 As far as insider trading is concerned, we certainly 
have a low probability of detection. It is therefore necessary to increase the 
maximum sanction in order to make up for the inefficient detection. 
The lawyer must also take into consideration certain general legal 
principles. What might appear acceptable from a purely economic view, 
need not necessarily be acceptable for a legal provision. It is suggested that 
the principle of proportion sets a limitation on the severity of both fine and 
imprisonment. The South African legislation has taken things rather far. 
Imprisonment for a maximum period of 10 years is imposed for 
kidnapping or sometimes for homicide. 1307 This is a gross exaggeration as 
far as insider trading is concerned, however central the role of the 
protected capital market might be. 
It does not seem acceptable to put a limit to the fine ( eg in the South 
African law), given that sometimes the gains from insider trading are 
extremely high. 1308 In cases where the profits are so immense that even the 
maximum fine which is conceived as a 'ceiling', would not create an 
appropriate sanction, the courts could still impose imprisonment. This, 
however, would mean a loss of flexibility. It is suggested that no ceiling be 
put on the fine, but that provisions should be made for a fine which may be 
up to three times as high as the gains which the insider realised. This is also 
a sufficient deterrent. A weakness of this approach is that in situations 
where the insider encourages others to deal or discloses the information the 
courts would lack a parameter that would help determine a proportionate 
fine. Since the person who passes on the information cannot foresee how 
much the actual dealer gains, there should be a ceiling fine for such cases. 
Another alternative would be to impose fines, as like under the German 
StGB, which are proportionate both to the severity of the criminal act and 
the persona,l financial situation of the wrongdoer. An example of this is a 
case where a fine is imposed which is equivalent to the income which the 
convicted normally earns in the space of 180 days. 
1306 Polinsky and Shaven. 'Enforcement costs and the optimal magnitude and probability 
of fines', (1992) 35 Journal of Law and Economy at 133. 
130? Still. the King Report op cit at 31 suggests that the maximum statutory sanction 
should be imprisonment from two to ten years. That seems exaggerated. 
1308 Jooste op cit at 599. 
345 
A Model Code ought to provide that money obtained through committing 
the offence be retained by the prosecuting authorities. These gains should in 
turn be used to finance the public body which monitors the stock exchange. 
Certain authors1309 have suggested that a duty be imposed on every manager 
and director to report all buyings and sellings in their companies' shares. 
This, of course, is not a sanction, but a Model Code may still provide for a 
sanction in case the duty is not fulfilled. Yet there is no evidence 
whatsoever that such reporting duties actually deter insider trading.1310 The 
lack of empirical evidence in support of the suggestion is not surprising. If 
one considers early attempts to combat insider dealing ( eg in the English 
and South African law) it becomes obvious that such reporting duties are 
not an effective preventative measure. Insiders can always act through third 
parties and thus escape those reporting duties. 
Having examined both economic and legal aspects of insider trading, it is 
now time to put the pieces together and make suggestions for a Model Code 
which incorporates modem economic theory as well as the results of the 
legal analysis in Part Two of the present study. 
1309 
1310 
For the point of view of a German economist see Schneider op cit (Wider 
Insiderhandelsverbot) at 1435. 
Schomer op cit at 181 et seq. 
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Chapter III: Suggestions for a Model Code 
The following suggestions for a Model Code incorporate the findings from 
both economic analysis and comparative examination. Our intention is to 
combine regulatory and de-regulatory aspects, thus opening up a pluralistic 
approach to insider trading. Technically, there is also the question of where 
the insider trading legislation should be contained. Since it is suggested to 
base an Insider Code on the market protection approach, the provisions 
should rather not be contained within the Companies Act. Also, it should be 
made clear that the prohibition not only relates to shares, but also to other 
financial instruments. 1311 It is, however, not necessary to enact a separate 
'Insider Trading Act', but it would be sufficient to include the relevant 
provisions in the Stock Exchange Act. 
I. Suggestions for the preamble to a Model Code 
Firstly, the preamble to a Model Code ought to say something about the 
economic uncertainty that still prevails in insider trading. It is suggested 
that the preamble should make it clear that the law needs to accept this 
uncertainty and grant several options for companies. It should also be 
mentioned that the law needs to be reviewed as soon as new empirical data 
about the economic pros and cons of insider trading becomes available. The 
options granted by the Code .should be that companies can either allow or 
disallow their insiders to trade. This means that firms can 'opt out' of the 
legal prohibition. If they do, their shares will not be monitored for insider 
activities. Insider trading is no longer prohibited per se. 
Surely firms can also 'opt in' which means that their insiders commit an 
offence when trading on non-public information. The prohibition is 
intended to enhance the functioning of securities markets (market protection 
approach). The prohibitions therefore apply to transactions only when these 
are effected in impersonal and regulated markets. When such trades are 
effected on the account of a juristic person, the individuals who acted on 
behalf of this juristic person shall be liable. Face-to-face transactions do not 
fall under this regime. 
Secondly, the preamble ought to give some guidance with regard to the 
1311 See King Task Group Report op cit at 43. 
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definition of the insider. This definition must be in line with the intention to 
protect the market. One should take into account that persons, even though 
they may have been in possession of inside information, cannot commit the 
insider dealing offence when they do not owe any duties for the functioning 
of the market. Only people with duties of that kind should be regarded as 
insiders by the courts. It is suggested that the Courts must es~blish that the 
effected transaction was likely to cause harm to the market. If there was no 
possible damage to the market the public good which the law intends to 
protect was in no danger. Hence no offence is committed. 
II. Suggestions for individual provisions 
Deregulation 
Above all, a Model Code should clarify that shares are monitored only 
when companies apply to the supervisory body of the Stock Exchange for 
monitoring, and pay a certain fee towards this service. 
To this effect a Model Code ought to allow companies to 'opt out' of the 
prohibition of insider trading. Insiders would then be allowed to deal on the 
strength of inside information or sell the information. It is suggested that 
companies should be required to insert their decision in the articles of 
incorporation. It is also suggested that there ought to be some contractual 
agreement between the company and its directors, managers, or other high-
ranked employees. It should be provided in these contractual agreements 
that the insider is allowed to deal on inside information in exchange for a 
reduction in his managerial remuner~tion. It is also suggested that such 
contracts should provide that insiders are prohibited to sell stock or go 
short in the shares of their company (ie enter into a sale where they do not 
yet possess the stock) ahead of bad news. 
Companies have to inform the Stock Exchange supervisory body of these 
contractual agreements. The securities issued by those companies are not 
monitored for reasons of insider dealing. If those companies wish their 
securities to be monitored on behalf of information exogenous to the 
company, they must contribute to the monitoring costs according to a 
payment scheme which should be developed by the Stock Exchange. 
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The Offence 
A Model Code ought to define the offence in a clear way. It is suggested 
that any person who is in possession of inside information or has knowledge 
of a recommendation which is based on inside information is guilty of an 
offence, if he discloses the information or the recommendation or deals in 
any security, right, option, contract, or derivative that may be affected by 
the information. The definition ought to be broad in that it assumes a link 
of causality between having the information and committing the offence. 
This makes it necessary on the other hand to limit the scope of inside 
information to major events. 
The term 'deal' ought to be broad enough to cover all forms of indirect 
trading, too. A Model Code should therefore provide that a person 'deals' 
when he, either himself or through any other person who acts on his behalf, 
acquires or disposes of securities, rights, options or derivatives, or enters 
into a contract which creates a right or a security or a derivative, or brings 
to an end such a right or contract or derivative. 
It is also suggested that a person should be held guilty of an offence if he 
recommends or procures any other person to deal, or disclose, or 
recommend to another person that he deal, disclose, or recommend, before 
that information is published in accordance with the publishing 
requirements. 
New information is incorporated in the share price on all international 
markets once it has been published in one country. It is therefore suggested 
that the insider does not commit an offence if the information has been 
published in accordance with the publishing requirements of a market in 
another country prior to his dealing. 
Given the importance of certain market activities for the functioning of the 
market it is suggested that a person does not commit an offence if his 
trading is effected in the proper performance of his professional duties, in 
his function as a market maker, or in the pursuit of monetary or other 
policies on behalf of a public sector body. 
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Inside Information 
Following on from our analysis, a Model Code should not try to define 
inside information in purely abstract terms. Instead, it is suggested that 
information is relevant for the insider trading prohibition when it appears 
on a list provided in the Act. At the risk of not catching some insider 
traders becaqse the information they use is not (yet) on the list, the gain will 
be much more security concerning the scope of the offence. 
A Model Code ought to include at least information about the following 
facts, events, undertakings, and organisational measurements: 
Company Information: 
- Take-overs; fusions; mergers; forthcoming offers and bids in relation to 
take-overs, fusions or mergers; management buy-outs; 
- Changes in the share capital of a company; resale of shares; 
- Earning announcements; substantial strikes in mineral ore; contracts 
which substantially increase or decrease the earning power of the company, 
or the ending of such contracts; new product lines. 
Market Information: 
- Change in taxes imposed on companies; 
- Embargo or lift of embargo on products of a company or companies (the 
latter being sectoral market information; 
- Change in the general interest rate by the Federal Reserve Bank; 
- Recommendations to sell or buy securities even if such recommendations 
are based exclusively on public data. 
- Identity of traders and trade volumes on securities markets. 
It is suggested that, where the word 'substantial' is used iii connection with 
earning power of a company it should mean 3% or more. In cases where 
the percentage is smaller the burden ought to be on the prosecution to 
establish that the insider nevertheless acted on the basis of the information. 
Surely economic research will reveal in future that other types of 
information are also relevant for the prohibition. A Model Code ought to 
provide for a potential enlargement of the above list. When empirical 
evidence is furnished that another type of information does usually change 
investors' expectations, the Minister should be allowed to add this type of 
information to the list. 
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Defences 
We have seen that some market activities such as trades by market makers 
in the normal course of their ~rofessional transactions ought to be 
exempted. Yet economic theory has shown that some other insider 
transactions do not harm the functioning of the market either. A Model 
Code should therefore provide some further defences. It is suggested that 
the accused ought to prove the existence of special circumstances that give 
rise to such a defence on the balance of probabilities. 
A person should not be guilty of an offence if he had no connection to the 
market. Such a connection may also be absent in situations where the person 
does neither act in his national market nor recommends to trade in it. A 
person should also not be guilty of an offence if he did not act on the 
strength of inside information, although he was aware of it. 
We have seen that the element of substantiality is difficult to define. A 
Model Code ought to take this into account and provide a defence in cases 
where the accused can prove that he did reasonably believe that the 
information was not price relevant. A Model Code could, for instance, 
formulate that 'a person is not guilty of an offence, if, although the 
substantiality requirement of the information is met, the insider had 
reasonable cause to believe that the event was nonetheless not likely to cause 
a change in investors' expectations about the assets of the company'. 
One of the most important lessons to learn from economic th~ory is that, 
due to secondarily informed trading, the price impact of the information 
can happen long before the information is actually published. If the price 
potential of the information has been used before the insider trades, there is 
no reason to punish the insider, because he cannot harm the functioning of 
the market. Thus a Model Code ought to provide that a person is not guilty 
of an offence, if, at the time of the alleged dealing or disclosing the 
potential price impact of the inf orrhation was already reflected in the price 
of the security. 
351 
Sanctions 
Our study has shown that it can be useful to combine imprisonment and 
fines in order to create a deterrent effect. We have also seen that, if the 
sanction is a fine, this fine must be in proportion to the gain the insider has 
made. A Model Code ought to provide that a person convicted of the . 
trading offence is sentenced to a fine not exceeding three times the amount 
of the profit which resulted from the offence, or to imprisonment not 
exceeding a period of three years of imprisonment, or both. 
Moreover, a Model Code ought to take into consideration some general 
princi pies of how to apply sanctions. It should provide that the Courts must 
take into account the severity of the offence, the profit which resulted from 
the offence, and also the financial situation of the convicted. 
Last not least a Model Code ought to take into account that insider trades on 
Stock Exchanges represent only a small part of the daily turnover. In order 
not to affect the rest of the trades, it is suggested that no transaction on the 
Stock Exchange should be void or voidable by reason only of the fact that it 
was based on inside information. 
Supervision 
A Model Code ought to address the issues of supervision and detection. It is 
suggested that the supervisory body of the Stock Exchange should develop a 
set of rules concerning detection devices with regard to insider trading. 
These rules ougth to provide that all trading activites in securities of an 
issuer must be examined after important information has been published, 
unless companies have informed the authorities of their choice not to have 
their shares monitored. 
The supervisory body of the Stock Exchange ought to develop within three 
months of the coming into force of the provisions a payment scheme 
according to which companies that wish their shares to be monitored pay 
fees for the monitoring services. The payment scheme ought to take into 
account the number of shares of a company which are regularly traded, the 
number of presumed insiders in that company, the volatility of the share or 
option prices of that company; the branch of industry; the occurance of 
insider trading in the securities of the issuer, and the average frequency of 




/ This thesis has pursued the idea that insider trading is not a problem of 
' 'fairness', but instead one of efficiency on securities markets. There is no 
convincing economic model which accurately explains whether insider 
trading causes benefits or losses to investors. Any fairness approach to 
insider dealing ought the ref ore to be discarded. 
fndeed, given the economic uncertainty surrounding insider dealing, it is 
unclear whether insider trading restrictions should be imposed at all. 
Economically, there is neither evidence that insiders outperform the 
market, nor that they cause harm to individual investors. Their trades do 
not result in price changes, because demand curves on stock markets are 
elastic. If there is price movement, it is caused by 'signalled' trading. 
Signals (ie price, volume of trades by insiders, and their identity) are 
decoded by other traders which helps incorporate new information into 
prices before announcement. From this perspective insider trading can be 
beneficial for the allocative functions of the market. 
We have seen that it is not self evident that insider trading is immoral. It 
could even be argued that insider trading is moral, if it fosters market 
efficiency. It has therefore been suggested that insider trading prohibitions 
should not be based on the alleged immorality of such trading. 
Insider trading does, however, involve some redistributional effects of 
wealth. The economic analysis yielded the conclusion that it is uncertain 
whether or not regulation of insider trading is beneficial for the parties 
involved in the redistributional process. Several economic theories suggest 
that deregulation would indeed be better. Based on these findings a 
'democratic market approach' was suggested which combines both 
regulation (monitoring) and de-regulation (companies may opt out and 
allow their insiders to trade). 
It was suggested that the law should allow firms to opt out of the regulatory 
system, allowing their shareholders and insiders to redefine the 
distributional effects of insider trading within the contractual nexus of the 
company. This agency approach ought to be permitted by the law because it 
allows principals (ie shareholders) and their agents (ie the management) to 
negotiate their interests in each individual company. That would help 
reduce transaction costs ( eg for monitoring) and bring conflicting interests 
into balance. 
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Economic research also evidences that insider trading helps to reflect 
information more accurately in prices, and thus enhances the efficiency of 
the pricing in securities markets. Given that monitoring insider activities is 
costly, it does not seem indispensable to restrict such trading. Instead, the 
law could rely on the effectiveness of contractual relations between 
shareholders and managers allowing the latter to trade on inside 
information in exchange for a reduction in salary. It has also been suggested 
that, given a residual risk-averseness on the part of the managerial staff, it 
is advisable to agree on a reduction in salary which does not equal the 
expected gains from insider trading. It was argued that these contracts can 
result in a more appropriate redistribution of wealth, because the actual 
producers of valuable information would profit from trading, rather than 
the securities industry people. 
It was submitted that, although some commentators think it might be 
difficult to determine the exact amount of such a reduction in rewards, this 
problem is best left open to negotiation between the parties involved. It was, 
however, found to be preferable to allow insider trading only on strength 
of positive information. This would seem to be necessary in order to 
prevent moral hazard problems. 
It was argued that at present insider dealing prohibitions serve the interests 
of people working in the securities markets industry, particularly in 
England, but also in Germany, though to a lesser extent. Shareholders 
should recognise that they can be outperformed by market professionals, 
and not only by classical insiders. Instead of moulding provisions in the 
interests of a certain groups, all interests should be balanced. To this effect 
private negotiation should be allowed in order to establish the real 
preferences of shareholders, companies, and management. 
If shareholders do not wish that their firms 'opt out', the law should 
prohibit only well defined situations in which informational imbalances are 
exploited by persons who owe some kind of duty to the securities markets. 
It was further suggested that companies which prefer their shares to be 
monitored for insider trading should be required to pay for this monitoring 
service. Since we do not know whether insider trading is detrimental, it is 
inappropriate to make the taxpayer pay for this type of transaction costs. 
In order to better understand the legal implications of insider trading, three 
laws were examined at length, namely the South African, the English and 
the German insider laws. Their provisions are in some ways representative 
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for the present situation in most countries where insider dealing is debated. 
It was found that restrictions placed on insider trading are based on the 
semi-strong form of the hypothesis of informationally efficient markets ie 
that only published information is reflected in the share price. This 
hypothesis is, however, contestable. Thus even the basis of the regulation is 
uncertain. This adds to the economic doubts. 
It was argued that it would be best to provide a legal solution which takes 
into account both regulation and de-regulation. This method would grant 
the greatest number of alternatives to market participants. Hence 
prohibitions still need to be formulated. 
Thus it is still necessary to determine the best possible definitions for 
insider trading prohibitions. The examination turned to the components of 
the three insider trading laws. It was found that, with regard to the key 
element of 'inside information', all prohibitions place restrictions only on 
dealings ahead of major events. This legal approach seems to be based on 
the hypothesis that both outsiders and the market are harmed only where 
insider profits are high and obvious. For this purpose, all three laws limit 
the prohibition, in on~ way or another, to 'material' information. 
However, the formulations used eg 'likely to materially affect prices' are 
likely to create much uncertainty amongst investors. Many suggestions for a 
more precise determination of 'material' have been made in Germany, 
where the doctrine , of the 'objective wording' places a limit on the 
interpretation of penal law statutes. The only thing of which we can be 
certain is that, economically, it is erroneous to try to determine 
'materiality' according to actual price shifts that occur on release of the 
information. It was submittted that the correct approach is to list certain 
major events, including some market information (not encompassed by the 
current South African law). It was recommended that the South African 
prohibition should be extended in this respect. It was also suggested that 
trading should be restricted only where it can be established that the trader 
is in possession of listed information. 
In terms of the 'market protection' approach, the definition of inside 
information should be narrowed so as to include only few very important 
items of company and market information. This would also reflect 
economic theory which demands clear-cut definition in order to grant 
maximum freedom. 
Another problem was to determine when the relevant information becomes 
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'public'. In this respect the examined laws were found to differ 
considerably. In South Africa, the moment when information becomes 
public is particularly uncertain. This leads to economically harmful results. 
Either important investors abstain from trading because of possible 
allegations of insider trading, with the result that the market's liquidity is 
reduced, or, traders act quickly and avail themselves of general or special 
defences. 
The English law provides a great number of such defences. It was found 
that these defences, ( as well as the debatable provision of many exceptional 
circumstances under which information 'may' be treated as public), reveal 
that the law was moulded under influences which originated, not from the 
legislator, but from the financial services industry. Given that all public 
information is almost instantaneously reflected in prices, there is no need 
for an extra 'digestion' time as provided by the South African law. Such 
extra time is a vain attempt to maintain the now discarded approach of 
small investor protection. 
It was suggested that information ought to be regarded as 'public' as soon as 
it is published according to the publication requirements, or when it 
becomes available on the Stock Exchange via ticker tape. No extra time for 
the information to be absorbed by market participants should be given. 
It was further argued that other additional elements in the definition of 
information such as 'specific' (in England) or 'precise' (in the European 
Directive) are superfluous. They should be discarded. 
'Investor protection' was evaluated as a conceptual basis to insider dealing 
regulation. The main issue for which a conceptual basis became relevant 
was the question of how to define the insider. It was suggested that the 
current provisions defining insiders are altogether defective. All three 
examined laws have discarded the fiduciary approach which defined the 
insider by means of his connection with a company. It was submitted that 
this is correct because many people other than company insiders are likely 
to trade on inside information, and most of these people are not bound by 
fiduciary duties eg bankers, advisors or lawyers. 
Yet no new criterion has so far been introduced to replace the old 
approach. It was suggested that the courts should be given discretion to 
develop certain criteria, such as 'market responsibility', which would help 
determine whether a person should be convicted. In general, any person 
who is in possession of information contained in the submitted list, should 
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be regarded as a potential insider. The law should, however, grant the 
courts sufficient discretion to develop through case law the notion of 
'market duty'. A person who has no duties towards the market cannot cause 
harm, because he cannot regularly outperform other market participants 
(eg someone who coincidentally overhears a conversation between two 
executives). Such persons should therefore not be convicted as insiders. If 
they steal information on someone else's behalf ( or pass the information on 
to an insider) they should rather be held liable for aiding and abetting. 
It was further suggested that the issue of 'tipees' is not properly addressed 
by the three laws. Either counselling is not banned (in South Africa), or the 
recipient of a tip can freely trade because the law requires that he must be 
in possession of the information itself (in England and Germany). 
Economically, however, tipee-trading was found to be one of the crucial 
issues. If insiders trade, the process of reflecting information in prices is 
enhanced through derivatively informed trading. Tipees, however, do not 
convey as much trading information to the market. Their trading is 
therefore less beneficial than trading by 'real' insiders. If restrictions are to 
be imposed, they should address tipee dealing in particular. 
Next, the issue of defences was dealt with. It was found that defences need 
be available only in situations where the insider did not intend to exploit 
informational imbalances, which was found to be the actus reus of the 
crime. The insider may also avail himself of some general defences, for 
instance, that he did not act on the strength of information (which should 
normally be inferred from the fact that he traded while in possession of the 
relevant information). It was submitted that market makers should be 
exempted. There is, however, no need to create many sophisticated defences 
in order to deepen pre-existing redistributional errors. 
Finally, the question of appropriate sanctions was considered. It was 
suggested that the appropriate sanction is a criminal one, which may be 
accompanied by a disqualification from certain business functions. It was, 
however, argued that it is pointless to provide civil remedies against 
insiders. Sanctions should be imposed equally on source insiders and 
recipients of information, because secondarily informed ('ti pee') trading 
does not convey sufficient trading information to other investors, and thus 
results in weaker price efficiency than trading effected by primary insiders. 
Given that market protection, allocation of capital, and the pricing of stock 
are public goods, and given that insider dealing as such probably causes no 
harm to individual investors, the only sanction which seems appropriate is 
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the criminal sanction. It was submitted that the civil remedy created by the 
South African law is a wrong way of trying to cope with insider trading. It 
is also very unlikely that a civil court would unvei11312 indictable offences 
which have been committed, if they have neither been detected by the stock 
exchange supervisory body nor by the public prosecutor. The onus of proof 
is lighter in civil law. But, since probably no investor is individually 
harmed when he trades with an insider, the lighter onus of proof does not 
really help and is therefore of no practical significance. 
Provided that the principle of proportionality is respected with regard to 
the period of disqualification, the criminal sanction could be accompanied 
by a disqualification order where the convicted is a director or a manager 
of a company. The English case law reveals that such sanctions are likely to 
contribute to the deterrent effect. Here again we should bear in mind that, 
at the current stage, the economic basis of insider trading is uncertain. It 
was the ref ore suggested that sanctions, especially imprisonment and 
disqualifications, should be imposed with great care. 
Having considered both economic and legal implications, and having based 
them on a new democratic approach towards insider trading, suggestions 
were made for a Model Code. 
1312 See, however, for an improved system of information-gathering in civil procedures 
Khama, 'Corporate criminal liability: What purpose does it senre?'; Hanrard Law 
Review, May 1996, vol 109, 1477 at 1520. 
